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ABSTRACT
Since the early 2000s, there has been a sharp increase in speculations that China’s 
development trajectory may provide a model for other developing countries—particularly 
those in Africa—to follow, and that this poses a profound challenge to the dominant global 
development paradigm.  A highly-charged media and policy debate has increasingly made its 
way into the academic literature, with central questions focusing around the lessons that 
African and developing countries are drawing from China and around the desirability of such 
emulation.  Due to the exploratory and recent nature of this growing literature, however, very 
few studies have been sufficiently grounded in empirical or theoretical analysis. 
This dissertation seeks to remedy this situation by examining the ideational influence 
of China’s development on those ultimately charged with evaluating and implementing these 
purported ‘models’: developing country elites.  Drawing on the theories of cross-societal 
emulation (Westney 1987) and lesson-drawing (Rose 1991), it finds that elites in two 
countries cases—Ethiopia and Kenya—indeed seek to emulate countries in East Asia. 
China, however, is viewed as only one source of potential ‘lessons’, and its elites often 
embed its experiences within a wider East Asian development trajectory.  In both country 
cases, this emulation challenges many of the assumptions that have driven development 
since the 1970s.  Unlike the Washington Consensus, the development paradigm prompted by 
this lesson-drawing is historically-contingent and views nation-building by a strong, 
visionary political leadership as the country’s single most important priority.  Because it 
favours large physical infrastructure projects, rapid economic growth, technologically-
optimistic solutions and a civilisatory discourse, its divergence from the more recent 
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‘Augmented’ Washington Consensus is even more striking.  In these and in other central 
lessons drawn, the development approach it most resembles, in fact, is the modernisation 
theory of the 1950s and 1960s.
Despite the fact that both Kenya and Ethiopia thus possess modernising elites that 
seek to emulate aspects of the East Asian experience, different dynamics drive the process in 
each national context.  In Ethiopia, a country slowly emerging from a history of communism 
and isolationism, a strong and ideologically unified ruling party looks to China, South Korea 
and other countries with a history of strong state intervention.  In Kenya, by contrast, a 
coalition of business leaders, technocrats and planners view Singapore and Malaysia as 
potential models by virtue of a shared colonial history and divergent post-colonial path. 
Kenya’s vision, whilst more moderate, is also more constrained due to the relative lack of 
influence its modernisers wield in the political process.  In both cases, historical factors 
bound and condition elites’ choice of model.
The emerging literature on the ‘Chinese Model’ of development deserves credit for 
beginning to theoretically and empirically substantiate an important current policy debate, 
but it also vastly underestimates the importance of its predecessors.  Given the extent to 
which Ethiopian and Kenyan elites root their emulation in the region as a whole, the East 
Asian ‘developmental state’ model is one such fore-runner.  Most importantly, however, this 
emulation illustrates the enduring topicality of many of the assumptions of modernisation 
theory—assumptions that are likely to play a central role in informing African and even 
global development paradigms in the future.  
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A NOTE ON THE DEATH OF MELES ZENAWI
On 20 August, 2012, on the eve of this dissertation's completion, it was announced that 
Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi had passed away after a period of illness.  Given the 
central role played by Meles in steering the policy and ideological direction of the EPRDF 
and, by extension, the country as a whole, this development will almost certainly have an 
impact on the issues covered in this study.  
	
 Due to the very recent nature of this event, I have been unable to incorporate its 
implications into my analysis.  The political direction that Ethiopia is likely to take in future 
remains highly uncertain at the time of writing, and long-term prospects will undoubtedly 
take some time to emerge.  I remain confident, however, in my analysis of Ethiopia's 
emulation of East Asia under Meles' rule; I also believe that the impact of this emulation will 
outlive the former Prime Minister, regardless of Ethiopia's overall future political direction.
	
 Ethiopia's Acting Prime Minister at the time of this dissertation's submission was 
Hailemariam Desalign.  As chief whip of the EPRDF-led parliament during my period of 
primary research in Addis Ababa in 2010, Hailemariam was one of the elites I interviewed 
for this dissertation.  His and Meles' original positions are retained in the body of the text, 
with new positions noted in footnotes only where deemed relevant.
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'In my head, I've got practically everything mapped out – if you give me ten years, I will give 
you South Korea.'
- Senior official, Ministry of Information, Kenya (KG9)
‘The issue of adopting and implementing the East Asian developmental model in Ethiopia 
today may be not only a possible alternative developmental paradigm that will offer us a 
much needed uplift in the direction of fast economic and social development but will also 
provide us a golden opportunity of fulfilling the age-old dream of our forebears.’
- Former Ethiopian Ambassador to South Africa (Tesfaye 2007)
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INTRODUCTION
If ideas about development can be said to have ‘tipping points’—moments when their 
hitherto-limited expression reaches a critical threshold and begins to spread exponentially—
the 'Chinese Model’s' own such moment surely came in May 2004.  On the 26th and 27th of 
that month, over a thousand developing policy-makers gathered in Shanghai to share best 
practices and lessons in poverty reduction.  The ‘Scaling Up Poverty Reduction’ conference 
marked the culmination of a year-long ‘learning process’ sponsored by the World Bank and 
hosted by the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).1  The conference may 
have covered a dozen country case studies and numerous cross-national thematic cases, but 
all eyes returned again and again to the development experiences of one country in particular
—that of China.  ‘The conference venue in Shanghai is symbolic of the progress that China 
has made in lifting 400 million people out of poverty since 1981’ wrote the World Bank 
(2004: 16) of the event, explaining that ‘China’s willingness to share its experiences led to 
the idea of inviting policymakers and people working on poverty programs in other 
developing countries to learn from each other’.  China’s example was a theme that then-
President James D. Wolfensohn (2004) returned to in his closing address:  ‘We've had the 
remarkable opportunity to look at China, which is a particular experience in itself.    How 
could we have found a place to deal with scaling up that was more an example of scale than 
China itself?’ 
	
 The same month also saw the birth of the term 'the Beijing Consensus' in a 
provocative working paper of the same name, written by Goldman Sachs advisor Joshua 
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1 Hereafter simply ‘China’.
Cooper Ramo (2004).  Ramo’s assertion that China’s post-reform development experiences 
were transforming global development practices by encouraging imitation in areas as far 
afield as Africa and Latin America has, in the years that followed, sparked a wave of 
discussion in the media and in policy fora.  Much of this has come from traditional donors 
and from the West.  At the 2007 African Union Summit, United Nations (UN) Secretary-
General Ban Ki Moon (2007) expressed the ‘hope that African leaders and African countries 
will also try to emulate the Chinese experience and economic development and policies, 
bringing about good governance and the importance of partnership with the outside world’. 
The Economist magazine has hosted an online debate on the motion that ‘China offers a 
better development model than the West’ (Economist 2010b), an article in the International 
Herald Tribune has cited lesson-drawing from China as one of the key motivations 
underpinning current diplomatic relations between China and Africa (Zhang 2006) and the 
Financial Times has named developing-country emulation of China ‘the biggest ideological 
threat the west has felt since the end of the cold war’ (Leonard 2005).  
	
 A host of countries and regions have been proposed as likely recipients for Chinese-
inspired development policies and practices, but sub-Saharan Africa has come in for 
particular attention, with everything from Zimbabwe’s slum clearances (McLaughlin and 
Truscott 2005) to South Africa’s use of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to boost employment 
(Herskovitz 2011) attributed to the phenomenon.  Africa, then, is often held to be ‘the BC’s 
[Beijing Consensus’] main testing ground’ (Sautman and Hairong 2007: 85).
Beyond the vague and largely unspoken agreement that Africa is a key locus of this 
debate, there is very little agreement on the implications such emulation may have—or even 
whether it exists in practice.  For every suggestion that China constitutes a dangerous model 
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that allows African elites to privilege stability over democratic freedoms and transparency 
(e.g. Callick 2007), there are several who either view it—as does Ramo himself—as a 
valuable driver of growth in Africa, or alternatively who object to the very notion that 
China’s domestic experiences could ever be replicated outside its borders (e.g. Altman 2005)
Few major Western news and policy outlets have failed to weigh in on the debate, but 
the question of China’s potential as a development model has also been debated more widely. 
It is openly discussed by China itself, where caution over being perceived as prescriptive and 
arrogant abroad is tempered by the recognition that emulation of China strengthens the 
country’s soft power among other developing countries.  Then-Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s 
(2009) dismissal of the ‘Beijing Consensus’ on the grounds that ‘Africa's development 
should be based on its own conditions and should follow its own path’ belies the raft of 
lesson-sharing initiatives China organises annually with governments (particularly those in 
Africa), and does not prevent China’s state media from reporting each expression of interest 
in China’s model that emanates from the continent (e.g. People’s Daily 2002). 
Such expressions are indeed frequent.  More than is the case with any other developing 
region, African elites are often publicly quoted expressing their desire to draw lessons from 
China.  Since the mid-2000s, newspaper editorials with titles such as ‘Chinese medicine just 
the tonic for developing countries’ (Kaluba 2004) and ‘Lessons for Kenya to learn from 
China’ (The People Daily 2008) have accompanied numerous similar pronouncements by 
African policymakers.  Nigerian Senate President Ken Nnamini’s assertion that ‘China has 
become a good model for Nigeria in its quest for an authentic and stable development 
ideology’ and that ‘China is a lesson to Nigeria on the enormous good that a focused and 
patriotic leadership can do’ (quoted in Shelton and Paruk 2008: 25) is one example, as is 
Liberian Finance Minister Antoinette Sayeh’s pronouncement that ‘we all have a lot to learn 
from China’ (China Daily 2007).  
Even in Africa, however, the debate is a controversial one, with some commentators 
echoing a position of self-sufficiency articulated most forcefully by Ghanaian economist 
George Ayittey (2010). ‘For decades’, Ayittey writes, ‘hordes of African leaders travelled 
abroad and blindly copied all sorts of foreign paraphernalia to transplant to Africa. The 
continent is littered with the putrid carcasses of such failed imported systems. Now, we are 
being told to emulate China. Enough.’
A final arena in which the concepts of the Chinese Model and the Beijing Consensus are 
being increasingly discussed and contested is in the academic literature.  As my review of the 
literature demonstrates, three schools of thought have tentatively begun to emerge around the 
question of the transferability of China’s domestic development trajectory.  Whereas 
advocates (Ramo 2005, Peerenboom 2007, Zhang 2007) view such emulation as both a real 
and a positive development in developing countries looking to achieve rapid economic 
growth and industrialisation, opponents (Halper 2010; Kurlantzick 2007) primarily argue 
that this lesson-drawing has dangerous consequences for human rights and democratic 
governance;  sceptics (Kennedy 2010; Dirlik 2006, 2011), constituting a third group, argue 
that China’s model is either too internally flawed, too historically and culturally specific, or 
(conversely) too generic to constitute a unique yet transferable model.  
	
 This dissertation is first and foremost an attempt to contribute to this literature by 
addressing its key empirical and theoretical flaws.  Some of the central texts in this area have 
begun to cast the debate in theoretical terms, but span numerous disciplines and therefore 
differ widely on the conceptual lenses they employ.  Others continue to engage in the 
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discussion on an ad hoc policy rather than a theoretical level, resulting in a collection of 
purported ‘lessons’ that span various levels of analysis.  My own study seeks to ground the 
discussion in theories of emulation (Westney 1987; Bennett 1991a) and lesson-drawing 
(Rose 1991; Bennett 1991b) in the disciplines of sociology and political science; it is, to my 
knowledge, the first on this subject to explicitly do so.  
	
 After harnessing these theories to determine the direction and extent to which China 
is held to be a model by elites in two African countries, I then situate the ‘lessons learned’ by 
these elites within the evolution of post-colonial development paradigms, allowing for a 
clearer understanding on how the emulation of models can influence the broader worldviews 
of lesson-drawers.  The first half of the dissertation thus uses emulation theory to understand 
whether this process is taking place; the second then looks to theories of development in 
order to ascertain the content of such emulation.  Taken together, they ask whether China—
and, as we shall later see, other countries in the region—provide African elites with new 
mental ‘maps’ towards development, and whether the contents of these maps differ in any 
way from previously charted territory.   
	
 Very few of the existing studies on the influence of the Chinese Model have drawn on 
primary data in determining the influence of China’s example, and even fewer have situated 
their analysis in a large body of systematically-collected empirical data.  By interviewing 91 
governmental and non-governmental elites from two country cases, subjecting the resulting 
transcripts to systematic coding and analysis and supplementing this information with other 
sources of official discourse, this study aimed to fill this gap in the literature.  The two case 
studies, Ethiopia and Kenya, were selected both due to the prominent positions each has 
occupied in development discourses on Africa and due to the vast divergences in 
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development approaches that each has adhered to in its recent history—together, the two 
countries are seen as intrinsically important as well as emblematic of the diversity of post-
independence development paradigms on the continent.  My primarily interview-based 
methodology was chosen based on a hermeneutic epistemology and a constructivist ontology 
that view social reality as empirically ‘knowable’ but subject to intersubjective 
interpretations.  For this reason, as well as due to the difficulties involved in tracing 
emulation from existing policies, my aim was to arrive at a Weberian verstehen of elites’ 
perceptions of development and the Chinese trajectory rather than a list of concrete policies 
derived from the Chinese example (although these did sometimes emerge).
	
 This dissertation took a number of iterative and often surprising deviations from its 
original research question.  An initial interest in comparing the much-discussed Chinese 
Model with the notion, popular in certain policy circles, that India could provide an 
alternative and perhaps more suitable model for emulation in Africa proved less compelling 
than expected, particularly given the relatively minor influence of the Indian example on 
current African development paradigms.  On the other hand, the prominence of the entire 
East Asian region as a source of African emulation was not anticipated by the original 
research design, and proved a central finding.  As a result, my analysis encompasses a model 
that is far broader in geographical scope than China; my dissertation is less about the 
Chinese Model per se than it is about situating this model within the East Asian model of 
which it is seen by African elites to be a part.  Countries such as Malaysia, Singapore and 
South Korea are incorporated into the discussion, as one key finding of the dissertation is the 
extent to which the Chinese Model overlaps with and is located within a broader regional 
model—at least as far as African lesson-drawing is concerned.  
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A further key finding lies in the content of these ‘models’.  Although China and other 
East Asian countries are serving as exemplars to key groups of elites in Ethiopia and Kenya, 
this emulation heralds the return of a broader paradigm of modernisation rather than an 
adherence to a more narrowly-conceived East Asian developmental state.  This paradigm is 
therefore most fruitfully captured through a look at the modernisation theory that influenced 
leaders of each country case during its heyday in the 1950s and 1960s.  In many ways—in its 
technological optimism, sequenced approach to structural transformation, emphasis on 
‘strong’ elite-led national development, focus on rapid ‘catch-up’ growth and more—this 
East-Asian-inspired paradigm shares much with the older thinking of theorists such as 
Marion Levy and Walt Whitman Rostow, and of practitioners such as Kenya’s Tom Mboya 
and Ethiopia’s Haile-Selassie.
As the above discussion demonstrates, the extent to which China acts as a model for 
African elites has important repercussions.  On the one hand, an answer to this question 
helps to lend a theoretical and empirical basis to a debate which currently provokes more 
heat than light in its ideological intensity.  My findings also have implications that extend 
beyond the immediate research question, however.  The continued relevance, as 
demonstrated here, of concepts such as lesson-drawing, emulation and modernisation has 
implications for the theories that they underpin, and for the general study of development. 
The contents and levels of influence of the Chinese and East Asian 'models' are also likely to 
play an important role in shaping the practical ways in which Ethiopia and Kenya—and 
potentially other African countries—approach  development and modernisation.  These 
models make powerful claims about many of the central issues of our time:  the role of the 
state, the desirability of democracy, the sources of sustainable economic growth.  Although 
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development paradigms by no means always translate directly into policy, they embody the 
ideational environment in which policy decisions are taken.  As the ebb and flow of these 
paradigms in Africa has illustrated, the implications for national decision-making and 
international aid efforts have been vast indeed. 
	
 This dissertation comprises nine chapters, contained in four sections:  Section One 
provides the framework and rationale within which the subject matter will subsequently be 
analysed.  Chapter One reviews the contemporary literature on the ‘Chinese Model’ and 
‘Beijing Consensus’, contrasting it briefly with the relevant historical literature and 
explaining this dissertation’s envisioned contribution.  Chapter Two explains the research 
design and methodological underpinnings of the study and makes the case for a hermeneutic 
constructivist approach to the research problem.  
	
 Section Two, the first of two largely empirical sections, analyses the extent to which 
Ethiopian and Kenyan lesson-drawers wish to emulate foreign development models, and asks 
from which countries or regions these models originate.  Chapter Three provides this 
discussion with a theoretical foundation by introducing the concepts of cross-societal 
emulation and lesson-drawing.  In applying these conceptual lenses, Chapter Four finds that 
elites from Ethiopia’s ruling party do indeed view China as a major development exemplar, 
but that they situate this country within a broader East Asian Model that serves as their 
primary source of lessons.  Chapter Five finds the East Asian Model to be an equally 
important exemplar for those technocrats and business leaders occupying influential 
positions in Kenya’s long-term development plan, but discovers that these emulators view 
the Chinese Model—when taken in isolation—with some distrust.  The historical 
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backgrounds of Ethiopia and Kenya are shown to be an important determinant in the specific 
country that each case chooses to emulate.
	
 Section Three moves away from country cases’ choice of model to the substance of 
their emulation, asking what specific lessons elites wish to draw when they look to the 
models identified in the previous section.  In so doing, this section requires a different 
theoretical framework from its predecessor.  As the second theoretical chapter, then, Chapter 
Six provides an overview of the development paradigms influential in Africa since the post-
colonial era; it focuses particularly on the earliest of these, namely modernisation theory. 
Chapter Seven analyses the first set of lessons that Ethiopian and Kenyan elites draw from 
the East Asian Model; these lessons relate to the processes and mechanisms that drive 
development, and each corresponds closely to the beliefs of earlier modernisation theorists. 
Chapter Eight addresses a second set of lessons, namely those that relate to the role of the 
state and its representatives in national development.  Although these in particular exhibit 
considerable overlap with the literature on the East Asian Model (and on various country-
specific East Asian models), these again fit into the broader paradigm of modernisation.  
	
 The conclusion found in Section Four synthesises and summarises these findings, 
bringing together the three pillars—China's growing international role, elite emulation and 
the theory of modernisation—on which my enquiry rests.  It argues that while East Asia acts 
as a development model for African elites, the result is neither an entirely new direction for 
Ethiopia and Kenya nor a return to the 1990s-era debates on the developmental state. 
Instead, it is a return to an even earlier era—one witnessed previously in both Ethiopia and 
Kenya under the indigenous modernisers of the 1950s and 1960s.  Contemporary emulation 
of China is indeed occurring in Africa, but can only be understood within a broader 
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contextualisation within the East Asian Model and an even wider-encompassing 
understanding of Africa’s return to the paradigm of modernisation.  
21
 PART I:  PRELIMINARY 
CONSIDERATIONS
22
CHAPTER ONE: 
THE 'CHINESE MODEL' DEBATE
Within the relatively short period since their emergence, concepts such as the ‘Chinese 
Model’ and the ‘Beijing Consensus’ have generated a substantial body of analysis and 
conjecture.  Although the 20th century witnessed certain limited attempts by developing 
countries to learn from China, the vast majority of literature has instead accompanied the 
growth of post-reform China’s more contemporary role in the global order and the 
developing world.  This chapter very briefly reviews historical attempts to understand and 
theorise China’s status as exemplar to the ‘Third World’, before exploring the contours of the 
current debate.  It finishes by identifying gaps in this literature and by explaining how this 
dissertation contributes to a broader understanding of this subject.
1.1   China as a Development Model:  The Historical Literature
Limited attempts to analyse the wider impact and transferability of a Chinese Model predate 
contemporary policy and academic discussions by several decades.  Against the 
ideologically-fraught backdrop of the Cold War, the establishment of the PRC—a socialist 
yet peasant-based alternative to the development model promoted by the Soviet Union—
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attracted the attention of a number of scholars concerned with development in the Third 
World.2  
In the early decades of the People’s Republic of China, the mainstream academic 
literature was generally ambivalent, often reflecting Western concerns that Chinese 
propaganda might inspire developing nations to undertake Maoist social revolutions (Tang 
1960; Halpern 1961; Van Ness 1970).  Tang (1960), for example, warned that the solidarity 
engendered by the spread of a Chinese model could be almost as influential in bringing about 
the spread of global communism as the efforts of the Soviet Union could be.  The Chinese 
model under examination was thus largely the Chinese Revolutionary Model—‘the way the 
Chinese Communists have represented the significance for others of their experience in 
achieving power by revolutionary means' (Halpern 1961: 1).  
Even those who did not take this particular view of emulation of China retained 
severe doubts.  Boorman (1961: 228) surmised that ‘during the years ahead the People's 
Republic of China may, in important respects, become the principal model for other 
developing nations of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America’ but felt that this 
stemmed as much from a scapegoating of the United States as from inherent strengths in the 
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2 The term Third World originated from comparisons with the French ‘Third Estate’,  that hitherto-marginalised 
class of people with whose allegiance and sovereignty the post-revolution French Republic was founded.  In 
1952, its originator wrote of those countries lying outside the Western and Soviet blocs during the Cold War 
that the ‘ignored, exploited,  scorned Third World,  like the Third Estate, wants to become something too’ (Sauvy 
quoted in Rothwell 2008: 893).  This third bloc, from the beginning, thus, connoted an ability to decide the 
shape and values of a dawning world order – a danger that both the First and Second Worlds demonstrated a 
keen awareness of.   No pejorative meaning is implied with the term, and my usage of it will be limited to the 
Cold War context.
model.   MacFarquhar (1963: 372, 385)  noted that ‘in recent years, commentators have 
devoted much attention to the possibility of China acting as a model for other 
underdeveloped countries’ and himself viewed Chinese leadership as a possible lesson for 
others, but concluded that this lesson was virtually untransferable in practice.  A small 
literature has also explored specific policy lessons taken from China during this period, the 
most notable African example being Nyerere’s emulation of Chinese ‘villagisation’ strategies 
in Tanzania (Hyden 1980: 100; Bailey 1975: 41-42).  Finally, a number of contemporary 
works (Cullather 2007; Gilley 2004) have also explored the ways in which the Indian model 
was in turn presented as an alternative to the Chinese model, particularly by an American 
leadership that felt, in the words of John F. Kennedy, the ‘real India-China struggle’ to be 
‘for the opportunity to demonstrate whose way of life is the better’ (quoted in Gilley 2004: 
22).  
As dependency theory and neo-Marxist approaches gained popularity in the 1970s, 
the Chinese Model also gained advocates within academia.  Eckstein (1977) argued that 
China's egalitarian and 'highly disciplined' approach could potentially be transferred outside 
its borders, Rifkin (1974: 257) viewed ‘the growth of an indigenous scientific and 
technological capability through self-reliance' in China as a model for others and Imfeld 
(1976: 157) posited that China’s suitability as a model stemmed in part from it purportedly 
having ‘eliminated hunger’.  Socialist scholar Thomas Weisskopf (1980: 314) argued that 
emulation of China could help only those countries who were willing to undergo radical 
social revolution, as ‘Chinese-style revolutions  might succeed  in generating historical and 
political-economic conditions  approximating  those  which  have contributed  to  the 
success of the  Chinese  strategy  of  development'.  The literature had always been 
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ideologically polarised and thus more preoccupied with the inherent virtues and 
transferability of China’s experience than with the views of Third World policymakers 
themselves; it now became even more explicitly activist.
Despite the existence of these debates, they have a limited relevance for my own 
research question.  To begin with, the historical literature on the Chinese model remained 
relatively limited in size and influence, tending to be greatly overshadowed by the vaster 
literatures on Western and Soviet development models.  In addition, the ‘China’ of the 1960s 
and 1970s is so fundamentally different from today’s ‘China’ that many of the parameters of 
the debate have shifted.  Many contemporary discussions of the Chinese model contrast 
China’s direct interference in the domestic politics of African governments during this earlier 
era—China supported Marxist guerrilla movements in Mozambique, Nigeria and Angola, for 
instance—with today’s emphasis on soft power and voluntary, demand-led emulation 
(Kurlanzick 2007; Halper 2010).  The 'rise' of China is a relatively new phenomenon, with 
the increases in international standing and domestic material welfare that Imfeld so desired 
for the country proving to be only of fairly recent provenance.  There is thus little suggestion 
in contemporary academic and policy discussions that developing country elites are today 
attempting to draw many lessons from the China of the Cold War era—and it is, after all, the 
contemporary Kenyan and Ethiopian situations with which this dissertation is concerned. 
Finally, the activist stance of much of the literature led to the conflation of issues such as the 
transferability and the impact of Chinese lessons, precluding empirical assessments able to 
trace the impact of a set of lessons from one geographical location to another.
The concept of a Chinese Model further receded in prominence during the 1980s and 
1990s, when a China in flux became more politically insular and focused on its own evolving 
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domestic situation.  The large literature on the ‘East Asian Model’ of development (Amsden 
1994; Wade 1990; Cline 1982; Kuznets 1988; Berger 1988; World Bank 1993) and the 
‘developmental state’ (Johnson 1982; Woo-Cumings 1999) became the most influential 
treatment on the subject of lesson-drawing between developing countries during this era. 
Because both of these concepts are explicitly capitalist in nature (Johnson 1999: 35; Wade 
1990: xiii-liv), China was excluded from these analyses.  If anything, more observers have 
commented on China’s emulation of other Asian countries during that era (Chung 2008: 
26-28; Tønnesson 2004; Friedman 2009) than the reverse.
It is only in the present century, then, that a truly influential and somewhat cohesive 
literature on the Chinese Model has emerged.  China’s full-fledged entry into the 
international arena—and particularly into Africa—has been accompanied by a rapid increase 
in speculation that this growing influence has an ideational as well as a material impact.  The 
next section discusses this growing debate.  
1.2 The ‘Chinese Model’ and the ‘Beijing Consensus’: The 
Contemporary Literature
The contemporary debate surrounding the ‘Chinese Model’ and ‘Beijing Consensus’ emerged 
in the first decade of the 21st century and focuses on several key questions.  Observers 
disagree as to the very existence of such a phenomenon, with sceptics questioning both the 
extent to which developing-country leaders truly wish to reproduce the development 
experience of China and the extent to which this experience is actually unique and coherent 
enough to warrant the label of model or consensus.  Even those authors who do feel China 
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possesses a model of development disagree on its contents and its influence: those who view 
the model as promoting ‘lessons’ that conflict with their own development paradigms tend to 
hold more pessimistic views on its efficacy, while the opposite holds true for the model’s 
supporters.  An analysis of the key contributions to these questions uncovers three broad 
camps; each is explored in further detail below.
1.2.1  The Advocates
The advocates of a Chinese Model believe both that developing-country leaders wish to 
emulate the example of China and that this emulation is delivering broadly positive results. 
The publication that in 2005 sparked the entire discussion—Joshua Cooper Ramo’s Beijing 
Consensus—falls into this category.  In this working paper, Ramo argues that China’s 
development trajectory is sufficiently unique and attractive as to allow the country to lead the 
world ‘by the electric power of its example’ (Ramo 2005: 3).  He points to three lessons that 
China could offer the numerous ‘nations examining China’s rise and trying to see what 
pieces of this miracle they might make manifest in their own land’ (Ramo 2005: 26).  These 
are: ‘innovation-based development’ that harnesses the forces of science, technology and 
pragmatic experimentation; an economic model that prioritises sustainability and equality 
over growth in a country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP); and self-determination for 
countries wishing to be free from the constraints of the Washington Consensus (Ramo 2005).
	
 Peerenboom (2007) also takes a broadly optimistic view, situating the Chinese 
example within a broader East Asian ‘model’ of modernisation and arguing that this model 
can help poor countries to break free from age-old developmental stalemates.  Once again, 
this model is deconstructed into specific lessons.  According to Peerenboom (2007: 5-9), 
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these are:  a pragmatic approach to reforms; strong state intervention in national economic 
affairs; the sequencing of economic reforms before political liberalisation; a ‘flexible’ and 
‘contextual’ approach to human rights; a communitarian approach to human problems that 
offers an alternative normative framework to Western liberal individualism; and a foreign 
policy based on sovereignty, self-determination and mutual respect.  Li et al (2009) construct 
a similar list of principles they view as constituting the Beijing Consensus:  localisation of 
best practices borrowed from abroad, an economic system shaped by both markets and the 
state; flexibility in pursuit of a common end; the freedom to choose ones’ own development 
policies; political stability; self-reliance; industrial upgrading, investment in science and 
technology; cautious financial liberalisation and ‘economic growth for social harmony’ (Li et 
al 2009: 20).  Such lists are also found with some frequency in the policy literature; Shelton 
and Paruk (2008: 43-45), for example, cautiously view China as a model for Africa, citing its 
success in developing export markets and investment incentives, its investment in education 
and its strict family planning policies as potentially transferable lessons.  
	
 Sautman and Hairong shift their focus to Africa, and particularly to the perceptions of 
policymakers themselves, several of whom are quoted as admiring China’s path to 
development (Sautman and Hairong 2007: 80-81).  According to the authors, China presents 
policymakers with an example of a country that invests heavily in infrastructure, acts 
independently of Washington Consensus prescriptions and promotes industrialisation in the 
global South.  Africans who are disenchanted with Western neoliberalism’, they hold, ‘regard 
the PRC as a plausible alternative’ (Sautman and Hairong 2007: 83).  A later piece by the 
same authors, one of very few to utilise surveys or other systematically-collected primary 
data, finds Ethiopian and Kenyan respondents to be positive about China as a development 
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model (Sautman and Hairong 2009: 736).  However, the study’s respondents comprise 
university students and faculty rather than policy elites; in addition, the question of China’s 
attractiveness in the area of emulation is only one of several questions more broadly aimed at 
ascertaining general attitudes towards China.
After an almost overwhelmingly sceptical reception to this debate within China, 
certain Chinese authors have also begun to take the position that their country provides a 
welcome alternative to Western development orthodoxies.  Zhao (2010), for example, argues 
that China demonstrates to other developing countries the importance of pragmatism, 
selective learning from others, state intervention in the economy and gradualism.  
	
 Finally, there has been an increase in scholarship by those who view specific aspects 
of China’s development as worthy of emulation but who do not use the broad terms ‘Chinese 
Model’ or ‘Beijing Consensus’.  Lesson-drawing in the areas of agriculture, rural 
development, industrialisation and science and technology policy is a particular focus, with 
some of the most interesting outputs on this subject originating either from African writers 
(Juma 2011; Davies 2008, 2010) or from the World Bank, which cautiously but increasingly 
advocates the limited transfer of ‘best practices’ from China to Africa (Ravallion 2008; 
Dollar 2008).
	
 Despite the range of interpretations held by advocates of a Chinese development 
model, virtually all observers in this group defines their object of study in opposition to 
‘Western’ models and particularly in opposition to the Washington Consensus.  To this group, 
then, emulation of China’s distinctive development trajectory would in turn allow lesson-
drawers to follow their own unique paths of development.  In this context, the World Bank’s 
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own writings seem largely reactive, constituting attempts to respond to and correct these 
criticisms.
1.2.1  The Opponents
Not all those who view China as an object of emulation perceive this development to be 
desirable.  As in the writings of the advocates discussed above, the purported ‘lessons’ 
contained within the Chinese Model also determine opponents' overall views of the 
desirability of the models' wider adoption.  The vast majority of views which hold China to 
be setting a dangerous example to other developing countries stem from the West, and 
particularly from the United States.  While membership stretches beyond the 'neo-
conservatives' charged by Sautman and Hairong (2007: 84) as most representative of this 
group,  these authors do often express a concern with the declining influence of Western 
values such as political liberalism and democracy.  'Many authoritarian African regimes 
desperate to invigorate their fraying economies while maintaining a strong grip on political 
power seem to find the Chinese economic development and reform model preferable to the 
free-market and representative-government policies promoted by the United States' (Brookes 
and Shin 2006: 6), charges one American conservative think tank, for example.
	
 The most extensive treatment of this subject is Stefan Halper's Beijing Consensus 
(2010), a pessimistic namesake of Ramo's original work.  To Halper, China's model is 
marked by the specific combination of two key ingredients:  capitalism and authoritarianism. 
While Western models have advocated progressive liberalisation in both the economic and 
political spheres, he charges, China is offering developing countries in Africa and elsewhere 
the chance to partake in the economic growth offered by the former whilst rejecting the 
democratisation that was hitherto assumed to accompany it (Halper 2010).  Numerous 
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articles in the Western media have also taken this approach, contrasting China’s 'economic 
freedom' with its 'political repression' (Callick 2007) and consequently charging the country 
with presenting others with a model of 'authoritarian growth' (Yao 2010).  African literature 
with similarly negative views is relatively rare, but Obiorah (2007), Askouri (2007) and 
Gaye (2008) all view the Chinese Model as a smokescreen through which African leaders 
may instrumentally entrench their own power at the expense of democracy and transparency.  
	
 A larger and more moderate body of work analyses China's potential to act as a 
development model within the broader framework of the country's 'soft power'; in this 
formulation, China's growing popularity as a model of development is only one facet of a 
broader arsenal of tools it deploys to strengthen its reputation and normative appeal around 
the world and especially in developing countries.  Kurlantzick's Charm Offensive, for 
instance, details China's use of public and cultural diplomacy in the dissemination of values 
such as authoritarian growth and non-interference in the affairs of other sovereign states. 
'Over the past decade', he claims, 'Beijing has begun to use aid, trade, investment, and the 
allure of China's economic model, which combines growth with state control, to charm other 
nations' (Kurlantzick 2007: 84).  Not all analysts of China's growing soft power are generally 
critical of this trend, but the majority view it as at least potentially problematic, or as 
detrimental to democratic governance in the developing world (Leonard 2010: 96).  In 
another influential exploration of China's soft power, Gill and Huang (2006: 20) primarily 
list authoritarian regimes such as Russia, Iran, Laos, Uzbekistan and Vietnam as some of the 
potential 'loyal disciples' of the Beijing Consensus.
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1.2.3  The Sceptics
A final subset of the literature is sceptical of the very notion that a Chinese Model or a 
Beijing Consensus indeed exists.  In The Myth of the Beijing Consensus, Scott Kennedy 
summarises many of these objections.  Firstly, he argues that both terms imply a long-term 
coherence and unity that has simply not been present in China's post-reform political 
establishment and the policies it has enacted (Kennedy 2010).  In addition, he argues, 
whether the terms are employed to refer to an export-oriented growth strategy, a general 
departure from the Washington Consensus or a trajectory of authoritarian growth, neither is 
sufficiently unique to constitute a model.  Of the last-mentioned criterion, he writes, 'if this is 
the only basis of the model, then surely it does not deserve the adjective China, since many 
countries have successfully pursued economic development in the context of a strong 
authoritarian state' (Kennedy 2010: 475).
	
 Critiques of the Beijing Consensus come from various points in the political 
spectrum.  Socialist scholar Arif Dirlik (2006, 2011) accuses Ramo's characterisation of 
Chinese development of utopianism; given the vast environmental and economic problems 
created by Chinese reform, he argues, the country is hardly in the position to act as a model 
for others.  Critics of Western hegemony dismiss Western fears of being overtaken by a 
Chinese exemplar as insecure, self-serving and rooted in a desire to unfairly maintain 
influence over the domestic affairs of developing countries (Suzuki 2009; Pang 2007: 132). 
Many who argue that Western-influenced values and economic institutions remain important 
in global development paradigms thus dismiss the discussion as faddish and premature (Pang 
2007; Huang 2011).  
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 Perhaps the largest group of sceptics of the terms 'Chinese Model' or 'Beijing 
Consensus' is situated in the Chinese-language literature, as summarised by Kennedy (2010: 
472-473).  As he points out, neither idea originated among Chinese scholars, who watched 
the rise of the notion that China's experience could in some way be universalised with some 
initial bemusement.  As previous sections in this chapter have shown, some Chinese scholars 
have begun to add their support to this claim.  However, the majority remain sceptical, 
arguing that the notion of a Beijing Consensus overestimates China's departure from the 
Washington Consensus, underestimates China's current developmental challenges and 
downplays internal debates within the country (Kennedy 2010: 473). Huang, for example, 
while conceding that 'one country's experiment is another country's theory', argues that 
Chinese economic growth is due to economic liberalism rather than 'the economic statism so 
enthusiastically endorsed by the Beijing Consensus' (Huang 2010: 46).  
	
 Notably, some of the most vociferous critics of the terms ‘Chinese Model’ and 
‘Beijing Consensus’ nonetheless admit to their discursive and political potential.  Kennedy 
(2010: 477), too, admits that leaders use the Chinese example both instrumentally and 
ideationally, even as the incoherent and uninformed nature of their emulation virtually 
condemns them to failure.  Although he rejects the notion that China presents developing 
country elites with a substantive set of lessons to emulate, Dirlik (2006: 2) suggests that the 
Beijing Consensus acts as a 'pole in the global political economy which can serve as a 
gathering place for those who are opposed to Washington imperialism'.  For this reason, he 
argues that the Chinese Model may be viewed, at most, as a loose and uncertain '“paradigm” 
for inspiration' (Dirlik 2011: 129).  
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 Although the distinction between a ‘paradigm’ and a ‘model’ will be explored in 
greater detail in the following chapter, one related point of terminological confusion should 
be clarified here.  As this overview of the literature has shown, the terms ‘Chinese Model’ 
and ‘Beijing Consensus’ form dual strands of a single debate; while both refer to emulation 
of China by the developing world, each differs slightly from the other in its emphasis and 
assumptions.  The latter is the more polarising of the two, and contains within it a de facto 
assertion that China’s approach to development is fundamentally different from that of the 
West.  It is the preferred term both in the most positive account of the Chinese example 
(Ramo 2004) and the most negative (Halper 2010), leading Chinese scholars in particular to 
view it as overly combative and divisive (Kennedy 2010: 473).  Finally, the term ‘Beijing 
Consensus’ is often used in a way that elicits considerable confusion:  analysts often use it to 
refer to those elements of China’s domestic development trajectory from which others seek 
to (or sometimes should seek to) draw lessons whilst at the same time equating it with 
China’s mode of engagement with Africa and the developing world, particularly as this 
contrasts with the approach of traditional donors (e.g. McKinnon 2010).  As my focus here is 
on the perceived transferability of China’s domestic policies to Ethiopia and Kenya, the latter 
emphasis on China’s policies of non-interference in Africa’s political arrangements or on 
China’s privileging of trade and investment over aid on the continent is less relevant; I 
believe a stronger distinction must be made between these two sets of dynamics.
The term ‘Chinese Model’ is less prone to this blurring of boundaries, usually focusing 
on China’s domestic situation—rather than on China-Africa relations or China’s approach to 
development assistance.  At the same time, it is less tightly-linked to Ramo’s original 
formulation and therefore more flexibly encompasses the myriad aspects of China’s 
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development experience which may be emulated by others.  It also does not imply the 
internal coherence and discursive unity which Dirlik (2006: 1) rightly objects to vis a vis 
former term.  It fits more comfortably with discussions of emulation and resonates with 
earlier literatures on the ‘East Asian Model’ of development.  Debates on this subject also 
occasionally use the term ‘China Model’ as a synonym, but this is less common overall and, 
when used, occurs mainly in the media (Economist 2010a; Jian 2011).  For these reasons, 
this dissertation prefers to use the term ‘Chinese Model’.  
1.3  The Proposed Contribution to the Literature
The contemporary literature has made important strides in beginning to summarise and 
interrogate the fast-moving but often superficial debates found in policy and media circles. 
Readers may wonder why I have chosen to focus on Africa as my central point of enquiry, 
given the vast geographical range (or, as frequently, the highly generalised, aspatial 
approach) in much of this literature.  There are several reasons for this decision.  Firstly, 
although the elites drawing inspiration from China are said to be located in countries as 
geographically diverse as Vietnam, Cuba, Russia and even India, Africa—as the largest 
collection of developing countries on the planet—is often viewed as a particularly important 
locus of the debate.  Although this is not always explicitly stated, several key texts (eg 
Halper 2010; Ravallion 2008), devote more attention to this region than to any other.  A 
recent review article on the subject (De Haan 2010) also singles out Africa as a particular 
focus of the literature, and Callick (2007) phrases it thus:  ‘from Vietnam to Syria, from 
Burma to Venezuela, and all across Africa, leaders of developing countries are admiring and 
emulating what might be called the China Model’.
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 A significant sub-section of the now very large 'China in Africa' body of scholarship 
also comments on this emulation, often addressing it as one aspect of the burgeoning 
relationship between Africa and China (e.g. Alden 2005: 156; Taylor 2009: 23-27; Brautigam 
2010).  By emphasising the ideational impact of China's domestic policies, a focus on lesson-
drawing by African elites is thus also an important counterpoint to more frequent discussions 
of the direct, 'on-the-ground' impact of Chinese investment, trade and diplomacy on the 
continent.  A final reason for this focus concerns the discourses of African elites themselves: 
in no other region in the world are the merits (and, to a lesser extent, the dangers) of the 
Chinese model as openly expressed as in Africa itself—as illustrated by the declarations of 
African leaders frequently quoted in the international, Chinese and African media.  It is 
precisely these declarations that non-Africans often draw on in making their case for the 
existence of a ‘Chinese Model’, but my intention was partially to ascertain the extent to 
which such quotes illustrated the full and true state of views on the subject.  
	
 This is necessary because despite the strengths of the literature discussed here, the 
current body of work remains incomplete and weak in several important areas.  Firstly, much 
of it conflates several important questions, namely:  whether China is viewed as a 
development model among leaders in developing countries; whether this is (or would be) a 
desirable or feasible phenomenon; which specific lessons developing-country elites wish to 
draw from the Chinese experience, and whether these lessons are uniquely Chinese.  By 
specifying more clearly what exactly a ‘model’ is and what it does, scholars can avoid 
conflating these normative, empirical and theoretical issues.  As I shall illustrate, a country 
need only inspire others towards emulation to be considered a model.  For this reason, the 
content and existence of lesson-drawing is here considered to be more important—at least 
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given the nascent state of the literature—than the feasibility and wisdom of such emulation. 
On a closely related point, the current literature also fails to distinguish between different 
areas of China’s influence, with some studies taking a global approach and a small number 
focusing on Africa alone.  
	
 Secondly, much of the ‘evidence’ given for the influence of a Chinese model in Africa 
and elsewhere is anecdotal and highly speculative.  According to Gill and Huang (2006: 20), 
‘no systematic information is available to assess the popularity of this model’, while Ramo’s 
(2004: 26) argument for the existence of a Chinese model is premised on the assertion that 
‘increasingly around the world, you stumble on anecdotes of nations examining China’s 
rise’ and attempting to emulate it.  To my knowledge, no in-depth empirical study has yet 
been undertaken to specifically assess the attractiveness of a Chinese Model anywhere in the 
world.  By systematically collecting and analysing primary qualitative data, my study has 
sought to fill that gap.
	
 Finally, few studies have attempted to situate the question of China’s ideational 
influence within a theoretical framework.  The debate has largely been located loosely 
within the discipline of international relations (IR), but this dissertation introduces two large 
and well-established literatures from the related disciplines of policy studies, sociology and 
development studies.  In so doing, it seeks to move the debate beyond its current mainstay in 
highly topical and often descriptive policy-oriented fora.  The theoretical frameworks that I 
employ are concerned, firstly, with processes of cross-societal emulation and lesson-drawing 
and, secondly, with the evolution of development paradigms in the post-colonial period, 
with a particular emphasis on modernisation theory.3   As explained in my chapter on 
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3 Because these are each reviewed in subsequent theoretical chapters, they are not covered in this section.
methodology, the purpose of my research was not to inductively contribute covering-laws to 
either of these literatures, but rather to harness the theories they provide towards a better 
understanding of the specific empirical question under consideration.  This dissertation does 
attempt a limited theoretical contribution, however, by illustrating the wider applicability 
and relevance of these theories to one of the key contemporary debates in development. 
	
 This does not preclude a contribution to debates in the area of applied policy studies, 
however.  The extent to which China is viewed as a model by African elites has important 
implications for the development policies and practices of development agencies and actors 
worldwide as well as in my country cases.  As a later discussion of the interaction between 
ideational and material factors in the social sciences demonstrates, this is likely to be true 
even if many of these lessons are not directly transformed into policy outcomes.
1.4   Conclusion
The Cold War era witnessed a number of academic attempts to analyse the wider adoption of 
a Chinese Model.  It is only in the 21st century, however, that what can be truly termed a 
literature on the Chinese Model has come into being.  Prompted by the publication of 
Ramo’s Beijing Consensus (2005) and a host of suggestions in media and policy forums that 
developing country leaders are seeking to draw lessons from the contemporary Chinese 
experience, the academic debate is now virtually as vibrant as its journalistic counterparts. 
Although scholars agree on the importance of this subject, they differ vehemently on the 
model’s suitability, its influence and its very existence.  
In this chapter, I have constructed a three-part typology that differentiates between 
the advocates, the opponents and the sceptics in this debate.  Despite the important strides 
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that these groups have collectively made in interrogating and exploring the question of 
drawing lessons from China by others in the developing world, I have also highlighted 
several key weaknesses that these share.  By conducting empirical analysis on the impact of 
lesson-drawing on emulating elites and by leaving aside questions of suitability and 
desirability, my study contributes to this broader literature and seeks to understand the 
veracity of each group’s claims.  It also situates these insights within selected 
interdisciplinary theoretical frameworks in order to move these debates from their 
descriptive and somewhat disjointed nature.  
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CHAPTER TWO:  
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
In seeking to address the research topic introduced in the introduction and preceding chapter, 
this dissertation follows a qualitative research design that focuses on understanding the role 
of specific ideational constructs in policymaking and draws on semi-structured interviews 
with a wide range of Ethiopian and Kenyan elites.  The following chapter explains the 
reasoning behind these methodological choices.  It begins by posing the central research 
question and hypotheses and detailing how these evolved as the project progressed.  It 
clarifies two key concepts, before providing a detailed analysis of the ontological and 
epistemological issues that arose during research.  The sections that follow explain how I 
selected my cases, sampled my data sources and collected and analysed my findings, as well 
as situating these choices within the methodological literature.  The chapter closes with a 
brief discussion on ethical considerations.
2.1   Research Questions and Hypotheses
This dissertation's central research question evolved considerably as the empirical phase of 
research progressed.  I was initially interested in contrasting attitudes towards two highly 
topical and prominent potential models, namely China and India.  Discussions in the 
international media and among policymakers, particularly in the West, had recently 
contrasted the approaches to development taken by these two countries.  More specifically, 
China's putative strategy of 'authoritarian growth' was frequently contrasted with India's 
slower, 'messier' but more democratic path to development (Summers quoted in Bajaj 2010; 
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Friedman and Gilley 2008; Elliot 2009).  Discussions that considered the Chinese Model in 
isolation—or contrasted it with the Washington Consensus—remained most prevalent, but 
these were supplemented by a growing body of debate on India as a potential alternative 
exemplar for developing countries.  
	
 In order to situate these models within a broader literature, my early research 
approached both as examples of modernisation.4   A small number of discussions on the 
Chinese Model had already sought to analyse China's development, and its potential to act as 
an exemplar, through the prism of modernisation (Peerenboom 2007; Zhao 2010).  This did 
not go far enough, however, in reflecting the overwhelming importance of the concept within 
China, where it continues to be one of the central preoccupations of Chinese academics and 
policy-makers.  According to the most comprehensive English-language review of Chinese 
discourse on the subject (Wheeler 2005: 18), in recent decades the 'center of modernization 
theorizing has followed the center of the process itself…to China'.  In the words of another, 
modernisation is 'a meta-narrative informing common explanations and predictions of 
China's development trajectory' and to which 'all aspects of human life...are commonly 
viewed as adjuncts' (Barabantseva 2011).  
	
 One of the aims of this dissertation was thus originally to reconcile China's status as 
potential exemplar for African countries with the striving for modernisation at the heart of its 
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4  According to Habermas' (1990: 2) classic definition, 'Modernization refers to a bundle of processes that are 
cumulative and mutually reinforcing: to the formation of capital and the mobilization of resources; to the 
development of the forces of production and the increase in the productivity of labor; to the establishment of a 
centralized political power and the formation of national identities; to the proliferation of rights of political 
participation,  of urban forms of life, and of formal schooling; to the secularization of values and norms; and so 
on.'  
reform-era development.  Although far fewer observers linked India's reform-era 
development to the concept of modernisation, I hypothesised that India, too, offered African 
lesson-drawers a model not just of development, but of modernisation.  While both China 
and India were undergoing processes of technologically-driven, rapid economic growth and 
the construction of 'modern' nation-states, China was doing so through carefully-sequenced 
structural transformation and a prioritisation of economic liberalism over civil and political 
rights; India, on the other hand, was undergoing a more ad hoc, pluralist version of this 
process.  My interest lay in first delineating the contours of these two 'models', before 
understanding which variant of modernisation (if any) appealed most to Ethiopian and 
Kenyan lesson-drawers.  I hypothesised that a number of factors would render the Chinese 
approach more attractive to such elites, the existence of a perhaps more feasible approach 
notwithstanding.  My initial research question, therefore, ran as follows: to what extent do 
Ethiopian and Kenyan elites admire and seek to emulate the Chinese and Indian models of 
modernisation?
	
 It is not uncommon for preliminary research questions to be reformulated in the light 
of new evidence gathered during the research process (Boeije 2009: 26).  Non-linear research 
paths, where knowledge is generated in a cyclical and iterative fashion, are frequently found 
in qualitative research (Neuman 2006: 153).  As Flick (quoted in Neuman 2006: 152) points 
out, this circularity can often be a strength as 'it forces the researcher to permanently reflect 
on the whole research process and on particular steps in light of the other steps'.
	
 My own early research question underwent two significant revisions.  Firstly, it had 
initially vastly underestimated the prominence of East Asian models other than China in the 
development policies and discourses of African elites.  The attraction felt by the majority of 
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Ethiopian and Kenyan respondents towards the region as a whole, as well as to certain key 
countries in it, proved more compelling than my findings on the Indian Model, which largely 
corresponded to existing literature on the subject.  These results, which demonstrated that 
India served as a very limited model in certain spheres such as law and information 
technology (IT) policy, are discussed briefly in Chapters 4 and 5.  However, the Indian 
Model (such as it exists) occupies a less prominent position in this dissertation than 
originally envisioned.  
	
 A second shift concerned the study’s theoretical framework.  During the process of 
data collection, the very broad nature of my earlier definition of modernisation became clear. 
Modernisation, it emerged, was indeed central to Ethiopian and Kenyan emulation of East 
Asia, but as part of a specific worldview that had underpinned developmental practices at 
points in each country's history.  This paradigm most closely resembled the 'modernisation 
theory' so influential in the United States and large parts of the developing world in the 1950s 
and 1960s.  In short, then, Ethiopian and Kenyan lesson-drawing fitted more readily into the 
developmental debates of the post-colonial period than into broader sociological 
disagreements on the existence or attractiveness of country-specific 
'modernisations'/'modernities'. The major contribution of the research has lain in the former 
rather than the latter area of enquiry.
	
 For the reasons given above, the revised research question is the following: 
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Despite the visible influence of my preliminary line of enquiry on my interview design, it is 
the revised research question, above, that is reflected in my review of the literature and in the 
analysis of my findings.
	
 Although my focus will remain on the two key questions above, the answers to these 
have several larger potential theoretical and empirical implications, some of which are 
explored within this dissertation and others that are left to the reader to infer insofar as he or 
she feels that my geographical and thematic foci are analytically generalisable (a concept 
that is explored, qua Kvale [1996: 265], in greater detail later in this chapter).  Firstly, the 
extent to which Ethiopian and Kenyan decision-makers draw on external models has 
ramifications for both the content and relevance of the theories of emulation and lesson-
drawing: the fact that both groups voluntarily seek to apply lessons from the East Asian 
experience suggests that emulation can be as potent a force as non-voluntary policy transfer 
in the policymaking processes of developing countries, and the geographical sources of these 
lessons illuminate the criteria that emulating elites use when searching for models.  The 
influence of Chinese and East Asian models of development also feed into broader 
To what extent is the development experience of China viewed as a model by Ethiopian 
and Kenyan elites?  If it is indeed seen as a model, what lessons do elites draw from 
China and how does this phenomenon inform broader Ethiopian and Kenyan 
development paradigms?  
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discussions regarding the putative rise in Chinese and Asian ‘soft power’ in Africa and 
elsewhere (Gill and Huang 2006: 20; Kurlantzick 2007: 84).  
	
 Finally, the influence that this emulation is likely to have on the content and 
application of future development paradigms in Africa should not be underestimated. The 
fact that the assumptions of modernisation theory are so often contained within Kenyan and 
Ethiopian emulation of East Asia demonstrates this school of thought’s return to prominence 
on the continent, and suggests that critiques of the 'neoliberal' development model may not 
always originate from the directions hitherto expected in the literature.  The post-Washington 
Consensus’ greater focus on bottom-up participation, local ownership, traditional forms of 
knowledge, decentralisation and transparency may in fact be at odds with much of what 
Ethiopian and Kenyan elites wish to draw from East Asia’s success, and this sometimes 
uncomfortable truth is an important area of further research for the academic and policy 
communities.
Despite these wider areas of relevance, my research question does preclude the 
answering of certain other lines of enquiry that may be equally valid but fall outside the 
scope of this study.  One debate to which I will not attempt to contribute concerns the non-
ideational impact of China's growing political and especially economic ties with Ethiopia, 
Kenya or Africa more broadly.  I do analyse these where my interpretive methodology finds 
them to have an influence on Ethiopian and Kenyan emulation, but am not here directly 
interested in the material impact of Chinese investment, trade and diplomacy on my country 
cases.  This places my study largely outside the purview of the bulk of the very large 'China 
in Africa' literature (Brautigam 2010; Alden et al 2005; Kaplinsky et al 2007) that has 
emerged in the past decade.  Another question that falls outside the scope of this project is 
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the extent to which the implementation of a Chinese Model is either feasible or desirable in 
Kenya or Ethiopia.  This, again, is an important area for further research; for it to be 
explored, however, it is first necessary to understand how such a model is understood by 
those who would be most likely to implement it.  It is this latter concern I address in this 
dissertation.
2.2  Defining Key Concepts:  ‘Model’ and ‘Paradigm’
 
There is some confusion and disagreement in the literature on the Chinese Model regarding 
the closely related concepts of 'model' and 'paradigm'.  Peerenboom (2007) uses the terms 
interchangeably, while Dirlik (2012) argues that the vague content of China’s example 
renders it a loose ‘paradigm’ for inspiration rather than a model.  Given the centrality in the 
research question of these concepts, it is important here to distinguish between the two and to 
provide a clear working definition of each.  
At their most fundamental, models in the social sciences are simplified versions of 
reality that accurately represent certain aspects of the original object being described whilst 
omitting others (Lave and March 1993: 3).  Standard definitions of the concept also accord it 
a second meaning; a model is also 'a thing used as an example to follow or imitate' (OED 
2011).  
	
 Although explicit definitions of the concept are surprisingly rare in the literature on 
lesson-drawing, both of these definitions accord with the concept's usage in such discussions. 
Rose's (1991: 20) classic article on lesson-drawing, for example, emphasises the importance 
of conscious simplification and generalisation by those policymakers who wish to apply an 
erstwhile idiosyncratic programme or process to non-local contexts, while other authors 
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emphasise the ways in which cognitive 'short-cuts' and mental schemata constrain and 
condition policymakers in their selection and understanding of external models (Weyland 
2004; Goldsmith 2005).  These lessons are models in that they correspond with real-world 
examples rather than being constrained to the theoretical realm (Kuznets 1988: S11), but are 
simultaneously the products of abstraction and selection.
	
 The normative, aspirational aspect of modelling is also present in these literatures, 
although (as I shall show in the following chapter) theories of lesson-drawing prefer the term 
emulation over imitation due to its more selective nature.  A polity from which 'desirable' 
policy lessons emerges is very frequently referred to as a 'model' — as labels such as the 
'Chinese Model' and 'East Asian Model' make clear.  Models are, by definition, perceived by 
their emulators as successful in some way.  Kuznets (1988: S11), writing of the East Asian 
model, holds that 'any economic development model must have particular attributes...The 
record, in short, should be a successful one that is worth emulating'.  Combining the two 
criteria discussed above, this dissertation defines a development model as a simplified 
version of an existing or historical development policy (or set of policies) that is viewed by 
others as an example for emulation. The term exemplar is frequently used as a synonym 
(Dolowitz and Marsh 1996: 252; Bennett 1991b: 36), and I have chosen to do the same.  
	
 Authors who are sceptical about the existence of a Chinese Model often argue that 
the Chinese development trajectory is not sufficiently distinctive, coherent or successful to 
constitute a model (Kennedy 2010: 475; Huang 2010).  My definition, however, does not 
require any of these characteristics to be present before China can be labelled a model.  If the 
Chinese experience is viewed by the subjects of this study as an example worthy of 
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emulation, a Chinese model can be said to exist, regardless of its uniqueness or 'intrinsic' 
value (if the latter can indeed be said to exist).    
	
 My definition above contains another term requiring clarification, namely 
development.  I refrain here, for the most part, from engaging in the notoriously heated 
discussion concerning what constitutes or does not constitute 'true' development for a 
country's citizens.  In a bid to remain as open as possible to the competing conceptualisations 
of development that research subjects may hold, I will use Bailey and Skladany’s (1991: 67) 
broad definition of development as 'conscious actions which promote sustainable and 
equitable processes of change leading to improvement in the quality of life for most 
members of a society'.  This allows for inclusion of the economic, political, social and even 
cultural facets of development.  Bailey’s emphasis on conscious agency also meshes well 
with existing theories of lesson-drawing and cross-societal emulation.  These are most 
frequently policy-oriented in nature, where policies signify broad 'statements of 
intention...which generally denote the direction policy-makers wish to take' (Dolowitz and 
Marsh 2000: 12).  Those efforts undertaken by a country's leaders to improve (whether 
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ostensibly or sincerely) their society's overall wellbeing can thus be targets of emulation by 
others—and are therefore the focus of my own research.5	

	
 A 'paradigm' is, like a model, a cognitive, simplified representation of reality.  Unlike 
the latter term, however, a paradigm is generally taken to correspond with a broader 
explanatory framework and world view (Kuhn 1970: 111).  Ethiopian leaders may thus use 
China as a model of economic growth, but fit this into a broader set of explanations 
regarding the nature of global inequality or national poverty.  Paradigms contain assumptions 
about causality and reality that aim to solve scientific (in the original Kuhnian (1970: 37) 
formulation) 'puzzles'.  A policy paradigm, by extension, 'provides policymakers with the 
terminology and a set of taken-for-granted assumptions about the way they communicate and 
think about a policy area’ (Carter 2007: 181).  Most influential, and most useful for my 
purposes, is Hall's classic definition, which guides my own understanding of a policy 
paradigm throughout this work.  A paradigm, accordingly, is the interpretative 'framework of 
ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments 
that can be used to attain  them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be 
addressing' (Hall 1993: 279).  The answers to development's central questions lie bound up 
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5 A final note on my use of this particular term in this dissertation: Certain Ethiopian and Kenyan leaders view 
East Asian countries as adhering to a single broad model, while others differentiate between sub-regional, 
national and occasionally even sub-national approaches to development.  For this reason, I use the term 'East 
Asian Model' to refer both to the literature of the same name (this encompasses—but is not limited to—closely 
related discussions on the 'East Asian Economic Model') and to cases where my findings are applicable to the 
region as a whole.  When reporting and analysing the responses of interview subjects, however, I often also use 
the plural 'East Asian models', as the distinction between single countries, groups of countries and the entire 
region is enforced to a lesser extent in practice than in theory.    
within the paradigms held by those tasked with 'doing' development:  why do poverty and 
inequality exist and how can they be alleviated?  What constitutes development and who 
drives it?  While emulation of individual models can alter broader paradigms of 
development, it can also lead only to what Hall (1993) calls 'first- order' or 'second order' 
learning, which take place within established explanatory frameworks.   
	
 Development in the post-colonial era is generally acknowledged to have undergone a 
series of paradigm shifts (Gore 2000; Thorbecke 2007).  Although this viewpoint is not 
universally held (see e.g. Pieterse (1998) for a conflicting reading) and although the lines of 
division between particular paradigms are disputed, four approaches—modernisation, 
dependency, the 'Washington Consensus' and various critiques of the Washington Consensus
—have emerged as likely contenders.  Chapter Six of this dissertation reviews this literature 
and finds that shifts between these approaches have indeed taken place at a paradigmatic 
level.  Only the last-mentioned ('post-development' to some, a 'post-Washington Consensus' 
to others) is better described as an augmentation rather than a replacement of its immediate 
predecessor.  As I go on to show, emulation of the East Asian and Chinese models takes 
place within this broader 60-year old debate, harking back to many of the assumptions and 
practices found in the paradigm of the modernisation theory of the 1950s and 1960s.
	
 With these definitions taken into account, it becomes clear that the term paradigm is 
neither a synonym nor a more fitting substitute for the term model, particularly when these 
are used to discuss the influence of a foreign exemplar on the worldviews of local elites.  A 
'Chinese development paradigm' would refer to the worldviews of Chinese development 
actors, but it is African worldviews that concern us here.  In short, models are more 
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transferable than are paradigms; the latter are influenced by a broader range of factors and 
are rooted in the cognitive frameworks of those who adhere to them.  
Finally, there is a significant overlap between paradigms and what Scott, in the 
classic Seeing Like a State, has called 'maps'.  In modern statecraft, he holds, 
developmentalist visions resemble mental maps in that they act as abridged versions of 
reality for those government actors and other officials who make use of them.  These tools, 
‘when allied with state power, would enable much of the reality they depicted to be 
remade’ (Scott 1998: 3).  A map, therefore, presents the representatives of the state (or, 
slightly expanding on Scott’s definition, elites who prevail on the policy decisions of the 
state) with a vision of both the present and desired state of affairs, as well as with the means 
by which to move between the two:  essentially, it informs these actors how to get from 
‘point A’ to ‘point B’.  Although it is not a term often used in this study, it is—given the 
central role that state power, leadership and developmental bureaucracy plays in both 
Kenyan and Ethiopian emulation of East Asia—nevertheless important for our purposes.  
	
   
2.3  Epistemological and Ontological Framework
The choice to study ideational constructs such as models and paradigms of development 
required significant attention to the epistemological and ontological frameworks 
underpinning such analysis.  Development studies is an inherently multidisciplinary social 
science encompassing elements of inter alia sociology, economics and political science. 
Certain of these disciplines and their sub-disciplines have long been premised on the notion 
that 'ideas matter' deeply, others have been the beneficiaries of a more recent 'ideational turn' 
and still others maintain a more rationalist and materialist foundation.  This section on my 
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understanding of the nature and 'knowability' of social knowledge will both explain my own 
decision to focus on ideas and clarify the means by which I will do so.  
2.3.1  A Constructivist Ontology
One of the important ways in which this study is bounded is through a focus on specific 
cognitive constructs, namely development models and development paradigms.  This focus 
is rooted in a broader understanding that ideational structures—including but not limited to 
ideologies, perceptions, identities, discourses and worldviews—constitute social 'reality' at 
least to the same extent as do material interests and resources.	
    
	
 In international relations, this approach has been termed ‘constructivism’ (Onuf 
1989) or 'social constructivism' (Wendt 1999).  Although constructivism is viewed by many 
as an epistemology due to the great impact it has had on widening the scope for non-
positivist research designs in its home discipline, I use it here in much the same way as does 
Alexander Wendt, who has done the most to elaborate the concept into a research agenda. 
According to Wendt (1999: 40), constructivism is as much a means of understanding how 
reality is constituted as of how it is understood; 'What really matters is what there is rather 
than how we know it [my emphasis]' (Wendt 1999: 40).    
	
 Although the approach has since undergone great fragmentation, it is underpinned by 
a view of reality as intersubjectively shaped by the collective understandings of social agents 
(Adler 1997: 322).  This is not to imply that constructivism necessarily denies the existence 
of structural constraints and a physical world;  ideational constructs and material interests 
are, rather, mutually constituted (Hopf 1998: 172).  The importance of behavioural norms 
means that actors are as much motivated by a 'logic of appropriateness' as by a 'logic of 
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expected consequences' (March and Olsen 1989). Ideas are thus not dichotomous with 
interests:  because they create the normative framework through which actors understand 
their interests, frequently ‘interests are ideas' (Wendt 1999: 114).	

	
 When applied to my research question, the key role that visions of development play 
in constraining and enabling policy decisions and outcomes becomes clear.  At a minimum, 
they act as filters to simplify decision-making, while they may even remake entirely the set 
of assumptions on which such decision-making rests.  While the precise nature of this 
interplay does not fall within the scope of my study, a constructivist approach allows for the 
recognition that 'political elites approach new decisions with pre-existing beliefs, ideologies, 
or worldviews and lean heavily on those generalized frameworks in judging specific 
situations and making specific choices' (Jacobs 2009: 253).  
	
 The influence of ideational aspects on policy and material outcomes does not negate 
the existence of other, competing demands on the decisions of African policymakers.  These 
include but are not limited to donor conditionalities, international economic/political 
institutional structures and natural resource endowments.  The lessons that elites draw from 
external models may even compete with other domestic ideational factors not fully explored 
in this dissertation.  In isolating one often undervalued strand of Ethiopian and Kenyan 
policymaking, and in demonstrating the important place it occupies in shaping development 
paradigms, however, this dissertation hopes to contribute to our understanding of the 
development process in general.  Given the central role that I find for emulation of East Asia 
in informing Ethiopian and Kenyan elites' development paradigms, the extent to which these 
elites eventually do visibly emulate the region in future decades may even illustrate the 
extent to which they possess freedom of action in their policymaking.  
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 Materialist and rational-choice approaches frequently object to the study of intangible 
concepts such as values or perceptions on the grounds that it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
ascertain and observe their impact on tangible political institutions and policy (e.g. 
Moravcsik 1999).  I would argue, however, that even were the paradigms of policymakers 
never to find concrete expression in policy (an unlikely outcome given the mutually 
constitutive nature of the material and ideational worlds), their existence would be no less 
'real' than the policy itself.  Although the former may be more difficult to quantify or 
measure, they exist, according to a constructivist ontology, at least to the same extent that 
policies and budgets—which, after all, are merely symbols printed on pieces of paper—do. 
Policies and resources are more than their physical manifestations; they are embedded in a 
set of intangible norms and understandings that give them their power.  Were this study to 
discover that African elites had indeed taken concrete policy actions to emulate East Asia, it 
would still not be able to prove that such actions would have an observable impact on the 
lives of ordinary Africans.   As Reis and Moore (2005: 9) point out, 'we all know of political 
reforms that had no impact, policy changes that were ineffective and laws that remained 
fiction – because they were in no way grounded in prevailing values and beliefs'.  One only 
has to look as far as the impact of structural readjustment in Africa to confirm this.  An 
understanding of political perceptions and values can thus be an end in itself rather than an 
intervening variable.  
	
 This study, then, does not aim to predict or describe policy outcomes.  Where I do 
discuss concrete policies that appear to reflect the influence of lesson-drawing from East 
Asia, this primarily follows from elites' own discursive linking of the two.  And just as an 
understanding of elite views on foreign development models does not necessarily translate 
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into an understanding of future development outcomes, so too an apparent similarity between 
East Asian and African policy agendas would not serve to demonstrate the existence of 
emulation.  Desires and beliefs must be measured independently from action unless 
preferences are to be inferred from behaviour alone (Rathburn 2008: 691; Bevir and Rhodes 
2003: 132); policy-makers must thus explicitly demonstrate the utilisation of information 
from foreign experiences in order for such a conclusion to be drawn (Bennett 1991b: 32).  I 
would argue that this is particularly true in the case of my own study, given the uncertain 
nature of the defining characteristics of an 'East Asian Model' or a 'Chinese Model'.
2.3.2  A Hermeneutic/Interpretive Epistemology 
Although constructivists in the field of international relations are usually loosely bound by 
the principles detailed above, they make use of a wide variety of epistemologies.  Some (e.g. 
Finnemore 1996) adopt a positivist approach, making use of the scientific method to arrive at 
covering-law propositions and to construct generalised theories on the genesis and influence 
of certain international norms.  Radical, post-modern and critical constructivists, on the other 
hand, accuse these 'mainstream' constructivists of insufficient distance from assumptions of 
rationalism and causality (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986).  This latter grouping often uses 
discourse analysis, deconstruction and other non-positivist methods to uncover and query the 
unequal power relations that they see as lying at the heart of much social and political life 
(e.g. Onuf 1989).  Hopf's (1998) distinction between 'conventional' and 'critical' 
constructivists and Adler's (2002) division between 'strong' and 'weak’ programmes of 
constructivism both reflect this division.  As Marcel (2001: 3) phrases it, 'Constructivism is, 
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indeed, increasingly divided along epistemological lines between post-modernism and 
positivism, making many constructivists strange bedfellows'.
	
 To myself and a small number of other scholars, a hermeneutic or interpretive6 
epistemology offers a third course between these two poles.  At its simplest, hermeneutics is 
the detailed understanding of texts, be these written or spoken (Neuman 2008: 88).  In the 
social sciences, hermeneutics is rooted in the Weberian concept of Verstehen or 
'understanding', which posits that social action can be understood only by 'penetrating to the 
subjective meanings that actors attach to their own behaviour and the behaviour of 
others' (Coser 1977: 219).  Human action is driven by the motives, values and ideas of 
individuals (Bevir and Rhodes 2002) which in turn are best understood by empathic and 
ideographic analysis and by 'thick' description.  As Neuman (2006: 91) phrases it, 'instead of 
a maze of interconnected laws and propositions, theory for interpretive social science tells a 
story....it contains concepts and limited generalizations, but does not dramatically depart 
from the experience and inner reality of the people being studied'. 
	
 The hermeneutic approach sets itself apart from positivism by making a clear 
distinction between the natural sciences (the 'Naturwissenschaften') and the social sciences 
'Geisteswissenschaften' (Dilthey discussed in Bernstein 1983: 112-113).  Unlike their 
positivist counterparts, interpretive epistemologies do not rely on the scientific method to 
construct universal generalisations, nor do they generally engage in the deductive testing of 
theories.
	
 Nor does the hermeneutic approach fit comfortably within ‘critical’ or radical 
constructivism, however.  Unlike either of these, it is based on the systematic observation of 
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6 In keeping with the majority practice in the literature, I shall use these terms as synonyms.
real-world phenomena, making it empirical in nature (Guzzini 2000: 156).7   Several 
interpretivist scholars therefore defend the importance of empiricism whilst simultaneously 
rejecting positivism (Guzzini 2000: 156; Morrow 2006: 444; Jarvis 2000: 101; Neuman 
2006: 107; Adler 2002: 100).  Rational critique, meaning and 'knowledge' are still possible, 
but this knowledge often extends to the intangible and unmeasurable elements of social life. 
This intermediate stance, then, usually 'accepts that not all statements have the same 
epistemic value' (Adler 2002: 96) and holds that 'the study of human meaning can aspire to 
objectivity' (Delanty 1997: 41).  It is this tradition to which my own research belongs.
	
 Some argue that constructivism’s emphasis on mutual constitutiveness makes it 
uniquely suited to a hermeneutic interpretation of science and thereby allows it to avoid the 
most dangerous pitfalls of both the positivist and critical approaches (Guzzini 2000: 15; 
Adler 2005: 12).  As the above-mentioned debates attest, however, the widely differing 
epistemologies used by those calling themselves constructivists make the straightforward 
equation of constructivism with interpretivism somewhat problematic.  Taking Marcel’s 
(2001) point on the diversity of constructivism and the need to carve out a specifically 
hermeneutic epistemology within this theoretical stance, my study combines the ontological 
assumption that social knowledge is both ideational and mutually constituted with the desire 
to understand this knowledge through the empirical interpretation of the spoken and written 
word.  
	
 One final remark on the possibility of determining causality is necessary here, given 
the fact that even those scholars united by a hermeneutic epistemology often disagree 
profoundly on this point.  On the one hand, some argue the concept of causal explanation as 
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7 This empiricism also distinguishes this stance from the philosophical approach.
inextricably linked to positivism, and therefore outside the realm of interpretation (Marcel 
2001: 1); such approaches often prefer to take a narrative approach, or what Geertz (1973) 
has termed ‘thick description’.  
On the other hand, Weber (quoted in Coser 1977: 219) himself defined his discipline, 
sociology, as 'that science which aims at the interpretative understanding of social behavior 
in order to gain an explanation of its causes, its course, and its effects.'  This dissertation 
follows Weber's approach in allowing for a cautious, limited understanding of causality. This 
causality is bounded in two important ways.  Firstly, it denies the validity of mono-causal 
explanations.  Due to the reflexivity of social actors and the complexity of social life, social 
scientists can only hope to isolate those social forces they believe—through observation and 
interpretation—to be most important and to express the impact of these forces in 
probabilistic terms.  Causes and effects can also impact each other in a mutually constitutive 
fashion.8  It is for this reason that the development paradigms of Ethiopian and Kenyan elites 
can both reflect the influence of ideational and material factors (increased Chinese Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) being an example of the latter) and in turn change development 
policies and practices in their countries.  Elites are agents not because they make decisions in 
a vacuum, but insofar as they 'can act creatively for reasons that make sense to them’ (Bevir 
and Rhodes 2002: 138).  
	
 On a closely related second point, causality cannot be expressed in the form of 
universal laws, but can only be surmised for the specific phenomena under discussion. 
Steadfast causal links do not exist in the social sciences, say interpretivists, but conditional 
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8 See  Weber 2011 [1905/1949]: 180-188 and Holton (2003: 31-32) for the primary and secondary discussions 
of Weberian causality from which my own summary is drawn.
and volitional links can nevertheless be explored and established through narratives (Bevir 
and Rhodes 2002: 136).   Weber (2011 [1905/1949]: 78-79) phrased it thus:
An exhaustive causal investigation of any concrete phenomena in its full reality is not only 
practically impossible - it is simply nonsense. We select only those causes to which are to be 
imputed in the individual case ‘the essential’ feature of an event. Where the individuality of a 
phenomenon is concerned, the question of causality is not a question of laws but of concrete 
causal relationships, it is not a question of the subsumption of the event under some general 
rubric as a representative case but of its imputation as a consequence of some constellation. It 
is in brief a question of imputation [emphasis in original].  
A constructivist hermeneutic approach was dictated by my central research question and, in 
turn, had implications for my choice of the interview as the primary research method.  A 
desire to understand African elites' views on Asian development models is premised on the 
assumption that processes of national development are at least partially rooted in the mental 
frameworks of those tasked with influencing and formulating development policy.   My 
findings on these questions are used not to deductively or inductively 'test' theories of 
development or emulation/lesson-drawing; instead, these theories are used to inform my 
understanding of the particular cases on which I focus.  This is by no means the only 
ontological and epistemological approach used by scholars of lesson-drawing and emulation, 
but I would argue that is the approach most compatible with my specific research question.    
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2.4  The Selection of Country Cases
As discussed in the previous chapter, my study’s isolation of Africa as a region of particular 
interest has a compelling logic rooted both in the existing literature and in the data on which 
it draws.  The choice of Ethiopia and Kenya as case studies within this region, however, 
requires further clarification here.  
The study of one or multiple cases that are bounded in space and time is a very 
frequently-used method in the social sciences; the classic study on the subject judges the 
method, 'by the standard of praxis', to be 'thriving' (Gerring 2004: 341).  The case study 
approach constitutes one of the principle means by which an individual researcher can 
collect empirical data, whether that data is to be used inductively or deductively, and 
qualitatively or quantitatively.
	
 When the case study is defined in narrower terms, as 'an intensive study of a single 
unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units' (Gerring 2004: 342), 
the method is not without controversy.  Numerous scholars have criticised the notion that one 
or a few cases may generate knowledge about a broader population as unscientific and 
lacking in rigour (e.g. Campbell and Stanley quoted in Flyvbjerg 2006: 219).  Nonetheless, a 
large body of literature has sought to demonstrate that—under certain specific conditions—
cases can be generalised for the purposes of theory generation, theory testing and description 
(Eisenhardt 1989; George and Bennet 2005).  These studies often admit that case study 
researchers sacrifice a certain degree of parsimony and breadth in exchange for the 
explanatory depth and richness they uncover, but treat this as a spectrum of choices rather 
than a dichotomy (e.g. George and Bennett 2005: 31).   
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 This study takes a similar approach, seeking to mediate these inevitable tensions 
between specificity and wider applicability.  On the one hand, its choice of the case study 
method is conditioned by its aim of obtaining a rich, context-specific understanding of a 
phenomenon that has hitherto been approached primarily in an exploratory manner.  Its use 
of a broadly constructivist ontology and hermeneutic epistemology necessitates an 
understanding of agents within their social and political contexts; it is highly doubtful that a 
broader survey of disparate African elites could have achieved this.  
	
 In his discussion on case selection, Stake (2003: 137) distinguishes between a case 
that is studied solely for its intrinsic value and an instrumental case study that 'plays a 
supportive role’ and ‘facilitates our understanding of something else'; he also states that cases 
can occupy intermediate roles between these poles (Stake 2003: 137).  In this case, the case 
selection does contain an element of intrinsic value:  Ethiopia and Kenya are both large and 
historically important African countries.  Both are among the most populous countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa, and each plays a leading political or economic role in its sub-region. 
The attitudes of their elites are therefore inherently important in illuminating the influence of 
East Asian development models.  As Giddens (quoted in Flyvbjerg 2006: 328) points out, 
particularistic studies such as these, when carried out in numbers, can help a discipline in its 
understanding of a particular issue.
	
 On the other hand, this study seeks not to ask 'What influences Ethiopian and Kenyan 
development strategies?' but rather 'Does the current literature accurately describe and 
explain the influence of Chinese and East Asian development models in Africa?'  As such, it 
is important that the two African countries chosen here offer information that is at least 
potentially relevant beyond their borders.   One way in which they do so is by constituting 
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what Flyvbjerg (2006: 232) calls 'paradigmatic cases'.  Since the colonial era, Kenya has 
occupied a central role in the popular Western, and by extension the academic, imagination 
of Africa.  As host to and focus of the paradigmatic 'Kenya debate' in the 1970s, which pitted 
Marxist scholars against those positing the existence of an indigenous pre-colonial Kenyan 
capitalist class (see Kitching 1985 for an overview), it has also had a particularly strong 
impact on political economy debates.  Although the country is unusual in certain respects, 
many of its major problems—corruption, ethnic discord, inequality, climatic and 
demographic pressures on land—are those seen as most troubling for the continent overall.
	
 If Kenya is the emblematic post-colonial political economy, Ethiopia is, in turn, the 
paradigmatic aid recipient.  To a certain extent, Ethiopia has long been treated as an African 
'anomaly' due to its atypical status as the sole sub-Saharan African country to resist 
colonisation and engage in nation-building activities of the kind more frequently seen in 
European history (Tibebu 1996).  Nonetheless, Ethiopia's status as one of Africa's poorest 
and most aid-dependent countries has given it a broader relevance in the study of 
development.  Where Kenya has exemplified Africa's problems of governance and ethnicity, 
Ethiopia has typified the drought, hunger and extreme poverty found in many countries on 
the continent.  As a result, several assessments of international development assistance 
cautiously extrapolate Ethiopia's experiences to other contexts (Maxwell 1996; Fengler and 
Kharas 2010).9  
	
 It is often fruitful to combine more than one logic when selecting cases (Flyvbjerg 
2006: 233).  Both Kenya and Ethiopia are paradigmatic when considered in isolation; when 
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9  Fengler and Kharas (2010), respectively the current and former chief economists at the World Bank, select 
Kenya as  the other of the two African countries they select as providing a 'cross-section' of aid performance.
considered in conjunction, however, Kenya and Ethiopia also constitute cases of ‘maximum 
variation’ (Flyvbjerg 2006: 230).  This allows for a certain level of extrapolation to those 
cases that fall between these extremes on a certain dimension, particularly when these 
divergent cases are broadly representative of the greater population of cases (Seawright and 
Gerring 2008: 298-299).   
	
 Because this study is concerned primarily with the influence of foreign models on 
African development paradigms, the most important dimension on which cases could diverge 
was in the particular development paradigms they inherited prior to the current emergence of 
the 'China Model' debate.  Ethiopia once provided the setting for one of the most avowedly 
and uncompromisingly communist regimes found in Cold War Africa, namely Mengistu 
Hailemariam’s Derg dictatorship.   This translated into an adherence to many of the precepts 
of dependency and neo-Marxist theories of development, such as a reliance on import-
substitution, nationalisation and a single-party state.  Kenya’s development paradigm during 
the Cold War was virtually a mirror-image.  Its post-independence elites retained many of the 
organisational patterns and modes of economic organisation in place at independence, and 
the country became one of those most firmly situated in the Western capitalist ‘bloc’.  
These periods were bracketed by eras in which Kenya and Ethiopia’s development 
strategies showed greater evidence of convergence:  each country, as shall be shown, 
witnessed indigenous efforts in the 1960s and early 1970s to apply the precepts of 
modernisation theory to development.  Likewise, aid dependence and regime decline have 
somewhat weakened the influence of local development ideologies and allowed for the 
implementation of many of the demands of the Washington Consensus.  Nonetheless, each 
country bears the historical legacy of its respective Cold War development strategy.  Where 
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the influence of East Asian models of development is similar across these two diverse cases, 
it would be reasonable to infer that other African cases exist with similar dynamics.  Where 
the influence differs, it would also be reasonable to conclude that historical differences in 
development paradigms at least contributes to this divergence.  
Because this study does not follow a positivist epistemology, this divergence is not 
conceptualised as an independent variable, and the aim is not to prove causal links that can 
be used to construct covering laws.  Instead, the Ethiopian and Kenyan cases are presented 
simply as two countries that are emblematic for the study of development, but which differ 
vastly in the paradigms that have informed their developmental experiences in recent 
decades.  The generalisability aimed for is neither that of systematic statistical sampling, nor 
of theory-building.  Instead, it is 'analytic generalizability,...a reasoned judgement about the 
extent to which the findings of one study can be used as a guide to what might occur in 
another situation' (Kvale 1996: 262) with which I am concerned.  This method relies partially 
on the explicit arguments regarding transferability that I have raised here and in the 
conclusion, but also partially on the induction and reasoning of the reader (Kvale 1996: 265). 
Generalisation, by its very nature, depends on unstated assumptions about similarity and 
difference (Firestone 1993: 21), and different observers are likely to extrapolate the 
significance of my findings to different extents.
	
 One final practical consideration, that of feasibility, played a role in determining case 
selection.   According to Miles and Huberman (1994: 34), it is important to take practical 
factors such as funding, timing and accessibility into account when carrying out sampling. 
In this case, it was most practical to conduct fieldwork in countries situated near to each 
other.  The danger does exist that, in so doing, I have limited generalisability to the East 
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African region.  However, this danger is greatly diminished by two factors.  Firstly, there is 
general, albeit unvoiced, agreement in the literature on the Chinese and East Asian models 
that regional variation does not play a significant role in African emulation.  Countries said to 
be following these models range from Angola (Powers 2012) to Rwanda (Collier 2011) to 
Ethiopia (Gamora and Mathews 2010: 96).  Variation, where it does exist, is held to occur 
along institutional or political lines; African governments with a strong grip on power, for 
example, are often said to be more willing and able to implement lessons from China (Gill 
and Huang 2006: 20).  Secondly, the factor that most distinguishes East Africa from other 
regions on the continent is its history of British colonisation.  I thus took care not to select 
two former British colonies, as this could indeed have skewed the research findings.   
	

2.5  Sources of Data and Methods of Data Collection/Analysis
2.5.1  The Use of an Interview Methodology 
Semi-structured interviews with the 91 elites listed in Appendix C constituted the primary 
source of data for the study.  These were conducted in Addis Ababa from June 2010 to 
September 2010, and in Nairobi from September to December 2010.  Interview length varied 
between 30 and 90 minutes; the average length was 53 minutes.
	
 There is a long tradition of using interview data in the hermeneutic approach. 
Interviewing 'gives privileged access to people's basic experiences of the lived world' (Kvale 
1996: 29) and is the research method best-suited 'for gathering data on those characteristics 
of the social world that differentiate it from the natural world: human beings' effort to 
intentionally transform their environment on the basis of cognition, reflection and learning 
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(Almond and Genco quoted in Rathburn 2008: 690).  My own commitment to placing 
interview data at the centre of this study—rather than in employing it in the supplementary 
and more casual manner more often seen in policy-oriented literature—reflects these 
beliefs.10 
	
 A qualitative interview methodology does entail certain inherent challenges. 
Positivist researchers, in particular, have raised issues surrounding the validity, reliability and 
objectivity of findings garnered by this and other qualitative techniques (detailed in Denzin 
and Lincoln 2005: 8; Kvale 1994).  At the other end of the ontological spectrum, these 
criteria have been rejected altogether by those critics of positivism (Guba and Lincoln 1985) 
who view credibility, transferability, reliability and confirmability as more suitable criteria by 
which to address post-positivist research designs.  The terms used to judge the soundness of 
my findings are less important here than the fact that I have aimed for research that is 
rigorous and empirical.  Taking as my guideline Cherryholmes' concept of construct validity 
(discussed in Kvale 1996: 240) , whereby a study is validated to the extent that its findings 
are persuasive to the research community, I focused in making my research design 
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10  A brief note is required here regarding a term to which this study does not otherwise devote significant 
attention, namely discourse analysis.  I engage in discourse analysis only insofar as I rigorously examine 
interviews and other written or spoken statements emanating from Ethiopian and Kenyan leaders.   Although a 
broad term, discourse analysis often entails an epistemological or ontological commitment either to 
understanding how language itself is constructed, or to interrogating and deconstructing the ways in which 
language is used to dominate and oppress (see the chapters on discourse analysis by Potter and Wetherell and 
by Fairclough and Wodak (in Seale 2004) for classic examples of each approach).  My own study of paradigms 
and cognitive constructs is interested in discourse only insofar as it is often the most direct way, in its own 
imperfect manner, in which these can be understood.
transparent, falsifiable and self-critical.  The means by which I have sought to do so are 
detailed throughout this section.    
	
 One of the key challenges researchers face when using interview data is the fact that 
interviewees may have faulty memories or understandings of particular events and processes; 
their highly subjective views may be clouded by emotion or ideology (Richards 1996: 200). 
For this reason, it sometimes proved fruitful to confront elite perceptions with the 
understanding, in the existing literature, of the processes by which elites’ ‘model countries’ 
developed.   In this way, whilst the dissertation remained consistently focused on subjective 
understandings, these were, when necessary, contextualised by an examination of the 
development trajectories of China, Malaysia and others in the region.
An interview methodology even presents the danger of outright lying, or what 
Rathburn (2008: 689) calls 'strategic reconstruction'.  However, several key works on this 
subject see outright dishonesty as extreme and unusual rather than the norm (Richards 1996: 
200; Rathburn 2008: 689).  Furthermore, my interest in my subjects' cognitive perspectives 
means that emotional and subjective responses become important sources of data rather  than 
obstacles.  Even where elites engage in more conscious dissembling, constructivist ontology 
holds that interests and ideas are mutually constituted; what elites choose to share—how they 
want their development paradigms to be perceived—is arguably inseparable from their 
'actual' development paradigms.  These will reflect intersubjective norms that are formed 
through consultation and debate not only with members of an 'in-group' such as their own 
political parties, but also with 'out-groups' such as Western donors and Asian investors.
	
 During the course of my own research, I found strategic reconstruction to be a severe 
problem only in one area, namely in gauging Ethiopian elites' attitudes to issues of 
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democracy and authoritarianism.  These challenges are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 
Eight.  Even here, however, a close interpretation of the discourse—again supplemented by 
the existing literature and other forms of discourse—enabled me to draw certain bounded 
conclusions.  The very reticence of Ethiopian elites on this question, for example, was in 
itself an indication of the tight control that the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) exercises over discourse in this area.  In addition, as discussed 
below, the use of other sources of elite discourse on this subject aided validity through 
triangulation.  
	
 Aside from the issue of interviewee 'truthfulness', interviewers face other potential 
practical pitfalls which may affect the quality of findings.  These are often specific to the type 
of interviewee being targeted.  Elite interviews, in particular, are often hampered by lack of 
access and by potential power imbalances between the interviewer and interviewee (Richards 
1996).  Because many of these issues can be minimised if the researcher approaches her 
interviews with an awareness of their existence, I took care to familiarise myself with the 
practical aspects of conducting elite interviews (Odendahl and Shaw 2001; Ostrander 1995; 
Moyser and Wagstaffe 1987; Richards 1996) before undertaking my own fieldwork.  This 
improved the design of my interview questions, my own conduct during interviews and the 
subsequent transcription and analysis of results.  For example, Ostrander (1995) details the 
ways in which interviewers may overcome the power imbalances inherent in the elite 
interview through their behaviour before, during and after an interview; I was able to apply 
many of these to my own interviewing technique.  
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2.5.2  The Sampling of Interview Subjects
 In order to narrow my focus and allow for in-depth analysis, the study is bounded in several 
important ways.    Firstly, rather than looking at all segments of society in Kenya and 
Ethiopia, it focuses solely on these countries’ elites.  To a large extent, this delineation 
follows directly from the research question.  This study seeks to provide an empirical 
underpinning to debates on the influence of a putative Chinese Model on African 
development policies; as Inglehart and Welzel (2005: 43) point out, elites are almost by 
definition the most powerful individuals in society—when actors become powerful enough to 
influence national decision-making, they are classified as elites.  The vast majority of 
theories of cross-societal emulation and lesson-drawing also retain this focus, either by 
empirically illustrating how specific elites across the world have historically learnt from each 
others' development experiences (e.g. Westney 1987) or by theorising the cognitive or 
institutional contexts that guide national decision-makers in their assessments of external 
models (Rivera 2004).  For people in management or leadership positions, external models 
hold greater promise as sources of lessons than internal models, since 'by looking within they 
only learn what they already know’ (Rose 1988: 233).   
	
 This is not meant to imply that elites alone can or should drive development; in the 
long term, wider consensus may well need to accompany any sustainable social, political or 
economic change. As Moyser and Wagstaffe (1987: xi) point out, one does not have to be an 
elitist to study elites.  However, there is a strong argument to be made that African elites are 
the only actors in society with the capacity to examine and institute (or, for that matter, 
decisively reject) outside models.  There may well be a gap between the views of African 
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elites and non-elites regarding the attractiveness of the various models (Horta 2009), but a 
limited study of this nature can shed light on at least one side of this complex equation. 
	
 The question of who qualifies as an elite is sometimes contentious and conceptually 
ambiguous.  Moyser and Wagstaffe (1987: 7) contrast maximalist definitions that adhere to 
Meisel's three 'C's'—coherence, consciousness and conspiracy—with more flexible 
definitions with allow for the inclusion of dissident groups and gradations of unity.  The 
extent to which elites are conscious of their own status and to which they 'conspire' to 
maintain their privilege are questions largely outside the scope of this study.  The extent to 
which elites are inherently coherent in their views on emulation and the Chinese Model is 
directly relevant to my research;  rather than assuming a coherence prior to sampling, 
however—and thereby focusing only on elites in a particular institution or sector—I viewed 
coherence (or lack thereof) as a research finding.  My aim was thus to attain a broad cross-
section of those Ethiopian and Kenyan elites representing various inputs into the policy-
making process.  
	
 My methodology in this regard has been inspired by previous studies with a similar 
scope, in particular Reis and Moore’s (2005) analysis of elite perceptions of poverty and 
inequality.  I adopt their definition of elite as 'the very small number of people who control 
the key material, symbolic and political resources within a country’ (Reis and Moore 2005: 
2).  Rather than attempting to measure levels of actual power held by each individual, they 
operationalise the concept in institutional terms, selecting respondents occupying 'prominent 
positions in institutions that help to frame policy and discourse' in their area of interest (Reis 
and Moore 2005: 59).  This definition of elites by occupation is a common approach, 
although elites can also be defined by income level, by educational background or by other 
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factors (Kvale 1996: 302).  This approach aids feasibility, as well as allowing for an 
understanding of how attitudes to emulation diverge and coalesce among different political 
groupings.
	
 My population of interview subjects, therefore, comprised all occupants of senior 
positions in those organisations or institutions contributing to the formulation of 
development policy and discourse in Ethiopia and Kenya.  In sampling interviewees within 
this population, I primarily drew on Patton's (2002) influential elaboration of the 'purposive 
sampling' method.  This method, also called 'judgment sampling', is one of main qualitative 
alternatives to the statistical/probability sampling used by quantitative studies.  Purposive 
sampling 'focuses on selecting information-rich cases whose study will illuminate the 
questions under study' (Patton 2002: 230).  Generalisability to a broader population may still 
be one goal of the research design, but it is tempered with the need for a deeper 
understanding of the complexity of individual cases; as with the selection of my country 
cases, this is a spectrum whereby calculated trade-offs are made between depth and breadth 
of inquiry (Patton 2002: 244).  
	
 Several logics may drive purposive sampling, and these may be combined for the 
purposes of triangulation and flexibility (Patton 2002: 244).  I combined two logics in 
particular, and these were supplemented by a third.  These are, in order of importance:
a) 'Critical case' (Patton 2002: 236):  This method focuses on cases that are particularly 
important.  In this dissertation, this translated to individuals and organisations 
occupying influential formal or informal positions in the formulation and 
implementation of development policy.  This information was drawn from existing 
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literature or from interviews as these progressed.  Interviewees did not necessarily 
have to exercise an influence on the top national leadership, but could be involved in 
disseminating and implementing development policies within the country.  Large 
umbrella organisations representing trade unions and NGOs in Ethiopia, for example, 
are in practice heavily subordinate on the government; nevertheless, the role they 
play in liaising with their members on behalf of the government validated their 
inclusion.  Where the views of these elites differ from those of their government, they 
are valuable in illustrating which divergent developmental views are still tolerated 
within the political mainstream. 
b) 'Maximum variation' (Patton 2002: 243): I also took care to select interviewees and 
organisations that represented the full spectrum of development discourse in the 
country.  The political, business and civil society sectors were thus all included.  In 
the political sector, I took care to select elites from several political parties.  This was 
true even in Ethiopia, where the main opposition party, Medrek, now holds only a 
single seat in parliament.  Because the leaders of Medrek are often marked by the 
influential positions they have held in previous (now-defunct) political 
administrations and by their close educational ties to the West, they represent a 
distinctive political discourse in Ethiopia—one to which the EPRDF often 
purposefully sets itself in opposition.  These views are partially useful, in fact, 
precisely because they reveal the strands of development discourse which 
increasingly fall outside the Ethiopian political pale.  
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c) Once a group of varied and important interviewees had been identified, purposive 
sampling using the snowball or chain referral method (Biernecki and Waldorf 1981) 
was used. In this method, the interviewer contacts subjects that have been 
recommended to her by those she has already interviewed.  This step contributed to 
the feasibility of the study, but it was strictly nested within the previous two.  In other 
words, recommendations from previous interviews were only followed up if they 
adhered to criteria a), b) or both.  	
    
Table 1:  Classification of Interviewees by Sector and Country
Ethiopia Kenya Total
 Parliamentarians 18 6 24
 Bureaucrats 8 * 10 29
 Advisors to government 1 6 7
 Business leaders 3 6 9
 Media 4 3 7
 NGOs 2 7 9
 Trade unions 2 1 3
 Religious organisations 1 2 3
 Other non-governmental 5 ** 2 7
 Foreign representatives *** 2 2 4
TOTAL 46 45 91
Notes:  
* In Ethiopia, senior bureaucrats are almost invariably members of the EPRDF, and the distinction between 
elected politicians and civil servants is thus virtually nonexistent.
** Includes those leaders of opposition parties who did not occupy seats in the National Assembly or 
Parliamentary Federal Assembly at the time of writing but who nonetheless represent distinctive strands of the 
existing national discourse.
*** Refers to Chinese and Indian diplomatic representatives to Ethiopia or Kenya – these are therefore not 
African elites.
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One further note must be included in this discussion of sampling.  As regards the 
geographical origins of respondents, I defined as 'Ethiopian' or 'Kenyan' elites those 
originating from and currently living in these countries.  The Ethiopian diaspora, in 
particular, comprises numerous elites who are often vociferously critical of the EPRDF.  The 
influence that these elites have on internal development discourse is minimal, however, as 
their (primarily internet-based) writings are effectively banned within the country.11  This 
selection criterion also allowed for the inclusion of Kenyans of Indian and non-African 
origin, two of which were interviewed for this study.  
	
 I selected one small supplementary group of interview respondents according to a 
very different logic.  In addition to the 87 interviews I conducted with Kenyan and Ethiopian 
elites, I interviewed four senior officials representing the governments of China and India in 
Nairobi and Addis Ababa.  Unlike the interpretive interviews that constituted my main source 
of data, these were primarily descriptive in nature.  Here the aim was not to understand the 
subjective worldviews of subjects but rather to discover the extent to which Ethiopian and 
Kenyan elites approached each Asian country for lesson-drawing purposes, and to 
understand the extent of current lesson-sharing.  Data was gathered on the number and extent 
of study visits, the main policy areas discussed at such events and the extent to which 
Chinese and Indian representatives were approached informally by Ethiopian and Kenyan 
elites for the purposes of lesson-drawing.  This data was used to supplement the main body 
of findings, but was not analysed electronically and comparatively. 
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11  Websites such as www.ethiopianreview.com and www.nazret.com and the writings of US-based dissidents 
such as Berhanu Nega and Alemayehu G. Mariam are blocked, albeit not always consistently (ONI 2009). 
	
 When presenting the findings garnered from elite interviewing, it is important to 
acknowledge the extent to which a lack of access to particular respondents inhibited 
representativeness (Richards 1996: 200).  In the case of this dissertation, response rates were 
generally fairly good, and I was able to attain access to the vast majority of the individuals 
and organisations I targeted.  In most cases, interviewees were drawn from the highest or 
second-highest level of seniority within an organisation or group.
	
 Access proved challenging within one sector in Kenya, where it was difficult to 
interview senior parliamentarians, particularly those without ministerial positions.  This was 
in part due to the commencement in 2010 of the highly fractious and time-consuming 
process of devolution necessitated by the implementation of the country’s then-newly passed 
constitution.  In addition, in Ethiopia I was unable to include those few select elites held (by 
internal and external observers) to exercise a shadowy, corrupting and often unofficial 
influence on the executive. An example is the leadership of the Endowment Fund for the 
Rehabilitation of Tigrai (EFFORT), an organisation that masquerades as an NGO but is, in 
fact, a vast multi-million dollar conglomerate headed by the wife of Meles Zenawi (Abbink 
2006: 5; Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003: 76).  The leadership of EFFORT declined to meet with 
me.
	
 I contend that neither omission has seriously compromised my findings, although I 
detail them here for the sake of transparency and to allow readers to engage in their own 
evaluation of the 'analytical generalisability' of my findings.  In the Kenyan case, those 
members of the legislature whom I did interview were sufficiently numerous to demonstrate 
the contrast between this sector and the executive, which exhibited a greater enthusiasm for 
emulation and whose lesson-drawing is largely the focus of the final two chapters.  This 
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sector's lack of interest in meeting with me also illustrated an apathy in the topic of my 
research, making its non-responsiveness a finding in itself.  In the case of Ethiopia, it is 
likely that the omitted interviewees would not have been responsive to any sensitive 
questions I put to them, even had interviews been secured.  It is highly likely that their input 
into governmental decision-making operates at a level other than that of policy outcomes.  To 
compensate, I was able to secure interviews with other highly controversial presidential 
advisors who occupied more transparent positions.
2.5.3  The Structuring, Transcription and Analysis of Interview Data
Although semi-structured interviews allow for greater flexibility and interviewer discretion 
than do survey-style or structured questionnaires, their design still requires a great deal of 
planning and knowledge; this is particularly true of interviews with time-pressed elites 
(Richards 1996: 201).  Care must be taken, for example, to avoid the posing of leading 
questions. In the case of the research detailed here, there was a further need to avoid specific 
mention of the Chinese, Indian or East Asian Models in the interview planning stage, as I 
wished for these to initially be given the chance to emerge organically from the discourse of 
interviewees themselves. 
	
 The majority of my interviews were, therefore, loosely structured in such a way that 
five broad topics were covered, most frequently in the following order:12 
1. Subjects' views on the concept of modernisation, as well as on socio-economic 
phenomena (industrialisation, rapid economic growth, urbanisation) typically 
77
12 A more detailed list of interview questions can be found in Appendix B.
associated with modernisation.  This introductory section also covered selected 
questions on elites' understanding of the nature of development, such as the 
relationship between economic growth and democracy, or the obstacles hindering 
development in elites' own countries.
2. Subjects' general views on cross-societal emulation.  This section contained the most 
important question of the interview, namely ‘Do you think your country should 
follow the development model of any other country or group of countries?’  The 
answer to this question was probed in some depth in order to gain an understanding 
of the reasons behind elites' choice of model (or, in some instances, their lack of 
model).  Non-governmental elites were also asked whether they discerned any 
emulation on the part of their national governments.  
3. Subjects' views on the potential of China to act as a development model for their own 
countries.  The perceived desirability and transferability of a Chinese model was 
probed at length.
4. Subjects' views on the potential of India to act as a development model for their own 
countries.  The perceived desirability and transferability of an Indian model was 
probed at length.
5. Subjects were asked to rank several potential countries (from the West, Africa, South 
America and East Asia) in order of their attractiveness as models.
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The prominent place given to the concept of modernisation and to the Indian Model reflects 
my dissertation's initial research question, which treated most current models available to 
African decision-makers as models of modernisation and accorded a greater importance to 
the Indian example than does my revised research question.  While the danger exists that the 
ordering and inclusion of these questions may have distorted my findings, I have taken care 
to minimise this risk.  For example, due to the danger that interviewees might follow my 
example and adopt my initial terminology, I have not taken interviewees' use of the term 
modernisation as evidence of their support for the associated content of this term unless this 
was warranted by the remainder of the interviewees' answers; I was also careful to avoid 
citing quotes that would give a false impression in this regard.  
	
 In many instances, the ordering and inclusion of these questions actually contributed 
to the rigour of my findings.  The fact that each question on lesson-drawing from China was 
accompanied by a similar question on lesson-drawing from India provided a useful basis for 
comparison.  India, in this sense, was able to act as a 'control' that highlighted the 
attractiveness of China to Ethiopian lesson-drawers and the attractiveness of East Asia to 
Kenyan lesson-drawers.  The inclusion of questions on modernisation and development at 
the beginning of the interview provided me with the opportunity to understand elites' 
interpretations of the drivers, aims and processes of development before the discussion of 
individual models associated these elements with a particular country's experiences.  It also 
allowed me to understand interviewee responses to specific terms such as ‘industrialisation’ 
and 'modernisation'—an important set of data given my argument that the emulating elites in 
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both Ethiopia and Kenya are more favourably disposed to modernisation theory than any 
others since the 1950s and 1960s.
	
 Not every interview followed the pattern set out above; a handful of interviews 
deviated substantially, with only the most essential pre-determined questions remaining. 
During semi-structured interviews, ‘the interviewer has a core set of open-ended questions 
that he or she supplements liberally with probes and questions tailored to the specific 
[respondent]’ (Sinclair and Brady 1987:  67).  The order of questions may vary and the 
researcher is free to follow up interesting tangents or alter the format based on the 
particularities of the interviewee.  At the same time, a semi-standardised approach allows for 
a certain amount of cross-interview comparison.  
	
 Semi-structured interviews occupy the middle ground between open-ended, 
ethnographic interviews and the close-ended technique most often used for quantitative 
surveys (Rathburn 2008: 687).  This interview format is non-positivist without ruling out the 
possibility that researchers can approach some degree of objective truth by weighing 
conflicting evidence offering the most convincing possible interpretation (Rathburn 2008: 
687); this makes it well-suited to my hermeneutic, interpretivist epistemology. Two other 
factors similarly militated for a semi-structured approach:  elites in particular are more likely 
to answer questions they feel do not constrain them, and the exploratory and under-theorised 
nature of research topic made a survey approach impractical (Aberbach and Rockman 2002: 
674).
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 Interviews were recorded where possible.  In Kenya, 100% of interviewees consented 
to being recorded, while in Ethiopia the figure was roughly 90%.13  Where recording was not 
possible, notes were taken in shorthand during the interview, and then expanded on 
immediately after the interview based on my recollection of the subject matter.  One 
interviewee opted to speak in Amharic and have a colleague act as interpreter.  Recorded 
interviews were transcribed in full upon completion. 
	
 The decision whether to transcribe interviews 'naturalistically'—and thereby indicate 
the occurrence of involuntary vocalisations, response tokens ('um', 'uh huh', etc), dialect and 
non-verbal gestures—or whether to 'de-naturalise' transcripts is a contentious one (Oliver et 
al 2005).  While a faithful reproduction of the mechanics of an interview can yield benefits in 
research that focuses on discourse and conversation analysis, my own research has opted for 
a 'denaturalised' approach.  Here, 'the focus is less how one communicates perceptions...but 
the perceptions themselves’ (Oliver et al 2005).  Light editing of transcripts, if done with 
restraint and self-awareness, can assist readers with readability and comprehension (Powers 
2005: 63).  It also, I believe, more faithfully represents the intentions of interviewees, who 
were all second-language speakers of English and would presumably not have made these 
grammatical mistakes if speaking in their native languages.  Transcriptions were thus lightly 
edited for grammar purposes and readability, although repetitions, unusual phrasing and 
profanities were, for the most part, left untouched.
	
 After transcription, interviews were analysed using Nvivo (Version 9).  In recent 
years, the use of computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) has 
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13 A small number of non-governmental respondents within this 90% spoke for a considerable length of time 
off the record.
increased rapidly in the social and political sciences, and Nvivo is currently the most 
commonly-used CAQDAS platform in these disciplines (Budding and Cools 2008: 23).  It 
allows researchers to either manually or automatically code document contents along a 
number of themes or 'nodes' determined by the user.  Documents can also be assigned 
attributes (e.g. 'age', 'gender' or, in my case, 'sector'); patterns in the data may then be 
discerned by comparing the prevalence of themes by specific attribute or the data sample as a 
whole.  	

The use of CAQDAS may, inter alia, allow researchers to retrieve and organise their 
data more effectively, oblige them to be clearer and more transparent regarding the reasoning 
behind their conclusions, and assist them in extracting meaning from large bodies of data 
(Fielding 2002).  It even allows for the production of basic quantitative data, enabling a 
mixed method approach.  However, even cautious advocates of the approach often advise 
against becoming overly-reliant on the automation that such software allows (Fielding and 
Lee 2002: 210; Thompson 2002); for this reason, I coded all my documents manually.  The 
only automated aspect of my analysis lay in the comparisons (between themes and between 
groups of interviewees) generated; the implications of these, particularly as they relate to the 
literature, were then again analysed by myself alone.  In this way, I believe I was able to 
delegate what Thompson (2002) calls the 'mechanical' aspects of the research to the software 
programme, whilst remaining in control of the 'conceptual' (Thompson 2002) elements.
2.5.4  Triangulation and the Use of Supplementary Documents
Although interviews constituted this work's key source of data, I also used a selection of 
written documents for the purposes of triangulation.  These fell into three categories:
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1. Policy documents issued by the Ethiopian and Kenyan governments. Cross-sectoral 
and 'flagship' documents were given higher priority than sectoral and lower-profile 
documents. 
 
2. Documents originating from the ruling parties of each country.  These documents 
were not necessarily aimed at readers outside the party, allowing for a rare but 
valuable insight into internal party discourse (particularly in the case of Ethiopia).
3. Opinion pieces and other documents by elites writing (or quoted) in their personal 
capacities.  As I also regarded certain journalists as elites, editorials in the media were 
also viewed as examples of elite discourse.  The status of individual elites and 
publications were, however, taken into account when weighing the relative 
importance of these texts.
The principle of triangulation is based on the assumption that 'any finding or conclusion in a 
case study is likely to be much more convincing and accurate if it is based on several 
different sources of information, following a corroboratory mode’ (Yin quoted in Budding 
and Cools 2009: 12).  It is frequently used in qualitative studies in order to improve the 
validity and rigour of findings.  The most influential typology of triangulation distinguishes 
between four forms of triangulation (Denzin 1970): 'data triangulation', which uses different 
sampling strategies to arrive at different datasets; 'investigator triangulation', in which more 
than one researcher collects and analyses data; 'theoretical triangulation', whereby more than 
83
one theoretical stance is taken in analysing data; and 'methodological triangulation', whereby 
more than one method is used for collecting data.  
	
 As the sets of elites whose views are contained in the above documents sometimes 
differed from those whom I interviewed personally, the form of triangulation used in this 
dissertation is primarily the first-mentioned.  The fact that these elites did overlap on 
occasion, combined with the difference in nature between the collection/analysis of interview 
transcripts and the collection/analysis of other documents used, lends my strategy an 
additional element of methodological triangulation.  Denzin (1970: 472) terms this use of 
more than one form of triangulation 'multiple triangulation'.
	
 The selective borrowing of certain elements of classic content analysis—such as the 
quantification of key terms and the quantitative analysis of manually coded sources—also 
contributes to methodological triangulation in this work.  The dissertation does at times take 
advantage of the opportunities offered by CAQDAS to introduce features of quantitative 
analysis into those sections of the dissertation where the number of interviewees or volume 
of text involved is sufficiently high to allow for the discernment of broad patterns of elite 
perception.  This shares important features with Roller at al’s (1995) ‘hermeneutic-
classificatory content analysis’, whereby data is first coded qualitatively and interpretively 
before being subjected to numerical analysis; ‘this technique’, the authors hold, ‘is especially 
suited for analysing unstructured or semi-structured interviews in which people describe and 
explain their views on specific topics in their own words (Roller et al 1995: 175).   
As detailed in previous sections, I have used purposive rather than random sampling 
methods, and these quantitative elements can therefore not be viewed as statistically 
transferable to a broader universe of cases.  The fact that 92% of Ethiopian interviewees 
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viewed China as either an example of outright or qualified success, for example, should not 
be taken to mean that the same percentage of Ethiopian elites necessarily share this 
sentiment.  Instead, the principle of analytical generalisability allows the reader to access the 
list of interviewees consulted (in Appendix B) and the positions they hold (in Table 1) and 
thereby come to a reasoned judgement regarding their broader applicability.  In order to 
avoid distortions based on very low numbers of cases, however, I have avoided introducing 
quantitative analysis where less than a dozen elites are being analysed at any one time.  This 
has allowed me to methodologically triangulate my findings and to use the often vast 
amounts of data generated by this study without compromising the work’s interpretive focus.
2.6  Ethical Considerations
It is important for research to adhere to international professional ethical standards, 
particularly where live research participants such as interviewees are concerned.  I took 
particular care to follow the research standards set by the Political Studies Association 
(Berrington et al 2011), a leading professional organisations in my discipline.  
	
 One important set of considerations relates to my ethical duty towards those I 
interviewed.  This includes the need to obtain informed and voluntary consent from each 
interview subject:  subjects must not be coerced into participation, must understand how the 
results of their participation will be used and must agree to this usage; prior to participation 
they must also be as informed as possible about the goals and aims of the research without 
the legitimate aims of the research being compromised (Neuman 2006: 135).  
	
 In my case, interviewees were given a written letter of introduction stating my 
institutional affiliations and a very broad description of my research focus, namely 'the 
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impact of non-Western models of development on development strategies in Kenya/
Ethiopia'.  Those who requested a prior list of questions were provided with a brief list of 
topics to be covered and were informed of the non-exhaustive nature of this list.  I did not 
disclose to elites my focus on Chinese and Indian models of development until these 
questions emerged during the latter half of interviews, as this would have biased my research 
aims.  I took care, however, not to engage in deception of any kind:  I disclosed the sources 
of my research funding where requested and stated clearly in what contexts the data obtained 
would be used before interviews commenced.  Interviewees were provided with my contact 
details and were able to request transcripts of their interviews.  Ostrander (1995: 139) 
suggests allowing research subjects to correct factual errors contained in the completed 
transcript whilst warning them that the researcher’s interpretation of these words may not 
always correspond with their own; this is a convention I have followed.
	
 Certain non-governmental interviewees expressed opinions that could potentially 
place them in harm's way through governmental persecution.  In keeping with the 
fundamental ethical principle of doing no harm to subjects (Babbie 2007: 27), care was taken 
to protect subjects' anonymity and confidentiality.  Thus interviewees were given the option 
of having their names and titles obscured.  Anything disclosed 'off the record' was also 
excluded from my reported findings.
	
   Researchers also have an ethical duty to readers and the broader academic 
community.  This includes inter alia a responsibility to report findings honestly and in good 
faith; to acknowledge the work of others when used and to be transparent about the biases 
that he or she may bring to the research.  Weber (1994 [1895]: 18) himself pointed out the 
impossibility of research unclouded by the values of the researcher; my own findings are 
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doubtless similarly affected.  The methodological, ontological and epistemological 
assumptions and procedures detailed in this chapter are one way in which I have attempted to 
clarify and examine the assumptions and process which have underpinned this research from 
beginning to end.  Transcripts (edited only for the purposes of confidentiality/anonymity) and 
coding data are, in addition, available on request to researchers who wish to corroborate my 
findings.
2.7  Conclusion 
This dissertation seeks to understand the extent to which the much-discussed Chinese Model 
is truly altering development paradigms in Africa.  After a careful reading of the subject-
specific and methodological literatures, I felt the research design detailed in this chapter to be 
best suited to answering this question.  By focusing on the Ethiopian and Kenyan cases, and 
by taking a hermeneutic approach that interprets the subjective worldviews of both 
governmental and non-government elites in both countries, this study provides an 
empirically-grounded analysis of the evolving development strategies of lesson-drawers 
themselves.  This chapter has defended and explained these methodological choices; the 
following sections will present the findings garnered from this approach.  
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PART II: AFRICAN ELITES AND 
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CHAPTER THREE:  LESSON-DRAWING AND 
EMULATION IN THE LITERATURE
The disciplines of political science and sociology together possess a relatively large body of 
literature examining the ways in which countries can be said to ‘learn’ from each other’s 
experiences and policies.  However, virtually none of the current discussions around the 
Chinese Model—and surprisingly few of the earlier debates on the East Asian Model—draw 
on the theoretical or conceptual tools provided by this literature.  This chapter makes the case 
for an application of the concepts of lesson-drawing and emulation to these contemporary 
policy debates.  It begins with an exploration of these and related terms, before providing an 
overview of their application to policy processes and outcomes.  This dissertation seeks to 
understand the impact of China’s development trajectory on the cognitive frameworks of two 
groups of national elites.  In keeping with this aim, the chapter ends by exploring one of the 
key discussions in the emulation literature, namely the role that cognitive constraints or 
‘shortcuts’ play in influencing the choices of lesson-drawers.  
3.1  The Concepts and Their Relevance
Recent decades have seen a proliferation of theoretical frameworks such as policy diffusion, 
policy transfer, lesson-drawing and emulation, all of which seek to explain the spread of 
institutions, policies or ideas from one country to another.  Although the concepts are closely 
related and often conflated, one can, in fact, discern significant differences in focus and 
content.  
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 'Policy diffusion' is the broadest of these terms; studies usually focus on the macro-
level of analysis and often use large-N comparisons to examine structural changes in the 
international system (e.g. Simmons and Elkins 2004).  In addition, much of the policy 
diffusion literature assumes a unidirectional spread of practices and policies from a single 
'lead country' to a larger group of countries, at times leading to charges of determinism (Rose 
1991: 9).  One study of diffusion, for example, defines it as 'any process where prior 
adoption of a trait or practice in a population alters the probability of adoption for remaining 
non-adopters' (Strang and Meyer 1991: 325).  Because convergence—rather than divergence
—is the focus, theorists are more concerned with tracing patterns of policy adoption than 
with the agency of policy recipients or with the reasons for adoption (Bennet 1991a: 221).  In 
fact, diffusion does not even have to imply the conscious transfer of policies, as historical, 
socio-economic and technological pressures may drive the ever-widening adoption of a 
foreign model.  Where the mechanisms of transfer are examined, prominence is given to 
policy entrepreneurs, epistemic communities and other external forces (e.g. Adler and Haas 
1992).  To use Majone's (1991: 104) distinction, diffusion focuses on the 'push' of a foreign 
model, rather than on its 'pull'.    
	
 Where purposive adoption from one policy setting to another is under discussion, 
'policy transfer' is the most commonly-used term.  This adoption is not necessarily voluntary, 
as a country may adopt external practices due to international obligations, conditionalities 
and pressures.  However, even where the process is coerced, 'the idea of policy transfer 
suggests that political agents are aware that they are drawing upon knowledge and 
experiences of other jurisdictions' (Jones and Newburn 2007: 23).  For this reason, the most 
comprehensive and influential study in the field subsumes other concepts such as emulation, 
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lesson-drawing and copying—but not diffusion—into policy transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh 
2000).  It takes a similarly broad view in determining what may be transferred, viewing 
ideas, ideology and attitudes as legitimate objects of transfer (Dolowitz and March 2000).  In 
practice, however, theorists of policy transfer have been more comfortable analysing transfer 
at the level of specific policies and institutions, and—perhaps for that reason—have focused 
on the rather narrow transfer of meso- and micro-level public policy between developed 
countries.  Radaelli (2002), for example, focuses on the transfer of currency, tax and media 
ownership policies within the European Union.  The theory of policy transfer has therefore 
made greater inroads into the fields of organisational theory and public administration than 
international relations and sociology.  Its primary concern is the mechanisms by which 
policies are transferred, rather than the structural outcomes of the process.  But because this 
transfer can be coercive as well as voluntary, it still does not focus on the cognitive 
mechanisms by which actors evaluate the benefits and transferability of foreign policies and 
programmes.  
	
 Theoretically, it would be possible to analyse the impact of the Chinese, East Asian 
and Indian models of development on other developing countries under the rubric of 
diffusion or policy transfer.  Given the debate surrounding the very existence of these 
models, however, it would be difficult to trace the spread of any one of them from its point of 
origin.  Policies and ideas usually reach a far greater level of coherence and observable 
influence before lending themselves to macro-level diffusion studies.  In contrast, an 
emblematic policy transfer approach to the problem might examine the role of World Bank 
consultants in transferring China's agricultural extension programmes to Malawi's 
agricultural policy.  However, the existence of an influential Chinese Model would require a 
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deeper, more far-reaching set of changes than such a study could demonstrate.  In addition, 
the main questions that have arisen thus far in the literature on the Chinese Model centre less 
around the possibility of one-way transmission mechanisms and more around the model's 
content and attractiveness to elites in developing countries.   Given China's famed reluctance 
to tie its aid to policy prescriptions, few have suggested that policy-makers in poor countries 
are coerced into adopting policies first applied in China.14   
	
 'Lesson-drawing', then, which refers solely to voluntary policy transfer (Dolowitz and 
Marsh 1996: 344), is a more suitable concept with which to evaluate the ideational impact of 
the Chinese Model on Ethiopian and Kenyan elites.  As Majone (1991) shows, the long-term 
success  of policy transfer depends on the existence of not only a 'push' from the originator, 
but also a 'pull' from the recipient.  
	
 Several influential theorists regard 'emulation' as a specific type of lesson-drawing, 
defined by the level of selectivity that elites apply when importing foreign programmes. 
Rose (1991: 22), for example, conceives of lesson-drawing as a spectrum: on the one end lies 
'copying', which entails the exact reproduction of foreign policies or ideas.  'Emulation', the 
'adoption, with adjustment for different circumstances, of a programme already in effect in 
another jurisdiction' is the next point along the continuum.  Even looser forms of lesson-
learning are 'hybridisation' and 'synthesis', which draw their lessons from two or more 
geographical locations.  'Inspiration', at the other end of the spectrum, relies on 'intellectual 
stimulus' from elsewhere, but entails the creation of an entirely new programme.  Similarly, 
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14  The entry of China and other emerging powers into developing countries, particularly on the African 
continent, may well affect the policies of domestic elites, but not necessarily in the direction of direct transfer 
from one policy setting to another.  
Bennett (1991b: 36) views emulation as a form of lesson-drawing that uses a limited 
geographical scope in the search for a single exemplar.  
	
 The distinction between slavish imitation and the more selective emulation is useful, 
as is the observation that nations are able to inspire each other without drawing specific 
lessons.  However, in discussions of the Chinese Model, the East Asian Model and the like, it 
becomes difficult and less important to draw the line between single and multiple exemplars: 
if elites cite lessons from Malaysia and Singapore as constituting emulation of the East Asian 
Model, is this hybridisation or emulation?  In addition, it is difficult to know exactly how 
selective elites have been until the implementation stage.  Some studies of voluntaristic 
policy transfer use only the term 'lesson-drawing' (Stone 1999), some only the term 
'emulation' (Howlett 2000), and many more (Rivera 2004: 46; Radaelli 2004; Robertson 
1991; Bennett 1991a) use the terms interchangeably.
	
 Most importantly, an overly narrow definition of emulation would exclude several 
key contributions from the field of sociology.  Westney (1987) uses the concept of 'cross-
societal emulation'—'the purposeful observation and incorporation of elements of societal 
and cultural organization from other cultures and societies into a particular culture'—to 
illustrate Meiji Japan's selective incorporation of modern patterns of organisation from three 
Western powers.   Others have demonstrated the central role that emulation—or 'selective 
incorporation' (Robertson 1995)—has played in the spread of modernity:  elites have used 
certain modern nations as 'reference societies' (Bendix 1980: 292) in the articulation and 
formulation of national identities (Greenfeld 2003), and in the spread of modern institutions 
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such as the nation-state.15  
	
 Because the line between emulation and lesson-drawing is thus so indeterminate, I 
will treat the terms as synonymous.  Taking two classic definitions as our benchmark, both 
concepts ultimately refer to ‘the utilization of evidence about a programme or programmes 
from overseas and a drawing of lessons from that experience’ (Bennett 1991a: 221) or the 
process by which 'political actors or decision makers in one country draw lessons from one 
or more other countries, which they then apply to their own political system' (Dolowitz and 
Marsh 1996: 344).  It is important to note here that the term 'lesson' should not be taken to 
imply an objective improvement in the quality of knowledge held by elites, but simply any 
new piece of information that rearranges or reinforces the emulative preferences of those 
learning (Goldsmith 2005: 20).  Nor do lessons always bring about change: 'negative 
lessons' (Rose 1991: 19) prevent actors from behaving in ways they view as having proved 
detrimental to others.   
	
 Theorists are beginning to understand the important role that emulation plays in 
shaping the preferences and actions of political elites.  The literature is rife with examples—
successful and unsuccessful—at all levels of policy:  China drew lessons from South Korea 
and Singapore in its economic liberalisation (Chung 2000; Tonneson 2004); Latin American 
countries have borrowed extensively from each other in the areas of social policy reform 
(Weyland 2004); the United States' Freedom of Information Act was an exemplar for 
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15 Some of these studies, in particular Westney's (1987), view emulation as either coercive or voluntary.  Indeed 
the line is not always a clear one, as Japan's emulation of the West in order to negotiate more equal treaty terms 
(Westney 1987) illustrates.  However, the distinction found in the political science literature shall be retained in 
this study, with emulation taken to imply, at the very least, lessons drawn at the own initiative of elites rather 
than to satisfy conditions for military, economic or political assistance.  
Canada's own such law (Bennett 1991b).  As mentioned previously, emulation is seen as 
particularly instrumental to the spread of modernisation processes:  the tendency of 
'latecomer' states to develop a strong and modernising state in order to rival more 
technologically ‘advanced’ exemplars is both well-documented and readily apparent in the 
examples of Germany, Japan and Russia (Gerschenkron 1965).  Japan in particular occupies 
a place in the literature and popular imagination as the consummate lesson-drawer, seeming 
as it does to prove the notion that emulators can in turn become emulated by others.  
There is thus an increasing awareness that 'emulation and selective incorporation are 
normal, not exceptional.  Indeed, they are conditions of national-societal vitality, even of 
survival' (Robertson 1995: 227).  At the same time, the phenomenon remains understudied in 
the political sciences.  Emulation carries a stigma, retaining connotations of weakness and 
intellectual piracy.  Although outright imitation is very rare and lesson-drawing thus almost 
always involves innovation (Westney 1987: 9), emulation causes envy and resentment 
alongside admiration—after all, it does, by definition, imply that the exemplar is superior or 
more successful in some way (Greenfeld 2003: 16).  For this reason, elites are still reluctant 
to include overt references to foreign models in official documents and pronouncements lest 
they are seen as out of touch with their own society.  Yet the presence of similarities between 
the ideas, policies and practices of different countries is not necessarily evidence of 
emulation—claims that emulation has taken place must demonstrate an awareness of the key 
actors in the process, as well as the origins of their ideas (Bennett 1991a: 223); ideally, 
policy-makers must explicitly admit to utilisation of information from foreign experiences 
(Bennett 1991b: 32).  To further complicate matters, deeply-held beliefs—even when 
uncovered—usually stem from a variety of motives, both instrumental and fundamental; this 
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makes causality difficult to establish.  Sometimes lessons drawn from others are never put 
into practice, or do not result in visible change.  These conundrums mean that emulation is a 
challenging process to study, particularly using a highly positivist epistemology. 
	
 Another, more subtle difficulty is ideological:  emulation is still associated with 
processes of convergence, and convergence theory has been unpopular since the demise of 
modernisation theory (Jacoby 2001: 6).  The criticisms levelled at post-war modernisation 
theory and, more recently, the Washington Consensus, seem to militate for locally-sourced, 
indigenous solutions rather than a 'one size fits all approach' taken from a foreign model.    
	
 These dilemmas are real, but not insurmountable.  When observers hold that 
'increasingly around the world, you stumble on anecdotes of nations examining China’s rise 
and trying to see what pieces of this miracle they might make manifest in their own 
land' (Ramo 2004: 26) or that 'China’s development model...provides key elements of 
economic success for developing countries' (Shelton and Paruk 2008: 45-46), they are 
essentially making the case for emulation.  The need for empirical data to replace anecdotal 
evidence or politicking on this relatively new issue should not outweigh fears of the 
limitations such data is likely to have.  
	
 Epistemological difficulties notwithstanding, students of lesson-drawing have been 
able to study the phenomenon through a variety of means:  through the quantitative analysis 
of surveys (Goldsmith 2005), the examination of historical documents and events (Greenfeld 
2003), the comparison of cases (Bennett 1991b), the analysis of public debates (Robertson 
1991), the use of interview data (Rivera 2004), to name only a few.  The interpretive, 
interview-based approach I take here stems from a desire to know whether emulation is 
occurring in a specific case, and in which direction it is occurring; the testing of theory is not 
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within the scope of this chapter, nor is an understanding of the eventual outcome of this 
emulation.  
	
 The problem of convergence is more easily refuted.  To find that domestic 
development policies are becoming more similar is not to say that such a phenomenon is 
desirable.  In addition, emulation—as a voluntary, purposive and selective action—requires a 
focus on the agency of domestic rather than international elites.  This is not to say the former 
will inevitably trump the latter, but only that an analysis of the views of the alleged recipients 
of the Chinese Model may indeed be a step towards the search for local solutions, albeit 
filtered through the experiences of others.  In addition, the various limitations on rationality 
that many analysts agree elites are subject to when drawing lessons (and to which we turn 
now) should often lead to variation:  'if politicians, in  their policy  analysis, are  indeed 
subject to the cognitive  biases  mentioned  above,  then they should rarely draw the same 
conclusions and make the same decisions' (Meseguer 2005: 77).  Even when emulation does 
result in convergence, it weakens arguments that development is everywhere underpinned by 
immutable objective laws, thereby offering a corrective to the teleological, evolutionary 
arguments of post-war convergence theory.    
3.2  The Determinants of Elites’ Choice of Model
This review has defined and placed into context the key terms associated with the purposive 
and voluntary transfer of lessons from one polity to another.  The task of this section now 
remains to briefly discuss two important debates within the emulation literature:  the 
questions of how elites choose their models, and when they are most likely to look abroad 
for lessons.  The goal of this dissertation is by no means to ‘settle’ these debates, but rather to 
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apply the issues they raise to the subject of Ethiopian and Kenyan emulation of China and 
East Asia in the hope of better understanding the dynamics of this specific process.
	
 The first question is, in a sense, part of a larger debate on the rational basis of lesson-
drawing.  If emulation is not only purposive but also instrumental, systematic and rational 
(Resende-Santos 2007: 60; Waltz 1979: 121), elites 'observe the experience of countries with 
different policies, they use that information to update their prior beliefs using Bayes' rule, 
and they switch to policies with the highest expected utility' (Meseguer 2006: 39)16.  This 
kind of lesson-drawing does not necessitate complete and perfect information on all foreign 
models in existence, but does assume that governments observe and process all available 
information in the same way (Meseguer 2006: 40).  Their observations primarily influence 
their beliefs, in other words, rather than vice versa.
	
 In studies where the question of rationality has been explicitly addressed, this view of 
emulation has found itself in the minority, however.  Westney's (1987) Japanese elites have 
been widely portrayed (both by themselves and others) as 'rational shoppers' that 
dispassionately and eclectically surveyed all possible option before choosing exemplars, but 
her study rejects this notion, finding instead a reliance on a small number of models (and not 
always the most obviously 'successful' available).  Similarly, Jacoby (2001: 24) sees the 
notion of 'rational shopping' as a technique used by elites to convey the impression of greater 
selectivity and skill than actually exists during the process.  The notion that lesson-drawing 
follows a logic of  'bounded rationality' has thus become the more favoured hypothesis, with 
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16  Bayes’ rule is a technique for decision-making under conditions of limited information.  It is used by 
Meseguer (2006:39) and others to demonstrate the notion that policy-makers compare the amount of 
information they are able to gather regarding foreign models with the amount of variation they observe among 
these foreign models to come to a rational calculation of risk before deciding to draw lessons from abroad.
theorists positing a number of cognitive 'short-cuts' or 'heuristics' (Weyland 2004) that 
severely constrain rational decision-making.   
	
 Firstly, elites are said to favour models that are geographically proximate and close at 
hand—what Weyland (2004) calls 'availability heuristics'.  Ramamurti (1999: 147) holds that 
a policy is most likely to be emulated if it has been successful in a nearby country, and 
Westney (1987: 20) finds that elites are most likely to possess information on nations 
dominant in their immediate environments—and therefore to emulate those nations. 
Theorists of 'soft power' have long pointed to the importance of personal visits and 
exchanges in spreading a country's values, culture and development model (Nye 2004: 13). 
Familiarity with a country's model does not always correspond with geographical proximity, 
but both of these can be said to apply to the level of exposure that elites have to a particular 
model.  
	
 Secondly, many theorists refer to the importance of a model's prestige; status and 
high international prominence are said to influence elites' choice of exemplar at least as 
much—if not more than—proven effectiveness.  'A policy innovation', writes Weyland 
(2004: 11), 'is more likely to turn into a model if it originates in a country of high status. 
Such a favourable image in turn arises from more advanced economic, social and political 
development; historical tradition or cultural attraction; and an earlier leadership role in world 
affairs'.  Goldsmith (2005: 37) and Westney (1987: 19) also emphasise this aspect of lesson-
drawing.  
	
 A third—and very often mentioned—set of mental short-cuts can be grouped together 
under the heading of historical, cultural and 'social psychological' similarity.  The latter term 
originates from Rose (1993: 107), who uses it to explain the tendency of British policy-
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makers to overlook Ireland and France as exemplars in favour of the United States, Canada, 
Australian and other Anglo-Saxon countries.  Similarly, Simmons and Elkins (2004: 187) 
conclude that 'governments systematically consider the lessons their cultural peers have to 
offer when fashioning their own economic policy choices', and Goldman (2006) finds 
'cultural match' to be an important predictor of emulation.
	
 The fourth and final set of short-cuts concern the various ways in which certain 
models allow elites ease of use.  Decision-makers often favour evidence of short-term 
success over long-term performance ('representativeness heuristics') and also prefer models 
that require fewer changes to implement ('anchoring heuristics') (Weyland 2004).  A shared 
language—or language barrier—can help or hinder the search for exemplars (Dolowitz and 
March 2000: 10).  Path dependency can also have a cumulative 'contagion effect':  drawing 
one aspect of a country's political or economic system may lead to changes (particularly of 
an institutional nature) that make further emulation from that country more likely (Westney 
1987).
	
 Interestingly, one factor is hardly mentioned as a constraint—cognitive or otherwise
—on voluntary lesson-drawing.  Very few theorists find the quality of political and economic 
relationships between exemplar and emulator to be a deciding factor.  It may affect the extent 
to which policymakers are willing to admit to emulation; Dhillon (2009: 176) and Beeson 
(2000: 346) find, for example, that Mahathir Mohammed's 'Look East' policy in Malaysia 
was actually an attempt to learn from Japan specifically, without invoking the negative 
connotations that a 'Looking Japan' policy would have inevitably invoked.  However, the fact 
that the true focus remained on Japan is both important and in keeping with the rest of the 
literature, which finds states attempting to learn from their economic and political allies, as 
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well as from their economic and political rivals.  If anything, as we shall see below, rivals 
may, under some circumstances, be seen as the most suitable exemplars.  This factor 
provides an additional rationale for not centring my own study of emulation around China’s 
newly-forged economic and political relations with Kenya and Ethiopia.  
	
 The four cognitive constraints listed above are not always inseparable in practice, of 
course.  A common language is often the byproduct of a shared history and culture, or of 
geographical proximity.  This is not always the case, however, and it is enough at this point 
to note that several factors combine to render 'proven effectiveness' or performance—seen as 
the main consideration by rational-choice approaches such as Resende-Santos (2007: 6)—
only one of several factors driving emulation.
	
 Emulators may be bound by these four constraints and still be 'boundedly rational' in 
the sense that they may be driven by the genuine desire to find solutions to domestic 
problems through the study of foreign programmes.  The literature is more divided on the 
question of whether elites driven by motives other than pure problem-solving can truly be 
said to be engaging in lesson-drawing.  On the one hand, several key authors (Dolowitz and 
March 1996: 347; Westney 1987: 26) view motives such as the legitimation of pre-existing 
decisions and the need to invoke continuity with the past as consistent with the process. 
Another group is sceptical: May (1992: 336), for example, holds out that fundamental 
normative or cognitive change must occur in order for what he calls ‘social learning’ to take 
place.  To yet a third group, it is precisely this which distinguishes lesson-drawing from 
emulation; they take lesson-drawing to be driven by 'bounded rationality' but emulation to be 
driven by other factors, including a desire for conformity and other instances of 'herding 
behaviour' (Meseguer 2006; Holzinger and Knill 2005).  This latter view is a minority view, 
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however, and I have already established that I shall be using the two terms interchangeably.  I 
take May’s (1992) point that lesson-drawing must involve at least some measure of 
ideational transformation in elites, but would point to several studies to show that the line 
between legitimation and learning is thinner than may commonly supposed.
	
 Most important in this regard is Bennett (1991b), who argues that elites use foreign 
evidence for many reasons—to put an issue on the policy agenda, mollify political pressure, 
identify an exemplar once policy priorities have been established, reinforce existing 
conclusions, and to genuinely search for the 'best' possible policy from outside.  Only the 
last-mentioned motive would be consistent with the theory of bounded rationality, yet several 
of these activities can legitimately be held to constitute learning at at least some level. 
Policy-makers frequently argue by analogy, for example, but this, rather than serving as a 
mere rhetorical device, contributes to the cognitive 'schemata' (Khong 1992: 25) that 
simplify reality and guide political decision-making.  This view is strengthened by others 
who see emulation and lesson-drawing as processes of social construction (Lee and Strang 
2006) and political contestation (Robertson 1991), where groupthink, 'hype', symbolism and 
wishful thinking all play a key role in decision-making.  
	
 The mere fact that a policy-maker is driven to emulation by considerations other than 
problem-solving does not, therefore, preclude the existence of cognitive change.  Naturally, 
the more the choices of policy-makers are motivated by internal political and social 
demands, the more selective and placatory the search for exemplars is likely to be. In the 
words of Christensen et al (2008: 368), learning will then often be partial and 'shallow'. 
These lessons will complement existing policy objectives, but do not act as an entirely new 
blueprint for reform—the latter situation would be, in any case, be quite rare (Weyland 2004: 
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39).  Only where elites use the public policy arena to pay 'lip service' to foreign models 
without any further evidence of even partial emulation, could lesson-drawing be said not to 
exist at all.  
	
 Taking the above arguments into account, this study shall discount the possibility that 
emulators act according to the logic of perfect or even Bayesian rationality.  On the opposite 
end of the spectrum, if I had found the use of rhetorical devices to be the sole factor 
motivating elites, emulation and lesson-drawing could not have been said to be taking place. 
Within these two extremes, however, lies a range of motives and cognitive outcomes.   My 
aim will be not to find the over-arching theoretical utility of any of the heuristic shortcuts 
listed above, but to understand which—if any—inform the thinking of Ethiopia and Kenya's 
political actors.
	
 If the literature is divided regarding cognitive constraints to elites' choice of 
exemplar, there is more agreement on the question of when emulation is most likely to occur. 
Emulation takes place in a wide variety of countries and situations, but many authors have 
found emulation to be most likely when elites are uncertain as to how to achieve their goals 
(Westney 1987: 5; Dimaggio and Powell 1983: 153), when they are dissatisfied with the 
status quo (Dolowitz and March 1996; 347) or when they face massive 'policy failure'. 
According to Goldsmith (2005: 36), this failure acts as a formative event that pushes states 
beyond their usual cognitive and organisational inertia to seek solutions outside their national 
borders.  He found Russian foreign policy elites more receptive to emulation than their 
Ukrainian counterparts, for example, due to the former's sense of total policy failure in the 
post-Cold War era.  
	
 When this failure is due to imposition by other, more powerful political entities, 
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lesson-drawing often takes the form of geopolitical rivalry, with emulators aiming to defeat 
their rivals 'at their own game'.  Once again, Japan—where the Meiji leadership emulated the 
West in order to protect from the threat of foreign domination and overcome unequal treaties
—is seen as the paradigmatic example of this dynamic (Jacoby 2001: 23; Westney 1987: 22). 
Wehler's (1987: 343) term 'defensive modernisation' is particularly useful to describe this 
dynamic, which often involves the adoption of limited reforms from above and outside in 
order to avoid either wholesale revolution from below or defeat by more ‘modern’ foreign 
powers.
	
 One final element of conduciveness to emulation has been convincingly posited by 
Goldman (2006), who finds that lesson-drawing is most likely to occur when official 
orthodoxy breaks down between elites, allowing for greater levels of tolerance towards 
diversity.  A policy setting marked by recent and large-scale failure, fears of external 
domination, and internal dissent should thus be most conducive to emulation; the reverse is 
likely to be true for a polity experiencing relative success and internal cohesion.
	
 Following this review of the theories of lesson-drawing and emulation, this 
dissertation now turns to their practical application, and particularly to the question of the 
extent to which Kenyan and Ethiopian elites engage in these practices.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: ETHIOPIAN EMULATION 
OF CHINA AND SOUTH KOREA 
Previous chapters have argued that discussions around the impact of China's emerging 
economy on global development discourse have suffered from a neglect of empirical enquiry 
into the desires and perceptions of developing country elites themselves—and particularly of 
elites in Africa.  I have also posited that this gap in the literature is best explored through the 
concepts of lesson-drawing and emulation, which focus on the voluntary and purposive 
transfer of ideas, policies and practices from one national setting to another.  
	
 This chapter presents the first set of empirical findings, exploring the attitudes of 
Ethiopian politicians, policy-makers, business leaders and civil society representatives to 
emulation.  It first sets the context by arguing that the country's historical and present-day 
experience reveals an abiding desire to learn from the modernisation experiences of others, 
coupled with a wariness of outside interference and deep-rooted sense of Ethiopia's own 
uniqueness.  It also provides a brief overview of Ethiopia under the ruling EPRDF, where—
particularly since the disastrous elections in 2005—the existence of economic reform within 
an undemocratic political environment has echoed the 'authoritarian growth' model often 
associated with China and certain of its neighbours in the region.   
	
 The second section of the chapter presents elites' current views on the notion of 
lesson-drawing, before detailing the countries and regions these leaders wish to emulate and 
some of their reasons for doing so.  It finds the ruling party to have a clear and cohesive 
policy of learning from the East Asian Model, a general category into which they subsume 
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the Chinese Model.  This is a contentious position, however, as non-governmental elites do 
not generally share this desire and are often critical of the government's emulation of the 
region.  The chapter closes with some reflections on the relevance of these findings for the 
broader research question.  It will not explore the specific lessons that elites wish to draw, as 
these will be covered in a later section.       
4.1  The National Context 
4.1.1  A History of Emulation, Exceptionalism and Modernisation 
Since the dawn of its existence, Ethiopia has been caught in the competing forces of 
emulation and self-sufficiency, in the tensions between modernisation and isolationism.  The 
only country in sub-Saharan Africa with a written history dating back well into pre-Christian 
times, it is one of the oldest surviving political entities in the world.  Its rich cultural heritage 
(it has a unique calendar, alphabet, and time system) and history of resistance to colonialism 
have fostered a strong, enduring sense of independence and exceptionalism.  
	
 Centuries of contact with more technologically advanced European nations, on the 
other hand, have often driven the country's leaders towards forceful projects of 
modernisation borne of both admiration and rivalry.  'As for the European presence', writes 
Bahru17 (2001: 270), 'it was a threat to the cherished independence of the country...At the 
same time, it opened up new possibilities of introducing western technology, particularly 
military technology, and of modernizing the country'.  The result of this ambivalence has 
been the adoption of a variety of Western and non-Western lessons throughout the country's 
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17 Ethiopians do not have family surnames, and instead use their fathers' first names as last names.  In keeping 
with common practice, Ethiopians cited throughout this work are referred to either by their full names or by 
their first name alone (as here).  
modern history—a highly contested, very ideological and often unsuccessful process.  At the 
heart of attempts to learn from countries such as Britain, Japan and the Soviet Union has 
been the attempt to learn from others how to acquire, consolidate and expand the power and 
unity of the state (Clapham 2006).  
	
 From the turn of the first century A.D., the powerful Axum empire ruled the northern 
highlands, adopting Egyptian Orthodox Christianity in the fourth century A.D.  In the 
seventh century, a post-Axumite kingdom emerged in the central northern highlands, 
expanding for the next few centuries throughout that area of Ethiopia inhabited by the 
Amhara people.  After an interlude that saw power fall into the hands of the hitherto-
subjugated Agaw people for 120 years, Ethiopia saw a succession of Amhara leaders—
claiming descent from the Axumite kings and King Solomon of Israel—gradually further 
expand the area under their control.  This Solomonic dynasty was gravely weakened in the 
16th century, following a series of devastating attacks from Muslims to the north and mass 
population migrations of the pastoral Oromo to the south.  The brief but relatively successful 
reign of Emperor Fasilidas that followed was unable to revive the former glories of his 
ancestors, and the kingdom fell into a state of fragmentation and warring fiefdoms.  The only 
Europeans in Ethiopia – Portuguese Jesuit missionaries – were expelled following pressure 
from the clergy, and the country isolated itself from the rest of the world for over 200 years.  
	
 Into this power vacuum, in 1855, stepped Tewodros II, generally considered the first 
of the four great modernising and centralising emperors (Bahru 2001: 228; Crummey 1969: 
459).  Tewodros' vision of a unified Ethiopian state led him to establish an army, promote 
Amharic as national language, and battle the clergy's entrenched ownership of land. 
Tewodros had great admiration for the technology and institutions of the European powers 
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who were beginning to make incursions into the Horn of Africa.  Letters to Queen Victoria 
asking for help in conquering Islam and pleading for the technical assistance that would 
allow 'blind', 'dark' and 'ignorant' Ethiopia to benefit from the 'light' of Europe (quoted in 
Bahru 2001: 37) went unanswered, however—an oversight Tewodros never forgave.  
	
 Tewedros' reign had established military victory, rather than descent, as the main 
mechanism for the transfer of power in Ethiopia (Clapham 1990: 28).  In 1872, Yohannes IV 
fought his way to the throne; he too, attempted to unify and expand the country, but sought 
(largely unsuccessfully) to do so through the more cautious approach of feudal federalism 
(Ghelawdewos 1995: 14).  
It took the assumption to the throne by Menelik II in 1889 to truly consolidate the 
unifying and modernising projects begun by his predecessors; over three-quarters of the area 
of modern-day Ethiopia, as well as the majority of its population (Harbeson 1998: 112), were 
subjugated and forcefully incorporated into the empire within the first ten years of his reign. 
This process of 'Amharaisation' also involved, more broadly, the construction of a 'common' 
Ethiopian cultural identity based on the religion and culture of its most dominant ethnic 
group.  Menelik used revenues from the periphery of his new territories to designate Addis 
Ababa as the national capital, and to build in it schools, hospitals, modern government 
ministries and communications infrastructure.  
Many of these efforts bore the mark of foreign influences and voluntary policy 
transfer.  One of Menelik’s closest advisors, the Swiss Engineer Alfred Ilg, assisted the 
Emperor in inter alia reforming the postal system, creating a national currency and building 
the country’s first railway from the capital to Djibouti (Uhlig 2007: 121).  There is also 
striking evidence to suggest that Ethiopian emulation of East Asia began as early as this era. 
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In 1903, US representative Robert P. Skinner wrote of Menelik that ‘he has heard of Japan, 
and in his own way is trying to emulate that striking example.  The new railroad, the new 
highways, the bridges, the telephones—all these things he probably cares very little for in 
themselves, but he realizes that nations must advance or they must fall’ (quoted in McVety 
2008: 381).    
These developments may have brought partial modernisation, but they also attracted 
the attention of would-be colonisers, and in 1895, Italian forces invaded from Eritrea. 
Menelik's defeat of the invaders at the Battle of Adwa had far-reaching consequences, 
sparing Ethiopia  from colonial rule, inspiring anti-imperialist insurgency movements across 
the world, and furthering the notion of a united Ethiopian nation.
	
 The final, and perhaps the best known, of Ethiopia's modernising emperors was 
Haile-Selassie I.  When he became regent and de facto ruler in 1916, Ethiopia was still a 
feudal society that required its peasants, or gabbars, to pay an elaborate system of tithes, 
taxes and provisions to the clergy and ruling class (Bahru 2001: 86).  Its period of expansion 
complete, Ethiopia had become larger and more difficult to govern; it remained poor and 
underdeveloped but was now surrounded on all sides by foreign ideas, military threats and 
economic interests.  The regent embarked on an even further-reaching programme of 
modernisation from above, gradually introducing a set of reforms designed to bring about a 
market economy. Trade with Europeans increased dramatically, a raft of foreign experts was 
brought in as advisers and a national oligarchy emerged.  A permanent standing army was 
created, and with it 'all the rest of the imported paraphernalia of the modern state' (Clapham 
1990: 29): a system of modern education (accompanied by an intelligentsia), banking, a 
bureaucracy, public services, and more.  Development efforts were highly concentrated on 
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the capital, however, and Selassie focused his education efforts on a small, loyal elite 
(Marcus 2002: 160).  
Europe was used as an exemplar in these attempts, but by no means exclusively. 
Most notably, the 'Japanisers', a group of progressive intellectuals prominent in the 1920s 
and early 1930s, urged the adoption of a ‘Japanese model’ due to the speed with which Meiji 
Japan had been able to transform itself from a feudal to an industrial power (Bahru 2001; 
Clarke 2004; Tesfaye 200718).  To Ethiopian admirers of Japan’s defensive modernisation, 
the country had—particularly in its victory over Russia in 1905—proved that certain non-
European nations could stand on a par with their European would-be oppressors, just as 
Ethiopia had once demonstrated its own ability to resist Western domination.  In a book titled 
Japan Endamen Salatanach (‘How Japan Modernized’), intellectual Kebede Michael 
(quoted in Clarke 2004) held that ‘the only country that has succeeded in safeguarding her 
independence and in charting her own path of educational progress is Japan’ and urged his 
countrymen to ‘examine her history and follow her example’.  
Such exhortations were not confined to academia.  It was a prominent Japaniser who 
drafted the Ethiopian constitution, modeling it so closely on the Meiji Constitution of 1889 
that numerous clauses found in the latter survived transition to the former more or less intact 
(Bahru 2001: 110).  Haile-Selassie himself expressed similar sentiments, provoking a visiting 
British Minister to remark that the Emperor’s wishes to emulate Japan ‘however incredible it 
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18  Much of Tesfaye’s text, titled Ethiopia and the Quest for East Asian Model of Development: A Historical 
Perspective,  is plagiarised word for word from Clarke’s article, but is included here as a source due to the 
prominence of its author,  prominent EPRDF supporter and former Ethiopian diplomat to South Africa. 
Tesfaye's belief that the EPRDF is returning to this project by emulating East Asia—and his own approval of 
this process—is highly instructive in the light of this chapter's own findings.
may seem to foreign observers—lead him to dream of Ethiopia as the Japan of 
Africa’ (Bahru 2001: 7). 
	
 As during the reign of Menelik, the defensive modernisation that marked Haile-
Selassie’s early years did not ultimately prevent Ethiopia's invasion by outsiders.  In 1936, 
the country was occupied by Italy, and Haile-Selassie sent into exile.  After five years of 
brutal occupation and a counter-insurgency that (with the help of British forces) defeated the 
Italians in 1941, the Emperor returned to Addis Ababa to continue his rule.  In the same year 
Ethiopia annexed Eritrea, a former Italian colony and sometime territory of the Solomonic 
dynasty.  
The next few decades saw a continuation of the reform agenda: a formally 
independent judiciary, second house of parliament and the constitutional recognition of 
human rights were all introduced in 1955.  Ethiopia’s civil and other legal codes were 
promulgated during this time, with the majority drafted by French legal advisors to the 
Emperor (Vanderlinden 1966: 250).  Ethiopia also became a central plank in the ‘Point Four 
Agreement for Technical Cooperation’, Truman’s flagship programme to export 
modernisation to the Third World.  Technical assistance would lead to economic growth, 
American officials felt, and this, in the words of Truman, would help the populations of 
developing countries ‘find out’ the importance of democracy (quoted in McVety 2008: 386). 
Haile-Selassie’s eagerness to collaborate with American technical experts was driven, 
according to McVety (2008), by a desire to modernise Ethiopia ‘from above’ and to maintain 
his hold on power.  Thus roads, railways and schools were both ways to fuel economic 
growth and a way for the state to incorporate and civilise its population.  
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 These changes had several consequences unforeseen by the Emperor, however.  Even 
as an uneven modernisation was sweeping Ethiopia, resistance to imperial rule was growing. 
In 1960, a leading American modernisation theorist remarked:
One of the most remarkable features of the Ethiopian system is that the emperor, whose 
position depends heavily upon the preservation of tradition, has been and remains one of the 
most powerful and modernizing influences in the country.    On his own initiative he has 
introduced modern constitutional structures; he is using the resources of the state deliberately 
to create a new class of educated Ethiopians to staff the expanding bureaucracy and a modern 
army.    He is, in a word, setting in motion processes of change which will most likely 
eventuate in profound tensions in society, and which in time could lead to a shattering of the 
whole traditional structure (Coleman 1960: 576).
The privatisation of land had driven down agricultural prices and left gabbars even worse off 
than before, and the government was forced to continue relying on the land-owning military, 
aristocracy and oligarchy for support (Keller 1991).  Critics resented Selassie's close ties to 
Western economic and political interests, particularly those of the United States.  Eritrean 
and ethnic Somali nationalism was growing, and Marxism was sweeping Africa.  For student 
groups and many others, reform was simply not happening fast enough.  The imperial 
regime's inadequate response to a famine that began in 1972 pushed discontent to breaking 
point.
	
 Ethiopia entered a new phase in its history of emulation two years later, when these 
pressures came to a head and Selassie was violently deposed by a Marxist-Leninist inspired 
military junta.  Led by Mengistu Hailemariam, the Derg ('Committee') established the 
112
People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia as a formally one-party state. As Soviet backing 
and the Derg's admiration for communist ideology increased, foreign firms were brought 
under state control and all rural—and later urban—land was nationalised.  Feudalism, 
imperialism and bureaucratic capitalism were declared the three main enemies of the 
Ethiopian people (Ghelawdewos 1995: 118).  The influence of Cold War ideology was 
striking: the revolution had grown out of student demands for Chinese-style peasant 
uprisings and Soviet-style anti-imperialism, and the Derg would go on to receive military aid 
not only from the Soviet Union, but from Cuba, East Germany and North Korea.
	
 For the next 17 years, Mengistu presided over one of Africa's most destructive and 
brutal post-colonial dictatorships.  Rising urban opposition was met with the Red Terror, a 
counter-insurgency campaign entailing 'one of the most systematic uses of mass murder ever 
witnessed in Africa' (De Waal 1991: 101) through massacres, disappearances and 
deportations.   
	
 A key feature of the regime was its desire to destroy Ethiopia's feudal system by 
forcibly villigising most of its overwhelmingly rural population.  Much of this was the direct 
result of emulation:  the Derg sent officials to observe Tanzania's (still much better-known) 
villigisation programme, itself inspired by the Chinese example.  Although the rationale of 
the Ethiopian scheme was borrowed from Tanzania, the former had a stronger military 
component, making it even more brutal and devastating than its progenitor (Scott 1998: 248). 
In 1985, Mengistu decried Ethiopia as a 'symbol of backwardness and a valley of ignorance', 
and announced plans to resettle 33 million rural Ethiopians into large collective farms (cited 
in Scott 1998: 248).  This destroyed social ties, and purposely rendered farmers and their 
families completely dependent on the state by eliminating the utility of local knowledge 
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(Scott 1998: 251).  It ultimately led to a series of widespread famines, killing approximately 
400,000 people in the period from 1983 to 1985 alone (De Waal 1991: 175).
	
 By the late 1980s, large-scale armed insurrection was rife, especially in the northern 
regions of Tigray and Eritrea.  The economy had been decimated.  The Soviet Union was 
beginning to collapse, depriving Mengistu of its primary source of financial support and 
leading to the retreat of communism around the world.  In 1991, the Ethiopian People's 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of the Tigrayan People's Liberation 
Front (TPLF) and other ethnically- and regionally-based opposition movements, captured 
Addis Ababa and overthrew the Derg.
	
 For centuries, modernisation and globalisation had been double-edged swords to 
Ethiopia's centralising leaders.  Although foreign incursions threatened the religious and 
political unity that Ethiopia's leaders had fought so hard to construct, they also, 
paradoxically, provided the necessary tools for this process of state-building.  And Ethiopia's 
efforts at modernisation served to incorporate the country into global dynamics of 
colonialisation and imperialism, even as they were designed to retain and consolidate its 
independence.  In the end, emulation and attempted modernisation won out over isolation. 
This emulation was never limited to Western models, as successive waves of efforts to 
emulate Japan, for instance, make clear.  Christopher Clapham  (2006: 138), the scholar who 
has most thoroughly explored the dynamics of this process, puts it thus:
Ethiopia's development trajectory can correspondingly be seen as a series of attempts by 
'modernising' Ethiopians to identify the mechanisms of developmental success of countries 
114
perceived as having some similarity to their own.  The idea was to draw from these countries' 
experiences in order to recreate Ethiopia in the resulting image of modernity'.
Like China, Japan and others of the era, Ethiopia thus overcame its first instincts towards 
isolationism by seeking to achieve formal recognition of sovereignty and equality with the 
West through modernisation.  Lacking the colonial history of others on the continent, its own 
elites stepped in to create the machinery of the modern state.  When this was seen to fail the 
country, the Soviet model stepped in to fill the breach—with disastrous consequences.  
4.1.2  Ethiopia after the Derg:  Cautious and Contradictory Liberalisation
The past two decades may constitute a new chapter in Ethiopia's history, but they have also 
been marked by many of the same competing forces that so chequered its past.  After 
decades of isolation and trauma, Ethiopia is still, in many ways, a country entering the 
international society of nations—and its transformation in this regard has been faster than 
ever before.  Globalisation has brought threats as well as opportunities, however, leading to 
suspicion and fear on the part of the country's new modernisers.  The story of present-day 
Ethiopia is, to a large extent, the story of how they have attempted to manage these 
contradictions.  As we shall see later, these tensions also form a central plank in their choice 
of China and East Asia as a model of development.
	
 As soon as the EPRDF-dominated coalition took control of Ethiopia, domestic and 
international pro-democratic and pro-capitalist pressures began to confront the country’s 
history of authoritarianism and communism.  In 1991, Ethiopia had no record of formally 
democratic governance, no political parties, no independent media and a tiny civil society. 
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The next 14 years saw a hesitant and incomplete move towards greater political and 
economic liberalisation.  On the one hand, the country gained a new constitution in 1994 that 
saw the creation of a judiciary and a reformed, bicameral legislature.  The country’s first 
formally multi-party national parliamentary elections were held in 1995, making EPRDF 
chairman Meles Zenawi (a member of the country’s Tigrayan ethnic group) the president of 
Ethiopia.19  The party dropped all public references to Marxism-Leninism, made overtures to 
the United States, and promised donors that it would bring political and economic 
liberalisation to Ethiopia. In 2001, the party also announced that it was opening its ranks to 
the national bourgeoisie, integrating into the global economy and officially following 
capitalism (Tadesse and Young 2003: 392).  Some state-owned enterprises were privatised, 
and a degree of press freedom permitted.
	
 On the other hand, the same period saw the consolidation of the power of the EPRDF
—and, within it, the TPLF—as the country’s dominant political force.  In the run-up to the 
1995 elections, the originally multi-party transitional government had increasingly been 
whittled away to leave only the EPRDF and a handful of other political groupings, as parties 
representing several major ethnic groups from the south of the country had withdrawn from 
the interim Council of Representatives.  The first formally democratic elections, although 
peaceful, were boycotted by the majority of opposition parties, who cited harassment and 
intimidation.  To the majority of outside observers (e.g. Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009a; Abbink 
2006: 11), this gravely compromised the legitimacy of the process.  In addition, voters were 
largely apathetic and lacked information on the political process (ICG 2009: 7).  According 
to Lyons (1995: 142), 'the population had acquiesced to but not necessarily accepted the new 
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19 This made him the first non-Amharic national leader to come to power in over a century.  
regime.  The  Ethiopian  transition  began  with  a  broadly  inclusive  national  conference 
and  ended,  four  years...later, with  a  single-party-dominant  political  system.'  Broad 
international consensus views the validity of subsequent national elections in 2000 with a 
similar degree of scepticism; severe irregularities occurred in certain parts of the country 
(Pausewang and Tronvoll 2000) and although more opposition parties contested the election, 
their meaningful participation was hampered by inter alia a lack of access to government-
controlled media (Shinn and Ofcansky 2004: 214).  The EPRDF secured another landslide 
victory.
	
 The leadership’s ambivalence towards economic and political liberalism could also 
be seen in the many elements of Marxist-Leninist ideology that remained after the fall of the 
Derg; all land remained the property of the state and the EPRDF continued to cast itself as a 
'vanguard party' (EPRDF 2006) with the duty of bringing about mass political mobilisation, 
particularly in rural areas, through 'democratic centralism' (EPRDF 2005: 36) and regular 
sessions of gemgema ('self-criticism').  The doctrine of 'revolutionary democracy' also 
remained central to the party's thinking:  collective, communal decision-making was seen as 
preferable to the plural representation and individual participation advocated by western-
style, liberal democracy (EPRDF 2006).  
	
 The influence of the past can be seen, also, in Ethiopia's preoccupation with the 
'national question'.  Ethiopia has over 80 ethnic groups or 'nationalities', and is one of the 
only federal states divided explicitly along ethnic lines; political sovereignty is vested in 
ethnic groups rather than individuals.  Article 9(31) of the constitution allows each 
ethnically-based federal unit the right to self-determination and secession (FDRE 1994). 
Although Ethiopia may take the idea of ethnic federalism to new extremes (in theory, in any 
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case), many authors have pointed out the clear debt that such thinking owes to Stalinist 
ideology (Aregawi 2008: 235; ICG 2009: 23).  Stalin argued that nationalities had the right 
to secession (1954 [1904]: 49), but viewed the imperialism and chauvinism of the 'Great 
Russians' as the primary cause of anti-Russian nationalism (1953b [1923]: 249); nationalities 
not subjected to bourgeois imperialism, then, no longer required the right to secede (1953a 
[1920]; 385-386).  In the same way, the Tigrayan-dominated EPRDF bases much of its 
legitimacy on the idea that it has united Ethiopia by breaking centuries of Amhara dominance 
and centralism (Clapham 2006: 148).
	
 Two crucial events in the first decade of the 21st century demonstrate the profound 
conflict between reform and continuity that marked Ethiopia’s return to the ‘society of 
nations’.  One, the 2001 split and eventual purging of the ruling party, illustrates the extent to 
which these tensions reached to the heart of the country’s leadership.  As the EPRDF was 
consolidating its hold on power, the organisation at its heart was undergoing far-reaching 
shifts in leadership and ideology.  The TPLF, a movement stemming from student- and 
peasant-based resistance to the Derg, had been highly influenced by Enver Hozha's Albanian 
variant of communism that emphasised independence from both Soviet and Western 
'imperialism'; one author calls Albania the (erstwhile) 'guiding light' of the TPLF (Clapham 
1992: 117).  Many reasons have been posited for the EPRDF’s cautious post-1991 move 
towards economic and political reform.  Where its leadership had rarely left the country 
before coming to power, now it faced first-hand exposure to an outside world where 
communism had fallen and capitalism was triumphant.  A revolutionary party once deeply 
anchored by its Tigrayan roots suddenly had to adjust to life as administrators of the urban 
centre, and of the entire country (Tadesse and Young 2003: 393).  Many were eager for the 
118
international aid and support that the United States – for tactical reasons of its own – 
provided in ever-increasing quantities.  In addition, the TPLF was eager to expand its 
domestic support base, and the country's communist ideology and institutions were tainted 
by association with the Derg (Clapham 1992: 118).  Finally, internecine struggles for power 
over the soul of the TPLF may, as Tadesse and Young (2003: 389) contend, have been as 
important a driver as ideology.
	
 Due to a variety of factors, then, by 2001 fissures had begun to appear between the 
'reformist' supporters of Meles and the Tigrayan 'hardliners' in the TPLF; the former accused 
the latter of Bonapartism and of being mired in defunct dogmas of the past, whereas the 
latter charged Meles with abandoning the socialist principles of the TPLF for bourgeois 
capitalism (Africa Confidential 2001: 5).  In addition, members of the 'anti-Meles clique' 
accused their opponents of appeasement in the war with Eritrea (the conflict had begun as a 
border dispute in 1998 and ended with a peace treaty two years later). Finally, as Africa 
Confidential (2001: 5) reported at the time, ‘the third prong of attack is political liberalisation 
(such as it is), devolution and the federal experiment.  Provided the kernel of power remains 
in Tigrayan hands, Meles supports a greater role for the regional states than do his critics’. 
The outcome to these disputes was the tehadiso ('renewal') of May 2001, which saw critics 
of Meles expelled, denounced (and, in several cases, imprisoned on charges of corruption), 
and which left Meles unchallenged in his ideological and organisational dominance of the 
party.   
	
 The second key event to exemplify Ethiopia's place at the crossroads of communism 
and globalisation was the country's third—and now somewhat notorious—national 
parliamentary election in 2005.  Following pressure from international donors, this election 
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was initially marked by unprecedented levels of openness and public participation.  Amidst 
nationally-broadcast public debates and widespread rural campaigning by opposition groups, 
'the hitherto submissive population turned into an enthusiastic electorate in a moment of near 
revolutionary quality' (ICG 2009: 8).  Two opposition groupings emerged: the Coalition for 
Unity and Democracy (CUD), drawing its support primarily from the urban, educated elite 
and the Amhara-dominated highlands, urged economic liberalisation and pan-ethnic 
nationalism (Abbink 2006: 9-10); the United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF) was a 
coalition representing a panoply of smaller ethnic groups.  A deep-rooted culture of 
authoritarianism and widespread lack of understanding of the democratic process continued 
to bedevil proceedings—many voters, perplexed by the sudden visibility of opposition 
parties and assuming that the EPRDF had abdicated, voted for the former as the most likely 
new rulers (LeFort 2007). Nonetheless, it seemed that the era of absolutism and autocracy 
was beginning to draw to a close; as Clapham (2005) puts it, 'these were real elections'.
	
 If the run-up to the elections saw the widening of the democratic space, its aftermath 
saw its swift and dramatic renarrowing.  Initial polling granted 174 of 547 seats to the 
opposition, which immediately alleged electoral fraud and intimidation.  Given the months of 
recriminations, recounts and legal disputes that followed, it is difficult to assess the fairness 
of the final results.  The majority of outside observers agree, however, that the EPRDF, 
shocked at the extent of its losses during the initial counting process, had attempted to 
manipulate the results in at least some areas (Abbink 2006: 12; Clapham 2005). 
Controversially, the European Union Election Observation Mission concluded that 'the 
counting and aggregation processes were marred by irregular practices, confusion and a lack 
of transparency' (EU-EOM 2005: 1).  In the aftermath, the CUD announced a boycott of 
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parliament and illegal protests broke out across the capital.  Both were met with severe 
repression—more than 100 opposition politicians were arrested and charged with treason, 
and 193 protesters (according to the Ethiopian government’s official enquiry commission) 
killed by security forces (AP 2006).  The EPRDF, for its part, alleges that the opposition and 
elements of the media were engaging in 'hate speech' against Tigrayans, the outcome of 
which 'might have made the Rwandan genocide look like child's play' (quoted in Plaut 2005). 
	
 In 2005, the EPRDF thus found itself at a crucial point in its history.  Having 
attempted simultaneously (if gradually) to democratise and to liberalise the economy in line 
with what it viewed as the demands of globalisation and donors, it decided to take a 
somewhat different tack in the aftermath of electoral chaos.  In the years that followed, the 
ruling party has closed many of the avenues of dissent and further increased its political 
control.  In 2008, the Freedom of the Mass Media and Access to Information Proclamation 
(FDRE 2008) was passed, strengthening governmental powers to initiate defamation suits, 
impose fines and deny broadcast licences.  Several publications have been forced to close, 
and those few newspapers that do openly criticise the government are primarily published in 
English and therefore remain the preserve of a tiny educated business elite.  Virtually all 
broadcast media is government-owned.  The 2009 Proclamation for the Registration and 
Regulation of Charities and Societies (FDRE 2009b) similarly restricts the activities of 
NGOs.  Local organisations that receive more than 10% of their funding from foreign 
sources are prohibited from engaging in advocacy, and harassment is frequent; many of the 
NGOs working in this area have thus been forced to close or scale down (Bertelsmann 
Stiftung 2012a: 30).  The Anti-Terrorism Proclamation of 2009 completed this trio of 
regressive legislation, extending the government's powers of arrest and detention, expanding 
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both the definition of terrorism and the penalties applied to those found guilty of committing 
or promoting it, and lowering evidentiary standards for its prosecution (FDRE 2009a).  The 
judiciary and the National Election Board of Ethiopia are not generally viewed as 
independent in practice (Abbink 2006: 185, 196; HRW 2010a: 51, 19).  
	
 The national constitution and other legislation remains fully consistent with Western-
style liberal democracy; Ethiopia is formally a federal parliamentary republic, with a legally 
independent ombudsman and human rights commission, and is a party to the majority of 
major international human rights treaties.  Although the basic legal framework for 
democratic governance is thus for the most part in place, the country operates according to 
what Pausewang terms a 'two track system':  it possesses the formal institutions required by 
donors, but 'below the surface it has built a party structure that keeps tight control at all 
levels and makes sure that no-one can use these democratic institutions efficiently to 
challenge its power' (Pausewang 2002: 230).  This disconnect is apparent, also, in the true 
status of Ethiopia's 'nationalities': in practice, the nine regional states are financially and 
politically weak and run by satellite organisations of the EPRDF (Keller in Asafa 1998: 114). 
Representatives from the TPLF also regularly act as unofficial advisors or coordinators 
within the regional governments (Tronvoll 2002: 163).  The restive state of Oromia, for 
example, is governed by the Oromo People's Democratic Organisation—created by the TPLF
—while the Oromo Liberation Front and other parties with explicit ethnic or secessionist 
agendas are regularly harassed or banned (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012a: 9). 
	
 Since the overthrow of the monarchy, Ethiopia's smallest unit of local government 
(and arguably its most important) has been the kebele, corresponding generally to 
neighbourhood level in cities and to the village level in rural areas.  The high level of control 
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that the tightly-organised national network of EPRDF cadres exercises over kebele 
administrations is well documented, as is the suppression of dissent that kebeles—who have 
their own militias and prisons—are able to exercise over rural dissent (HRW 2010a: 17-19; 
ICG 2009: 18).  Controversial reports by Human Rights Watch (2010a; 2010b) have detailed 
the 'one hundred ways of putting pressure' exercised by the EPRDF, including the blocking 
of supporters of the opposition from employment in the civil service, and the distribution of 
seeds and fertilisers only to supporters of the ruling party.  In a country where over 85% of 
the labour force is employed in agriculture, the convergence of the 'food for votes' tactic with 
the expansion of EPRDF membership from 700 000 in 2005 to more than 5 million in 2010 
(LeFort 2010) is surely not coincidental.  Sectoral organisations such as the Association of 
Manufacturers and Chamber of Commerce have been disbanded or had their leadership 
replaced (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009a: 16).
 	
 The EPRDF thus had five years to conduct an extensive campaign of co-option, 
intimidation and 're-ideologization' (Tronvoll 2011: 124) before the parliamentary elections 
in 2010.  Opposition to the EPRDF was vested primarily in the eight-party coalition Medrek, 
widely viewed as the successor to the decimated CUD.  Although a decisive victory for the 
EPRDF was expected, the sheer dominance of the EPRDF nonetheless took many by 
surprise—the EPRDF took 99.6% of seats in parliament, leaving only two MPs unaffiliated 
with the party at the time of writing.  The usual allegations of vote rigging, harassment, 
intimidation and outright violence against the opposition were rife (Tronvoll 2011: 124), but 
criticism from the international community was muted.  Relations between the EU and the 
Ethiopian government had been severely (and publicly) damaged by the critical report of the 
Observer Mission five years previously; nevertheless, a large EU observer mission was 
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granted accreditation provided it signed a 'code of electoral conduct', consented to very late 
deployment, and agreed to learn from the 'mistakes' of the past.  The new mission's final 
report in 2010 was less damning than its 2005 counterpart, but nevertheless found that ‘the 
electoral process fell short of international commitments for elections, notably regarding the 
transparency of the process and the lack of a level playing field for all contesting 
parties’ (EU-EOM 2010: 1).  
	
 This is not to imply that all movement has been unambiguously in the direction of 
authoritarian governance.  There has been a handful of more promising developments in the 
arena of democratic governance: the EPRDF 'allows and even encourages the teaching of 
democratic values' (Pausewang et al 2002: 239) in schools, cadre trainings and kebele 
gatherings—as long as it is completely in control of the process.  In certain aspects, 
minorities are less marginalised than before; the right to be educated in one's mother tongue, 
for example, is now generally beginning to be recognised in practice (ICG 2009: 24).  Aware 
of the long-term dangers of being associated with rule by a single ethnicity, Meles has made 
efforts to appoint non-Tigrayans to senior posts in government, most notably in the 
composition of the 2010 cabinet.  Two decades of debate, however limited, on issues of 
democratic rights and human rights seem to have had at least some impact on ordinary 
Ethiopians' level of knowledge of their civic rights and responsibilities, although this is 
difficult to measure.  All attempts towards democratisation are, however, carefully mediated 
and controlled by a ruling party which seems to see the ‘granting’ of these rights as a tactical 
or developmental strategy rather than a legal or ethical duty.
	
 Although the level of repression and state violence thus in no way even approaches 
that of the Derg regime, Ethiopia can nonetheless not be seen as democratic in the way the 
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term is commonly understood.  A deep-rooted culture of fear and state dominance remains in 
place; no government has ever come to power in Ethiopia without the use of force, and any 
criticism of the government is still often treated as treasonous (Clapham 2002: xviii).  'The 
EPRDF has effectively merged with the state' (Tadesse and Young 2003: 389), and other 
societal actors depend on access to state resources and the EPRDF's favour for their survival.
	
 Where political reform has slowed or even halted, economic reform, while still 
constrained, has gained considerable momentum.  Banking, telecommunications and land all 
remain government-owned, but the country has gone to great lengths to attract FDI and 
promote its exports.  Of these, coffee remains the most lucrative, but the government is also 
trying to move away from a reliance on the export of primary commodities through agro-
processing and value addition (Ethiopian Investment Agency 2010).  A nascent middle class 
is emerging in the country's urban centres, and the government's call on members of 
Ethiopia's 1.5 to 2 million-strong diaspora to invest in the country appears to have borne 
fruit; officials (quoted in Henshaw 2006) estimate that more than $800 million of investment 
into Ethiopia from 2001 to 2006 stemmed from the diaspora.  
	
 The government has placed rapid economic growth at the forefront of its highly 
ambitious five-year plans: the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End 
Poverty (PASDEP) made 'a massive push to accelerate growth' the second of its central 
pillars, and aimed to achieve an average of 7 to 10% growth in real GDP from 2005 to 2010. 
(MoFED 2006: 165, 63).  After exceeding its ‘high-case’ scenario of 10% (World Bank 
2012), in 2010 it launched the even more optimistic Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), 
which aimed to double the country's GDP by 2015 and achieve ‘middle-income status’ by 
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2025 (MoFED 2010a)20.  Much of this growth has been achieved—and is likely to be 
achieved in future—through increased external inflows of capital.  
	
 The present economic situation, however radical in the Ethiopian context, diverges 
from current donor orthodoxy in a number of ways.  One example is the immense emphasis 
given, especially since PASDEP, to government investment in physical infrastructure.  The 
government has obtained a loan from China that is to fund the construction of 2000 
kilometres of railway by 2015 and an additional 3000 kilometres shortly thereafter—a more 
than seven-fold increase on the current situation.  The project is intended to support 
Ethiopia's agricultural sector by transporting livestock and grain, and relies on the the China 
EximBank and the China Railway Corporation for funding and construction, respectively. 
The GTP also articulates the government's aim to increase the amount of roads in the country 
from 49,000 to 136,000 (MoFED 2010a: 17).  Western donors have funded such projects in 
the past by, for example, providing grants and credits to the World Bank's Road Sector 
Development Program.  They have not openly criticised the recent move towards an even 
greater focus on infrastructure, but neither have they been the driving force behind it.  
	
 At times, these projects have come up against countervailing doctrines emphasised, at 
least in principle, by international institutions.  The most notable example is the country's 
controversial and extensive hydroelectric energy programme.  Five hydroelectric dams are 
planned for the Omo River in the south of the country; the biggest of these, the Gibe III, will 
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20  Interestingly, Amharic-language documents and unofficial English translations such as that cited above 
contain these figures,  which have also been widely cited in the media.   However,  the official English-language 
document for presentation to donors (MoFED 2010b) omits explicit mention of these aims, perhaps due to 
earlier criticism by IMF officials and others that the original plan was 'overambitious' (quoted in Kirubel 2010).  
be the second-largest dam (and largest hydropower plant) in Africa.  Although it is expected 
to more than double Ethiopia's power generation capacity, it will also, according to critics, 
disrupt the livelihoods of up to one million rural Ethiopians (Sharife 2010).  A large 
international campaign has emerged to oppose the 'eco-genocide' (Sharife 2010) that would 
ostensibly result from the dam's construction.  The project was planned and executed very 
rapidly; a no-bid contract was awarded to Italian firm Salini Costruttori before funding or 
impact assessments had been carried out, leading the World Bank and other donors to decline 
involvement in the project (Greste 2009).  The majority of funding secured by 2011 was in 
the form of loans from the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and the EximBank of 
China.
	
 A second divergence from current Western development orthodoxy resides in the 
more general subject of state involvement in the economy.  Aside from the wholesale public 
ownership of the sectors mentioned previously, the government also practices import 
substitution, imposes controls on foreign exchange, and protects and promotes key industries 
from outside competition.  The Development Assistance Group (DAG), representing the 26 
major traditional donors to Ethiopia, has gone on record urging the government of Ethiopia 
to accord a greater focus to private sector development and to open the unproductive sectors 
of the economy to competition (Taylor 2010).    
	
 Ethiopia remains highly dependent on the funding of Western donors, leading some 
critics to view the EPRDF’s limited attempts at reform as commensurate solely with what the 
party can ‘get away with’ while retaining its position as ‘donor darling’ of Africa (Brüne 
2009: 139).  Ethiopia received almost $4 billion in Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) 
in 2009 (OECD 2011: 114), and it was the UK's second-largest recipient of aid in 2011 
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(DFID 2011: 30).  In 2002 (the latest year for which figures are available), aid contributed a 
staggering 81% of the Ethiopian government's total budget (UNDP 2010: 121).  Ethiopia is 
still one of the poorest and most drought-stricken countries in the world. Depending largely 
on the weather conditions in a given year, anywhere from 2.8 million (Reuters 2011) to 10.4 
million Ethiopians (FEWS NET 2006: 1) are estimated to be dependent on food aid for their 
survival.  As a result, government policy is invariably formulated in consultation with the 
DAG.
	
 This picture of a self-interested government undertaking what limited reforms it must 
in order to stay in power is complicated by indications that Ethiopia’s combination of slow 
(or even static) political liberalisation and moderate economic liberalisation has led to some 
level of tangible improvement in the material welfare of Ethiopia’s poor.  The government's 
behaviour, while authoritarian, is not consistent with the hollowed-out, patrimonial regimes 
that have plagued large parts of post-colonial Africa.  Even sceptics note 'its clear vision on 
development and ambitious development agenda' (Segers et al 2009: 97), as well as the 
economic growth and expansion of public services that it has helped to bring about (ICG 
2009: 29).  As Ethiopia's track record on political rights has deteriorated, its performance in 
the area of economic rights has, paradoxically, improved.  Ethiopia's score on the Human 
Development Index (HDI), although still one of the lowest in the world, has improved year 
on year since 2000; it was the African country that exhibited the greatest improvement in 
HDI from 1990 to 2010 (UNDP 2010: 3).  A major multi-donor report has referred to 
Ethiopia one of ‘the few countries in sub-Saharan Africa making fast progress toward the 
Millennium Development Goals’ (ADB et al 2012: 196). Macro-economic figures are 
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equally impressive:  Ethiopia was the 5th fastest-growing country from 2001 to 2010, and 
was predicted to be the 3rd fastest-growing from 2011 to 2015 (Economist 2011).
	
 The picture is further complicated by the DAG’s own dependence on EPRDF 
cooperation (Borchgrevink 2008; Brüne 2009).  The reaction of donors to repression is 
heavily constrained by strategic considerations: Ethiopia is seen as a vital ally against 
terrorism in the unstable Horn of Africa, and as a buffer against Islamic extremism. 
Allegations that aid money is being used to fund repression are vehemently contested by the 
DAG (2010).  Donors do proffer mild criticism, but these factors, in combination with 
China's growing role in the Ethiopian economy, give the government of Ethiopia more 
freedom of action than most aid recipients.  
	
 Some of the poverty alleviation of the past decade has been achieved with the help of 
the same kebele system that the party uses to restrict rural dissent.  The intricate and 
extensive rural party infrastructure that allows the EPRDF to police its cadres is also used to 
increase access to basic services, mobilise the population and educate farmers on new 
technologies.  Substantial investments have been made in agricultural extension services, 
leading to a vast rise in the quantity and levels of professionalisation of the extension officers 
available to each kebele (Davis et al 2010: 1).  Primary school enrolment has increased from 
33% in 1991 to 95% in 2007 (UNDP 2010: 108), and rural health posts and health workers 
both increased more than sixfold from 2003 to 2007 (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009a: 24).  This 
has led the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2010: 51) to the somewhat 
surprising admission that 'Even without fully competitive national elections, local 
mechanisms that increase access and thus the provision of public goods can operate 
effectively'.
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 The acknowledgement of these achievements is not to suggest that the EPRDF does 
not suffer from corruption or use its power to the advantage of its members.  Although the 
government has privatised hundreds of firms and parastatals over the past few decades, many 
of these have been integrated into large conglomerates owned by members or relatives of the 
ruling party (Abbink 2006: 5).  These 'party-associated enterprises' (Vaughan and Tronvoll 
2003: 76) still exercise a near-monopoly on certain supposedly liberalised sectors.   Criticism 
that the culture of power pervades economic activities at even the lowest level is rife, and 
many observers of rural agricultural extension programmes note their top-down focus, 
vulnerability to corruption and lack of inclusivity (Segers et al 2009).  
	
 Nor does this assessment deny the huge economic challenges that face the country. 
Despite its advances, Ethiopia was still one of the countries with the lowest human 
development in 2010 (UNDP 2010: 145); in 2008, it was also one of the most gender-
unequal (UNDP 2010: 144).   The country remains overly dependent on food aid and rain-fed 
agriculture.  Some of the country's current problems stem directly from the recent high 
growth: the economic boom in urban areas may have created an unsustainable construction 
bubble, and high inflation has led to fears that the economy is overheating (Ohashi quoted in 
Davison 2011a). Rapid urbanisation and rising inequality are both matters of concern.  The 
scale-up in service delivery has strained existing systems, leading, for example, to 
overcrowding in schools (UNDP 2010: 108).
	
 Despite these concerns, however, there is much in the EPRDF’s recent economic 
policies and performance to demonstrate that the country’s overall direction, post-tehadiso 
and post-2005 elections, is neither entirely determined by donor conditionalities nor driven 
entirely by the self-interest of the ruling elite.  Despite a continued dependence on the DAG, 
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the government has acted semi-autonomously in a number of key economic areas: it has 
retained greater state control over the economy, and the same tool that has granted it tight 
political control—a quasi-socialist approach to rural development and mobilisation centred 
around the kebele—is also credited with bolstering some of its economic achievements.
	
 At present, the available evidence suggests the following:  the EPRDF’s first phase of 
leadership was marked by ideological uncertainty and by a pace of political liberalisation 
that matched—or at times even outstripped—the pace of economic reform.  The ideological 
tensions inherent in a socialist movement facing widespread global and domestic changes on 
coming to power in 1991 were partially ‘settled’ a decade later by the victory, in the form of 
Meles Zenawi, of a faction favouring Ethiopia’s slow but steady transition to an export-led 
market economy.  These developments were consolidated by the catastrophic 2005 general 
elections, which left the ruling party shocked at its loss of support and vowing a change of 
direction in the political sphere.  The result, since 2005, has been a policy of gradual but 
noticeable economic liberalisation accompanied by an almost complete halt (or perhaps even 
a reverse) in measures to democratise the country.  Rapid economic growth in Ethiopia has 
thus coincided with the EPRDF's consolidation of its hold on power and restriction of 
domestic dissent.  As one international NGO summarises this disjuncture, although 'many 
Ethiopians have benefited from the economic modernisation of the past eighteen years' and 
the EPRDF 'has overseen sustained economic growth and advanced development, 
democratic rhetoric has not been matched by democratic practice' (ICG 2009: 1, 5).  This is a 
trend that looks set to continue, given the raft of recent legislation and restrictive measures 
put in place since 2008.  
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 A comprehensive understanding of the reasons for the EPRDF’s moderate level of 
economic reform (by donor standards) and minimal attempts at democratisation would 
require a full look into the ‘black box’ of decision-making.  While such a task is difficult 
enough in democracies and virtually impossible in authoritarian regimes, an interpretive 
analysis of elite and particularly official discourses can achieve the more modest goal of 
shedding light on aspects of the process.  As this and future chapters will argue, the EPRDF’s 
current policy approach is at least partially driven by emulation of East Asia, and particularly 
of those countries who themselves undertook economic reforms before political reforms.  It 
is by using these countries as templates, I contend, that ruling elites wish to revive historical 
attempts at modernisation.  While ruling elites from Meles Zenawi downwards have made 
the ideological decision to move the party and country from its communist history towards 
the free market system that donors demand, they draw lessons from Taiwan, South Korea 
and particularly China on how best to do so.  This allows them to control a process that is 
often seen as potentially destabilising and invasive.  It is to these arguments that the chapter 
now turns.  
4.2  Findings: Ethiopian Elites and Emulation
4.2.1  A Government Searching for Lessons from Abroad
The first task of a study on Ethiopian elites' perceptions of China’s potential as a model 
requires an examination of their attitudes to the very notion of emulation.  On the whole, 
interviewees responded positively to the idea that their country should take lessons from 
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others, although different sectors exhibited varying degrees of enthusiasm.  Most 
respondents viewed the process as both natural and desirable, and admitted to participating in 
a process of lesson-drawing:
Best experiences, best lessons, experience-sharing, benchmarking...are wonderful. 
Especially for Ethiopia.  We are developing, so it's very very important (EN17).21
We want to develop, we want to struggle to fight poverty too, so we can from learn countries 
who attained development in a short period (EG3).
I believe not only that it is important and useful, but that it is a must.  Even if you wanted to, 
you could not do without it.  Even if you want to be bad, you have to learn from the bad 
ones!  If you don't want to learn—in Ethiopia will we start all over again from the industrial 
revolution?  It would be stupid.  The knowledge [belongs to] human beings—they should 
take it...Whether you like it or not, that is the rule of the game, and you do it as a human 
being (EN6).  
It will be recalled that current theories on emulation and lesson-drawing have found the 
process to occur most often when countries find themselves in crisis, with previous policies 
and ideologies having been discredited.  This proves to be particularly true in the case under 
consideration here: the devastation left by the Derg regime, coupled with the global decline 
of communism, left the EPRDF at a critical juncture in the early 1990s:  the new ruling party 
could not simply continue the Marxist, isolationist policies of its predecessors, yet the way 
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21  The system used to code interviewees is explained in Appendix C.
forward was unclear.  These crossroads spurred elites to begin their search for an exemplar—
to many, emulation became one of the consequences of Ethiopia's assimilation into the global 
economic and political order, as well as one of the means by which Ethiopia can control the 
content and speed of what is often perceived of as a threatening process:
When you isolate yourself, you don't know those you've isolated yourself from. But, now that 
we've opened up, we've identified what it is that we lack, and how to defend ourselves, and 
therefore we're part of the world community once more (EG24). 
As far as economics is concerned, the world is currently 'one village' [due to] globalisation. 
Based on this, we are creating a market economy and assimilating with other countries 
(EN11).
Just under half of respondents (45%), corresponding to Rivera's 'pure voluntarists' (2004: 
49), named one or two specific countries—or a specific region—when asked about models 
Ethiopia might follow (see Fig. 1).  Seen to be almost as important as learning, however, 
were the countervailing principles of selectivity and indigenisation.  Even pure voluntarists 
paired most expressions of admiration for a country or region with the warning that it could 
not be simply copied or imitated indiscriminately.
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Fig. 1:
An additional 50% of respondents could be classed as 'quasi-voluntarists' (Rivera 2004: 50)
—those who approved of emulation but felt that Ethiopia could learn from the best 
experiences of many countries rather than following a particular model.22  These elites, in 
particular, continually emphasised the care and skill by which the experiences of others had 
been adapted for use in Ethiopia, and often mentioned the uniqueness of the Ethiopian 
situation.  These were also more likely to name instances of sectoral learning and 'first-order 
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22  The distinction between 'voluntarists' and 'quasi-voluntarists' was not always clear-cut,  calling for sensitive 
interpretation.  My interviews were less structured than those of Rivera (2004: 47), and interviewees therefore 
tended to fall somewhere on a spectrum.  For example, a subject who stated that Ethiopia could learn equally 
from many countries, but then went on to focus overwhelmingly on lessons from a single model when asked for 
details, was classed as a voluntarist.   However, a subject choosing one model at national level, but using a 
variety of models equally within his own organisation, was classed as a quasi-voluntarist.  
policy learning' (Hall 1993) than the previous group.  Many of these respondents expressed 
the notion that many countries held lessons Ethiopia could adopt, depending on the sector or 
policy area under discussion:
I don't have a country [in mind], really, because I can tell you of countries that have been 
successful in managing their environments, but their environments and ours are different. 
And, therefore, I would not like to imply that if we do everything that they did we would be 
like them. It's foolish, in my mind. You start where you are – you identify the specificities of 
your situation, the specificities of the change you want, and then you can then learn from the 
experiences of other countries and other people.  But you can't copy what other countries 
have done (EG24).
I think it is generally always useful to contextualise things rather than bringing them just 
from abroad, otherwise we will end up with some kind of cargo culture (EN18).
There were some significant differences between the two main sectors represented in 
interviews.  Those working in government were more positive about emulation, overall, than 
were their peers in the non-governmental sector; there were an equal number of voluntarists 
and quasi-voluntarists in the governmental sector, whereas voluntarists were outnumbered in 
the non-governmental sector.  In addition, whereas politicians and civil servants emphasised 
the utility of learning more than the need for selectivity, the opposite was true for business, 
civil society and the media.  A look at elites' expressions of 'non-lessons'—the name I shall 
give to features from another model that respondents expressly did not wish to emulate—
136
confirms this:  governmental elites listed four lessons for every non-lesson.  For non-
governmental elites, this same ratio was only two to one.  
	
 Another area of divergence was the extent to which emulation was portrayed as a 
rational process.  Those charged with formulating and implementing policies were most keen 
to portray themselves as adhering to the 'rational shopper' model rejected by Jacoby (2001: 
24), Westney (1987) and others.  Almost all non-governmental subjects believed that the 
current government was indeed basing its actions on one or two specific foreign models, but 
several disapproved of this tactic altogether, whilst others were not opposed to emulation per 
se, but felt the EPRDF was copying in either a haphazard or overly literal manner.  These 
interviewees were less likely to portray emulation as a rational, carefully thought-out process
—perhaps largely because they were less likely to participate directly in the process 
themselves.  According to one member of the opposition:
Sometimes just copying models can also create problems. What we have been experiencing 
in the last thirty years...we are taking models, we are copying and seeking lessons, for 
example, from China. And it's unfortunate we are still in that vicious circle. We are not 
listening to our culture, to our history, going back to our roots (EN2).
Aside from being generally more positive about emulation, interviewees in government were 
also more likely to draw a sharp distinction between economic and political emulation, 
believing the former to be preferable to the latter.  A common view was that economic 
modelling was essential if Ethiopia was to survive the competitive post-Cold War 
environment, but that political learning was more difficult due to several features that set the 
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country apart from others.  In this respect, Ethiopia's unique history was seen as less 
important than its current 'objective reality'.  One of the most commonly-cited of such 
features was Ethiopia's large rural population; almost 85% of the population is rural (FDRE 
2008: 19), making Ethiopia one of the largest pre-industrial societies in the world. The other 
was Ethiopia's ethnic diversity; Ethiopia's 'more than 80 nations and nationalities' were 
mentioned in virtually every interview with government officials (e.g. EG7).  Even those 
who viewed Ethiopia as possessing a unique model were, overall, more likely to cast 
Ethiopia in the role of pupil than teacher, as very few interviewees mentioned specific 
lessons Ethiopia could teach others at present.  
Despite reservations and caveats, then, the benefits of learning were emphasised 
somewhat more, overall, than the benefits of selectivity—and even those who stressed the 
latter did not usually discount the importance of some form of limited emulation.  The view 
that Ethiopia should create its own model without any policy emulation whatsoever was only 
very rarely expressed:  only two interviewees, when asked whether Ethiopia should draw 
lessons from the broader development trajectories of others, answered largely in the 
negative.  One of these 'traditionalists'—to return to Rivera's (2004) classification—was the 
country's Human Rights Commissioner, who felt that 'you cannot borrow from here or there, 
because our background is completely different from any other' (EN16).  Traditionalists were 
vastly outnumbered, however, by those who, like one of Meles Zenawi's primary advisors, 
admitted to regularly taking part in 'a demand-led process of learning from models' (EG13).  
	
 The two most important written sources of EPRDF ideology are even more frank 
about the importance of lesson-drawing.  It is difficult to overestimate the influence on party 
thinking of African Development: Dead Ends and New Beginnings, an unpublished 
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manuscript written by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi (2006) in a personal capacity.  One 
newspaper editor says simply that 'everything the government is doing you can find in this 
book...there are no other ideas' (EN8).  In post-tehadiso Ethiopia, Meles is the ‘unchallenged 
intellectual and ideological guide of the party and the government' (Tadesse and Young 2003: 
401), and the ardour with which the most junior party cadres I met expressed their 
admiration of their party leader and his ideas spoke volumes about the extent to which he 
almost single-handedly drives party policy.  It is therefore significant that almost half of this 
manuscript, the fullest expression of Meles' personal philosophy of African development, is 
devoted to lauding the development experiences of a handful of countries—the majority of 
them outside Africa.  Nowhere is emulation explicitly mentioned, but the document as a 
whole is an exercise in the wielding of foreign models to alter indigenous policy 
frameworks.  
	
 A second central document is Development, Democracy and Revolutionary 
Democracy (EPRDF 2006).  'We believe in this, as Christians believe in the Bible', says one 
senior parliamentarian of this document (EG4).   An unpublished training pamphlet widely 
seen as also having been written by Meles himself (LeFort 2010: 455), it is largely devoted 
to selectively emulating and improving on foreign models, and applies the lessons set out in 
African Development to the Ethiopian case.  Negative lessons (Rose 1991: 19), containing 
pitfalls that other countries have fallen into and the EPRDF aims to avoid, are also explored 
in great detail.  
	
 The more official a document, however, the less frequently lesson-drawing is 
mentioned.  Fleeting references to 'benchmarking', 'experience-sharing' and mutual learning 
can be found in five-year plans and speeches (MoFED 2010a: 35; Meles Zenawi 2010), but 
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official documents, particularly those created for the consumption of donors, tend to present 
Ethiopian policy as stemming from indigenous necessities in conjunction with donor 
consultation.  It seems, then, that the stigma that Westney (1987: 9) and others refer to still 
attaches to the process of emulation, making elites uncomfortable to admit that too much of 
their policy is adapted from elsewhere.  This is particularly true in the case of Ethiopia, given 
its dependency on donors who fear the dilution of their influence by other emerging actors in 
Africa.  
	
 Emulation thus helps to inform the thinking of Ethiopian elites, who view their 
country as emerging into the international community after a long period of isolation and 
'backwardness'.  The EPRDF, in particular, relies heavily on lessons drawn from abroad, 
although its elites are reluctant to declare this too openly and careful to emphasise the 
selectivity and rationality of their actions.  This policy of emulation comes straight from the 
top, and is largely formulated by Meles Zenawi himself.  Non-governmental elites are more 
circumspect.  They too, value the experiences of others, but are also more cognisant of the 
dangers of faulty or overly hasty lesson-drawing; in their critique of government emulation, 
they subscribe to the view, prevalent in the literature, that emulation is a process of 'bounded 
rationality' (Weyland 2006) rather than 'selective shopping'.    
4.2.2  China and East Asia as the Models of Choice
It will be recalled that just under half of Ethiopian interviewees showed a clear preference 
for a specific country or region as exemplar.  The responses of these voluntarists can be 
further broken down into three categories: for roughly one in three, a 'Western' country or 
140
sub-region was preferable:  Scandinavia and Germany were most often mentioned, followed 
by the United States and Switzerland.  Those who gave this response came primarily from 
the non-governmental sector—and specifically from the opposition.  One member of 
Medrek, for instance, responded 'I lived 22 years in the United States, so I'm inclined toward 
that model, and some traditions that have been added through the years to that model' (EN5).  
	
 For roughly two out in three voluntarists, however, East Asia was the best model for 
Ethiopia to follow (no voluntarists identified India—or indeed any country outside North 
America, Europe or East Asia—as their model of choice).  Although answers typically did 
not distinguish sharply between countries, speaking of 'the Asian Tigers' (EG16) or 'the East 
Asian countries' (EG7), interviewees often followed this general appraisal with one or two 
examples.  In this regard, China was chosen most often as a 'first choice',  followed by South 
Korea.  Taiwan and Malaysia tied in a distant third place.23  In contrast with the previous 
group, this group came overwhelmingly from the governmental sector.  For one Deputy 
Minister, for example, the experiences of these countries contributed to him joining the 
EPRDF:  
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23  There is some debate both in the academic and policy spheres regarding the scope of the term 'East Asia', 
particularly as it applies to the notion of an 'East Asian Model'.  Following the seminal World Bank (1993) 
study, this dissertation will take the region to refer to eight countries: Japan,  China, the  'Four Tigers' (Hong 
Kong,  the Republic of Korea,  Singapore, and Taiwan), and the three 'newly industrializing  countries'  in 
Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, and  Thailand).   Because I am interested in the region only insofar as it is 
seen as a model for Africa, the term 'East Asia' will also be limited to these countries.  Where interviewees have 
included other countries, such as the Philippines, in their conceptualisation of the East Asian model, this will be 
noted and discussed.  
I must admit that I was sceptical at the beginning—I was a journalist.  But I had to read [the 
party literature] and I had to go through it very critically, and eventually I got interested by its 
fascinating ideas, and I saw direct parallels in nations such as South Korea, Taiwan's 
development, and even the theory of China itself, to some extent...The success stories of 
these nations, and the Southeast Asian countries, has helped me to solidify my belief and my 
support for the revolutionary democracy ideology of the EPRDF.  Eventually, I joined the 
party (EG12).  
The first choice of voluntarists is not the only indication that China, South Korea and the 
other high-performing economies in East Asia are the most emulated countries among 
Ethiopian elites.  Quasi-voluntarists, too, spoke more highly of these countries.  Because 
these respondents drew from a broader range of models, a wider range of countries began to 
creep in here—primarily South Africa, India and a greater variety of Western countries.  But 
despite quasi-voluntarists’ claims that Ethiopia could learn equally from a wide range of 
countries (perhaps reflecting fears that emulation of one model could stigmatise their efforts), 
specifically-cited examples remained remarkably constrained to a single region.  The most 
frequently-mentioned and most fervently-admired region, particularly among members of the 
EPRDF, remained East Asia.  
	
 One notable feature of nearly all respondents who mentioned the East Asian 
experience as holding important lessons for Ethiopia, was the reluctance to single out a 
specific country in this region. China and South Korea were again more often mentioned by 
name, but interviewees who focused on one country alone were very rare.  The East Asian 
Model was thus overwhelmingly privileged over a specifically 'Chinese Model' or 'South 
Korean Model', with elites focusing more on the commonalities between these countries than 
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on the differences.  Sometimes this seemed due to a desire to deflect criticism that Ethiopia 
was blindly copying from one country—particularly China.  This is the most likely reason 
for the one very senior EPRDF member's assertion that 'We want to see the Asian Tigers as a 
general model, but not a specific country.  We take some of the specific issues from different 
countries in different ways' (EG16).24  At other times, however, especially outside the top 
echelons of the EPRDF, it appeared that a lack of knowledge about the intricacies of each 
country's development path blurred their differences and pronounced their similarities for 
elites.  Thus, when asked whether the East Asian countries differed in the way they had 
developed, one respondent replied:  'Personally, I can't figure [it] out.  I can only generalise 
and see that our experience comes from China, Korea and East Asia' (EG11).
	
 Interviewees were also asked whether the Chinese and Indian models were examples 
of 'successful development', with responses coded as 'successful', 'successful with flaws' and 
'largely unsuccessful' (see Table 2).25 Once again, responses varied widely between the two 
sectors: half of government respondents viewed China as successful, and the other half 
viewed it as moderately successful—none viewed it as deeply flawed.  In contrast, those 
outside the EPRDF overwhelmingly viewed China as moderately successful, with the 
remainder equally divided on either side of the spectrum.  Both sets of elites saw India as 
moderately successful overall, but those in government either spoke more highly of China 
overall or did not express a preference one way or the other.  For most, the comparison was 
implicit rather than explicit, but a few stated it bluntly:  
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24 This interviewee is now the country's Acting Prime Minister.
25 It will be recalled that I was initially interested in comparing the influences of the Indian and Chinese 
models of development, hence the prominence of the former in this section of my findings.  
Well, for example I can draw one great distinction between the Chinese and Indian approach 
– the biggest difference is in education...Secondly, in the case of China, the people that have 
benefited from the change are vastly different from India – they are much higher, much 
higher [in number].  So  if one is attractive, it is the Chinese model, if I could put it that 
way...So looking from afar at what I see as a glaring difference between the two, the Chinese 
model has delivered a better result (EG5).
Table 2: Ethiopian Perceptions of China and India’s Developmental ‘Success’
Governmental Non-governmental Total
Is China an example of 
successful development? 
Yes 52% 21% 37%
Qualified 
yes 48% 63% 55%
No 0% 16% 8%
Is India an example of 
successful development?   
Yes 33% 28% 31%
Qualified 
yes 62% 66% 64%
No 5% 6% 5%
Which country is a better 
model?*
China 48% 18% 35%
India 9% 64% 32%
Neither 43% 18% 33%
Source: primary interview data
* Where this question was not asked directly, interviewees’ responses to the question ‘Is China a good model for 
your country’ were compared with responses to the question ‘Is India a good model for your country?’ 
Those outside of government, on the other hand, were more likely to India's approach 
development as preferable to China's.  One respondent, for instance, felt the Chinese model 
was 'infested with too much theory'.  In India, on the other hand, people 'say “yes, we are 
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normal, Western, free market”, but they are developing anyway.  It is not so much about 
mottoes and slogans...I prefer that one.  Just do it!  Don't shout about theories, just do 
it' (EN6).   
	
 EPRDF representatives, therefore, most often named China—and the East Asian 
region more generally—as a potential model.  They also saw China as either fairly or very 
successful. A third factor further demonstrates their preference for the East Asian Model of 
development: government elites were far more likely to cite specific lessons from China and 
South Korea than from any other countries.  They were less likely to cite lessons from the 
West, or to list Western countries as exemplars.  Those they did cite—Scandinavia, Germany, 
'the early days of the West'—were often seen as providing similar lessons to East Asia, in 
sharp contrast to 'neo-liberal' countries such as the United States.  An example of this is the 
use of Germany’s technical and vocational training as an example for Ethiopia’s own 
educational system.  The German Embassy to Addis Ababa memorably explains Ethiopia’s 
highly instrumental use of German expertise in educational and vocational reform as follows: 
‘Realizing that the advancements of the so-called education, and in quality infrastructure 
“Asian Tiger”  economies over the past decades were based on an industrial development 
model from Germany, the Ethiopian government went to the source and secured the German 
Development Cooperation as a partner’ (Embassy of the FRG in Ethiopia 2010: 7); this is a 
finding substantiated in interviews with EPRDF policymakers.  A select group of Western 
countries are thus seen as supplementing lessons taken from East Asia.
	
 African countries were also not very frequently mentioned.  South Africa was 
sometimes mentioned as an exemplar, but usually in specific sectors rather than as a general 
model.  Where cited, African states were often held up as negative examples:
145
We have discussed failed states [in our party].  We took so many countries, for example the 
Congo.  The Congo has natural resources, everything, but you know the case in Congo—
everybody's attention is there.  Why?  To get something from that conflict.  So we concluded 
that natural resources are not a factor for development (EG4)
Non-governmental elites, on the other hand, cited specific lessons from China, India, South 
Korea, the West and others around the world at roughly equal rates, showing only a very 
slight preference for India.  A coherent programme of emulation was thus more difficult to 
discern, and these respondents ultimately answered as one would expect from a group 
without a clear agenda for lesson-drawing.  The fact that these actors did not share the 
government's strong desire to draw lessons from China, South Korea and their neighbours 
illustrates, however, that emulation of these countries is an emerging point of contention and 
political discord in Ethiopia.    
	
 An examination of EPRDF documents also demonstrates the ruling party's desire to 
learn from East Asia in particular.  Both African Development (Meles 2006) and 
Revolutionary Democracy (EPRDF 2006) focus on two specific countries:  South Korea and 
Taiwan.  'Above all', states the latter, 'the strategies devised by [the] EPRDF are more or less 
similar to that [sic] of Taiwan'.  Given this documents' use as an EPRDF training manual, it 
is not surprising that even the most junior party official I met was well-versed in the need to 
emulate East Asia.26  According to the former document, which demonstrates a thorough and 
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26  This informal supplementary meeting with a local government official (Addis Ababa, 18/12/2010) is not 
included in the list of interviews or sources.  
formally-cited reading of the literature on the East Asian Model, 'Taiwan and Korea are 
without doubt the most successful of all developing countries in terms of achieving 
successful development over the past 50 years' (Meles 2006).	

Surprisingly, neither document mentions China as a model, making interviewees from 
the governmental sector more positive about lesson-drawing from China than their party's 
documents would suggest.  Government representatives have frequently used the media and 
academia to express their admiration of China, however.  It is a quotation from an Ethiopian 
minister, for example, that spurs one author to remark that 'the admiration expressed by 
African presidents, government bureaucrats, business leaders, traders and journalists upon 
seeing the marvels of the New China for themselves produced a public euphoria rarely 
experienced in politics' (Alden 2007: 13).  	

Aside from being asked their own preferences regarding emulation, elites outside the 
government were also asked whether they perceived the government to be following any 
development models.  On this question, the responses were clear and unambivalent:  the 
majority singled out China as the primary template for Ethiopia's current development.  This 
answer was particularly common among opponents or critics of the government, and all 
members of Medrek, for example, gave this response.  These critics were united in their 
condemnation of this process, and rejected the EPRDF's assertion that Ethiopia was taking 
only economic (and not political) lessons from China.  Most also viewed its talk of the East 
Asian model as a thinly-veiled attempt to make emulation of China more acceptable to 
donors:
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Meles and his group are certainly idealising countries like China, and I see that. Although 
they don't state it and write it down, I think that is where they are really trying to use it as a 
model or something (EN3).
[T]he political model is going to be that of the Chinese model—they don't say that, but that's 
what we see (EN5).
If you talk to our Prime Minister, he talks about the South Korean model, the Taiwan model, 
but he is copying China (EN1).
Business leaders, civil society and editors were generally likely also to point to China as the 
EPRDF's primary model, but were—with a few notable exceptions—more forgiving of this 
fact.  Some believed the government was applying lessons incorrectly despite its best 
intentions, while one or two were opposed to what they saw as overly narrow imitation of 
China by the EPRDF.  Many, however, echoed the government's distinction between 
economic lessons (said to come from China) and political lessons (said to be home-grown or 
taken from other models): 
On the developmental side, we look like the Chinese. On the democratic, we differ (EN6).
Economically, it uses China as a model, but politically it looks more to places such as South 
Korea and Scandinavia...I truly think Meles wants to be the Deng of Ethiopia. He would like 
history to look back on him as the person who finally pulled Ethiopia out of the poverty of 
the past 100 or 150 years (EN7).
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Non-governmental elites were very prone to view China's political and economic relations 
with Ethiopia as inseparable from its status as exemplar. China's enormous stake in the 
Ethiopian construction industry is seen as both the catalyst and symptom of great Chinese 
influence in other areas of Ethiopia's development.  In addition, the close relationship 
between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the EPRDF—as evidenced by high-level 
study exchanges, mutual assistance in international fora and (according to some respondents) 
underhanded financial dealings—was often cited as reasons for China's role as model:  'They 
share experiences sending some officials there', one respondent said, 'and they are getting 
their money from the Chinese government, so the Chinese may influence the government to 
do such things' (EN9).
	
 The second most-commonly cited model that non-governmental elites perceived the 
government to be following was that of East Asia as a whole.  By specific country, South 
Korea was by far the most frequently-mentioned, followed by Singapore and Taiwan.  Japan, 
Malaysia and Thailand also featured to a lesser extent.  As in discussions of their own 
personal preferences for lesson-drawing, interviewees did not distinguish between China and 
other countries in the region when commenting on the government's attempts.  Most 
responses in this category were simply relaying second-hand information from the 
government rather than offering their own interpretations: according to a representative from 
an NGO umbrella organisation, for example, 'They are referring to the experiences of certain 
countries or even certain regions...in the public speeches, or in their rationale, or in their 
thinking.  Taiwan has come up, South Korea, China, to a certain degree Malaysia....I think 
these are the things I have heard.' (EN18).  This was not always the case, however, as several 
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respondents did report concrete impacts of lessons drawn from East Asia which could not 
have been drawn with equal success from China (EN4; EN8).   To a final group, countries 
such as Japan, Singapore or South Korea represented a slightly softer, less extreme version 
of China's authoritarian political system for the EPRDF to emulate (EN7; EN5).  
	
 In short, the EPRDF takes East Asia as an exemplar, and sees the experiences of the 
region as constituting a loose but nonetheless very real East Asia Model.  This is due not 
merely to a conglomeration of individual preferences, but is a matter of party policy that 
originates from the highest echelons of power.   However, the matter of the exact countries it 
focuses on is more complex.  Publicly, the party claims to be drawing lessons from South 
Korea and Taiwan, but privately South Korea and China are the two countries it expresses 
the greatest desire to emulate.  
	
 What are we to make of this discrepancy?  Three factors—in addition to interviewees' 
direct references to China—suggest that this country is indeed highly important as an 
exemplar, in conjunction with other countries in the region.  Firstly, the EPRDF's perceived 
emulation of China constitutes a key weapon in the rhetorical arsenal of its opponents—the 
government may thus be sensitive to the notion that it is taking its political development 
from China and almost certainly downplays the extent of this emulation.  Secondly, the 
majority of non-governmental elites who are somewhat sympathetic to the government also 
believe it to be taking lessons from China.  Finally, government respondents were themselves 
often reluctant to distinguish between the development experiences of China and other East 
Asian countries, suggesting a belief that China was at the very least a crucial new incarnation 
of an older and broader model of developmental success.  
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 In contrast to this fairly cohesive government outlook, non-governmental elites drew 
lessons from a wider variety of sources.  Medrek tended to favour Europe and the United 
States, putting them in direct contrast to their opponents.  Newspaper editors, business 
leaders and other civil society organisations were the most heterogeneous of all, suggesting 
the lack of an independent or cohesive lesson-drawing project on their part.  Although they 
cited East Asia, India and the West in equal measure, those with favourable views of the 
government were more likely to agree with its choice of exemplar.  Lesson-drawing is thus 
still a highly divisive, government-driven and politicised process in Ethiopia.
4.2.3  Cognitive Constraints on Elite Decision-making
The previous chapter discussed the significance of various biases, or 'cognitive shortcuts', 
that elites bring to their study of external models and that constrain the possible lessons open 
to them.  In the case of Ethiopian respondents, one factor in particular—historical and 'social 
psychological' proximity—played an important role in elites' choice of exemplar.  The single 
most important reason that elites cited for their choice of East Asia and China as exemplars 
was the fact that these countries were late developers, like Ethiopia; by contrast, the West's 
virtually unrecognisable and inscrutable past was seen as the biggest obstacle to its use as a 
model:
Western countries which have developed for 300 or 400 years have reached a very high stage. 
We're not aiming to reach that stage.  Those that have transformed their countries in the last 
30, 40, 50 years are nearer to us than those that have transformed their countries hundreds of 
years before (EG14).  
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We can also take lessons from India and China.  Like us, India is a democracy and a federal 
system.  But it is not ethnic-based, like us.  Like us, China was largely a feudal, peasant 
society, with a lot of ancient history and good leadership.  But it is not a democracy.  Both are 
only good for learning the importance of rapid development.  We cannot learn much from the 
US, because its origins were so different from our own (EG2).  
When we send economic and political cadres, we do send to Asia or Korea or...Singapore. 
And even political cadres—to China, India.  So I think it is because Asia is developing or 
because Asia is probably nearer to us.  Culturally and in development also (EN16). 
Several factors play a role here:  elites see late modernisers as facing challenges that early 
modernisers did not have to contend with, they see the experiences of these countries as 
easier to understand and study due to their recent nature, and they appreciate the sheer 
rapidity with which countries such as China have modernised.  
	
 Governmental elites were reluctant to mention China and Ethiopia's common 
communist past, but this theme nonetheless often emerged in subtle ways.  Unlike Kenyan 
elites, who (as we shall see presently) often mentioned China's communist history as a major 
obstacle to emulation, few Ethiopian elites outside of Medrek did the same, suggesting a 
certain acceptance that one communist country could learn from another.  Non-governmental 
observers who felt the government was emulating China also frequently pointed to this 
factor:  'It's natural that they should choose China—it is also a socialist country, and now for 
the first time, its system is paying off' (EN7).  Finally, much of the discourse and policies 
used by the CCP and the EPRDF remain steeped in the influence of Marxism, and also echo 
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each other.  To name just a few examples, the EPRDF (2011: 5) openly admits to following 
the Leninist principle of 'democratic centralism'; this is the 'basic organizational principle 
and mode of operation' of the CCP (PRC 2005a) also.  Both parties describe themselves as 
'vanguard' parties (CPC 2007; EPRDF 2006: 67), both came to power through rural-based 
revolutions, and both preside over mixed—but primarily socialist—economies.  These past 
and present similarities stem from a shared history, and facilitate the transfer of lessons from 
the more developed to the less developed of the two.  
	
 In contrast to the historical and 'social psychological' proximity Ethiopia shares with 
East Asia and particularly China, cultural and geographical proximity were both seen to have 
little impact.  Shared culture was rarely cited as a reason for lesson-drawing, and this is 
understandable given Ethiopia's conception of itself as having a culture unique in Africa and 
the world.  Elites frequently cited lack of cultural similarity as an obstacle to wholesale 
emulation, but this was as much the case for other Western and even other African countries 
as it was for China and the rest of East Asia.  As we shall see in a later chapter, less important 
than pre-existing cultural similarities were the ways in which East Asia could inspire 
Ethiopia to modernise its culture whilst retaining a distinct identity.  On the one hand, 'we 
need a Cultural Revolution like China had' (EG23), while on the other, countries in East Asia
—and particularly Japan—show that cultural homogenisation need not accompany 
modernisation (EG1; EG16).  Even non-governmental elites who preferred other models 
such as Scandinavia and Germany did not do so on cultural grounds.  Elites did not, thus, 
tend to look for countries with similar cultural or linguistic backgrounds when choosing an 
exemplar.
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 A second important constraint on a purely performance-based selection strategy was 
exposure to and familiarity with various foreign models.  One important indicator in this 
regard was high-level government exchanges and study visits.  The Chinese leadership has 
increasingly followed a strategy of bringing African elites to China for study visits and the 
like; by 2009, for example, 10,000 African professionals were receiving post-graduate 
training in China annually (Kurlantzick 2009: 9).  This is even more true for Ethiopia than 
for others in the region, given the strong political ties between the two countries. 
Approximately 60% of governmental elites I spoke to had visited China, whereas only 33% 
had visited India, for example (for non-governmental elites these numbers were 43% and 
35% respectively).  The Chinese Embassy in Addis Ababa estimates that the number of 
Ethiopian ministers who visit China annually has doubled over the past decade, and views 
these exchanges as one of the most important mechanisms driving the 'sharing' of 
experiences (EA1).  None of the interviewees with a primarily negative view of China's 
development had visited the country.  More generally, most respondents had visited the 
country or region they most wished to emulate, and most had done so either specifically on a 
study visit or had lived there.  Elites who wished to draw lessons from Western countries, 
particularly in Medrek, had virtually always either studied or worked in these countries, 
sometimes for decades at a time.  
	
 It is difficult to know conclusively whether study visits directly improved elites' 
perceptions of a country, or whether the causality ran in the opposite direction. On the one 
hand, a few very senior officials and heads of organisations may have had the freedom to act 
as initiators of visits to countries that interested them.  On the other hand, many more 
interviewees spoke of having their heads turned only after having observed, first-hand, the 
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successes of another country.  The interviewee I spoke to who was perhaps most enthusiastic 
about the Chinese model was a parliamentarian who had recently visited China as part of a 
larger delegation.  When asked whether the trip had changed his view on development, he 
replied:
 
Yes, definitely!  I was in the rural area before I came to the parliament. When I saw [Chinese 
workers], I did not understand such men. When I went to China, my understanding—my 
view—totally changed. We can change our country, because they did. I've seen their bridges, 
their buildings, their dams. Therefore, why? Is there a special problem in Africa, in Ethiopia? 
And we ask ourselves—why? When I see the roads in China—all the roads are twice the size 
[of those] in Ethiopia.  I see farmers' houses with ventilators, with TV, with telephone. I've 
seen it.  And, really, my views are changed totally (EG8).
It is difficult to conclude that all admirers of China's development were won over through 
these means.  Those who had visited China were just as likely to see its development as a 
qualified (rather than outright) success as those who had not visited.  The choice of East Asia 
as a model also shows the limits of exposure—South Korea is far less active and visible in 
Ethiopia than India or the United States, for example, yet was more often seen as a model. 
However, formal study exchanges do appear to be an important factor in transforming mere 
curiosity into more focused attempts at emulation.  Even an interviewee who embarked on a 
tour of Asia primarily to establish economic linkages came away with the desire to learn 
from one country—Malaysia—to a greater extent than the other countries he visited (EG22).  
	
 At the very least, it is clear that the boom of recent state-funded visits to China is not 
unconnected with Ethiopia's attempts at emulating this country in particular.  Some who 
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went on such visits cited concrete lessons implemented on their return.  A senior civil 
servant, for example, charged with improving school attendance, observed and drew on 
Chinese strategies of educating and mobilising recalcitrant families (EG19).  Unsurprisingly, 
those who expressed admiration for East Asia's development, without being able to explain 
how this development came about, were also less likely to have visited countries in the 
region.  Interviewees were less familiar, by contrast, to India.  For those of certain 
generation, their primary exposure to the country stemmed from being taught by Indian 
teachers employed by the Haile-Selassie regime (e.g. EN11).  This disposed them favourably 
to the country, but did not often translate to lesson-drawing beyond the area of education.
	
 Aside from study exchanges, a host of other factors provide Ethiopian elites with a 
higher level of familiarity with China than with other potential models.  Ethiopia's economic 
ties with China are burgeoning:  China is Ethiopia's leading trading partner (Economist 
Intelligence Unit 2011), and Chinese investment in Africa has grown exponentially in the 
past five years.  The granting of contracts totalling several billions of dollars to Chinese 
construction and engineering firms has brought thousands of Chinese workers to Ethiopia; in 
many parts of the country, all foreigners are now greeted with cries of 'China, China!'  In 
April 2011, the two countries signed an agreement pledging Chinese provision of $12 
million in grants and loans.  Political ties between the two countries are also on the rise: the 
first ever Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) to take place in Africa was held in 
Addis Ababa in 2003.  Bilateral meetings have taken place at the highest levels, and it is no 
exaggeration to say that China is Ethiopia's closest political and economic ally.  This 'on-the-
ground' familiarity was visible in interviews as well:  several interviewees spoke of being 
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impressed by the speed of Chinese construction in Ethiopian cities, as well as the diligence 
of Chinese employees: 'Every Chinese I know is hard-working, very hard-working' (EN14).
	
 China's strong ties with Ethiopia raise the issue, of course, of the extent to which 
dependency on economic and political support from Ethiopia might prompt Ethiopian 
leaders to profess a desire to learn from—or even to actively emulate—China for insincere 
and instrumental reasons.  Although this may initially seem likely, particularly given the 
difficulties in determining this through an analysis of elite discourse alone, a close reading of 
the literature proves otherwise.  One of the few points of near-agreement in the ‘China in 
Africa’ literature is the fact that the former largely follows a 'no-strings attached' approach in 
its dealings with Africa (Alden 2007: 102; Taylor 2007).  As long as countries are stable, 
willing to trade with China, and  adhere to the 'One China' principle that views Taiwan as a 
part of China, there is (at present) minimal pressure for China's African partners to follow 
particular economical and political programmes.  As we have seen previously, China is still 
uncomfortable with the idea that it possesses a coherent model that can be exported outside 
its borders, and has only recently begun to respond to external demands for lesson-sharing. 
In addition, Ethiopia's dependency on Western ODA dwarfs its reliance on Chinese 
investment, and yet Ethiopia's elites still cite the latter as a more valuable model.  Their 
frequent expressions of a desire to learn from Taiwan are a further indication of China's 
relative lack of concern regarding the models elites may or may not be following.  
	
 This is not to suggest that China's economic presence in Ethiopia may not influence 
elites' development strategies, of course.  Sometimes the practical imperatives of dealing 
with China may sway Ethiopia towards emulation of China: in the case of infrastructure, for 
example, lesson-drawing and Chinese investment coalesce to bring about a new emphasis on 
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the rapid construction of roads, dams and railways.  At other times, these two forces may 
actually conflict: there is evidence to suggest that certain African countries may be prevented 
from following China's emphasis on manufacturing by the very fact that Chinese goods are 
already penetrating their markets (Goldstein et al 2006: 66).  The actions of external powers 
may well influence both Ethiopian development strategies and outcomes, then, but 
dependency alone has little impact on the models elites wish to emulate.  This is in keeping 
with the emulation literature which, reader will recall, holds that countries are as likely to 
draw lessons from their rivals as from their allies.  In short, exposure to and familiarity with 
China plays some role in 'converting' Ethiopian elites to that model, but interacts with other 
factors and stems more from the desires of elites themselves than may at first appear to be 
the case.  
	
 In the case of Ethiopia, then, perceived historical and 'social psychological' proximity 
play a significant role in conditioning elites' choice of model; exposure to and familiarity 
with the model also lead elites to consider certain models far more frequently than others. 
China, as a country that shares Ethiopia's communist past and has only relatively recently 
experienced rapid development, resonates with elites eager to learn how to follow a similar 
trajectory.  The sheer visibility of the Chinese model, particularly for elites visiting the 
country on study trips and official visits, is an additional factor.  Similarly, the choice of East 
Asia is partially determined by its 'late developer' status, which resonates with an Ethiopia 
that sees itself as the quintessential late developer.  In neither case were emulating elites 
much deterred by the radical cultural differences that differentiate them from their 
exemplars.
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 These heuristic devices constrain the possibilities available, but do not alone 
determine them.  The performance of exemplars, the perceived merit of the specific lessons 
they 'teach', and their instrumental utility to elites are all important determinants of the 
choices Ethiopian elites exercise when emulating others.  Because these are so inextricably 
linked to the content of the models themselves, they shall be discussed in Section Three of 
this dissertation.
4.3  Conclusion
In June 2010, Ethiopia's leading English-language newspaper published an editorial entitled 
'EPRDF Aims for Chinese Model Legitimacy not Democracy'  ('EPRDF Aims' 2010).  In it, 
an unidentified commentator accused the ruling party of imitating the Chinese economic and 
political system and of thereby deriving its legitimacy from material prosperity and 
nationalism rather than from democracy.  The EPRDF's blistering rebuttal (MoFA 2010) 
fervently rejected accusations of authoritarianism, but did not directly refute the notion that it 
was indeed adopting broad lessons from China, at least in the economic sphere.
	
 Careful analysis of interview and documentary sources illustrates that governmental 
elites do indeed wish to emulate China, and that this notion has been so thoroughly 
transferred from its origin in the personal ideology of Meles Zenawi downwards throughout 
the EPRDF structure that it can be said to constitute official party policy.  However, China's 
neighbours in the region—South Korea, Taiwan, and others—are also highly important as 
exemplars.  Indeed, many in the party see the entire region as offering an essentially similar 
model, of which China is only the latest, and most prominent, incarnation.  Countries seen as 
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occupying a similar, or slightly higher level of development are preferred, as are those to 
which respondents had had the greatest amount of exposure.  Economic/political dependency 
and cultural similarity, in contrast, have a minimal impact on choice of exemplar.  Despite 
growing suggestions in the global media and policy discourse that India can act as an 
alternative model to China, there is little evidence to suggest that Ethiopian elites feel the 
same way.  As one economic planner summarises it, ‘We are also learning from India on a 
sectoral level, although not on an aggregate level…[There] we place an emphasis on 
China’ (EG20).
	
 If the choices of the governmental sector could be said to adhere to a single broad 
regional model, this was not true for elites in other sections of society.  Elites outside the 
EPRDF were both more critical of emulation, and more likely to choose from a wide range 
of exemplars.  As the Addis Fortune debate illustrates, emulation of China and East Asia is 
one of the central pillars of ideological and political contestation in Ethiopia today.  To 
admire China, in present-day Ethiopia, is to admire the EPRDF and its vision for the future 
of Ethiopia; voices calling for the taking of lessons from other countries—particularly in the 
West—have been marginalised and now fall outside the political pale.
	
 Ethiopia's history of emulation and particularism has long led it to draw lessons from 
'front-runner' countries inside and outside the West.  The EPRDF's post-2005 strategy of 
retaining tight control over the political sphere whilst gradually acceding to economic 
liberalisation brings to mind much of the literature on the 'authoritarian growth' experienced 
by China and (as shall be shown later) East Asia; the evidence suggests that this resemblance 
is no coincidence, but rather the product of concerted lesson-drawing. This process 
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represents a continuation of Ethiopia's historical attempts to ensure modernisation and 
development whilst retaining control over its own destiny.   
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CHAPTER FIVE:  KENYAN EMULATION OF 
SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA   
In exploring the attitudes of Kenyan elites to the emulation of foreign models, this chapter 
takes a similar approach to the previous.  This dissertation has established that Ethiopian 
elites are looking to East Asia—and particularly to China and South Korea—for models that 
will enable them to resolve the country's long-standing ambivalence towards modernisation 
and assimilation; it has also found this tendency to be most pronounced among members of 
the ruling EPRDF, which governs the country virtually unchallenged.  In this chapter, I 
present the corresponding evidence from Kenyan elites:  I begin by tracing the historical 
roots of the country's emulation of foreign models, before addressing general attitudes to 
lesson-drawing today.  I then identify the specific models that Kenyan leaders wish to follow, 
and examine the reasons for these choices.  I again conclude with some reflections on the 
relevance of the findings for the broader research question, setting the stage for a comparison 
between the content of lesson-drawing attempts in Ethiopia and Kenya.  Once again, the 
precise lessons elites are drawing from others, as well as the implications of this trend for 
broader development discourses, are left to Section II.  
5.1  The National Context
Before examining current trends towards—or perhaps away from—emulation in Kenya, it is 
important to briefly explore the role that various elites and development dogmas have played 
in the country's recent past.  Kenya, one of the most studied countries in Africa, has been at 
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the centre of global and African development discussions since its independence in 1963. 
The country has been at once one of the most assiduous followers of modernisation theory 
and subsequent mainstream development orthodoxies, and one of the sites where alternative 
hypotheses to development has been most thoroughly debated.  Its adherence to the capitalist 
path of development associated with the ‘West’ has, at times, been voluntary and, at other 
times, the result of conditionalities imposed from outside.  It has also been shaped by 
alliances and rifts between the elites who have governed the country—with greatly varying 
degrees of success—since the ending of colonial rule.
	
 Kenya is a unitary multi-party republic with a unicameral parliamentary system. 
Until the establishment by Britain of the East Africa Protectorate in 1895, the interior of the 
country was inhabited by various pastoralist and agrarian tribes, while the coast was 
dominated by the settlements of Arab and Persian traders.  The territory was initially valued 
by the British as a corridor between the resource-rich Lake Victoria in Uganda and the East 
African coast; for many years, therefore, British control and investment extended only to the 
area traversed by the Uganda-Navaisha Railway.  This changed with the influx of large 
numbers of European settlers and the concurrent establishment of large-scale, cash-crop 
farming in the fertile Rift Valley and central highlands.  This dispossessed large numbers of 
Kikuyu—then, as now, Kenya’s largest ethnic group—and Kalenjin of their means of 
livelihood.  Tribal divisions and conflict had preceded colonialism, but were now 
exacerbated and formalised by the establishment of tribal reserves and boundaries (Maxon 
2002: 339).  Thousands of Indian labourers had been brought in to build the railway, further 
altering the protectorate’s ethnic composition.  	
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 In 1920, the construction of a modern colonial state and capitalist economy further 
intensified with the British creation of the Colony of Kenya.  Over the next few decades, a 
stratified economic system comprising a landed European ruling class, an Asian trading 
class, a small African ‘petty bourgeoisie’ and a large African peasantry was consolidated 
(Ochieng and Atieno-Odhiambo 1995).  It was largely from the penultimate of these groups 
that black political mobilisation, spurred by political disenfranchisement, overtaxing and 
landlessness, initially originated.  In 1944, this resulted in the establishment of the Kenya 
African Union (KAU), headed by the gradualist constitutionalist Johnstone Kamau (later to 
become Jomo Kenyatta).  Before long, however, resistance grew more militant, and the 
famed Mau Mau rebellion—drawn largely from poor rural Kenyans—broke out, leading to 
the brutal deaths of an estimated 50 000 Kenyans (Blacker 2007)27 and 100 Europeans 
(Berman 1990: 352) over a seven-year state of emergency.  
The insurgency not only eventually helped to force the end of British rule over 
Kenya, but exemplified the tensions within the country’s African—and particularly the 
dominant Kikuyu—population.  Several thousand casualties of the conflict had been 
constitutional nationalists, as well as ‘loyalists’ who served the colonial administration. 
When the Kenya African National Union (KANU), successor organisation to KAU, came to 
power at independence, it represented a fragile and last-minute coalition of these three 
factions: loyalist, moderate and radical.  
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27 This is still a controversial number:  official British figures (cited in Blacker 2007: 226) stand at 11 503, and 
the highest estimate at 300 000 (Elkins 2006), but both these numbers have been widely, and convincingly, 
discredited by Blacker and others.
This détente was short-lived, however, and post-independence Kenya—headed by 
Kenyatta—took a firm, unequivocal turn towards capitalism, modernisation and the retention 
of colonial institutions.  Author after author has contrasted Kenyatta’s status as cosmopolitan 
member of the Kenyan middle class with the socialist, often-illiterate former combatants 
who now found themselves politically sidelined (Tamarkin 1978: 314; Berman 1991: 201), 
and division has run through Kenyan political life ever since (Branch 2009).  
 Very shortly after independence, then, Kenyatta and his inner circle emerged as the 
paradigmatic modernising elites envisioned by the modernisation theory of Parsons, Rostow 
and Shils.  Resolving to keep in place the basic colonial administrative infrastructure and 
means of production, but to gradually place both in the hands of Africans, Kenyatta’s 
government represented a union between those Kenyans who had served the British 
administration and those who had negotiated independence in London.  As such, ‘it is 
generally accepted that independent Kenya did not affect a major ideological or structural 
break with the colonial state’ (Ochieng and Atieno-Odhiambo 1995: 259), favouring policies 
of capital accumulation over redistribution (Bates 1989: 147), agricultural export-promotion 
over smallholder agriculture, and urban over rural development.  Many former colonial 
administrators stayed on as advisors, even as Kenya’s new rulers sought to distance 
themselves discursively from the administration that had preceded them (Speich 2009: 453). 
Technology transfer, planning, social engineering, pragmatism, open markets and 
industrialisation were seen as the best guarantors of economic growth, and that economic 
growth in turn seen as the best means of ensuring the development of the country as a whole.  
The clearest expression of this emphasis was Sessional Paper Number 10 of 1965, the 
Kenyatta government’s first macro-economic blueprint.  This document laid out plans for a 
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mixed economy, or managed capitalism, which maintained the role of the inherited state 
apparatus but aimed to harness it to create rapid growth.  'Other immediate problems such as 
Africanization of the economy, education, unemployment, welfare services, and provincial 
policies must be handled in ways that will not jeopardize growth', stated the document.  'The 
only permanent solution to all of these problems rests on rapid growth' (Kenya 1965a: 18). 
This focus on growth-and-trickle-down was also reflected in the country's first and second 
development plans, launched in 1964 and 1970 respectively (Kenya 1965b; Kenya 1970).
If Sessional Paper Number 10 was the written embodiment of Kenya’s modernisation 
efforts, the man widely recognised as its author, Planning Minister and technocrat Tom 
Mboya, was its corporeal incarnation.  As Daniel Speich puts it, ‘independent Kenya shaped 
its self-image...in the style of Tom Mboya: a bright westernized young man full of 
confidence in the technical promises of modernity, who wore his traditional cap only 
rarely’ (Speich 2009: 453).  Mboya identified as a democratic socialist, and his desire to 
strengthen the capacity of the Kenyan state—coupled with often-sharp rebukes to the West 
(quoted in Goldsworthy 1982: 259)—belie the charges levelled at him by critics of the time 
that he was no more than an agent of the West.  However, independence would be rushed 
only to the detriment of economic and social development, Mboya felt, making him ‘East 
Africa’s most effective advocate of…liberal capitalism’ (Cohen and Atieno-Odhiambo 2004: 
182) and someone whose rejection of both Marxism and African traditionalism rendered his 
thinking ‘basically pragmatic…in a thoroughly British mould’ (Goldsworthy 1982: 54).
For several years, Mboya’s thinking typified the policies of the Kenyatta government. 
Kenya had inherited a strong, well-organised and professional civil service, and the power of 
the country's ambitious bureaucrats often surpassed that of its politicians (Grindle 1996: 
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121).   Certainly there was an element of instrumentalism in this strategy, as the thriving 
African middle class that supported it had a considerable stake in the status quo.  Political 
voices that drew on the grievances of Marxists and the rural poor, led by Vice President and 
Luo28  elder Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, were forced out of the ruling coalition in 1966. 
Odinga’s political rivals exaggerated his connections with China, the Soviet Union and India 
to portray him as a foreign-trained radical.  In turn, charges of ‘neo-colonialism’ were 
frequently levelled at Kenya’s rulers by critics inside (Odinga 1968: xv) and outside (Leys 
1975) the country.  
	
 At the same time, several factors complicate the picture of a purely self-interested 
ruling comprador class that critics sought to paint.  Firstly, insofar as Marxism also 
advocates state-led economic planning, national mobilisation and an emphasis on 
technology, Odinga and Mboya shared a degree of ideological overlap that is often 
overlooked.  Sessional Paper Number 10's alternative title, On African Socialism and its 
Application to Planning in Kenya, may have been a misnomer, but the document did embody 
a desire to 'Africanise' the economy. In addition, Kenyan living standards rose during this 
time: per capita GDP went from $104 in 1963 to $447 in 1980, and GDP grew by an annual 
average of 7.1% from 1965 to 1978 (World Bank 2012).  Although several deep-rooted 
economic problems remained, Kenya's middle class expanded.  This gave the government 'a 
relatively wide and solid social basis' (Tamarkin 1978: 312) and garnered the country an 
international reputation for stability and prosperity.
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28 The Luo, at 13% of the population, are the third-largest ethnic group in Kenya, after the Kikuyu (22%) and 
the Luhya (14%) (CIA 2012).
	
 Within a few years after independence, however, two changes were working to erode 
the hold of Kenya's modernising elites.  Firstly, the global tide was beginning to turn against 
modernisation theory, and the Kenyan experience was at the very heart of this debate.  The 
University of Nairobi's influential Institute for Development Studies (IDS) had long been the 
academic nucleus of what Speich (2009: 449) calls Kenya's '”laboratory of development”  in 
which key assumptions of Modernisation Theory were tested and refined'.  By the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, leading global and Kenyan academics at IDS were beginning to seriously 
challenge 'trickle-down' theory.  Public and intellectual opinion began to shift towards 
policies with a greater focus on policy alleviation, redistribution and rural development 
(Barkan 1994: 107); this would be reflected in the country's third and fourth five-year 
economic plans (Kenya 1974; 1979).29
	
 Despite this, the IDS itself was beginning to lose standing, as succession struggles 
loomed and Kenyatta's inner circle consolidated its hold on the state's resources.  In 1969, 
Mboya was assassinated and opposition parties banned.  Six years later, prominent socialist 
Josiah Kariuki was also killed; the parliamentary investigation that followed implicated 
several senior government officials in the incident.  The Office of the President became 
immensely powerful (Tamarkin 1978), and Kenya began to more closely resemble its 
neighbours in its reliance on factionalism.
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29  In the early 1980s, the IDS would host a continuation of this discussion between capitalist- and socialist-
oriented modes of development thinking, culminating in the fiercely-fought 'Kenya Debate' between Colin Leys 
and his detractors,  Stephen Langdon and Raphael Kaplinsky.  The most thorough overviews of the debate, 
which focused on the question of the existence of a pre-colonial Kikuyu proto-capitalist class, can be found in 
Kitching (1985) and Leys (1994).
	
 The first half of Kenyatta's rule had been marked by ideological contestation and the 
emergence of a group of planners who strongly adhered to the assumptions of modernisation 
theory of the time.  This soon gave way, however, to the politics of patronage;  by violently 
eliminating opponents on both the left and right of the political spectrum, Kenyatta's 
administration had set the scene for a post-ideological struggle for the control of national 
resources by special interests.  As Bates (1989: 91) puts it, 'the heroic period of Kenyan 
politics was over'.  While this was happening, modernisation theory was falling from grace 
all across the developing world; in 1979, a senior Kenyan politician proclaimed in parliament 
'Let us hope there will be no more of this modernisation.  This modernisation can also kill 
us' (Shikuku 1979: 1457).  
	
 When Kenyatta's Vice President, Daniel Arap Moi, succeeded him upon his death in 
1978, many of these trends were exacerbated.   Moi amended the constitution to make Kenya 
a one-party state, mismanaged the economy, and appropriated national resources for his 
personal use.  He also stoked Kenya's ethnic tensions and helped to create a culture of 
violence, arming groups of young men from his Kalenjin tribe against Kikuyus who 
threatened to make gains in elections (HRW 2002); this practice continues to this day 
(Hanson 2008).  The average annual rate of economic growth during Moi's presidency fell to 
3.4%, and per capita GDP was 37% lower in 1993 than it was in the year he took office 
(World Bank 2012).  Most importantly, for our purposes, was the continuing marginalisation, 
shrinking and politicisation of Kenya's technocratic elite.  Grindle (1996), in particular, has 
chronicled this separation of technical expertise and political power, and the gradual process 
by which Kenyan policy experts, particularly after 1987, lost presidential support and the 
ability to influence decision-making.
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 Moi's ineptitude was not the only factor in Kenya's development setbacks during the 
1980s.  Kenya's relatively liberal economy was vulnerable to external shocks, and therefore 
badly affected by the 1979 increase in oil prices and the global recession that followed. 
Droughts and price fluctuations of major imports added to Kenya's problems, and the 
government explicitly scaled down Kenya's development goals in Sessional Paper No. 4 of 
1980: Economic Prospects and Policies (quoted in Maxon and Ndege 1995: 151).  A balance 
of payments crisis in the mid-1980s forced the government to enact a programme of 
structural adjustment:  foreign investment and export diversification were encouraged and 
the private sector was given a larger role in industry and commerce.  At the same time, 
national development plans reflected a shift away from growth-led strategies towards 'basic 
needs', poverty alleviation, service delivery and the development of rural areas.  Overall, 
official development policies diverged only partially from Kenyatta's already market-friendly 
strategies, but implementation 'was often  lethargic  and sometimes  even  completely 
contrary  to the stated  policies' (Swamy 1994: 1).  
	
 Kenya's chequered relationship with donors during Moi's rule pushed the country to 
liberalise further in the 1990s.  Although assistance was suspended a number of times for 
corruption, non-compliance with conditionalities and a lack of political reform, this only 
made the country more dependent on donors.  The vast majority of state-owned and partially 
state-owned ventures were privatised.  Where Moi turned to policy experts, he preferred to 
use foreign advisors attached to international economic institutions (Grindle 1996: 126). 
These efforts saw limited success, however; among the many posthumous critics of Kenya's 
structural adjustment programmes (e.g. Dollar and Svensson 2000: 895) is the World Bank 
itself (Swamy 1994).
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 Since 2002, when Moi buckled under international pressure and was ousted in 
Kenya's first transparent multi-party elections, the country's development and leadership 
prospects have been more ambiguous.  On the one hand, the country has seen an economic 
upturn under President Mwai Kibaki, whose Economic Recovery Strategy (ERS) for Wealth 
and Employment Creation 2003-2007 met many of its targets.  From 2003 to 2010, Kenya’s 
average annual GDP growth was 4.7%; its per capita GDP also increased substantially in this 
period (World Bank 2012). 
	
 In his macro-economic policy, Kibaki is advised primarily by the National Economic 
and Social Council (NESC), an advisory body established in 2004 and comprising selected 
government officials, business leaders, representatives of professional organisations and 
foreign advisors.  NESC's flagship project is the highly ambitious Vision 2030, a long-term 
development plan that aims to produce annual growth rates of 10% and transform Kenya into 
a 'newly-industrialising, middle-income country' by 2030 (Kenya 2007a).  Vision 2030 
retains an existing focus on foreign investment, but aims to bring about structural economic 
change away from the large agricultural sector and towards the secondary and tertiary 
sectors.  Although Vision 2030 explicitly seeks to address social, political and economic 
'pillars' of development in equal measure, NESC has not, at the time of writing, contained 
any representatives from the NGO sector.  By contrast, the business sector plays a dominant 
role in NESC/Vision 2030, with several entrepreneurs and business elites having held key 
positions from the conceptualisation to the implementation phases.
	
 The economic growth of the Kibaki era has not yet translated into political stability, 
however.  In December 2007, disputed election results led to violent clashes between 
supporters of Kibaki's Party of National Unity (PNU) and the Orange Democratic Movement 
(ODM), led by his rival, Raila Odinga.  The violence killed over 600, mingled with existing 
land disputes between rival ethnic groups, and highlighted problems of youth unemployment 
and the marginalisation of the poor.  The clashes shocked so many with their ferocity that 
they in many ways 'shattered the foundations of the Kenyan state' (Bertelsmann Stiftung 
2009b: 2).  The international mediation effort that followed led to the formation of the 
current Grand Coalition government, under which an unprecedented 42 ministers from all 
the major parties govern in tandem and in which Odinga serves as Prime Minister.  This 
political re-organisation seems to have done little to diminish the high levels of corruption, 
infighting and tribalism for which the Kenyan political process remains notorious 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012b; Wrong 2009; Economist 2010c).
	
 One important final development has, however, altered the political landscape since 
the 2007 electoral debacle.  In 2010, Kenyans voted overwhelmingly to accept a new 
constitution, putting an end to a lengthy and politically-fraught reform process that had 
begun almost a decade earlier.  The document, which replaces the British-drafted document 
inherited at independence, has provisions for inter alia enhanced regional devolution and 
reduction of presidential powers.  There is great hope among a great number of Kenyans that 
the birth of their 'Second Republic' may lead to greater accountability, transparency and 
governance (Kivuva 2011), but many sceptics also doubt the potential for successful 
implementation (Macharia 2011).
	
 Kenya's political elites have traversed several distinct phases in their leadership of the 
country.  Competing visions of development confronted each other during the transition to 
independence, culminating in the swift triumph of Western- and growth-oriented modernisers 
over their redistributionist rivals.  These technocrats, led by planner Mboya, went on to 
172
preside over a period of fairly rapid (if unequal) development, but were eventually sidelined 
when global development thinking shifted towards dependency theory and—even more 
significantly—the succession worries of Kenyatta's inner circle ushered in an era of tribal 
and factional politics.  The government ceased to concern itself with emulation or 
development theories—a situation kept intact by Moi, whose mismanagement and 
dependence on Western aid resulted in policies driven by domestic special interests and 
donor-imposed conditionalities.  There is less agreement about the dynamics that have driven 
elite politics since the Kibaki era began.  As shall be demonstrated, an examination of elite 
attitudes towards the adoption of external models can help us to understand the evolution of 
Kenya's development strategy more generally; it can simultaneously shed light on the 
influence of a specific and currently highly-lauded such 'model'—namely that of China.   
5.2  Kenya's Planners Leading Attempts at Emulation
My examination of Kenyan elites' attitudes to lesson-drawing revealed them, like their 
Ethiopian counterparts, to regard the process as an important component of policy-making. 
Kenya's economic stagnation during the Moi era, combined with the aftermath of the 
disastrous 2007 elections, has left elites of all persuasions with the feeling of having 'gone 
wrong somewhere'.  Many interviewees thus saw lesson-drawing from countries that have 
'overtaken' Kenya as the means by which the country could overcome this fall from grace 
and recapture its former promise.  In addition, development was consequently largely seen as 
a process of 'catching up' with global trends, with very few viewing Kenya's development 
path as unique to the country:
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So many of the study tours have gone to Japan, Singapore and Malaysia.  And then we have 
moved on to South Africa to see what they have done.  I can assure you, if we implement the 
outcomes of these study tours, what they are doing and we are not doing, we will be able to 
catch up (KN9).
I think I would not call it unique, in the sense that you cannot say there is a Kenyan path.  We 
are now grappling to use other templates... (KG6)
You've really got to benchmark yourself with the best in the world.  And Kenya, as a society, 
deserves nothing but the best.  So even if you don't know what's the best, find it out.  And find 
out how you can get there (KN15). 
As in Ethiopia, the more senior the elites, the more eager they were to draw lessons from 
abroad; those at the helm of their ministry, business or organisation listed more lessons for 
every non-lesson, and were more likely to emphasise the importance of emulation over 
selectivity.  This suggests, once again, that Rose (1988: 233) is correct when he surmises that 
'particularly for people on top of an organization, looking outward offers the only prospect of 
learning about alternatives, since by looking within they see only what they already know', 
and that this facilitates what he calls 'crossnational lesson-drawing'.  
	
 Unlike in the previous case study, however, there was little overall difference in 
attitudes to emulation between the governmental and non-governmental sectors.  In Ethiopia, 
governmental elites were less likely to emphasise the importance of selectivity than were 
non-governmental elites, but Kenyan interviewees from the two sectors viewed selectivity as 
important in roughy equal measure.  More significant was the divide between those 
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respondents directly involved with NESC or Vision 2030, and those not closely engaged with 
either body.  The former group were slightly more likely to speak favourably of the general 
need for lesson-drawing than the need for indigenisation, whereas the reverse was true for 
the latter group.  Planners more freely and frequently reported using the experiences of other 
countries to inform day-to-day decision-making as well:  'Everywhere we go', said one, 'we 
actively go to learn lessons to see what's working, what's not working, and why' (KN10).
	
 Other indicators corroborate this finding.  Elites involved in NESC or Vision 2030 
listed 2.6 potential lessons for every 'non-lesson', compared to 2.2 lessons for other elites' 
every non-lesson.  In other words, the former group were more likely to identify ways in 
which other countries' development experiences could be transferred to Kenya than they 
were to find obstacles to this transfer.  
	
 Readers will recall Rivera’s (2004) typology, whereby elites are identified either as 
‘pure voluntarists’ (those with a particular regional or historical model in mind for 
emulation), ‘quasi-voluntarists’ (those who wished to draw from several or many models) or 
‘voluntarists’ (those who largely eschewed the use of models).  In the case of Kenya, 55% of 
elites involved in Vision 2030 and NESC could be classified as 'pure voluntarists’.  In 
contrast, only 38% of elites not involved in these institutions were 'pure voluntarists', with 
many more falling into the category of 'quasi-voluntarists' (See Fig. 2).  When these 
indicators are taken into account, it is clear that that group of business leaders, bureaucrats 
and economic advisors clustered around the creation and realisation of the Kibaki 
government's long-term development vision view emulation more favourably—and claim to 
be engaged in lesson-drawing—to a greater extent than do elites in both civil society and the 
various political parties.  
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Fig. 2:
These differences, and others related to lesson-drawing, are such that Kenyan elites can be 
divided into three distinct groupings: planners, other political elites and civil society.:
a) Planners:
Because NESC and the Vision 2030 Secretariat are the main bodies tasked with the design 
and implementation of Kenya's long-term macro-economic strategy, members of the first 
grouping have all been heavily involved, in one way or another, with one of these two 
institutions.  These include senior bureaucrats in key ministries such as the Ministry of 
Planning, National Development and Vision 2030 or the Ministry of Roads.  They also 
comprise academics who act as economic advisors to the government, representatives from 
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influential think tanks, and that small number of elected political representatives whose 
previous positions as technocrats have established them, in Kenya, as authorities in the realm 
of planning.  
	
 Most notably, a substantial segment of this group is drawn from the private sector and 
the umbrella organisations that represent it in Kenya's political arena.  The very large 
influence that Kenya's private sector has had on NESC and Vision 2030 is admitted by 
politicians and business elites alike:  according to one business leader, ‘the private sector 
initiated it—the body called NESC.  I also sit on NESC.  Vision 2030 was actually conceived 
by the private sector...the private sector was deeply involved in the whole mechanics – 
getting it through and pushing it through’ (KN10).  In 2010, the Chairman of the Vision 2030 
Delivery Board and the Director-General of the Vision 2030 Secretariat were two of Kenya's 
most visible and well-known entrepreneurs.
b) Other political elites:
Kenya's planners stand in contrast to its other political elites, who tend to operate according 
to somewhat different dynamics.  As career politicians, party advisors, bureaucrats in minor 
ministries or legal experts, their input into Vision 2030 and NESC has been minimal, or (in 
the case of the first two) closely tied with their party political affiliation.  Their views on 
these government projects have tended to be either critical, or (more usually) supportive but 
based on second-hand knowledge of the process.  An example of the former is the ODM's 
senior advisor on coalition affairs, who forcefully distanced himself, and his party, from 
Vision 2030 during our interview (KG20).  Although the strategy comprises political, 
economic and social pillars—explicitly including, therefore, issues such as the rule of law, 
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human rights, societal cohesion and environmental protection—legal and societal actors 
generally felt a lesser level of involvement and had a lower stake in the plan.  
c)  Civil society:
The third and final group, namely civil society, comprises editors of broadcast and print 
media, leaders of religious organisations, trade union representatives and activists.  These 
groups have an input into the political process in Kenya, are relatively independent, and can 
influence government decision-making; according to Freedom House (2010), Kenya 
possesses—exceptions notwithstanding—'one of the liveliest media environments on the 
continent' and a 'robust civil society'.  This view was broadly corroborated by the civil 
society representatives I interviewed.    
Of the three groups, therefore, Kenya's planners are most supportive of emulation.  This is 
not to imply that they expressed support for the wholesale importation of foreign 
programmes into Kenya; themes of adaptation and pluralism also emerged in interviews with 
many of these elites.  However, these themes were emphasised both to a lesser extent than 
was the case with other elites, and in a slightly different way.  Civil society representatives 
and politicians usually took greater pains to emphasise the systematic, 'rational' nature of 
their own attempts at emulation.  Lesson-drawing was seen as a process whereby elites—
ideally, at least—examined all possible exemplars and skilfully combined the strengths of 
each, all the while grounding them firmly in local realities:  
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We have seen the entire array of issues and experiences that we have as a buffet of ideas, and 
we pick and choose as we deem fit and necessary' (KG17).  
I'm not very much for copying systems – maybe we can learn from best practices, see the 
things that have worked in other economies.  How can we tailor it to make it work for us? 
We should not copy blindly (KN2).  
Unexpectedly, planners—those elites most frequently engaged in lesson-drawing—were in 
fact least likely to portray themselves as 'rational shoppers'.  A large number were 
surprisingly willing to admit the influence of serendipity, language barriers, donor 
willingness, historical ties, personal experience and other factors unrelated to a model's 
performance or suitability.  According to one, for example, Scandinavia was emulated in the 
area of land reform largely because 'they approached us and said “we can help you”' (KG6). 
Several others admitted that lesson-drawing initiatives with India and China were less 
prevalent than could be expected, yet were unable to give a reason.  'Somehow the 
framework of engagement with India seems not to fall into place', said the Secretary-General 
of NESC (KG15).  'I don't know [why]. I find this thing very confusing.  But, if you ask me, 
it is not the country that will come first, despite the great things they're doing now in 
development.'    
	
 Those elites who emphasised pluralism in lesson-drawing without portraying the 
process as entirely systematic often simply pointed to the diverse and wide-ranging 
influences and models available to (and acting on) them, and the practical need to isolate the 
one or two that might be easiest to learn from. This pragmatic position recognised the need 
to assess and adapt external models before implementing them, but also acknowledged the 
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impact of time and resource constraints.  One of the most striking articulations of this 
position came from the director of the Vision 2030 Secretariat:
I think sometimes you can study things to death.  My focus is on execution, and as you're 
executing, you do what works for you.  So therefore picking one country and then along the 
way, as you encounter different problems, asking 'who should we look to?' is a much more 
efficient way of doing things than sitting down and saying 'let's look at the 180 countries in 
the world and take the top 20 and then apply it'.  We could spend 10 years doing that...I think 
as you go along, whether it is in agriculture or horticulture or shipping or retail markets, we 
end up in different places (KG16).  
Kenyan elites were, in short, eager to draw lessons from the experiences of others, 
particularly at a time when Kenya was seen to be at a critical juncture in its development. 
The most enthusiastic group were those involved in the planning and implementation of the 
country's long-term development vision.  Although many respondents cautioned strongly 
against the notion that a single model could be transplanted into Kenya from outside, this 
hesitancy was more prevalent among civil society leaders and political elites not involved in 
NESC and Vision 2030.  Technocrats were also likely to place less emphasis on the rational 
customisation and indigenisation of certain models to the Kenyan situation.  This lies in 
contrast with the Ethiopian case, where the great pains that emulators in the EPRDF took to 
demonstrate their evenhandedness and rationality instead helped to reveal the ideological 
nature of their lesson-drawing.  In Kenya, the need to juggle the variety of different 
exemplars that currently exist, in a far more ad hoc way, emerged instead as a dominant 
theme.
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5.3  East Asia—but not China—as the Source of Models
If Kenya's leaders, and especially its planners, look abroad for development lessons, which 
specific models do they prefer to draw from?  When compared to Ethiopian elites, Kenyan 
elites cited a far broader range of countries and regions as influences.  However, clear 
patterns and preferences could nonetheless be discerned.  Kenyan respondents in all three 
groups listed East Asia—or specific countries in East Asia—as the model(s) from which they 
most wished to draw:  
But most all, the need to forge ahead, and the desire to get the same level as the Asian Tigers, 
is really moving us ahead (KN9).
We also would like to be thinking about Malaysia and Singapore.  That has been one of the 
areas that you find most people in Kenya looking at (KN20).
The countries I think you have heard we admire here so much are Singapore and 
Malaysia...and probably South Korea.  Those are the countries we have to emulate (KG13).
This trend was particularly pronounced among Rivera’s ‘pure voluntarists’, a full 80% of 
whom singled out East Asia—or the region as a whole—as a model.30  Unlike Ethiopia, 
however, where elites subsumed China and East Asia into a single category and focused on 
the similarities between the countries, Kenyan leaders viewed China as distinct from the rest 
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30 The remainder mentioned Canada, the Scandinavian countries and Cuba as their primary models. 
of the region.  Planners were particularly likely to distinguish between the two, and to point 
to concrete policy differences, but all three groups of elites viewed China as a generally 
unsuitable model.  When countries were grouped into five models for coding purposes—East 
Asia, China, India, the West and 'Others'—China emerged as the least attractive model of the 
five, among all three groups of elites:
I don't think we have invested deliberately in what we want to learn from China.  I don't think 
we have done that (KG8).
China is at the bottom, in terms of what we aspire to be (KG6).
I don't like China. The example it sets is so negative, I'd basically campaign against people 
adopting China as a model (KN13).  
Five reasons were cited for this relative lack of attraction to the Chinese model.  Firstly, 
elites raised questions regarding the model's performance, particularly in the areas of 
democratisation, pluralism and decentralisation.  One newspaper editor, for example, 
complained that 'Development alone for the sake of the economy without freedom is 
foolhardy.  I don't like the Chinese model where, yes, they work hard, but the people are in 
zoos.  They can't talk about their government, they can't say things about the system' (KN3).  
	
 The most important factor inhibiting emulation—arguably even more important than 
performance itself—was the fact that China was seen as fundamentally different from Kenya 
in its culture, history, size and political and economic systems.  Despite criticisms of Chinese 
authoritarianism, the majority of respondents viewed China as fairly successful on its own 
182
terms (see Table 3).  This was even more true of those elites involved in Vision 2030 than of 
other elites, with a third seeing China as ‘very successful’ and the vast remainder viewing it 
as ‘moderately successful’. 
Table 3:  Kenyan Perceptions of China and India’s Developmental ‘Success’
Elites involved in 
Vision 2030 
Elites not directly 
involved in Vision 2030 Total
Is China an example of 
successful development? 
Yes 33% 9% 21%
Qualified 
yes 57% 73% 65%
No 10% 18% 14%
Is India an example of 
successful development?   
Yes 38% 36% 37%
Qualified 
yes 62% 46% 54%
No 0% 18% 9%
Which country is a 
better model?
China 24% 18% 21%
India 48% 59% 53%
Neither 29% 23% 26%
Source: primary interview data
* Where this question was not asked directly, interviewees’ responses to the question ‘Is China a good model for 
your country’ were compared with responses to the question ‘Is India a good model for your country?’
Even these respondents, however, generally felt that few of the country's experiences could 
be transferred to a country such as Kenya.  Few elites, whether involved in Vision 2030 or 
not, preferred China to India as a model, for example (and even the latter country, as we shall 
see, is not widely emulated).  Even the much-heralded Special Economic Zones (SEZs) 
(Davies 2008), which Kenya—like many other African countries—is planning on 
establishing according to a Chinese template, were deemed by a top planner in the Ministry 
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of Finance to be unfeasible and unnecessary in a market-oriented economy such as Kenya's 
(KG10).  
	
 A third factor that featured strongly in elites' rejection of the Chinese model was a 
distrust of China and its actions on the African continent.  These sentiments were 
particularly strong among civil society and business elites, but were by no means limited to 
these groups.  Several critics pointed to China's sponsorship of repressive regimes in Sudan 
and elsewhere (KN17), while others complained of the low standard of Chinese imported 
goods, and the threat that these posed to domestic industries (KG11).  There existed the 
sentiment that emulation of China would further increase Kenya's dependence on a large, 
increasingly powerful country—the intentions of which were not yet entirely clear or to be 
trusted.  As one official put it:
I think Kenya is a very small economy...Even we as a country, when we try to engage with 
China—you are talking of a 10 000 GDP-per-capita economy of one billion people. 
Honestly, how do we engage with them?  And that's why we are very vulnerable in dealing 
with China, in my view (KG8).
For the most part, these perceptions did not prevent elites from seeing current Chinese 
economic involvement in Kenya as generally positive—more interviewees saw China's 
activities in Kenya as beneficial than viewed the country's domestic and foreign policies as 
worthy of emulation.  China's stake in the Kenyan economy centres overwhelmingly on its 
dominance of the construction industry;  in the 2010-2011 fiscal year, Chinese firms were 
awarded over two-thirds of Kenyan contracts for construction projects, for example (Nijihia 
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2011).  Despite concerns over slow skills transfer and untransparent bidding processes, even 
elites generally critical of government economic policy felt China-Kenya relations, on 
balance, to be mutually beneficial:  
If you look at whether they complete their projects on time, within budget, then yes, they are 
really efficient.  If you look at whether it leads to long-term employment in that sector, and 
long-term technological transfer, it's up in the air, really.  And I don't think we've had the sort 
of rights problems associated with extraction that you might have around Zambia around 
copper or around oil...So it's not been negative, I don't think....Well, everyone likes having 
good roads (KN12).  
Elites were thus cautiously optimistic about China-Kenya economic relations overall, but 
more sceptical regarding the ethical compromises it felt that China had had to make—in both 
its foreign and domestic strategies—to get to its present position.  
	
 A fourth obstacle to learning from China stemmed from a lack of knowledge of and 
contact with the country, a factor that contributed to Kenyan suspicions.  Despite the fact that 
a relatively large number of interviewees had visited China (83% of governmental elites and 
40% of non-governmental elites), most felt that their visits had not given them sufficient 
insight in and understanding of the country.  When planners were asked why NESC—which 
in 2010 and 2011 included advisors from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia—did not 
have any Chinese or Indian representatives, the most common answer resembled the 
following: 'Because the countries weren't interested!  It was not that it was a deliberate 
choice at all.  It's not that they weren't considered; they didn't consider themselves, is what 
I'm saying.  They didn't come to ask' (KG21).  Although the additional reasons mentioned 
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above revealed the truth to be more complex, unfamiliarity and lack of contact did emerge as 
a key factor inhibiting emulation.  Chinese reluctance to export its model, a paucity of 
historical relations, a language barrier and the recent nature of China's development were all 
cited in this regard:
Do the Chinese share [their experiences]?  I think I don't know enough about them, and I 
haven't had enough of an encounter to know whether or not they do that (KN17).
China is a new country for Kenya.  China and Kenya used to deport each others' diplomats in 
the 1960s, and even by the late 1970s we were not sure about our feelings about China.  Now 
I know we will do a lot with them, because they seem to have the money to invest in our 
economy.  They will not, for example, I think, invest in or influence how we do education.  I 
know our technical schools will probably get some technical equipment from them, but once 
you get that technical equipment, it is the other countries – like South Africa, the UK or the 
US – whose curriculum you are going to borrow (KG3).
	

Well, China has just taken off in the last few years. There's also a huge problem with 
language in China (KG16).
If you go to China, the language can be a burden on its own.  When you go, you want to ask a 
lot of questions, and often there is only one person who can speak English.  And sometime 
you don't know if the interpreter is translating correctly (KN8).
A fifth and final barrier to Kenya-China emulation arose from the sentiment that China, 
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despite developmental successes, did not, in fact, possess a unique model of development.  In 
fact, China was lauded for its skilful and selective adaptation of other countries' technologies 
and policies.  In many cases, this successful emulation of other models was itself a lesson for 
elites: 'If you look at how they got to where they did, there was a very acute awareness of 
what's happening elsewhere, and the good coming from that.  And they pursued that 
relentlessly...they domesticated everything that they borrowed' (KG20).  China's ability to 
draw foreign lessons spurred admiration, but also meant that elites often preferred to look to 
the original source of innovation when drawing on specific policy lessons or programmes:
I don't know what you copy from China, because the technology is not just Chinese. 
Building roads, that's engineering, and I don't think that's Chinese engineering.  Building 
houses – that's not Chinese (KG20).
Everything that I like about China, Singapore has done (KG16).
A good chunk of the development of China recently was advised by Singapore. If one of the 
smallest countries can advise one of the biggest countries in the world – why can't we learn 
from it? (KG15)
This final factor may appear to give rise to a paradox.  On the one hand, elites—particularly 
those involved in planning—made a clear distinction between China and its neighbours in 
the region, preferring strongly to learn from the latter.  On the other hand, they felt the 
models to be similar in the sense that China's success stemmed largely from emulation of 
countries such as South Korea and Singapore.  Elites resolved this tension by seeing smaller 
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East Asian countries as offering many of the same lessons as China, but in a clearer, less 
threatening package, and on a more manageable scale.  As one planner summarised it, 'it's a 
story that's easier to tell' (KG8).
	
 There was one important exception to this relative lack of interest in emulating China 
specifically.  Kenyan elites from all sectors viewed China as a the single best example in the 
area of infrastructure, drawing not only specific, sectoral lessons, but also lessons on the 
broader importance and feasibility of large infrastructural programmes.  Due to the impact of 
this specific lesson on development discourses in Kenya, it is further discussed in a 
subsequent chapter.
  	
 In short, the relative lack of interest in emulating Chinese policy programmes stems 
in part from purely performance-related factors, particularly in the areas of devolution, 
human rights and democratisation.  However, an unfamiliarity with the country, a belief that 
China's approach to development—no matter how successful—is not unique, and a desire to 
maintain independence in the face of Chinese economic power were all factors that 
discouraged Kenyan elites from drawing broad lessons.  Most importantly, China's history, 
culture, political system and economic institutions were seen as extremely different from 
Kenya's, inhibiting lesson-drawing.  Although most elites cited sectoral, technical and even 
policy lessons from China, the vast majority could not be said to wish to emulate the Chinese 
model as a whole.  
	
 Interviewees' feelings on the potential of emulating India, the West and other 
developing countries were more ambivalent.  All three groups of elites viewed India as a 
better model to follow than China.  In one closely-related group of policy areas—
democratisation, judicial reform and devolution—India was very often described as a 
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potential source of lessons.  For this reason, legal experts and human rights activists were 
most likely to report having consciously emulated aspects of this country's development: the 
Chairman of the landmark 2003 Bomas Conference—where the first draft of the Kenyan 
constitution that was eventually passed in 2010 was drawn up—lists India and South Africa 
as the two countries that most inspired specific clauses in the draft (KN14).  As former 
British colonies, Kenya and India have similar legal institutions, and many interviewees 
mentioned the very large number of Kenyan lawyers have been trained in India.  This aspect 
of learning was corroborated by a senior Indian official, who pointed inter alia to Kenyan 
scholarship of the Indian Panchyati Raj system, by which revenues are allocated to regional 
governments, and held that 'there is a tremendous Indian stamp on many [Kenyan] 
institutions' (KA2).  It is also in keeping with the literature on the 'Indian Model', which sees 
India's history of democratic institution-building as one of the most important lessons it 
holds for other developing countries (Friedman and Gilley 2008; Elliot 2009).  
	
 Several of the other lessons that elites most wished to draw from India corresponded 
to those purported aspects of the 'India Model' that lay in the realm of economic development 
(Bosworth and Collins 2008; Das 2006).  One was the prioritisation, domestication and 
monetisation of technology, particularly in the fields of IT and medical services.  According 
to one planner, 'Yes, we've taken lessons from India...They've given us the courage to go into 
IT, software development, etc.  Science is really a focus in India. I think that's why you find a 
lot of engineers in India. That is a lesson' (KG7). Similarly, India was cited (KG5) as an 
important inspiration for Vision 2030's focus on outsourcing and 'health tourism' (Kenya 
2007a: 14, 18).  Elites also admired India's rapid economic growth and industrialisation—on 
both the level of cottage industries and larger export-oriented enterprises.  
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 Despite these indications of limited lesson-drawing from India, several counter-
indications precluded the country's widespread use as a model.  Elites cited numerous 'non-
lessons'—features they felt were undesirable or untransferable—when asked about India. 
Certain of these were performance-based.  Elites very frequently pointed to the inequality 
and poverty that remain rife in India, and objected particularly vehemently to the Indian 
caste system:
The fact that the caste system is still there is troubling. You can't call a country developed 
where people are born into poverty and die into poverty because of design.  And they have no 
chance of coming out of it unless they go into exile.  That's not right (KG20).
India is a complicated country.  You go to India and the levels of poverty in some places in 
India are just as bad as Kenya, or worse (KG6).
Maybe my views are biased by what I saw when I went there.  I don't read much about India, 
but I went there about five years ago.  I saw so much poverty there.  So I would not call that a 
model of democracy if you still have so many people living on the street.  I was in Bombay; I 
didn't like what I saw.  Maybe that had shaped my view about how the economy is 
developing (KN2).
As the final quote above illustrates, India was a country that actually left a number of 
Kenyan elites with a lower opinion after having visited.  Slightly fewer elites had visited 
India than China (of those polled, 44% of governmental elites and 62% of non-governmental 
elites for India, compared to 83% versus 40% for China), yet those who had visited were not 
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significantly more likely to regard India as successful than those who had not.  Several 
planners, in particular, reported being somewhat taken aback by the disparity between media 
reports of India's booming economy, and the reality they witnessed during study visits.  To 
one, India 'really doesn't come to mind very fast – it doesn't look very prestigious, for lack of 
a better word' (KN8).  'I've been to India only once, and it was very recently, actually', said 
another. 'I was shocked, because it's not as glamorous.  I found it completely different [from 
what I had read]...I think what I was expecting was what I found in Singapore' (KN20). 
While some respondents (including the latter planner quoted above) took from this the 
positive lesson that a country could develop in a more modest, gradualist fashion than was 
often assumed, many others questioned the very notion that India was sufficiently developed 
for Kenya to emulate.  These elites pointed to the recent and tentative nature of India's 
'success'.  
	
 Exposure to India and its developmental experiences appeared to inhibit purposeful 
lesson-drawing in additional ways.  There can be no doubt that the complex web of business, 
institutional and interpersonal ties stemming from Kenya's history of extensive contact with 
the Indian subcontinent facilitate the transfer of technologies, practices and institutional 
arrangements from India to Kenya.  At the same time, this seems rarely to occur at the 
conscious or voluntary levels; as a result, broader policies and national plans retain little of 
the 'Indian stamp' the Indian embassy speaks of.  When it comes to policy learning, 'it's not 
even on the radar' (KG21), and as a result there are far fewer formal, high-level arrangements 
to facilitate lesson-drawing from India than there are to spur emulation of Singapore, 
Malaysia, South Korea or even Japan.  As the secretary of NESC explained, 'Our embassy 
for Singapore is in India. We don't have someone on the ground in Singapore...But then, 
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when it came to signing a government-to-government cooperation [accord], it was with 
Singapore – and nobody ever thought of India, even though we have a huge political 
representation in India. (KG15)'.  One respondent declined to choose India as a model 
because 'India we will learn from anyway, whether we like it or not' (KN21), while for 
another 'India is not often considered really a foreign country to us' (KG3).
	
 Most controversially, there was evidence to suggest that negative preconceptions 
stemming from historical tensions between Kenyans of African and Indian origin coloured 
decision-makers' view of India as a whole.  Fully one-third of interviewees openly felt this to 
be the case—a high number, given the contentious nature of this admission.  Even where 
elites were keen to distance themselves from prejudicial views, they frequently felt others 
might be influenced by such thinking.  Indeed, attitudes towards Kenyans of Indian origin 
were sometimes undisguisedly negative:
The people from India here, they have not influenced [us] as much because most of the 
experience has been negative...They have not been good examples.  I'm sorry to say, but they 
have been the worst examples of exploitation.  They have never contributed much towards 
the development of the country (KG13).
I think it's also their business practices, especially the ones we have here.  They had a 
tendency to maximise the benefits for the period they are here, and then they take off.  They 
quickly became residents in London and Canada, and a burden here.  Those kinds of 
experiences are also informative, in terms of how you engage (KG8).  
How would I put it – is it their culture or their way of life?  They are not open to others, 
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especially to Africans.  Whether it is their homes, their shops or their industries, they are a 
closed community.  So then it becomes a bit difficult to learn from them.  They are not seen 
as part of us...It might not be true, but that is what we see (KN18).
Rather than aiding lesson-drawing, therefore, historical contact and familiarity with India 
appears to have had, if anything, the opposite effect.  While the intricate web of institutional, 
legal and economic ties between the two countries may, at the same time, have spurred the 
unintentional transfer of policies and practices, these are unlikely to pertain to broad 
development models or to be implemented by high-level decision-makers.
	
 Similar tensions marked elites' views on emulation of countries in 'the West'.  Not 
surprisingly, Kenyan elites cited these countries more often than did Ethiopian elites.  As 
with India, emulation was most pronounced in the areas of constitutionalism, 
democratisation, devolution and other legal aspects, and interviewees with legal backgrounds 
or professions were most likely to speak of these countries as models. Both the content and 
origin of lessons varied greatly, with Sweden, Canada, Denmark, Germany, the United States 
and the United Kingdom mentioned most frequently.  Elites' high levels of exposure to these 
models, and the fact that a lesson-drawing infrastructure was already in place, played a role: 
many interviewees had completed post-graduate studies in Europe and North America, and 
these respondents were demonstrably more likely to approve of lesson-drawing from the 
West.
	
 The United States came in for special attention; elites admired its 'work 
ethic' (KG18), system of education (KG2), 'democratic values and structures' (KG22) and 
systems of public accountability (KN2).  A concrete lesson that appears to have emerged at 
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least partially from the American example is the choice of a presidential system of checks 
and balances in the 2010 Kenyan constitution, cited with frequency by those involved in last-
minute political negotiations on the matter.  One of the PNU's chief advisors in the run-up to 
the adoption of the constitution, for example, says that:  'We ended up literally adopting the 
American system – not only the Presidential system, but also the way it is structured...all the 
principles that define the American constitution...So in terms of political framework, we are 
looking to America as a country' (KG22).  The result has been the creation of a Senate, a 
Supreme Court and a system of vetting senior judges.  
	
 Such attitudes notwithstanding, the transfer of policies and legal arrangements from 
Kenya's former colonial masters and current donors are better viewed as involuntary or semi-
voluntary than as examples of true lesson-drawing.  Colonial Kenya received English law by 
decree, and codifications first used in the British Raj were subsequently imposed on Kenya 
(Berkowitz et al 2003: 197).  Wabwile (2003) has traced the deep influence that such 
colonial-era legal arrangements continue to have on Kenya's current legal order.  Even those 
elites who did prove receptive to emulation from these countries were pragmatic about the 
level of genuine choice that this entailed:
But our model is the British one, who were our rulers.  Our laws, our language [come from 
the UK], so we are borrowing from that model (KN4).  
Also it's easy for us to look at Britain – we know the sources, we know where to go to look at 
something (KN14).
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Our system of land law was basically inherited from England, so that linkage continues 
(KG6). 
In fact, Kenya's record of dependency on Western countries, and particularly the UK, often 
propelled elites away from emulation of these models.  This view is exemplified by a senior 
journalist's view that 'while we copied a lot from Britain, in my opinion maybe we should not 
have copied everything.  We should have tried to find out...how best to implement what 
works for us, instead of just implanting the British system.  To this day, we still use very 
archaic laws from the British system' (KN2).  The Deputy Prime Minister, similarly, feels 
Western countries to be less suitable 'perhaps because those ones are not coming from a 
background of having been dominated by another government or another system' (KG5). 
This aspect is evident, also, in extent to which emancipation from Kenya's colonial-era 
constitution was portrayed in the political discourse as an essential step in Kenya's evolution 
as a fully mature, independent state (e.g. Mutiga 2010; Saturday Nation 2010).
	
 The fact that the transfer of specific legislative arrangements stems more often from 
factors such as path-dependency and routine than from concerted attempts to emulate entire 
programmes enacted other countries is also reflected in the literature on lesson-drawing.  An 
entire legal literature exists to describe the myriad ways in which legal precedents and 
institutions in one jurisdiction are transferred to another (Watson 1974; Miller 2003), but 
there is very little overt overlap between these writings and those that this dissertation has 
focused on.  Instead, theories of lesson-drawing and emulation usually take it for granted that 
the successful importation of foreign societal programmes, institutions or policies will be 
accompanied by the necessary legal accommodations.  The most exhaustive typology of 
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lesson-drawing (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000: 10) does not directly address legal emulation, 
whereas another seminal work views the creation of legal statutes primarily as the first step 
by which a borrowed political programme is implemented (Rose 1991: 6).  Moreover, the 
most influential theory in the discipline of law (see, for an overview, Lalenis et al 2002: 
33-38) has traditionally held that laws and statutes are primarily—and most easily—
transferred to those in the same 'legal family', suggesting that elites have only a limited 
number of countries from which they can hope to draw lessons in this particular sector.  Even 
in the few cases where the role of legal systems is directly discussed in the emulation 
literature, the balance of opinion mirrors this finding:  accounts that view legal transfer as a 
possibility up to and including the constitutional level (Rose 2005: 1), are outnumbered by 
those which mention legal culture and constitutional arrangements primarily as constraints to 
lesson-drawing across polities (Radaelli 2004: 726; Robertson 1991: 68).  
	
 Kenya's use of the American constitutional model would seem to contradict this to a 
certain extent.  Kenyan politicians' desire to look outside the 'legal family' of the 
Commonwealth strengthens the contending theory of 'legal transplant' (Watson 1974), which 
holds that new legislation is often fruitfully borrowed and domesticated from laws enacted in 
radically different legal and societal settings.  This particular example shows that elites do, at 
least sometimes, opt for explicit and large-scale legal emulation (although judgement must in 
this case be withheld on the efficacy of such attempts).
	
 Even here, however, a note of caution is warranted.  The areas in which emulation of 
the United States is occurring are also those in which the influence of Kenya's turbulent 
internal political dynamics and power struggles are most apparent.  The decision to adopt a 
US-style constitution was hammered out by the Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) on 
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Constitutional Review, and only subsequently incorporated into the draft constitution by a 
Committee of Experts (CoE) set up to revise the draft the constitution before the referendum. 
The possibility of emulating the United States in this regard arose very suddenly:  a tale of 
brinkmanship and horse-trading emerges from interviews with those involved in the Kenyan 
constitutional process, with both PNU and ODM parliamentarians rather unexpectedly 
agreeing on the arrangement for tactical reasons and to prevent the collapse of talks (KN14; 
KG20).  Both a chief author of the country's first constitutional draft (KN14) and a non-
Kenyan member of the CoE31 feel that there was little evidence of a comparative focus on 
foreign constitutional arrangements in the deliberations of this body, and that such a focus 
would have benefited the final draft.  This is borne out from an interview with the CoE's 
Chairman (KG19), who felt issues of lesson-drawing to fall largely outside his remit.  
	
 Finally, the COE's final report also supports these conclusions. In it, the body 
mentions its initial preference for a hybrid system of government that follows neither the 
American nor Westminster models; its ultimate capitulation in favour of a full presidential 
system in the American mould (in line with parliament's preference) is relegated to 'a 
political responsibility taken by the political leadership' (CoE 2010: 8). 
	
 The highly-politicised nature of Kenya's taking of this particular lesson does not 
invalidate its impact.  As several theorists of lesson-drawing have pointed out, the process is 
as often used by decision-makers for the purposes of political leverage, or as a rhetorical 
weapon, as it is employed for problem-solving (Robertson 1991; Bennett 1991b).  This does, 
however, make implementation of the American lesson highly contingent on current political 
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31 Supplementary interview, Nairobi, 21/10/2010.  
power configurations, calling into question its durability as Kenya’s extremely fragile 
political alliances undergo shifts in the future.
	
 A final category of lessons cited by elites derived from other countries situated 
outside the 'West', East Asia and South Asia. Kenyan elites mentioned such lessons more 
frequently than did their Ethiopian counterparts, and this gap was particularly wide when 
lessons from other African countries were discussed.  South Africa was mentioned most 
often as a model; individual respondents also mentioned Botswana, Dubai, Cuba, Tanzania, 
Brazil, Chile, Rwanda, Ghana and several others.
	
 This fairly large range of countries demonstrates Kenya's relative eclecticism, but do 
not, on the whole, detract from its overall focus on East Asia.  South Africa aside, few elites 
cited these countries as general models, but rather listed sectoral examples of learning: Israeli 
methods of irrigation were lauded, for example (KG22), and Vision 2030 openly cites the 
creation of a free trade port as an attempt to 'bring Dubai to Kenya' (Kenya 2007a: 14). 
Although several elites viewed South Africa as a general model to emulate, most of these 
cited it in tandem with East Asia—and at least the same number rejected it as a model, 
pointing to its racial tensions, inequality and uncertain future.  
	
 African countries were the most frequently cited of the 'negative lessons' that elites 
gave as examples of failure from which they could learn.  One such negative lesson, 
interestingly, was African countries' perceived dependence on Western models.  Africa was 
not a good exemplar, certain leaders felt, because it had allowed itself to slavishly adopt the 
culture of its colonisers: 'Nigeria is a good example – it has not come out from that.  So 
unless you break away from the umbilical cord which joins the colonial and post-colonial 
times, the country will not develop' (KG20), said one.  
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 Here, again, there is evidence to suggest that the use of African lessons at times 
constitutes a rhetorical or political device rather than an attempt to identify the 'best' policies 
that can be transferred from abroad.  Bennett's (1991b) distinction between symbolic 
attempts to assuage criticism and the more open-ended desire to identify models or external 
policies that might solve internal problems is of particular relevance here:  because the 
identification of African models confounds those who may criticise elites for insufficient 
attention to local, indigenous solutions, these elites have an interest in 'playing up' their use 
of models from inside the continent.  This may, at times, lead to the actual transfer of policies 
and programmes from African countries, but Bennett's (1991b: 37) analysis implies that 
foreign evidence, when used thus, does not generally alter the policy-making process in a 
meaningful way.  One activist and lawyer admitted to using this rationale:
Being someone who is both pan-Africanist and a feminist, often when we engage our 
brothers on issues pertaining to sexism, they avoid that engagement by claiming that we're 
Westernised.  So one of the things I did deliberately was use African examples and models. 
Because it then shuts off that escape (KN17).  
If all three groups of Kenyan elites cited China least frequently as a model, other East Asian 
countries most frequently, and other regions intermittently, these trends were magnified in 
the case of one group in particular—Kenya's coterie of national planners.  Elites involved in 
NESC and Vision 2030 were over twice as likely to express a desire to emulate aspects of 
East Asia's development trajectory than were other political and non-political elites.  They 
also exhibited greater levels of knowledge of the models in question and were more likely to 
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mention concrete lessons their institution had recently drawn from these countries.  They 
took greater care to distinguish between specific countries in the region, and, perhaps for this 
reason, were least likely of all to view China as a model.  In their attempts to emulate East 
Asia, two countries emerged as particularly important models, namely Malaysia and 
Singapore.  Other countries such as South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia were also cited, but 
not to nearly the same extent. 
	
 To conclude, Kenyan elites view East Asia as a model for Kenya, but look 
specifically to countries such as Malaysia and Singapore rather than China.  Although this is 
true to a certain extent for political elites, non-governmental leaders and long-term planners, 
the last-mentioned group is clearly leading Kenya's emulation of the region.  Despite the 
much-heralded influence of the Chinese Model in Africa, Kenyan leaders view China as a 
suitable exemplar only in the area of infrastructure, with a variety of performance and non-
performance-based factors inhibiting broader emulation.  India and the United Kingdom both 
emerged as very strong influences on Kenya's legal system, but this is more often due to the 
legacy of colonial institutions, to membership of the same commonwealth family and to 
path-dependency than to voluntary attempts to adapt a broader societal programme to the 
Kenyan context.  In many cases, Kenya's history of prior contact with British and Indian 
influences actively deter leaders from drawing lessons; emancipation from the former was 
seen as a greater priority than its emulation, while historical tensions between 'Africans' and 
Kenya's minority of Indian origin similarly impede desires to learn from India.  Kenya's 
adoption in 2010 of a constitution adapted from its American counterpart constitutes the 
clearest recent example of lesson-drawing from a country outside East Asia, but this lesson's 
role as political 'football' places its long-term survival and implementation in jeopardy.
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5.4.  Emulation of East Asia:  What Other Sources of Elite 
Discourse Say 
An examination of non-interview sources such as policy documents and media commentary 
largely corroborates the trends detailed above.  Kenya's senior leaders are periodically 
quoted in the media as stating that Kenya can draw lessons from other countries' successes, 
and East Asia is one of the most frequently-mentioned models.  Presidential candidates now 
use emulation of Malaysia and Singapore as planks of their electoral campaigns (Opiyo 
2011), and politicians often return from study trips to these countries with effusive praise for 
their developmental achievements (Barasa 2011).  
	
 Although this evidence paints the broad picture of a political leadership attempting to 
emulate East Asia, an analysis of interviews and official documents clarifies certain key 
points.  Firstly, senior politicians publicly cite a wide number of countries from which they 
wish to learn lessons; this often includes China, India, South Africa and other countries about 
which leaders were more lukewarm in interviews.  Odinga, for example, listed South Africa, 
India, Malaysia and China as exemplars when speaking at the launch of Vision 2030 (Odinga 
2008).  
	
 The expression of such sentiments is particularly common  during official visits to the 
countries in question, the purpose of which is often to garner Asian investment in Kenya.  A 
2005 presidential visit to China, with the aims of strengthening bilateral political cooperation 
and marketing Kenya as an investment destination, also saw China lauded by Kibaki as an 
example from which his country could learn (State House Kenya 2005).  In interviews, 
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however, the disadvantages and obstacles to lesson-drawing from countries like China and 
India become clearer, and leaders are given the chance to compare the benefits of various 
models.  This slight discrepancy between public pronouncements that all countries Kenyan 
leaders visit have something to teach the country, and private admissions that Singapore and 
Malaysia remain the most suitable models, is illuminating.  High profile leaders thus often 
express their desire to learn from others for partly instrumental reasons, or because the 
opportunity presents itself and the full implications of emulation have not yet been 
considered.  
	
 Among this panoply of exemplars, senior politicians do maintain a slight emphasis on 
the East Asian model in their public statements.  The narrative is essentially a simplified 
version of that found in documents by and interviews with bureaucrats and others involved in 
long-term plans such as Vision 2030, however, suggesting that politicians draw this discourse 
from planners.  In fact, in no other publicly available document do Malaysia, Singapore and 
their neighbours emerge as clearly as models as in the plans jointly drawn up by Kenya's 
bureaucrats and business leaders.  According to the very first paragraph of the 'popular 
version' of Vision 2030, the plan derives from two sources: stakeholder consultations, and 
'suggestions by some of the leading local and international experts on how the newly 
industrialising countries around the world have made the leap from poverty to widely-shared 
prosperity and equity' (Kenya 2007a: 1).  It directly uses the example of these countries to 
argue for the 'intensive application' of science, technology and innovation, as well as 
research and development, in order to 'raise productivity and efficiency levels'  in Kenya 
(Kenya 2007a: 8).  In a reference to emulation that is relatively unusual among national 
blueprints for its frankness, it states that its drafters:
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learnt as much as they could from countries that have achieved rapid growth and also 
improved the lives of their people greatly in a span of 20-30 years, with particular reference 
to the South East Asian 'newly industrialising countries'. The standards achieved by those 
countries are ones Kenya should aim for, bearing in mind her own history and culture (Kenya 
2007a: 3).
This emphasis extends beyond the Vision 2030 document itself.  At the official launch of the 
Public Service Commission Strategic Plan in 2009, the most senior bureaucrat in the 
Ministry of Planning cited Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia and China as examples of successful 
human resource development (Sambili 2009).  The mid-term review document of the ERS 
states that Kenya aims 'to function with effectiveness of the kind we have observed in East 
Asia' (Kenya 2007b: 32).  An unpublished presentation delivered by planners to international 
donors in 2007 used the presence of similar plans in East Asia to make the case for the 
establishment of what was to become Vision 2030 (Muia 2007). Prominent Kenyan 
intellectual, economic planner and ODM leader Peter Anyang' Nyong'o (2007) devotes two 
chapters to emulation of the East Asian model in his vision of a modern Kenya, entitled A 
Leap into the Future.32  
	
 The notion that Kenya should learn from East Asia is often debated in the Kenyan 
media; while most commentaries on the subject express a desire to emulate Malaysia, 
Singapore and others in the region, however, many are also sceptical that Kenya's current 
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32 As elected representative, intellectual and key economic planner under Kibaki, Anyang' Nyongo occupies 
several roles, and is arguably most aptly classified using Silva's  (2008: 8) term of 'technopolitician' – one who 
straddles the divide between planner and politician.
leadership is capable of doing so successfully.  For every editorial expressing the sentiment 
that 'Lessons from Malaysia are Key in Resuscitating our Ailing Economy' (Mwiria 2009), 
there are others who are disillusioned with the prospect:
To the vice president and the other presidential aspirants though, I would say forget it. They 
might add a little here and there to our future prosperity, but they cannot match what Dr 
Mahathir and Mr Kuan Yee [sic] did. This is not to doubt their ability and vision for Kenya, 
but because under our current constitution they will not have both the authority and time to 
translate their visions into reality...We threw out the good with the bad. That is why we will 
never have a Dr Mahathir or a Kuan Yee (Wehliye 2011).  
If the public pronouncements and writings of Kenya's senior political figures and opinion-
makers are marked by a certain ambivalence regarding the best model for Kenya to follow, 
those of its long-term planners display little of this ambiguity, pointing, once again, to a 
strong desire on their part to learn from a few specific countries.  
4.5. Kenyan Planners and the 'Fall from Grace' Narrative 
The finding that Kenyan elites, and particularly its planners, are actively seeking to draw 
lessons from Singapore and Malaysia poses the obvious question of why this should be the 
case.  Why are elites now focusing on emulation, and are they doing more so at present than 
in the past?  In addition, what criteria do they use when evaluating and selecting potential 
models?  
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 It will be recalled that my overview of the lesson-drawing literature raised the 
possibility that numerous cognitive or 'heuristic shortcuts' (Weyland 2004) play an important 
role in influencing those who borrow policy from abroad.  Historical, cultural, linguistic or 
'social psychological' affinities (Rose 1993: 107) can lead decision-makers to privilege 
certain countries or regions over others; elites are also said to prefer models that are 
geographically close at hand or to which they have had a large amount of exposure.  A 
model's prestige and ease of use are additional factors that may affect the process.
	
 In the case of Kenya, a particular narrative that combined several of these elements 
emerged as the chief motivating factor for elites looking to Malaysia and Singapore.  This 
narrative, cited in virtually every interview I conducted, ran as follows:  
Malaysia, Singapore and Kenya all gained independence from the United Kingdom within a 
few years of each other, at which stage all three possessed roughly similar levels of 
development.  If anything, Kenya was the more advanced of the three countries, leading 
Malaysia and Singapore to draw lessons in areas such as agriculture, construction, 
transport infrastructure and tourism.  Since then, something has gone dramatically awry, 
and Kenya's per capita GDP is now roughly one-third that of Malaysia and Singapore.  If we 
can pinpoint the source of this divergence, we will be able to emulate these countries' 
trajectories and attain their levels of development and modernity.  
This story contains several important elements of convergence and divergence.  Historical 
and social-psychological linkages are writ large here: the three countries were seen as having 
suffered equally under British rule, having inherited common colonial institutions, and 
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lacking substantial natural resources.  They are also viewed as having 'come of age' at a 
similar time (independence came in 1957 for Malaysia, 1963 for Kenya and 1965 for 
Singapore), and therefore having had to confront similar international environments.  For one 
business leader, 'We have a similar historical background—colonisation by the British. 
Therefore our thought processes might not be that far apart' (KN7).  To other respondents, 
the three countries were 'age mates':
Even at a personal level, if you want to compare whether you are doing your PhD early 
enough, what you do is go to your age-mates, people who are born in the same day—have 
they reached [their] PhD yet? If you find they haven't, you can say 'I'm ahead'. If you find that 
they finished ten years ago, you'll know that you're lagging behind. So we have picked 
countries that started together with us. Malaysia, Singapore (KG11). 
Most importantly, elites see Kenya as having begun on a similar developmental footing as 
did these two countries, and even as having acted as their model, in certain sectors, during 
the early decades of independence.  Crucially, this allows Kenyan elites to feel that the 
lessons they are taking are not entirely new or alien to their society, but that they have merely 
been 'lost' and are now being re-appropriated.  
We are told, when we go to Singapore, that some of the processes that they used began in 
Kenya, so I would say we are following a road of modernisation processes that probably we 
discarded before – that's where we are starting (KG14).
For example in 1978, Malaysia came to this country to study our national social and security 
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fund.  They also came to study our sugar estates.  And in the case of the national social and 
security fund, when they went back...they created a provident fund and this became a major 
source of capital for investment in buildings and things like that.  So this was a major story 
for us as a country.  That there is something we can learn from them.  Although they came to 
learn from us, we must have fallen somewhere – we have to go back and learn from them 
(KG8).  
To Kenya's emulating elites, then, these similarities combine with the vast differences 
between the countries' development levels today to produce a very distinct heuristic.  The 
differences are seen as just large enough to render countries such as Malaysia and Singapore 
worthy of admiration, while not so large as to make lesson-drawing impossible; according to 
one trade union leader, for example, 'Malaysia was a third world country.  Of course we can't 
compare ourselves to countries like Germany – those are just too far' (KN4).  The speed and 
the recent nature of East Asia's growth is also appealing, as elites feel that they can observe, 
first-hand, the structural transformations taking place in these economies—and that they can 
hope to see similar changes in their own countries within their own lifetimes.  One admirer 
of Scandinavian development, for example, nonetheless preferred East Asia as a model, 
arguing that the former group of countries 'are not moving people out of poverty, they are 
actually maintaining the status quo.  And I was not there to see what they did or whether they 
were very poor like Africa is, and whether they were able to move people out of 
poverty' (KG9).
	
 Numerous studies on lesson-drawing have remarked on the deep influence that 
stories, symbols and analogies can have on uncertain decision-makers (Robertson 1991; 
Stone 1988), and this Kenyan narrative is a very clear example.  Certain East Asian countries 
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are identified and studied as 'laboratories' of development; with elites trying to isolate the 
independent variable that will account for the differences in outcome between their country 
and countries like Malaysia.  This approach means that no country is too small to selectively 
learn lessons from: elites are not fazed by Singapore's status as a city-state, while India and 
China were consistently labelled too big and populous to act as models.  The fact that Kenya 
is said to have acted as erstwhile mentor rather than disciple to these countries is, at the same 
time, deeply emotionally satisfying.
	
 Despite lukewarm reactions to Western models, one notable aspect of planners' 
identification of potential models is the role that foreign experts—from East Asia as well as 
from the West—have played in facilitating the process in Kenya.  Vision 2003 was partially 
developed and drafted by international business consultants McKinsey and Company, and 
several planners credited this mechanism with having brought lessons from emerging 
economies in Asia and elsewhere to their attention.  In addition, many of the relationships 
between senior Kenyan planners and East Asian advisors were brokered in the 1980s and 
1990s by international donors seeking to use the Asian Tigers to illustrate the benefits of 
liberalisation.  One planning veteran (KH10) dated his interest from the appearance of the 
World Bank's (1993) controversial East Asian Miracle study, while two others trace their 
interest to the attendance of lesson-sharing events arranged by Western donors.  In addition, 
East Asian economic advisors to the Kenyan government echo the central narrative and help 
to construct it, using it as a motivational tool during study visits:
I have forgotten the name of the professor, but he came from South Korea and was identified 
by UNDP to help us.  So he listened to us.  And at the end of the workshop he told us – he 
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was brutally honest – he said '...I will only accept to be your consultant if the UNDP agrees to 
expose you to how South Korea transformed into a modern economy'...So we came back and 
I requested to the Permanent Secretary that we think that before we finalise the development 
plan, we need to visit the Southeast Asian tigers and the South American economies.  So I led 
a team of seven to South Korean, to see how their economic planning and financial 
institutions functioned. The whole purpose was to appreciate South Korea's transformation – 
how it became one of the most modern economies in South East Asia (KG8). 
It [would have been] very easy for Kenya to go the other direction, because at the time we 
got independence, we were at the same level as Singapore and Malaysia.  Singaporeans 
remind us all the time that they used to learn from Kenya (KG6).  
If these findings are combined with those that have explored Kenyan elites' attitudes towards 
other potential models such as China and India, it is clear that these decision-makers act on a 
wide variety of motives when emulating or rejecting models.  Exposure to models 
encourages lesson-drawing to a certain extent; if there is very little history of contact with a 
country—as is the case with China—distrust, language barriers and the lack of an lesson-
sharing infrastructure can discourage elites from emulation.  On the other hand, exposure 
brings benefits only up to a certain point.  Overexposure to a country and its people is often 
accompanied by a history of unequal relations or other historical baggage, as elites' attitudes 
to the United Kingdom or India as exemplar shows.  Transfers that happen between such 
countries are more likely to be legal or routine rather than broadly policy-based.  Familiarity, 
then, can be a double-edged sword, depending on how it comes about and how impressive 
foreign models appear when elites are able to witness them first-hand.
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 Two factors that were decidedly lacking in elite discourse were cultural and 
geographical proximity, with relatively few elites seeing Kenya's physical or cultural 
distance from East Asia as a stumbling block to emulation.  Conversely, suggestions that 
Kenya should learn from other African countries due to these same factors were relatively 
rare; elites were more likely to feel that attempts to compare Kenya to other African 
countries constituted 'settling' for second best.  Rose's (1991: 14) observation that 'subjective 
identification  is  more  important  than  geographical  propinquity  in  directing  search' is 
thus strongly backed up by the Kenyan and the Ethiopian case studies.
	
 Nor did dependence sway many respondents—at least not in the manner which might 
most commonly be supposed.  Rather than instrumentally mentioning those countries on 
which Kenya is most dependent economically or politically, interviewees took care instead to 
cite models which they saw as engaging with Kenya on a more equal footing.  The United 
Kingdom, Uganda and Tanzania are Kenya's largest trading partners (UN Comtrade 2012), 
and the UK is the biggest investor in Kenya (FCO 2011), yet these are by no means the 
countries or regions from which Kenya most wish to draw lessons.  Elites feel that emulation 
holds benefits, but that it may also create indebtedness or dependence between countries. 
The fact that powerful and threatening countries have not automatically become Kenya's 
models contradicts not only those who feel that elites' expressions of admiration for certain 
countries are merely 'lip service', but also those emulation theorists who feel countries look 
to defensively emulate those countries they see as most advanced and, therefore, as the 
greatest threat to their survival.  
	
 The factors that have ultimately played the greatest role in steering elites, and 
particularly planners, towards Malaysia, Singapore and other East Asian countries, however, 
210
are the historical and social-psychological backgrounds that elites feel Kenya shares with 
these former colonies.  These factors were mentioned even more frequently than the 
economic or political performance of the models themselves.  The notion that these countries 
had fulfilled their potential in exactly the same time period that Kenya had squandered its 
own—and that colonialism alone could thus not entirely be to blame—is an enormously 
powerful one, and provides a narrative or story that elites can use as a framework for action. 
That East Asian elites and Western institutions have assisted in the construction of this 
narrative does not overly concern the pragmatic planners at the heart of Kenya's lesson-
drawing efforts.
	
 This is not to imply that East Asia is the only region Kenya wishes to learn lessons 
from, or that other, more instrumental factors do not sometimes spur lesson-drawing.  The 
almost total absence of references to Taiwan—'Taiwan is never mentioned because of the 
Chinese relationship', stated one interviewee (KG17)—illustrates this.  So too does the last-
minute agreement the major political coalitions reached in 2010 to emulate the American 
constitution in order to strengthen the post-election positions of their top presidential 
candidates.  However, the evidence demonstrates the existence of a layer of emulative 
behaviour that lies beneath such rhetorical use of foreign evidence, and that this layer is built 
on narratives that are relatively stable and widely-shared—at least among planners.
	
 If the perceived disparity between Kenya and its 'age-mates' determines planners' 
choice of model, it also, to a large extent, provides the main reason for these decision-
makers' recent 'emulative turn' in the first place.  It will be recalled that many studies have 
found elites to turn to foreign models in the face of recent and far-reaching policy failure 
(Goldsmith 2005), fears of external domination (Westney 1987), or internal dissent among 
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elites (Goldman 2006).  An analysis of the Ethiopian case has shown each of these conditions 
to have been present after the fall of the Derg in 1991.  
	
 On the one hand, the process of coming to see East Asia as a model has been an 
incremental one.  Interviewees often reported having admired the region for several decades 
prior to the creation of NESC and Vision 2030, variously mentioning 1981 (KN8), 'the early 
1990s' (KG10), 1995 (KG6), and 1996 (KG8) as years in which their own professional 
capacities and exposure to these models began to pique their interest.  Emulation of these 
countries, and others, may even have had a minimal input in government policy at that time. 
Even Moi, rightly viewed by scholars and interviewees alike as overwhelmingly driven by 
narrow self-interest, is said to have drawn on Canadian education policies in expanding the 
provision of technical training at tertiary level (KN13).  
	
 On the other hand, two particularly traumatic periods appear to have triggered a deep 
discontent with the status quo in Kenya, and resulted in a renewed search for external 
inspiration.  Under Moi, the process of policy transfer was largely enacted by Western 
advisors employed in the Kenyan state machinery as a condition of international aid.  Cohen 
(1992) has detailed the substantial remit of these 'donor constituency', 'gate-keeper' and 
'condition precedent' advisors at the time.  Implementation of policies—both indigenous and 
borrowed—was severely lacking, leading to the economic stagnation and disillusionment of 
the 1990s.  It took a period of economic decline, combined with rapid development 
elsewhere, for Kenyan planners to begin their search for lessons from abroad in earnest; 
when they did so, they turned to those countries with whom they could draw historical 
parallels.
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 An overview of development statistics shows elites' claims regarding the erstwhile 
parity of Kenya and its models in East Asia to be somewhat exaggerated.  At independence, 
World Bank (2012) figures show that Kenya scored at least slightly lower than Malaysia and 
Singapore on indicators relating to educational attainment, healthcare and income.  To take 
just one example, one senior Kenyan bureaucrat, comparing his country to Singapore, held 
that 'in 1964, we were at the same level (if not even a bit better) in terms of GDP per 
capita' (KG15); in fact, Kenya's per capita income in 1964 was only a third of Malaysia's, 
and less than a quarter of Singapore's (World Bank 2012).  Nonetheless, it is also true that 
the intervening decades have seen a drastic widening of this gap (see Fig. 3), and that the 
disparity was widest of all in 1992—at the height of the Moi era—when Singapore's per 
capita income was over 79 times that of Kenya's.  Similarly, Kenya's score on the Human 
Development Index actually decreased from 1990 to 2000, in sharp contrast with its East 
Asian exemplars (World Bank 2012).
	
 Kenya's disappointing development performance had led to a widespread sentiment 
of disillusionment and frustration by the end of the 1990s.  Virtually all planners who 
reported viewing East Asian countries as models during Moi's rule held that they had only 
been able to implement this vision since his electoral defeat.  According to one technocrat, 
'for 24 years we were moving back...but there is leadership now...You can see a president that 
is not interfering with what we do – he doesn't come to the treasury and tell us to put money 
into this or that.  He doesn't tell a minister to go and fire so-and-so.  He doesn't get involved 
in that.  He lets you do your job' (KG10).  Another recalled receiving a stern phone call 
taking him to task for publicly unfavourably comparing Kenya to South Korea in 1997, 
'because the government was headed for elections and I was giving us a bad image' (KG8). 
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By 2010, my interviewees showed no qualms in repeating the sentiment that East Asia had 
succeeded where Kenya had failed.
Fig. 3:
The desire of significant sections of the Kibaki administration to emulate East Asia was 
visible in several early policy initiatives:  in the regime's desire to 'Look East' as a central 
pillar of its foreign policy, in the explicit mentions to the lessons offered by East Asian 
economies found in its key policy documents, and in the high profile of Asian advisors such 
as high-profile Singaporean Victor Koh in NESC and other government bodies.  Many of the 
policy lessons explored in subsequent chapters—such as the explicit modelling of NESC on 
Malaysia's first National Economic Advisory Council—emerged in the first five years of 
Kibaki's rule.  Kenya has also substantially decreased its dependence on aid and increased its 
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domestic revenues since 2002 (Mwega 2010: 117), leading to a renewed emphasis on 
voluntary and mutual lesson-drawing as opposed to policy transfer linked to conditionalities.  
	
 At the same time, many interviewees credited a second, more recent trauma with 
intensifying their desire to learn from others' successes.  This event was the disputed 2007 
elections, viewed by many as delivering a profound shock to complacent elites accustomed 
to being lauded for presiding over one of Africa's most peaceful and stable countries:
If we had gone through a successful election, with no violence, we would be in the same 
place that we were ten years ago.  It was a blessing in disguise...that we were forced to go to 
a situation we had never been in, and to change systems (KG2).
The National Accord might mean we had gone too far this time.  The first 100 days of 2008 
were just a study in how a country can just collapse...When the violence started in Navaisha 
(that's the holiday retreat for the elites), that's when they realised psychologically that it could 
come into the city, and Nairobi could become Mogadishu (KN13).  
You'll get limited success unless the country says 'we need to change as an economy and 
there's a burning platform for us to do so'...Our burning platform was the post-election 
violence in 2008, and out of that certain things are happening.  And if you look at Kenya over 
the next five years and look at what the triggering event of development was in this country, 
you'd probably find that the post-election violence was that burning platform...We've taken 
the opportunity to form NESC – all these things are as a result of that.  And that obviously at 
some stage, if my theory works, out of these ashes will rise the phoenix of a new 
Kenya' (KN5). 
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But for us I think maybe the damage was not so bad – and I think it was able to give us the 
impetus to pass the constitution.  It helped for sure, because consensus used to be a bit 
difficult, but now people say ‘we don't want to go back’.  Because in Kenya nobody actually 
ever thought we could break into violence. (KN20).
The analysis above indicates that it is not entirely correct to state that Kenyan planners have 
only recently begun to desire the emulation of East Asia.  Several senior planners who served 
under Moi had similar goals, but feel that this was previously impossible due to the 
ineptitude of Kenya's political leadership, the country's dependency on the Bretton Woods 
institutions, the closed nature of the Kenyan economy at the time and the overweening power 
of the Office of the President.  Now that such factors have arguably diminished in impact, 
they feel, there is greater pressure—and freedom—to follow Malaysia and Singapore's 
success.  
	
 This is not to say that the influence of conditionalities has ceased, or that 
implementation of lessons is now running smoothly.  The National Accord—the peace 
settlement that halted the violence in 2007—emerged from mediation efforts by an 
international team led by Kofi Annan.  The inclusion of foreign experts in bodies such as the 
CoE and the Independent Review Commission of the 2007 Elections was mandated by the 
same body rather than the result of initiatives taken by lesson-drawers themselves (KAF 
2009: 57, 59).  As we have seen, non-governmental elites are often vociferous in their 
criticism of the government's perceived inability to transform its plans into reality. 
Nonetheless, even these critics, on the whole, express a cautious optimism that Kenya's 
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situation might be gradually improving, and link this improvement to the events of the 
post-2007 period.  Although these elites may at times disagree with the lessons drawn by 
NESC and the Vision 2030 planners, their greater concern is the lack of implementation of 
foreign lessons:  more effective emulation—rather than more selective emulation—is 
generally advocated.  Strikingly, the vast majority of elites equate successful lesson-drawing 
with general policy success.
	
 According to Rose (1991: 10), 'policymakers are driven  by  the  need  to  dissipate 
dissatisfaction.  Instead  of new  knowledge,  policymakers  prefer  the  assurance  of  doing 
what  has worked  before,  or  been  effective  elsewhere'.  In this case,  Kenya's economic 
misfortunes in the 1990s created the widespread sense that existing policies had failed, which 
came to a head with the election of a new president in 2002.  Although attempts to emulate 
East Asia and other models soon followed, elites feel that these began to pick up speed only 
when the devastating 2007 elections laid bare the policy failures of the first years of the 
Kibaki regime.	

5.6 Conclusion
The Kenyan case adheres less comfortably than its Ethiopian counterpart to suggestions that 
China is increasingly acting as a model to African leaders.  There is little evidence to suggest 
that the rise of China has so captivated Kenyan elites that they wish to study its development 
trajectory for lessons they can apply to their domestic situation.  Nor do Indian, Western or 
African models have the impact that opponents of the Chinese Model would wish, although 
isolated lessons are drawn from some of these countries.
217
	
 This does not mean, however, that the broader rise of non-Western models of 
development have not had an important influence on the development thinking of Kenyan 
policy, business and community leaders.  A handful of countries in East Asia that initially 
appear to be unlikely models for Kenya are, in fact, emerging as the sources of many lessons. 
Foremost among these are Singapore and Malaysia, twin exemplars heralded by Kenyan 
elites for the economic and developmental achievements that they are said to have attained 
since 'coming of age' with Kenya in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  The impulse to borrow 
from Singapore and Malaysia is particularly strong among those business and policy elites 
who are most heavily involved in the flagship Vision 2030 development strategy, and in the 
National Economic and Social Council that advises the President on issues of broad, long-
term national planning.  
	
 This desire to draw from Singapore and Malaysia cannot be fully understood without 
again returning to Kenya's own historical context.  Kenya's first influential post-
independence elites were also national planners who sought to emulate the 'successful' 
models of the day—in this case, the United States and Great Britain.  Kenya's embrace of 
post-war modernisation theory under technocrats such as Tom Mboya saw substantial 
economic growth, but also the beginning of deep ideological rifts that would divide Kenyan 
academia and research for several decades.  This short-lived era soon gave way to succession 
struggles and interest-based politics, however; Kenya's problems were compounded by 
exogenous shocks, aid dependency and economic stagnation in the 1980s and 1990s.  
	
 Kenya's emulating elites long for a return to what has been referred to as Kenya’s 
'golden age' (Maxon and Ndege 1995: 151), and have constructed a narrative that they feel 
will enable them to do so.  Driven more by psychological and historical affinity than by 
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physical or cultural proximity, they look to Singapore and Malaysia as 'age mates' that took 
the path that Kenya missed.  The power of this narrative is compounded by the fact that these 
East Asian countries engaged in a certain amount of emulation of Kenya shortly after 
independence, when all three countries were ostensibly equally developed;  this parity is 
somewhat exaggerated, but contains at least a measure of veracity.  Emulation of Malaysia 
and Singapore entails, by this thinking, the transplantation not of 'foreign' models, but simply 
home-grown strategies that Kenya has forgotten in its fall from grace.
	
 This narrative could hardly be summed up more clearly than in an excerpt from 
senior planner Anyang' Nyongo's Leap into the Future (2007: 22).  Anyang' Nyongo writes 
of speaking to Singapore's then-Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew at a conference in 1995:
During question time, I asked the Senior Minister one question, which was:  'Sir: you say that 
in 1969, when your GDP per capita was the same as ours in Kenya and Uganda then, you 
people made a deliberate choice to move rapidly with economic growth and achieve growth 
targets which led you to eradicate poverty, provide full employment  and achieve a modern 
standard of living for your people. Why couldn't we do the same?'  The Senior Minister 
looked calmly at me and replied: 'While we chose to go forward in Singapore, you in Kenya 
assassinated Tom Mboya.'  The answer was pregnant with meaning.
There is much more talk of the 'Chinese Model' than of the 'East Asian Model' today, but the 
Kenyan case shows this move to be premature.  As in Ethiopia, Kenyan elites adapt and 
select from the East Asian model to fit their historical and psychological needs.  The next 
chapters will explore exactly which lessons they take in the process.  Moving away from the 
question of whether elites draw models and which geographical area they focus on in their 
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efforts, the coming section uses theories of development to instead examine the substance of 
elite emulation of East Asia.
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PART III:  AFRICAN ELITES AND 
LESSONS IN MODERNISATION
221
CHAPTER SIX:  MODERNISATION AND ITS 
SUCCESSORS IN AFRICA 
This dissertation seeks not only to understand whether China serves as a model to elites in 
Kenya and Ethiopia, but also to uncover the lessons that these elites are attempting to draw 
from their chosen models and to situate these within a broader theoretical framework.  The 
processes of lesson-drawing that I examine here are in large part significant because they 
diverge from recent developmental practices and challenge the status quo.  It thus important 
to provide an overview of the evolution of the development theories that have dominated in 
Africa since the post-colonial period, within which I will then embed my empirical analysis. 
This section does not seek to offer any substantial revisions to our current understanding of 
post-colonial paradigms, but simply to clarify how terms such as modernisation theory, 
dependency theory and the Washington Consensus are used in this work and in what ways 
they are seen to differ from one another.  Because this dissertation argues that Ethiopia and 
Kenya's emulation of East Asia is repopularising many of the assumptions and principles of 
the modernisation theory that proved so central to African development thinking in the early 
post-colonial period, particular attention will be paid to this school of thought.
	

6.1  Modernisation Theory 
Development theory, as the concept is thought of today, dates back to the period shortly after 
World War Two, when a series of international events radically altered the way policymakers 
and academics approached the amelioration of social, political and economic problems 
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around the world.  Europe's former colonial territories were beginning to achieve 
independence, raising the question of which policies would best help these new countries to 
attain prosperity and modernity.  The Cold War had begun to divide the world into competing 
spheres, giving the United States a stake in the direction the countries of the Third World 
would choose to follow.  New institutions such as the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) were radically altering the international economic environment and 
facilitating, for the first time, the creation of a global development agenda.  In academia, 
comparative politics shifted its focus to political development outside the West, while a 
parallel development in economics saw the advent of the notion that 'backward' countries 
faced specialised challenges outside the purview of classical economic thought.
	
 Out of this environment emerged modernisation theory, arguably thus the first theory 
of international development.  At once a political programme for developing-country elites, a 
plank of US foreign policy and an interdisciplinary research agenda, modernisation theory 
was not a single, unified, unchanging body of work or practice.  Many later critics who 
blamed modernisation theorists for uniformly caricaturing the divisions between the 
developed and developing world were themselves thus guilty of a similar lack of nuance. 
However, the theory’s origins as an alternative to the historical materialism found in 
Marxism and at the time gaining popularity in parts of the developing world lent it a certain 
coherence that united proponents and followers alike.  As such, certain recurring assumptions 
and prescriptions can be found in the writings of key proponents such as Talcott Parsons, 
Marion Levy, Neil Smelser, Walt Rostow, Seymour Lipset, Lucien Pye, Daniel Lerner and 
Gabriel Almond.  Whilst the term 'modernisation' was itself rarely used in the early years of 
this approach, a set of common themes rapidly emerged, and these themes found a clear 
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expression in development policy.  In focusing on the commonality of these themes rather 
than the differences between individual works and authors, I approach modernisation theory 
not as ‘a mishmash of ideas’ (Harrison 1988: 1) but rather, like Tipps (1973: 201), as a 
general 'value system' or 'theoretical orientation'.  
	
 Comprising political scientists and sociologists and originating mainly from the 
United States, modernisation theorists drew on the work of 19th century thinkers such as Max 
Weber and Emil Durkheim.  They retained these original authors' focus on industrialisation, 
rationality and the cultural linkages between capitalism and culture, whilst at the same time 
adapting these to the optimistic and ideologically-divided post-war setting and thereby 
downplaying the disillusionment and ambivalence found, for example, in the Entzauberung 
(disillusionment) of Weber (1991 [1919]), the anomie of Durkheim (1997 [1893]) or the 
Entfremdung (alienation) of Marx (2007 [1857]).33  
	
 At the heart of modernisation theory lay the belief that the evolution of non-Western 
societies towards the modes of economic, societal and political organisation found in their 
Western counterparts was both inevitable and desirable.  According to Moore, 'modernization 
is the total transformation of a traditional or pre-modern society into the types of technology 
and the associated social organization that characterise the ‘“advanced”, economically 
prosperous and relatively politically stable nations of the western world' (1963: 89), while to 
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33  Anomie is a word without an uncontroversial English equivalent, but it has most often been defined as 
'normlessness' or, in Merton's classic definition, 'a breakdown in the cultural structure, occurring particularly 
when there is an acute disjunction between the cultural norms and goals and the socially-structured capacities 
of members of the group to act in accord with them' (Merton 1968: 216).  Limitations of scope unfortunately 
preclude a deeper discussion on these three classical theorists of modernity,  as a fuller discussion would detract 
from the current focus on the influence of post-war modernization theory on African leaders.  
Lerner (1964: ix), a model that first 'evolved in the West as a historical fact...reappears in 
virtually all modernizing societies on all continents of the world, regardless of variations in 
race, color, creed'.  A 'Great Dichotomy' (Huntington 1971: 285) divided the societies of the 
world into the 'traditional' and the 'modern', but societies eventually could, and would, move 
from one category to the other through a series of roughly predictable stages of development. 
Movement along these 'stages of growth' would bring about convergence between societies, 
although each society would begin this process at a different point in history.    
	
 This notion of staged development along a single, irreversible trajectory was most 
unambiguously expressed in Rostow's The Stages of Economic Growth, subtitled A Non-
Communist Manifesto (1990 [1960]).  Rostow, a close advisor of the Kennedy administration 
in the area of international aid and the modernisation theorist who most consciously 
straddled the divide between Cold War policy-making and academia, posited the existence of 
five stages through which modernising nations would pass before reaching the stage of 'high 
mass consumption' witnessed in the West.  The most important of these was 'take-off', when 
levels of investment were sufficiently high and political/societal institutions sufficiently 
developed as to make economic growth the 'normal condition' of society (Rostow 1990 
[1960]).  Similarly, Parsons (1971) viewed development in terms of biological evolution, 
with societies increasing in complexity as they passed through four stages from the 
'primitive' to the 'modern'.  Parsons placed Western Europe, the Soviet Union, Japan and the 
United States in the latter category, and designated the United States as the most modern of 
these (Parsons 1971: 114).  
	
 Not all modernisation theorists agreed on the factor or factors that would start a 
country on its journey along this trajectory, or the order in which they would occur.  The 
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earliest tended to focus on a single 'critical variable' (Tipps 1973: 203) such as 
industrialisation or rationalisation.  Even as this single-variable approach began to give way 
to broader accounts, theorists focused on roughly two groups of facilitating factors. To many, 
certain cultural and social preconditions had to exist before a country could begin to 
experience the rapid economic growth and industrialisation that was associated with 
development.  McClelland (quoted in Gilman 2007: 98), for example, saw entrepreneurship 
and the 'need for achievement' as underpinning economic growth; where these do not exist, 
'traditional norms must give way to new ones'.34   For Rostow, the most important 
precondition for 'take-off' was normative:  'above all, the concept must be spread that man 
need not regard his physical environment as virtually a factor given by nature and 
providence, but as an ordered world which, if rationally understood, can be manipulated in 
ways which yield productive change and...progress' (Rostow 1960: 19).  According to this 
neo-Weberian approach, this change in values would bring about, inter alia, advances in 
education, an increase in entrepreneurial skills, and the creation of institutions that could 
mobilise the capital needed to bring about industrialisation. 
	
 Among this set of perspectives, Parsons (1991 [1951]; 1965) was perhaps most 
influential in his identification of five 'pattern variables'—dichotomous choices that 
individuals make in their relations with others and that thereby determine broader social 
structures and values.  Individuals act instrumentally rather than expressively when they: 
apply universal standards to their actions, are oriented towards the well-being of the 
collectivity, are able to exercise emotional restraint in their dealings with others, evaluate 
others on the basis of their achievements rather than their inborn qualities, and act in a 
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34 Emphasis in the original.
context-specific manner (Parsons 1991 [1951]; 1965).35   Societies with higher levels of 
instrumental behaviour are more likely to develop 'evolutionary universals' such as money, 
bureaucracy and social stratification, and this, in turn, leads to greater societal complexity 
and modernity (Parsons 1964). 
	
 As important as Parson's variables were, it took another theorist, Marion Levy, to 
historicise these largely theoretical observations, and to attempt to adapt them to the 
developing world.  According to Levy (1952: 118-119), traditional societies were marked by 
non-rational, functionally diffuse and particularistic values and role orientations.  Modern 
societies, on the other hand, operate according to rational, functionally specific and 
universalistic values and role orientations.36 
	
 Another smaller set of theorists approached the relationship between culture and 
economics from the opposite direction, viewing the socio-cultural transformations they 
sought in the developing world as stemming primarily from industrialisation and the 
mechanisation of labour.  For Inkeles and Smith (1974: 155) the factory was 'a school in 
modernity', where 'traditional man' learned the attitudes and behaviour of 'modern man'. 
These values included punctuality, openness to new experiences and to social change, an 
understanding of the need for long-term national and personal planning, a belief in science 
and technology, and an understanding of social issues outside one's immediate environment 
(Inkeles and Smith (1974: 21-24).  With technological and scientific advances allowing for 
the greater accumulation of capital and mobilisation of natural resources, rapid increases in 
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35  The formal designations for these five dichotomies are: diffuseness versus specificity, affectivity versus 
affective neutrality, particularism versus universalism, ascription versus achievement and self-orientation versus 
collectivity-orientation.  A useful discussion of these, and other,  Parsonian concepts can be found in Trevino 
(2001: xxxviii-xli).
36 The terms of a functionally specific relationship are expressly and precisely defined and delimited, whereas 
those in a functionally diffuse relationship are vaguely defined (Levy 1966: 144).  
the incomes of large sections of the population were now possible.  For this reason, a society 
'is more or less modernized to the extent that its members use inanimate sources of power 
and/or use tools to multiply the effects of their efforts’ (Levy 1966: 11).  
	
 These perspectives shared with Marx a view of 'technology as the prime mover of 
industrialization and social change' (Burns 1969: 35), but viewed the immediate changes it 
wrought as primarily positive and permanent in nature.  With this emphasis on industrial 
development, two further themes emerged.  One was a deep belief in human rationality, 
scientific progress and the perfectibility of society.  Modernization allowed for humanity's 
'rapidly-widening control over nature' (Rustow 1967: 3).  It entailed the 'rationalisation' of 
society, first described by Weber (2003 [1905/1930]), whereby the criterion of rationality 
became increasingly central in different areas of collective decision-making (Habermas 
1971: 81).  Modernisation theory was thus an optimistic (and to its critics utopian) vision, 
whereby rationality was associated with 'progress' and social improvement.  As the chairman 
of two of America's most potent symbols of modernity—the Tennessee Valley Authority 
(TVA) and United States Atomic Energy Agency—wrote in 1949, 'this American experiment 
has fortified men's confidence that human beings need not be chained to the wheel of 
technology, but that man can use the machine in the interest of human welfare' (Lilienthal 
1949: 49-50).  
	
 A second theme was rapid economic growth, seen to go hand in hand with 
industrialisation and cultural transformation.  Whether cultural change led to industrialisation 
or vice versa, the overarching goal was the accumulation of capital and the raising of 
incomes.  Rostow's (1990 [1960]) definition of development as a country's movement 
through five stages of economic growth is the clearest example of this emphasis, but the 
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assumption that this process underpinned development pervaded the literature as a whole. 
Critics and defenders alike label economic growth the 'ne plus ultra' (Gilman 2007: 183) and 
'core societal project' (Inglehart 1997: 77) of modernisation theory.  This focus would not 
have been unusual among economists, but that it should have converged around a group of 
sociologists and political scientists was somewhat more surprising.
	
 One of the reasons for this emphasis was the perceived relationship between 
economic growth and democracy.  Beginning with the influential work of Seymour Lipset, 
modernisation theorists generally believed that an increase in a country's national wealth 
would set off a series of societal changes that were in turn likely to culminate in 
democratisation.  National wealth would allow for the creation of a functional civil service, 
and the distribution of economic goods would tend to become more equitable as overall 
wealth increased (Lipset 1960: 64).  More importantly, economic growth would lead to the 
emergence of an educated, politically-engaged middle class.  Whereas traditional ruling 
classes might be loath to relinquish inherited power and wealth through political reform, and 
working classes prone to electing radical parties running on populist platforms, the middle 
classes produced by a free market would tend towards 'secular reformist gradualism' (Lipset 
1960: 60) that would bring about the gradual widening of political participation.  'The more 
well-to-do a nation', wrote Lipset, 'the greater the chances that it will sustain 
democracy' (Lipset 1960: 48).
	
 Observers will note the sheer range of societal sectors with which modernisation 
theorists were concerned.  Whatever the relationship between industrialisation and cultural 
change, something in the interaction between these two variables was seen to bring about an 
array of additional, interlinked transformations in the political, cultural, religious, economic, 
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organisational and legal arenas.  This stood in direct contrast (and opposition) to Marxist 
theories of historical materialism, ‘that view of the course of history’, in the words of Engels 
(2008 [1878]: 16),
...which seeks the ultimate cause and the great moving power of all important historic events 
in the economic development of society, in the changes in the modes of production and 
exchange, in the consequent division of society into distinct classes, and in the struggles of 
these classes against one another’.  
Modernisation theory, on the other hand, viewed socio-cultural change as integral to the 
modernisation process, rather than solely reactive. This was largely due to the notion of 
structural functionalism, in many ways constituting the core of modernisation theory and 
stemming, once again, from the work of Parsons (1991 [1951]).  Structural functionalism 
provided a 'grand narrative' of social change, seeking to subsume all global societies and 
historical periods under a unifying holistic narrative.  It conceived of society as an organic, 
self-correcting whole, in which each component would adapt to maintain overall 
equilibrium:
Societies are more or less self-sufficient, adaptive social systems, characterised by varying 
degrees of differentiation, and with roles and institutions, rather than concrete individuals, as 
their principal units.  The balance of equilibrium of the various parts of the whole maintained 
for as long as certain functional prerequisites are satisfied and, generally speaking, an 
institution is 'explained' once the functions it fulfills are satisfied. Finally, the entire 
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system...is kept together through the operation of a central value system broadly embodying 
social consensus (Harrison 1988: 6).
Building on this theory that social norms worked to maintain societal functional equilibrium, 
numerous subsequent modernisation scholars identified the adjustments societies were said 
to make in the face of industrialisation.  To Smelser (1959) and others, modernisation 
entailed structural differentiation, whereby a role previously filled by one social organisation 
or group splits into several roles or entities, in order to better cope with increasing social 
complexity.  Modernisation is the 'universal social solvent' (Levy quoted in Gilman 2007: 
125), which subsumes and transforms traditional modes of human organisation.  Kinship 
loses its hitherto central importance, with the family ceding certain roles to other institutions 
such as schools, factories and trade unions.  Many accounts built on the observations of 19th 
century sociologists who witnessed, first-hand, the effects of the Industrial Revolution. 
Urbanisation, greater social, occupational and geographical mobility (Sutton 1963: 67), the 
rise of mass media (Lerner 1964) and the rise of voluntary association were some of the 
trends seen to accompany—and hasten—this process.  All these changes combined to move a 
society inexorably from the traditional to the modern.  
	
 A large group of theorists focused specifically on changes in political organisation. 
Ward and Rustow (1964: 6-7), for example, identified eight features of a 'modern' polity. 
These included a high level of popular identification with the history, territory and national 
identity of the state, the prevalence of rational and secular procedures of political decision-
making and a high level of functional differentiation in government.  The cultural changes 
brought about by modernisation would spill over into the political sphere as communal 
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identities began to give way to functionally-specific interest groups (Coleman 1960: 535). 
The most famous conceptualisation of political modernisation stemmed from the work of US 
Social Sciences Research Council's Committee on Comparative Politics, led by Lucien Pye. 
It came to similar conclusions, finding an increase in political equality, government capacity 
and structural differentiation to be at the heart of this new 'development syndrome' (Pye 1972 
[1966]: 33). 
	
 Modernisation theory's desire to subsume economic development under the broader 
banner of societal change often put it at odds with economists.  On the one hand, theorists of 
modernisation viewed economic growth as the central prerequisite for developments such as 
rises in living standards, democratisation and personal self-fulfilment; on the other hand, 
authors such as Hoselitz (1960) charged purely economic analyses with neglecting the socio-
cultural preconditions and effects of this fiscal growth.  
	
 Because the process of modernisation was viewed as so self-contained and yet 
comprising so many inter-related elements, the theory exhibited a distinct focus on internal 
causes of development.  Although Parsons and others often used the term society, this tended 
to be assumed as corresponding to the nation-state—indeed, it was hoped that modernisation 
would create a 'nation' to fit the 'state'.  Inkeles and Smith (1974), placed their 'modern' men 
firmly within this framework, for example.  States were generally treated as closed and 
natural systems (Martinelli 2005: 30), a development encouraged both by structural 
functionalism and the growth of new states in the post-colonial era (Harrison 1988: 59).  As a 
result, any obstacles to development—whether in the form of traditional values, elite 
intransigence or a lack of technological know-how—were overwhelmingly seen as internal 
and domestic in nature.
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 In modernisation theory, the state was more than merely the unit of analysis—it was 
both a primary agent and an outcome of modernisation.  Contemporary critics who class 
modernisation with neo-liberalism as a manifestation of Western ideological hegemony (e.g. 
Dibua 2006: 5) overlook inter alia the central role that the former accorded to a strong and 
even coercive state.  'Strong, centralized government' would break traditional kinship ties 
and create wage relations; it would also accommodate the competing demands levelled at the 
new political unit (Smelser 1959: 60).  Only the modern state could mobilise sufficient 
resources, and then make the investments in infrastructure, education and political 
institutions needed to bring about economic growth and industrialisation.  To Reinhart 
Bendix, modernisation primarily entailed the creation of an authoritative, bureaucratic 
nation-state with revenue-raising powers and the extension of formal citizenship to all 
classes of society.  'The growth of the welfare state in the industrialised societies of the 
world, which in one way or another provides a pattern of accommodation among competing 
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groups', was 'a model to be emulated by the political and intellectual leaders of follower 
societies' (Bendix quoted in Gilman 2003: 16).37  	

	
 Modernisation theorists were by no means alone in their advocacy of a strong state in 
the post-war period.  In mainstream economics, the rise of Keynesianism overturned the 
laissez-faire capitalism of the interwar years and ushered in a new consensus on the 
importance of what came to be called 'managed capitalism' (Rapley 2007: 17).  Development 
economists and comparative historians such as Alexander Gerschenkron (1965) argued that 
latecomer and 'backward' countries needed—and benefited from—higher levels of 
government intervention than did early industrialisers; what they lacked in private enterprise 
and capital, they would gain in readily adaptable technologies.  Gerschenkron and Rostow 
disagreed on the extent to which the development trajectories of latecomers would diverge 
from the experience of the first modernisers, but both accorded the state an important role in 
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37 Due to his criticism of early modernisation theory and what he viewed as the overly simplistic dichotomies 
contained therein (Bendix 1967), Bendix is not always considered a modernisation theorist.   Huntington (1971: 
293), for example, labels him a proponent of ‘modernization revisionism’.  Other authoritative assessments, 
however, include Bendix in the former category (Harrison 1988: 47; Gilman 2003: 16).  Harrison (1988: 47) 
points out that Bendix’s critique operated within the parameters of modernisation theory rather than outside it. 
Despite Bendix’s (1967: 307-309) often vociferous criticism of Parsonian approaches to ‘tradition’ and 
‘modernity’, his work is a reconsideration of the processes by which countries modernise, industrialise and 
‘catch up’  rather than a rejection of these notions.   Bendix is also the originator of one of the most influential 
definitions of modernisation as ‘a type of social change which originated in the industrial revolution of 
England…and in the political revolution in France’; ever since, he states, ‘the world has been divided into 
advanced and follower societies’ (Bendix 1967: 329-330).  Even Huntington (1971: 293), therefore,  views 
Bendix and other early revisionists as offering only ‘a small-scale corrective reaction’  to early modernisation 
theory.  For these reasons, Bendix is here loosely classed as a modernisation theorist.  
adapting the foreign technologies and mobilising the resources that would allow it to 'catch 
up' with 'firstcomers'.  'Only vigorous leadership from the central government', wrote Rostow 
(1990 [1960]: 31), ‘can bring about those radical changes...whose quick achievement may 
also constitute a precondition for take-off'.  Later writings on modernisation more explicitly 
took Gerschenkron's point on board; Levy, for example, felt that modernisation necessitated 
unprecedented levels of centralisation, control and planning—‘usually under government 
auspices, but by no means confined to them’ (Levy 1966: 529).   
	
 This control was to be partially economic in nature, as modernisation theory's faith in 
economic planning illustrated.  The government should not control the means of production, 
it was felt, and a private economic realm operating on the principles of supply and demand 
was certainly viewed as essential to economic growth—these are, after all,  the key factors 
distinguishing modernization theory from Marxism and the approaches the latter was to 
inspire after modernization theory’s downfall.  However, the scientific knowledge and 
rationality of governmental technical experts gave it an overview of the entire system that 
private capital lacked, giving the government a key steering role.  Modernisation required 
'planning and the employment of economists and statisticians, conducting surveys to control 
the rates of savings and investments, the construction of new factories, the building of roads 
and harbors, the development of railways, irrigation schemes, fertilizer production, 
agricultural research, forestry research, ceramics research, and research of fuel 
utilization' (Shils quoted in Gilman 2003: 2).  The success of the Marshall Plan and the rapid 
industrialisation of the Soviet Union had demonstrated to American observers the potential 
of state-led technocratic planning, and the enormous government-led TVA project—intended 
to modernise the 'backward' areas of the United States during the 1930s—became, post-war, 
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an example for US-advised governments to implement as far afield as South Vietnam, Iran 
and Colombia (Ekhbladh 2002).  
	
 Modernisation theory's emphasis on technocratic planning and economic growth had 
political and socio-cultural implications, too.  Formally, and in keeping with their firm 
allegiance to the Unites States and their liberal credentials, modernisation theorists supported 
the democratisation of all developing countries.  At the same time, there was a parallel 
recognition, in keeping with Lipset, that full democracy might need to be delayed until the 
cultural transformation, stability, institutional development and economic growth necessary 
to sustain it had taken place.  Exponents thus believed that apparent short-term dangers to 
democracy—such as monolithic and unchallenged ruling parties—could in fact sometimes 
go on to strengthen democracy (Eisenstadt 1966: 95).  Lucien Pye (quoted in Berger 2004: 
103) expressed the need for a 'grand ideological solution' and a 'greater sense of order' in 
transitional societies such as Burma.  Mass education and a certain amount of social 
engineering were needed in order to train citizens for their roles in the new modern state.  Of 
course, the practical application of modernisation theory through American foreign policy 
saw further sacrifices to democracy in the name of putative technological and economic 
progress, as attacks on the democratically-elected rulers of countries such as Chile, Zaire and 
Nicaragua showed.  There existed, therefore, an 'authoritarian flavor' in large sections of the 
theory, particularly in later years as the Cold War wore on and developing countries failed to 
democratise as expected (Gilman 2007: 9).  By 1972, one of the most fervent modernisation 
theorists was sufficiently disillusioned to state that 'whether the political procedures of 
latecomers will be properly described as “democratic”  is highly questionable' (Levy 1972: 
109).   
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 Even where modernisation theorists and practitioners continued to emphasise 
democratic government, their conception of it remained fairly technocratic and elite-led. 
Levy, Almond, Pye and their cohorts may have been political liberals, but they were still men 
of their time—and American democracy in the 1950s looked very different from Western 
democracy today.  Populism and mass rule were viewed as major causes of both fascism and 
communism (Lipset 1960: 137) and it was hoped that the politics of modernisation would be 
able to rise above this melee.  Democracy was approached in minimalist, Schumpeterian 
terms, whereby democratic procedures, rather than outcomes, were used as criteria for 
evaluating democracy (Schumpeter 1976 [1950]).  Democracy was a system of government 
in which citizens gave groups of political elites the right to rule in periodic elections, but 
these elites could not rely on the often unformed and uninformed opinions of citizens in day-
to-day decision-making. It is for this reason that observers have often characterised 
modernisation theory as 'strangely apolitical' (Schech and Haggis 2000: 11).
	
 One of the most pressing questions that modernisation theory had to answer was how 
modernisation would spread between—and within—latecomer societies.  Although 
exponents generally believed the process to be inevitable, positive and unidirectional, several 
were also aware of its inherent tensions and problems.  Lerner (1964) wrote of the crises of 
identity that could result from rapid modernisation, and Smelser (1959) catalogued the 'social 
disturbances' that accompanied it.  Structural functionalism meant that the system would 
eventually correct itself, but the process was not always a smooth one.  Most modernising 
societies contained one or several 'growth poles', where the cultural, economic and legal 
impact of modernisation originated, and from which these then radiated (Harrison 1988: 60). 
This could result in 'dual societies' where tradition and modernisation temporarily existed 
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side by side and competed for dominance.  It was the role of political elites to gradually 
move modernisation beyond the growth pole towards the rest of society (Shils 1962: 60, 
Germani and Silvert 1961: 68-70) and the role of entrepreneurial elites to create the 
economic conditions for continued growth (Rostow 1990 [1960]).    
	
 But if modernisation constituted 'the model of the West detached in some way from 
its geographical origins and locus' (Shils quoted in Gilman 2007: 2), how was this jump from 
one setting to another to be made initially?  Although Marx, Durkheim and other early 
observers had held a primarily evolutionary view, believing that similar conditions would 
naturally unfold from country to country as industrialisation progressed, the majority of post-
war theorists took a more interventionist line.  Diffusion, not evolution, would provide the 
conditions for 'take-off'—conditions which had been endogenous to Britain but would be the 
result of 'external intrusion by more advanced societies elsewhere' (Rostow 1990 [1960]: 6). 
Similarly, to Parsons (1971: 137) these changes were extended by colonisation and through 
the example of 'lead societies' such as the United States. 
	
 In the Cold War context, this view manifested itself in an interventionist foreign 
policy aimed at actively bringing about the capitalist modernisation of post-colonial states 
around the world.  Beginning with Truman's highly influential Point Four Programme, the 
United States made the provision of technical assistance and other forms of foreign 
assistance to developing countries a central plank of its foreign policy.  These countries were 
at danger of attempting a dangerous short-cut to industrialisation—communism—but the 
United States itself could help them to 'leapfrog' to more advanced stages of development. 
As Truman announced in 1949:
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We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances 
and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. 
More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery....Their 
economic life is primitive and stagnant....[while] our imponderable resources in technical 
knowledge are constantly growing and are inexhaustible (Truman 1949).
Modernisation theorists were at the heart of this trend in American foreign policy, and 
volumes by Ekbladh (2011) and Engerman (2003) have detailed the immense influence that 
theorists such as Lerner and Millikan had in research and policy-making institutes such as 
the Center for Economic Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  Rostow was 
particularly successful at straddling the divide between policy and practice, steering, in the 
early 1960s, Kennedy's dramatic moves towards higher levels of foreign aid to countries 
seen as at risk of falling under Soviet influence (Haefele 2003).  Contemporary scholars have 
thus emphasised the domestic historical and ideological circumstances by which 
modernisation theory became legitimated as a central plank of American foreign policy 
(Latham 2000; Gilman 2003, 2007).
	
 Although newly independent countries falling under the United States' sphere of 
influence were thus strongly encouraged to adhere to the precepts of modernisation theory, 
there is also substantial evidence to suggest that these ideas resonated with many of the 
leaders of these countries themselves.  I have already explored the attraction of the Haile-
Selassie and early Kenyatta regimes towards these ideas in 1960s Ethiopia and Kenya 
respectively, but these did not stand alone.  Most developing countries attempted to 
implement aspects of modernisation theory before the popularity of dependency theory in the 
1970s moved many in a more Marxist-oriented direction.  In Indonesia, Suharto's New Order 
regime was heavily influenced by Rostow and his peers (Tirtosudarmo 2005: 64), and in 
Turkey, a political-military coalition continued Attaturk's prewar Kemalist modernisation 
project.  A host of other non-aligned countries such as India, Egypt and Tanzania distanced 
themselves from the West rhetorically, but undertook clear projects of modernisation, marked 
by an emphasis on nation- and state-building, secularisation, industrialisation and scientific 
advancement.  The reaction of American policy-makers and intellectuals to the latter group 
was not always positive; in their desire for rapid transformation, Third World modernisers 
borrowed from the Soviet Union as well as from the West, and emphasised heavy industry 
and the role of the state to an even greater degree than advocated by modernisation theory. 
The equation of modernisation with industrialisation led to widespread import-substitution, 
for example.  However, as Engerman (2003: 216) points out, the goal remained familiar:  'for 
many nations in the world, centrally planned industrialization was a route to modernity, not 
to communism.  And if the quickest route to economic modernity mimicked aspects of the 
Soviet experience...so be it.'  In the substance of policy, if not always in the explicit 
recognition of models, many of modernisation theory's optimistic, technocratic and 
evolutionary ideas appealed to national leaders inheriting multi-ethnic,  post-colonial states.
	
 Several authors have constructed lists of the main features of modernisation theory—
some from the perspective of political science (Huntington 1971), some from development 
studies (Harrison 1988; Brohman 1996: 16) and some from sociology (Alexander 1994). 
Combining these disciplinary perspectives with the review given above, modernisation 
theory can be said to adhere to the following nine core beliefs:
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1. Societies largely function as self-contained and self-correcting units, where changes in each 
subsystem brings about changes in the others.  In the modern world, the borders of societies 
correspond with those of nation-states.
2. Development occurs in discrete stages that are similar for all countries, although the speed 
taken may vary.  The world's most industrialised and wealthy countries occupy the final stage 
of development, and developing countries must do all they can to 'catch up'.
  
3. The primary means by which countries progress from one stage to another is through rapid 
economic growth and industrialisation, achieved within the framework of a capitalist 
economy.  This brings about broad-based structural change, transforming the country from a 
primarily agricultural to a primarily industrial economy.
4. Possessing a culture that is predisposed to modernisation can help a country to develop more 
quickly.  Failing that, however, modernisation can also bring about the necessary shifts in 
cultural orientation through education and the creation of a middle class. Traditional societal 
practices are more often hindrances than facilitators of modernisation.
5. The harnessing of science and technology can allow a country to gain control over its 
environment, mobilise resources and solve the most pressing problems of its people.
6. The state's immediate political task, in developing countries, is nation-building rather than 
democratisation.  The desired end-point is a democratic welfare state, but the state's 
immediate role in planning, infrastructural development and capital accumulation is more 
important in the initial stages of modernisation.
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7. Although the obstacles to modernisation are largely endogenous, modern countries can help 
traditional countries to develop by providing technical and financial assistance.
8. Technocrats and other modernising elites have the knowledge needed to make society's key 
decisions in a neutral, scientific manner, and also play an important role in spreading modern 
culture through society.
9. Development is at once a revolutionary and an evolutionary process.  In the depth and scale 
of its change, it naturally transforms every facet of society, but an attempt to hurry the 
process through a literal overthrowing of the existing political or economic order is ill-
advised.
Very few modernisation theorists would have agreed with every single point on the above 
list.  Analyses ranged from the highly simplistic (arguably best embodied in Rostow) to the 
nuanced and sophisticated (particularly among later scholars such as Bendix and Eisenstadt). 
In addition, several development doctrines before or since have shared some of these beliefs. 
However, it is in the distinctive combination of these nine facets that this specific 
development doctrine resides.  We are, at the very least, able to say the more of these beliefs 
a theorist or practitioner adheres to, the more he/she is a proponent of modernisation theory.  
6.2  Dependency Theory and Marxist-Inspired Approaches
As the 1960s gave way to a new decade, modernisation theory became subjected to 
increasing criticism.  Although it attempted to absorb and counter these attacks from within
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—with each subsequent edition of its founding texts prefaced by a greater and greater 
emphasis on historical contingency and on the tensions inherent in the process of 
modernisation (Rostow 1990 [1960]: xxxix-xlvi; Pye 1972 [1966]: viii)—the theory soon 
began to crumble under the weight of attacks from both sides of the political spectrum.  By 
1976, Emmanuel Wallerstein (1976) had declared the paradigm 'dead', and modernisation 
theorists themselves, worried about their declining popularity in developing countries, found 
themselves fretting that 'our subject matter has turned its back on us' (Smelser 2010). 
	
 One of the most influential critiques of modernisation theory usefully distinguishes 
between the empirical, metatheoretical and ideological charges levelled at the paradigm 
(Tipps 1973).  Within the first category, modernisation's allegedly teleological and automatic 
nature was questioned (Weinberg 1969: 12); rather than being a unilinear path to 
convergence, critics argued, modernisation could suffer setbacks and fragmentation.  A 
related point of contention concerned what critics saw as a static and overly uniform 
understanding of preindustrial societies.  In this vein, Huntington (1971: 293) challenged 
what he viewed as a false and simplistic dichotomy between tradition and modernity—a 
dichotomy more concerned with 'ideal types' than the often-messy realities of transitional 
societies.  Sceptics also disagreed with what they saw as modernisation's technological 
determinism and elitism (Weinberg 1969:  9-10).  By underplaying the role of historical 
factors, human agency and non-elite actors, they argued, modernisation theory was 
presenting a distorted view of reality.
	
 The retreat of the modernisation paradigm was also coinciding with a metatheoretical 
revolution in the social sciences.  Structural functionalism and grand systemic narratives of 
social change were beginning to be replaced by 'area studies' and a focus on specific, narrow 
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areas of study.  The study of economics was increasingly treated as radically removed from 
rest of the social sciences, where behaviouralism was beginning to dominate (Guillen 2002: 
2).  As such, modernisation was accused of conceptual vagueness, theoretical overreaching 
and an overemphasis on abstract, untestable assumptions (Tipps 1969: 218).     
	
 It is, however, the ideological and normative criticisms that concern us most, and that 
ultimately did the most damage to modernisation theory—particularly in the developing 
world.  By universalising the historical experiences of Western countries, the paradigm left 
itself open to charges of ethnocentricity (Weinberg 1969: 13).  Developing countries would 
not necessarily replicate the path that the United Kingdom and the United States had taken, 
but instead faced unique challenges and opportunities.  Even were such replication possible, 
argued critics, who was to say that the inhabitants of developing countries wished to emulate 
the lifestyles of their Western counterparts?  Modernisation often involved tensions and even 
social breakdown, held critics.  The replacement of 19th century ambivalence to 
modernisation with a utopian vision of unalloyed progress served to further American 
interests abroad, but did not reflect reality, they held.  According to some, modernisation 
theory had thus become an instrument of 'cultural imperialism' (Tipps 1973: 210).
	
 Given these allegations, it is fitting that the most powerful body of criticism emerged 
from scholars focusing on—and often originating from—countries outside the West. 
Opponents of the paradigm had long alleged an unwarranted neglect of external factors on 
development in the Third World.  Now, a powerful new perspective emerged to argue that 
underdevelopment in poor countries was caused not by internal cultural factors, but rather by 
conscious attempts by the West to maintain economic and political dominance.  This 
perspective, heavily influenced by Marxist theory and initially posited by scholars of Latin 
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America such as Andre Gunder Frank (1967) and Fernando Henrique Cardoso (with Faletto 
1979 [1971]), came to be known as the dependency approach.  Rejecting the notion that 
industrialisation was spreading around the world and moving traditional societies into the 
modern age, these critics argued that the global capitalist structure had already penetrated all 
corners of the globe and created a system whereby the majority of the population in 
underdeveloped economies was being kept in a state of perpetual and deliberate dependence. 
These countries—dependency theorists focused primarily on Latin America but extrapolated 
to other regions—were poor due not to a static, ahistorical premodern past, but as a direct 
result of the same colonial and neo-colonial structures that had enabled the developed world 
to grow rich (Frank 1969).  'It may happen', wrote Cardoso (with Faletto 1979 [1971]: 10), 
'that a society modernizes its patterns of consumption, education and so forth without a 
corresponding advance in development, if by development we understand less dependency 
and self-sustained growth'.
	
 The implications this held for democracy were dire.  Because the exploitative system 
was abetted by corrupt local elites, what little economic growth was possible would simply 
be appropriated.  This pseudo-development would never, thus, lead to democracy, but rather 
to 'bureaucratic authoritarianism' (O'Donnell 1973).  It was only through revolutionary action 
against this parasitic 'comprador' class that the establishment of socialist structures and 
‘delinking’ from the global economy that countries could free themselves from this vicious 
cycle.  In practice, this necessitated the adoption of measures such as import substitution, the 
nationalisation of property and assets, protectionist policies and a focus on heavy industries 
such as steel and coal.  
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 In Africa, this approach combined with other neo-Marxist perspectives to exercise an 
immense influence on the development thinking of decision-makers.  The 1970s saw the 
adoption of a number of communist regimes in Africa, including Ethiopia.  However, even 
avowedly non-aligned countries adopted policies heavily inspired by socialistic critiques of 
modernisation theory.  A trio of African theorists cum statesmen were particularly important 
in relocating such critiques in Africa, and thereby bridging the divide between development 
theory and practice.  In Ghana, then-president Kwame Nkrumah spearheaded a wholesale 
rejection of capitalism in an attempt to escape what he called the 'neo-colonialism' of the 
West (Nkrumah 1965).  A state subject to neo-colonialism 'is, in theory, independent and has 
all the outward trappings of international sovereignty', but 'in reality its economic system and 
thus its political policy is directed from outside' (Nkrumah 1965: ix).  This dominance was 
particularly marked in relations between African countries and the Bretton-Woods 
institutions, which forced states to compromise their economic policies and allowed multi-
national corporations access to primary commodities in exchange for manufactured goods.  It 
was imperative for African countries to unite and to industrialise rapidly in order to free 
themselves from economic, political, ideological and cultural exploitation by their former 
colonisers.     
	
 Senegal's first president, Leopold Sedar Senghor, took a similar but more culturally-
oriented approach in his advocacy of negritude, an approach which again found its greatest 
political expression in the 1970s.  Desiring a uniquely African socialism born of Une 
relecture africaine de Marx et Engels38 (Senghor 1976) and existing ‘African’ cultural 
strengths such as communalism and solidarity,  Senghor combined early Marxist philosophy 
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38 ‘An African Rereading of Marx and Engels’
with what he saw as indigenous African models.  Once again, anti-imperialism and self-
sufficiency—from both the Soviet and Western blocs—was the goal (Senghor 1976).
	
 Where Ghana sought emancipation from neo-colonialism, and Senegal the embracing 
of negritude, Tanzania, under its first post-independence president Julius Nyerere, wished for 
ujamaa, or 'African socialism'.  For a time one of the strongest policy expressions of 
Marxism in Africa, ujamaa once again advocated a communitarian rejection of capitalism 
based on putative African cultural traits.  The philosophy, as set out in the Arusha 
Declaration of 1967 (TANU 1967), formed the basis of rule by the Nyerere government.  Its 
overarching goal was the adaptation of Tanzania's so-called 'economy of affection'—the 
network of non-capitalist ties that linked citizens to each other within families and 
communities—to the national arena.  In order for this to occur, it was important that 
'wherever possible the Government itself directly participates in the economic development 
of this country' (TANU 1967): all forms of local production were collectivised through a 
system of enforced 'villagisation', a one-party system was instituted and the country sought 
to cut itself off from all forms of Western aid and trade.  In a move that openly emulated 
China, however, Tanzania prioritised rural development over industry, declaring agriculture 
'the basis of development' (TANU 1967).  Tanzania's extensive use of Chinese economic and 
technical assistance is well-documented, and there exists widespread agreement that 
villigisation in particular was drawn from the Chinese model of the time (Hyden 1980: 100).
	
 On the one hand, these critiques of modernisation theory shared much with their 
nemesis.  Both are ultimately theories of modernisation, although they differ somewhat in 
their estimation of how this process should come about in the Third World.  Whatever names 
they took, dependency theory, neo-colonialism, ujamaa and negritude shared with their 
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predecessor a preoccupation with nation-building, rapid economic growth, the primitive 
accumulation of capital and the extension and consolidation of state power.  Virtually all 
emphasised industrialisation and its allegedly liberating effects on the peasantry. Even rural-
oriented ujamaa has been called 'modernization by traditionalization' (Mushi 1971) due to an 
emphasis on state-led planning that extended to the lowest reaches of social and cultural life. 
It should not, of course, be forgotten that Marx himself was first and foremost a theorist of 
modernisation, with a central focus on the essentially inevitable societal changes wrought by 
industrialisation.  It is for this reason that many scholars emphasise the common roots of 
modernisation theory and the dependency approaches, particularly as they were applied in 
Africa (Speich 2009: 459;  Omeje 2007: 473; Hyden 1980: 228-229).  Sklar (1995: 19) calls 
the two approaches 'methodological mirror-images', and Harrison (1988: 28) points out that 
the development debates of the period tended to focus more on which Cold War bloc to 
emulate than on hard and fast principles removed from their points of origin.  Dependency 
was thus a theory of modernisation, even if it was not what is called, in this work and others, 
'modernisation theory'.
	
 At the same time, certain important differences remain between these two 
perspectives, leading to a sharp polarisation of the development debate in the 1970s.  The 
most basic of these is the fact that one advocated a capitalist, free-market path to economic 
growth, while the other preferred a state-run economy.  Both thus accorded the state an 
important political role, but modernisation theory preferred a 'managed economy' founded on 
private capital and entrepreneurship.  Another important difference concerned the perceived 
influence of exogenous versus endogenous factors on national development.  Whereas 
dependency theory usually looked towards existing domestic norms and institutions for 
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inspiration, these primarily represented obstacles to modernisation theorists.  Conversely, 
dependency theorists viewed foreign aid and trade as largely exploitative, whereas their rival 
theory saw these are the very means by which countries could be helped over the hump to 
'take-off'.  Both perspectives felt it important that governments safeguard what has since 
come to be called domestic 'policy space' (Gallagher 2005), but modernisation theorists felt 
that emulation of and engagement with the West would enable states to do just that. 
Dependency theory disagreed with many other aspects of its predecessor, including the 
latter's staged, evolutionary approach and faith in technocratic elites.  Finally, dependency 
theory-inspired policies brought about a shift from economic growth and structural change to 
poverty reduction, the satisfaction of 'basic needs' and income distribution (Gore 2000: 791).
6.3  The (Augmented) Washington Consensus 
If dependency theory differed substantially from modernisation theory, so too did the 
paradigm that replaced it in the 1980s.  Just as dependency theory usurped in popularity a 
predecessor it regarded as empirically and theoretically unsound, it itself soon faced 
accusations of having actually worsened economic conditions in the countries it had sought 
to help.  In Africa, those included Ghana and Tanzania, both which saw their economies 
brought to the brink of collapse at least partially due to dependency-inspired policies 
(Ahiakpor 1985; Blomstrom and Hettne 1984: 159).  In the words of one African critic, 'it is 
hard to escape the conclusion that dependency theory can be and has been a misleading 
framework within which to design economic policies for LDCs' (Ahiakpor 1985: 551).  At 
the same time, the successes of Asian countries such as Taiwan and Singapore—which had 
not followed a neo-Marxist approach—were beginning, to many, to illustrate the benefits of 
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economic liberalisation and to render the dependency approach 'obsolete' (Lim and Pang 
1991: 180; Amsden 1979).
	
 And thus the third and final major development paradigm of the post-war era 
emerged to transform, once again, the policy and practice of development in Africa.  The 
content and impact of the 'Washington Consensus' and the 'neoliberalism' it has advocated for 
Africa has been detailed at extraordinary length, and only a short explanation of how it 
differs from modernisation theory is therefore needed here.  The term Washington Consensus 
was first coined by John Williamson (1990), who used it to posit the existence of ten policy 
recommendations for developing countries on which economists from the World Bank, IMF 
and US Treasury Department were said to broadly agree.  Briefly stated, these policies 
required a retreat of the state in developing countries:  government-owned enterprises were 
to be privatised, public spending cut, trade liberalised and macro-economic stability and 
discipline prioritised (Williamson 1990).  Corresponding with a more general disillusionment 
regarding the utility of state-led development and the collapse of communism, the 
Washington Consensus became, over the next two decades, short-hand for the package of 
reforms encouraged by the Bretton Woods institutions.  
	
 It is true that some analyses (e.g. Stiglitz 1998a) may have overemphasised the 
single-mindedness of the doctrine's faith in unregulated markets—what investor George 
Soros (2000: xii) has termed its 'market fundamentalism'39 ; certainly, no advocate would ever 
state its precepts quite so boldly again, nor claim allegiance to the term itself.  However, the 
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39  Both the terms 'neoliberalism' and 'market fundamentalism' are sometimes used as synonyms for what is 
most commonly called the 'Washington Consensus', but I shall hitherto use only the last-mentioned term due to 
its more neutral connotations and its prominence in development debates.
reforms demanded of developing countries by global economic institutions (often as 
conditionalities in exchange for financial assistance) did signal a significant departure from 
both the modernisation and dependency paradigms, most notably in its minimalist approach 
to the state.  Gone was the notion of a strong political leadership engaged in a modernist 
project of nation-building and resource mobilisation; 'important developmentalist concerns 
such as constructing national unity and realizing national sovereignty are thus 
excluded' (Gore 2000: 791).  Planning, even by enlightened technocrats, was inferior to the 
efficiency created by the decentralised workings of market forces.  Indeed, the state's role in 
development is frequently viewed as the most important point of divergence between the 
content of modernisation theory and that of the Washington Consensus (Brohman 1996: 30; 
Pieterse 2004: 10).
	
 Many other differences also exist, however.  As Stiglitz (1998b: 11, 14) points out, 
the paradigm has traditionally overlooked the importance of technology transfer and 
investment in innovation; the World Bank went without a science advisor or a science policy 
for much of the 1980s and 1990s, implying that it believed science to be a priority only for 
wealthy countries (Sachs 2003: 131).  Both paradigms viewed rapid economic growth as 
immensely important, but even here lay nuances:  whereas modernisation theory had 
emphasised economic growth as a motor for broad structural and societal change, the 
Washington Consensus largely limited its analysis to macro-economic factors, treating 
growth as an end rather than a primary means of development.  The World Bank's most 
influential early reports on Africa broadly took this route; development's main goal, for 
example, was to ‘increase investments, diversify economies and raise productivities’ (World 
Bank and UNDP 1989: iii).  Structural transformation—a shift in the means of production 
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usually led by a decline in the overall importance of the agricultural sector—was replaced by 
'structural adjustment'—'the introduction of more market-oriented policies' through the 
creation of a more flexible and globally competitive economy (World Bank 1981: 2).  The 
envisaged sources of growth also differed from those found in modernisation theory:  the 
latter had emphasised the development of domestic industries, whereas the Washington 
Consensus stressed the need for investment-intensive, large-scale agricultural exports.  Value 
addition was viewed as less important than the exploitation of comparative advantage, and if 
Africa's advantage lay in the export of cash crops and other primary commodities, the 
intensification of productivity in these sectors was vital (World Bank and UNDP 1989: 21).
	
 Of course, a focus on financial aspects is perhaps only natural—the World Bank and 
IMF are, after all, financial institutions.  However, the enormous degree of influence these 
institutions had on the overall policy framework of developing countries was itself a 
component of the new paradigm, which assumed that sound financial policies were the main 
guarantor of overall national development—even if those policies came from outside the 
country itself.  This claim, regardless of its veracity, contrasts markedly with the view of 
economic growth as a tool through which enlightened domestic elites could guide their 
citizens along the same historical path the West had taken.  Local 'ownership' had become 
much less of a concern (Chandler 2010: 147), and international donors were cast, if not 
explicitly as the primary movers of development, then at least as equal in stature to local 
decision-makers (World Bank 1981: 121).
	
 This brings up another important difference between the two paradigms: whereas 
modernisation theory was historicist and guided by a grand narrative, the Washington 
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Consensus relied on ahistorical performance assessment along a standardised set of 
developmental indicators.  According to Gore (2000: 795):
Before the shift, development agencies acted as handmaidens of ‘progress,’ ‘modernization,’ 
‘industrialisation,’ or the emancipation of people from oppression, exploitation, disease and 
drudgery. After it most agencies re-oriented their work to monitor and seek to improve 
‘performance,’ often through local problem-solving and local social engineering designed to 
make economic and social institutions ``work'' better. Adjustment also entailed the 
abandonment of grand long-term government-directed designs for whole societies and a shift 
to decentralized decision-making, laissez-faire and local social engineering....The vision of 
the liberation of people and peoples, which animated development practice in the 1950s and 
1960s, has thus been replaced by the vision of the liberalization of economies.
In keeping with the formal prohibition on political involvement contained in the World 
Bank's mandate (World Bank 1989), the Washington Consensus did not initially place a 
significant emphasis on democracy.  Numerous critics have accused it of promoting 
repressive practices (Harvey 2007: 66; Beckman 1992), particularly in countries such as 
Nigeria and Ghana where liberalisation has clashed violently with labour unions and other 
groups threatened by the rollback of the state.  From the beginning, however, the approach 
assumed democracy, human rights and development to go hand in hand:  it coincided with 
the ascendance of a broader belief that the collapse of the Soviet Union would lead to the 
global triumph of liberal democracy and capitalism, and contained few of the justifications 
for the delaying of full democracy found in the work of many modernisation theorists.  The 
often-unspoken approach was one of 'democracy first' and of extensive political liberties, 
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even if economic reforms took precedence over widespread popular participation (Norgaard 
2000: 61).
	
 This policy of elision changed in the early 1990s, when the Washington Consensus, 
responding to a powerful backlash from developing countries, Western civil society and 
academia, adopted the 'good governance' agenda.  The Netherlands, several Scandinavian 
countries and Canada had begun to add political conditionalities to their aid programmes in 
the previous decade, and by 1992 the World Bank had declared good governance 
'synonymous with sound development management' (quoted in Leftwich 1993: 610).  
A reference to this concept is now obligatory in virtually all World Bank reports, and 
constitutes a central plank of aid programmes around the world.  Good governance is 
associated with a wide array of concepts:  transparency, rule of law, participation, pluralism 
and the exercise of individual liberties.  Individual governmental donors such as the United 
States Agency for International Development and the British Department for International 
Development (DFID) have tended to adopt a broad, political and rights-based approach, 
whereas the World Bank has taken a more managerial and administrative approach (Leftwich 
1994: 606).  There has been a particularly strong emphasis, from both sides, on the building 
of strong, accountable and transparent institutions—to the extent that some now accuse 
agencies of 'institutional fundamentalism' (Rodrick 2006: 979).  This has by no means 
overturned the focus on a minimal state, however, but rather added to it the notion of a 
government with a small remit but a large capacity.  The notion that traditional culture must 
be altered before democracy can take root is found far less frequently. 
	
 Most importantly, the adoption of this new, more political agenda signalled a 
fundamental change in thinking about development:  now good governance, human rights 
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and democracy have come to be seen to be as conducive to—or even as preconditions of— 
development (Przeworski 2000; Sen 1999).  As Leftwich (1993: 605) argues: 'In this respect 
the new orthodoxy turns on its head earlier claims of modernisation theory that stable 
democracy presupposed  prior economic and social development, as had been the case in 
much  (but  not  all) of the now developed world, where advancing industrialisation normally 
preceded democratisation'.  The obstacles to democracy are held to be primarily institutional 
in nature, rather than cultural, economic or social.  This new orthodoxy means that critiques 
that accuse the current development consensus of insufficient attention to participatory 
democracy are today joined by a number of others—particularly from within the developing 
world—which view it as subjecting poor countries to prematurely high or ethnocentric 
standards of transparency and ‘good governance’ (e.g. Mkandawire 2007; Mafeje 2002: 9).  
	
    Some of the most sustained criticism of the early Washington Consensus emerged 
from within the World Bank itself, and particularly from its erstwhile Chief Economist 
Joseph Stiglitz.  Stiglitz's (1998a; 1998b) calls for the expansion of the 'incomplete' 
Washington Consensus to include previously-neglected priorities such as poverty reduction, 
human capital, institutional capacity and environmental policy have had a profound impact 
on donor policy.  The discourse of UN agencies and international NGOs has also played an 
important role; to Rapley (2007: 208, development theory today largely represents the 
inclusion of this non-governmental agenda into the discourse of the Washington Consensus. 
The Millennium Declaration of 2000 and the UNDP's 'sustainable human development' 
approach (Anand and Sen 1994) are the starting points of this perspective, which focuses on 
the attainment of basic needs, on poverty reduction and on development at the grassroots 
level.  The influence on World Bank and IMF policy can be seen in the creation of measures 
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such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) that recipient countries have to 
submit every three to five years, but the new development discourse has now become 
significantly broader than the Bretton Woods institutions, to the extent that one commentator 
(Sumner 2008: 1406) has rechristened it the 'New York consensus' (in reference to the city's 
status as the UN's headquarters).  
	
 In fact, more radical voices have also found their way into the revised development 
agenda.  The 'post-development', 'degrowth' and ‘anti-globalisation' perspectives (Rahnema 
and Bawtree 2008; Latouche 2009; and Starr and Adams 2003 respectively) reject the notion 
of development in much the same way that the notion of modernisation was rejected 50 years 
ago.  Spurning concepts such as the nation-state, progress, development and even scarcity 
(Rahnema 2008: 400), these critics view development not as a means of improving the 
wellbeing of populations, but rather as a means of establishing external control over their 
lives and retaining colonial patterns of domination (Rahnema and Bawtree 2008: 379). 
Tinkering with individual programmes or strategies will not address the underlying problems 
of the development project as a whole, which should be scrapped altogether in favour of 
entirely localised, indigenous solutions.  According to these approaches, development 
initiatives, whether driven by national elites or exogenous actors, dissolve traditions of 
communal solidarity and subjugate local people to the needs of an impersonal and uncaring 
state machinery.
	
 At first glance, a movement with the rallying cry of 'leave the poor alone' (unnamed 
quoted in Gras and translated in Latouche 2010: 61) would not appear to have much in 
common with the present efforts of the donor community.  However, this set of approaches is 
increasingly influencing the mainstream Western development paradigm.  Both desire 
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smaller, more flexible and more adaptive governments, and both emphasise decentralisation 
and local participation; 'out of this seemingly unlikely meeting of post-development thought 
and neoclassical economics, a new consensus is emerging' (Rapley 2007: 6).  Another 
influential overview agrees, contending that alternative notions of development have largely 
been absorbed into the mainstream: stakeholder participation and NGO involvement now 
play a larger role, 'human development' has replaced GDP growth as a goal, and 
development has become more reflexive (Pieterse 1998: 344).  'Well-being' and subjective 
experiences of development are increasingly the focus of development projects that are today 
more programmatic, particularistic and ad hoc.  In marked contrast with modernisation 
theory, such projects view structural change as possible only when local dynamics are fully 
understood and taken into account.  As the World Bank's 'Economic Growth in the 1990s: 
Learning from a Decade of Reform'—a repudiation of many of the reforms advocated in that 
decade—puts it:  'We need to get away from formulae and the search for elusive ‘best 
practices...The complexity and diversity of growth experiences are not amenable to 
simplistic policy prescriptions' (Zagha et al 2005: xiii).  Successful development is taken to 
be a bottom-up rather than a top-down process, even if implementation of this perspective is 
often uneven and even if the discourse of the most radical 'post-development' thinkers 
remains outside the policy-making mainstream.
	
 If the Washington Consensus has changed significantly since its heyday, what should 
the new perspective be called?  Stiglitz (1998b) dubs it 'the post-Washington Consensus', 
while others, as we have seen, speak of a UN-inspired 'New York Consensus' (Sumner 2008: 
1406).  These labels, however, imply a complete transformation of development policy—a 
paradigm shift.  Mainstream development practice has indeed undergone profound shifts in 
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recent decades, but not, many would argue, shifts that are deep enough to warrant 
consideration as a completely new paradigm (Pieterse 1998: 344, Maxwell 2005; Rodrik 
2006).  The new loose development consensus, to the extent that it can be said to exist, has 
flourished in the gaps left by the 'old' Washington Consensus, rather than overturning it 
entirely.  The latter's assumption that democracy and the rule of law fuel economic growth 
has been made explicit, and blended with neoliberal economics in most areas where the two 
have clashed.  Decentralisation and the creation of flexible, small and accountable state 
institutions have continued apace, albeit with a greater emphasis on the empowerment of 
local stakeholders and their participation.  A market-led economy that is fully integrated into 
the global economy is still preferred, but poverty reduction, equity and wellbeing are now 
discursively privileged over wealth creation and GDP growth. The new approach represents 
a 'compromise' between the positions of the World Bank and its critics rather than a victory 
of the latter over the former.40  For this reason, I prefer Rodrik's (2006) term, the 'Augmented 
Washington Consensus'.  Its tenets (summarised in Rodrik 2006 and Maxwell 2005: 2), have 
taken the Washington Consensus even further away from modernisation theory, but will 
henceforth be treated as a variation on the earlier orthodoxy rather than an entirely new 
approach.
6.4  The ‘East Asian Model’
The era of the Washington Consensus provided the setting for one final academic and policy 
debate that is of particular importance to the focus of this dissertation.  The 1980s and 1990s 
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40 Maxwell uses the term 'meta-narrative' rather than 'Augmented Washington Consensus', but his conclusions 
are very similar to Rodrick's.  
witnessed intense controversy surrounding the notion of an East Asian development model, 
as well as the associated concept of the 'developmental state'.  This debate was particularly 
concerned with the extent to which the state had intervened in the economic growth of the 
'Asian Tigers', the sustainability of such levels of intervention as did indeed exist, and the 
compatibility of such interventions with liberal democracy.   
	
 When these discussions emerged in the early 1980s, the Washington Consensus was 
firmly on the ascendant, and the state was therefore accorded a largely regulatory and 
facilitating role in the development literature.  Early discussions by inter alia Friedman and 
Friedman (1980: 48), Chen (1979) and Balassa (1988) sought to fit the experience of East 
Asia into the same framework by positing that the region's economic success stemmed from 
the unfettering of long-repressed market forces.  In 1993, the World Bank itself notoriously 
expressed its own support for this view in a report titled The East Asian Miracle (World 
Bank 1993), arguing that the Asian Tigers owed their success largely to its prescriptions.  
	
 By this time, however, an influential wave of revisionist literature had also begun to 
emerge.  Wade (1990) found South Korea, Japan and Taiwan's development to accord to a 
'governed market' approach, and dubbed the East Asian Miracle report an act of self-serving 
'paradigm maintenance' on the part of the World Bank (Wade 1996).  Johnson's (1982) 
'capitalist developmental state', epitomised by but not limited to Japan, was dependent on the 
firm but business-friendly guiding hand of an elite bureaucracy of economic policy-makers. 
Amsden argued that development in Taiwan (Amsden 1985) and South Korea (Amsden 
1992) could not be understood without giving credit to the powerful role played by public 
enterprises and other instruments of the state.  This literature did not deny the benefits of 
integration into the global capitalist economy, particularly through the attraction of foreign 
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investment and the creation of strong export-oriented manufacturing industries; this 
integration, however, needed to be gradual and carefully sequenced.  This strand of 
revisionist literature has ultimately been the most influential within this debate, and the East 
Asian Model is still regarded, where it is used, as referring to a selectively interventionist 
state that temporarily places rapid economic growth above political liberalisation and that 
relies on export-oriented manufacturing as the source of this growth.
	
 Despite the wide literature generated by discussions on the East Asian Model, several 
factors prevented it from displacing the dominant neoliberal paradigm and bridging the 
policy divide, particularly in Africa.  As an article by Amsden (1994) asked, 'Why isn't the 
Whole World Experimenting with the East Asian Model to Develop?'. Firstly, the 
aforementioned debates were confined largely to the West; the discourse emanating from 
East Asia, in contrast, tended to emphasise the uniqueness of the region's growth.  Most 
significantly, Asian leaders such as Mahathir and Lee argued for the importance of distinctly 
'Asian Values' such as social cohesiveness, filial piety, hard work and self-sacrifice (Lee 
quoted in McCarthy 1998; Mahathir 2000).  This amounted to a de facto dismissal of the 
possibilities for emulation of the model from outside.  	

	
 In addition, this was the era in which Africa was at its most dependent on foreign aid, 
and when the Western model of political and economic liberalism was at its highest ebb in 
the institutions granting this aid.  This dissertation has shown how, in both Ethiopia and 
Kenya, the 1980s and 1990s were largely periods of adjustment to and negotiation with 
donor conditionalities.  As Cullather (2009: 512) writes, 'it is hard to imagine the World 
Bank's African clients today asserting their entitlement to progress or fashioning an 
independent vision as assertively as Mboya did in 1961'.  I would argue that this statement 
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no longer holds true, but certainly did until fairly recently.  The question of East Asia as a 
model was thus subordinated, by both African elites and by donors, to other concerns. 
Finally, the East Asian Economic Crisis of 1997 led, in many quarters, to disillusionment 
with the region's economic model.  Western observers who had lauded the Asian Tigers' 
market liberalisation two decades previously now accused these systems of 'crony capitalism' 
and of tolerating an overly close relationship between the business and state sectors 
(Krugman 1998), 
	
 This is not to suggest that either Western financial institutions or African 
development elites dismissed East Asia completely in this time.  The reader will recall that 
several of my Kenyan interviewees spoke of the 1990s as the era in which they first became 
interested in emulating aspects of East Asian development, and that several even mentioned 
examples of said emulation.  Since the mid-2000s, the World Bank has organised several 
study visits and published reports exploring the potential for Africa to learn from China's 
best practices (Dollar 2008; Ravallion 2008).  However, discussions on an East Asian Model 
have in the past been overshadowed by deeper global economic and geopolitical 
considerations, and subject to dynamics that differ greatly from the present situation and that 
have prevented them from dislodging the Augmented Washington Consensus from its 
dominant position.
6.5  Conclusion
Thus far, I have detailed the three broad development paradigms that have shaped the 
development landscape in post-colonial Africa.  While the East Asian model never coalesced 
into a distinctive and highly influential paradigm in its own right, the opposite is true for 
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modernisation theory.  The latter constitutes a way of approaching development that remains 
distinct from its successors, although some overlap does exist.  It shares with dependency 
theory a focus on nation-building and a strong role for the state, but differs radically on 
whether this state should preside over a capitalist or socialist economy.  It shares with earlier 
versions of the Washington Consensus a predilection for economic growth, but diverges on 
the question of the size and functions of the state.  It disagrees most vehemently with the 
move towards the 'bottom-up', participatory development and institution-building seen in the 
Augmented Washington Consensus, referring instead a technocratic and elite-led process that 
relies on a gradual incorporation of the working classes and peasantry as mass education and 
the accumulation of capital advance.  Each of these three post-independence approaches to 
development has truly served as a distinct paradigm, both in Africa and abroad.  As the next 
sections shall demonstrate, Ethiopian and Kenyan emulators are again returning to the oldest 
of these paradigms, seeing East Asia first and foremost as an example of successful—and at 
least partially replicable—modernisation.
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CHAPTER SEVEN:  HOW TO MODERNISE?  
THE PROCESS & NATURE OF DEVELOPMENT
	

	
 Believing it can be achieved is a lesson in itself.
	
          
	
 	
 	
 	
 	
 	
 - Senior economic planner, Ethiopia (EG20)
***
Both Ethiopia and Kenya possess groups of elites who seek to emulate aspects of East Asia's 
broad development experiences.  Ethiopia's EPRDF, as this study has demonstrated, cites 
China, Taiwan and South Korea as important models; in Kenya, on the other hand, planners 
and business elites look to Singapore and Malaysia for inspiration.  Despite vast historical, 
political and economic differences between the two countries, it is East Asia as a region that 
holds the most appeal for both sets of emulators
	
 This convergence may perhaps appear unusual, until the specific lessons—and their 
implications within the broader African development debate—are taken into account.  Those 
policies, ideas and practices borrowed from East Asia penetrate to the very heart of what 
development itself means for elites, as well as how best to achieve it.  This chapter is the first 
of two to explore the specific lessons that Ethiopian and Kenyan elites draw from their 
exemplars of choice.  It looks at the process by which emulating elites wish to develop and 
seeks to understand how, in their eyes, development is said to occur.  The subsequent chapter 
then addresses how elites see their own roles in this process.  In other words, the former 
focuses on the 'what', 'how' and 'when' of development, while the latter looks primarily to the 
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'who'.  Both combine analysis of the Ethiopian and Kenyan perspectives in order to situate 
these within the broader development paradigms explored in the previous chapter.41     
7.1  Development as an Endogenous, Sequential Process
Early development theory viewed modernisation as a series of interrelated systemic changes 
that gradually transformed the entire fabric of a given society.  This view had three 
implications: firstly, development was largely a national project exercised within the confines 
of the modern nation-state.  The early post-colonial era witnessed the globalisation and 
naturalisation of the nation-state system, when even former empires were becoming nation-
states (Berger 2003: 422).  As the now-'organic' setting within which all development 
activities took place, ‘the nation-state became the central and unquestioned unit of study for 
modernisation theorists’ (Berger 2003: 422).  Although modernisation theory was later used 
by American policymakers to advocate for change abroad, its theoretical assumptions thus 
remained 'endogenist' (Pieterse 2004: 47).  
	
 Secondly, development was seen to occurr in series of distinct, virtually unavoidable 
stages from the 'traditional' to the 'modern', although the transfer of technology from more 
'advanced' countries could help to accelerate this process.  Finally, modernisation theory's 
reliance on structural-functionalism implied the fundamental interconnectedness of the 
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41  As East Asia has been established as both the most prevalent and the most important exemplar in both 
countries under consideration, the following chapters address only the lessons that elites draw from this region. 
Although elites also draw other lessons from the West, fellow African countries and other models around the 
world, these dynamics are not explored in detail in this section.  The 'elites' referred to in this chapter thus refer 
to those who have admitted to engaging in emulation of East Asia. 
socio-cultural, economic, political and legal realms.  Development was unified into a meta-
narrative that applied to all facets of all societies at all points in time.
	
 These beliefs are central to development thinking among both Ethiopian and Kenyan 
elites, and there is evidence to suggest that the East Asian example has compounded their 
importance.  A newfound endogenism means, on the one hand, a strong emphasis on self-
sufficiency and self-reliance.  Traditional aid and the conditionalities that often accompany it 
are denigrated by even otherwise Western-friendly elites:
In my view, the prescriptions by the World Bank do not help developing countries to grow. 
It's like they look at you as if you are a small baby – ‘do this, do that’.  Sometimes they are 
very wrong.  And that's why I prefer private capital to borrowing from the World Bank 
(KG9). 
To succeed, you wait for World Bank and IMF consultants, you listen to the advice, and then 
you do the opposite (KG15).
 
African leaders may have been unhappy with Western prescriptions irrespective of East 
Asia's economic situation, but the latter has provided a vivid illustration not just of the 
desirability, but also of the importance and the possibility of greater self-reliance.  Several 
discussions of the Chinese Model have emphasised China's ability to safeguard its domestic 
'policy space' (Zhang 2006; Zhao 2010: 424), and the 'economic nationalism' with which 
East Asian models are so often associated (Wong 2004: 351) includes a desire to free one's 
country from dependence on foreign 'charity'.  Parallel discussions emphasise the role that 
China's economic presence in Africa plays in giving African governments greater policy 
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freedom (Oya 2006).  Freedom from aid and the dependency it brings has become almost a 
rite of passage, signifying a country's entrance into the 'club' of middle-income countries—a 
status both the Ethiopian and Kenyan leaderships have staked their futures on attaining.  For 
this reason, the ability to set its one's own domestic policies, feed one's own population and 
choose the pace of one's own political and economic liberalisation was mentioned by elites 
in both countries as one of the foremost lessons drawn from East Asia:
	
 The lesson and the motivation that I personally derive is that you can still build...an economy 
that is...immune from external influence....you can build a national economy that is generally 
sovereign.  This is the general lesson that I am taking (EG13).
You wouldn't say the Chinese accepted Western help.  They were even blocked and 
condemned.  I have said there are parts of the Chinese model I don't like, but what it tells me 
is the internal policies are the decisive ones.  This is what I learnt (EN6).  
But other countries that have 'made it' have actually organised themselves internally and 
forged development from inside, by starting industries, by pretending they need to produce 
what's already available elsewhere. It's not that there was a lack of goods when the famous 
Asian Tigers set out to build cars, washing machines, what everybody else was producing. 
It's not that they couldn't get them from Europe, it's just that they wanted to make them for 
themselves.  And this has helped, that at the end of the day they have come up and are now 
talking to you and the rest of the developed world on equal terms (KN15)! 
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In the case of Ethiopia, the desire to lessen aid dependency has clearly not borne fruit in 
practice: Ethiopia was the country to receive the third-largest amount of official development 
aid in 2009, and this amount increased more than three-fold from 2001 to 2011 (GHA 2011); 
aid remains highly dependent on climactic conditions from one year to the next.  Kenya, on 
the other hand, has managed to diversify its income and decrease levels of foreign assistance 
(Mwega 2010: 117).  As has been pointed out in Chapter Four, however, even Ethiopia is 
often able to exercise a surprising level of freedom of action in its dealings with donors. 
Those who seek to emulate East Asia often do so with the medium-term goal of further 
increasing and maximising this freedom.  
	
 Increasing policy space should not be confused with political isolationism or 
economic 'delinking' in the dependency mould, however.  Virtually no elites, even in 
Ethiopia, wished to retreat from participation in the global economy; instead, respondents 
wished to use policy freedom to affect gradual integration with the global economy—but on 
their own terms.  If—in Ethiopia, at least—a certain level of import substitution is still a 
necessity, this (the reasoning goes) is merely the prelude to a greater international role than 
ever before.  There was thus a grudging but almost universal recognition that Ethiopia's 
development would occur within the context of a globalised, free-market system. 
Globalisation was seen as an inevitable force that could either ‘make’ or ‘break’ a country, 
depending on the quality of its internal governance.  Even (or perhaps especially) in an era of 
globalisation, in the words of one of Meles Zenawi's most senior advisors, ‘development is 
basically a local act' (EG14).
	
 A focus on endogenous routes to development had another, more surprising outcome. 
In both countries, the national context was seen to hold not merely the keys to future success, 
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but also to present failure.  When asked to identify the main obstacles to development, the 
vast majority of respondents pointed to internal factors such as a lack of technology, capital 
and infrastructure.  Ethiopian elites placed a particular emphasis on cultural and religious 
constraints to development (EN9, EN10, EG7), and to the legacy of isolationism and 
dictatorship (EG6, EN13), while Kenyan elites almost unanimously mentioned the lack of a 
national committed leadership (KG19, KG20, KN6).  Relatively few focused on the legacies 
of foreign interference, structural adjustment or an unequal international economic order.  
	
 Those who mentioned East Asian countries as models were the most likely, of all 
groups, to emphasise domestic constraints.  Countries such as South Korea and China, they 
argued, had demonstrated the possibility of succeeding in an international system that had 
appeared to be stacked against them.  As a result, they felt, elites could no longer use external 
constraints to excuse their own poor performance: 
So China has shown us that things that were considered not feasible, not do-able, for which 
there was no financing...have been made possible (EN18).
Look at Korea – Korea is a question of hard work, discipline, and really being a lot more 
relaxed about opening to investment.  We didn't do this, because we came in to a situation of 
our own colonial structure, and then spent a great deal of time blaming the colonial structure 
rather than moving ahead with the work (KG3).
We overslept.  When the whole world was embracing technology, where were we? (KN9).
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While Kenyans have involved themselves in scandals, stealing money, that's the time that 
Shanghai in China was being built.  So if you look at what's happened in China for 10 years, 
and where we are, it's shit.  It's shit! (KN4).
Optimism is a difficult concept to address in the political sciences, as it is not easily 
operationalised.  Nonetheless, there existed a tangible sense of possibility among those 
Kenyan technocrats and Ethiopian party members who most desired emulation of East Asia, 
while pessimism about the future was strongest amongst those who felt the East Asian 
experience to have little applicability to the African situation.  It is no coincidence that 
modernisation theory is the most optimistic of development theories, envisioning, as it does, 
a future in which technological and scientific knowledge is harnessed towards 'progress' and 
the amelioration of humanity's problems.
	
 The example of East Asia has also strengthened the notion of development as a 
staged process of transformation.  One of the most striking ways in which many East Asian 
approaches to development have harked back to post-war development theory is in their 
focus on sequencing and historically-contingent development.  Gore (2000: 794) contrasts 
the desire of modernisation theory to understand the 'rhythms, patterns and laws of 
development' with the 'ahistorical performance assessment' undertaken by the World Bank, 
and finds East Asian developmentalism partially responsible for the return to prominence of 
the former approach.  
	
 This stageist reading of development was one of the aspects of modernisation theory 
that critics most objected to, especially when it was accompanied by the belief that these 
stages were broadly similar for all countries.  Yet elites in both country cases made frequent 
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use of Rostow's terms, speaking of the need for cultural, technological and industrial 'take-
off', and expressing a desire for an 'industrial revolution'.  Here, the view of one Ethiopian 
member of parliament is representative:
I can say most of the countries actually started with agriculture.  The role of agriculture 
changed, from agriculture to industry, from industry to services.  Now in developed 
countries, services dominate in the economy, isn't it?  That is a gradual process...Others have 
also proceeded, and they are in the mass consumption stage now, like in Japan, the US and 
others.  We are following that path.  Of course, all of us are following capitalist paths of 
development (EG22).
On the one hand, elites emphasised the importance of indigenous, locally-specific paths of 
development.  Ethiopian respondents, when asked whether their country's development 
differed from or corresponded to that of other countries, primarily chose the former.  In 
keeping with the exceptionalism and desire for independence on which many observers of 
Ethiopia's past and present have remarked (Clapham 1990: 229; Adejumobi 2007: 31), 
interviewees felt that 'the process of modernisation in Ethiopia is rather unique when we 
compare it with other countries' (EG18).  
	
 On the other hand, such claims were fraught with contradictions.  When asked for 
examples of Ethiopia's uniqueness, elites were often unable to respond, or cited those factors 
that they had previously identified as the keys to China, South Korea and Taiwan's success. 
The prioritisation of agriculture and rural development, for example, was at once cited as an 
example of Ethiopia's divergence from international norms, and, very frequently, as a 
valuable lesson to be drawn from East Asia.  Witness, for example, the sentiments of this 
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EPRDF parliamentarian, who stated:
When we launched our agriculturally-led industrialisation, we were secure in the knowledge 
that countries like Taiwan, Korea, places like that, Malaysia, had done it.  And China, much 
earlier.  They did bring about a Green Revolution and that enabled them to transform to an 
industrial society where industry will then take over.  So we had good examples of that 
(EG5).   
Similarly, Ethiopia's alleged rejection of 'neoliberalism' and harnessing of state 
developmentalism was viewed as a rejection of the Washington Consensus' 'one-size-fits-all' 
model and proof of the need for home-grown solutions;  it was also, however, the most 
frequently-mentioned aspect of the country's emulation of East Asia.  Dead Ends and New 
Beginnings (Meles 2006) is almost entirely devoted to exploring the successes of the 
Taiwanese and South Korean 'developmental states'.  
	
 The fact that many Ethiopian elites accused the West of hypocrisy for glossing over 
its own early history of state intervention and agriculturally-led development provides a 
further indicator that Ethiopia's current discourse on the uniqueness of its development path 
stems more from a desire for independence rather than a genuine rejection of a stageist path 
towards modernisation.  'The importance of the state we learned from the East, and also from 
the early days of the West', said one of the architects of the GTP, for example;  'the state has a 
guiding, mobilizing role, and countries need it to progress' (EG20).  
	
 Perhaps the most revealing insight into this dynamic is the role that Bismarck's 
Germany is said to play in the ideology of the EPRDF.  According to Ethiopia's former 
President, 19th century Germany has been cited in the party literature as an example of the 
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mobilisation, nation-building and capital accumulation 'stage' that the EPRDF believes 
Ethiopia to occupy at present (EN4); the German example, paired with that of East Asia, is 
allegedly used to defuse demands from the opposition for greater democracy.  In short, many 
in the EPRDF thus do not mind developing broadly as the West has done, but feel that the 
East Asian Model reflects this trajectory more accurately than does the Washington 
Consensus.  A poster on display in the Ethiopian Ministry of Trade and Industry states that 
'No country has ever reached middle-income status without industrialization and 
urbanization'—a message presumably aimed as much at visiting donor representatives as at 
ministry staff.
	
 Kenyan elites were less explicit in specifying the precise content of each 
developmental stage, but also more likely to agree that their country's development should 
follow a general global trajectory.  This was partially due to an acknowledgement that 
Kenya's colonial legacy was shared by other countries, but also due to a sense of having 
fallen behind in a race for development.  'We were late. We are trailing. Because there are a 
lot of countries which have more modern things than we have', said one respondent (KN16). 
According to another:
In my view, [development] has to be similar but the evaluation at different times will find 
people at different levels...All of us will have to take different paths, but the outcome might 
be the same...It takes time and effort for countries to develop to certain levels.  If we say we 
are going to take 300 years to be where Europe is, it's not going to be right.  It's a long time 
(KN7).
This notion of having to 'catch up or perish' pervaded the discourse of emulating elites in 
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both countries.  The concept of 'catch-up growth', whereby countries use technology transfer 
to achieve a level of rapid growth that comes to rival the originator of the technology, has 
been theorised by Ozawa (2005) in reference to the Japanese example; as we have seen, it 
also echoes the writings of modernisation theorists such as Rostow.  According to this notion, 
emulation and learning are said to constitute the primary mechanisms by which countries 
achieve 'catch-up' growth (Ozawa 2005: 8).  The fact that many elites in both Kenya and 
Ethiopia look to East Asia in order to achieve catch-up growth and take-off is thus not 
unexpected, but instead consistent with the literature on emulative modernisation.  'We have 
no choice! If we don't industrialise we will be gobbled up!', said a senior environmental 
policy-maker (EG25).  A metaphor derived from athletics was frequently used, and 
development was conceived of as a competition, or a race:
It's like doing a pole vault – to catch up with [Western countries], they are very high – you 
need a pole vault.  You need somebody who is just where you can catch up or learn lessons of 
transformation like industrialisation, where did they start, what are they doing (KG14).
Of course it would be nice to be like the UK or US one day, but we have to be like a 
marathon runner.  We need endurance, and to focus on achievable goals [such as reaching the 
level of China] first (EG2).
The notion that one’s country is ‘behind’ has a particular resonance with Ethiopia’s historical 
situation, and especially with the regimes of Tewedros and Haile-Selassie.  Donham (1999), 
for example, has illustrated the ways in which Ethiopian elites—and the new middle class 
created by Haile Selassie’s policies in particular—historically viewed Ethiopia as 
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‘backwards’ and longed for the prestige and prosperity that membership to the club of 
‘modern’ nations would bring.  Of the situation on the eve of the 1974 revolution, he writes: 
‘the grand scheme of modernization—the march of advanced nations, followed by backward 
ones, along a continuum defined by different groups’ success in applying science and 
knowledge—had come to define reality for many of the new Ethiopian educated 
elite’ (Donham 1999: 25).  
Today, however, East Asia presents to emulating elites the tangible and visible 
example that such membership can be gained within the course of a generation; for the first 
time since the ‘Japanisers’ of the early 20th century, such emulation is linked not to Europe 
but to East Asia.  It is in this spirit that Tesfaye Habisso (2007), former Ethiopian 
ambassador to South Africa and continuing supporter of the EPRDF, expressly links the aims 
of Meles Zenawi, ‘the main revivalist of this ideology’, with the aims of those elites who 
pressed for emulation of Japan nearly a century earlier.
Closely related to the issue of staged development are the notions of prioritisation 
and sequencing.  Much of the literature on the East Asian and Chinese models emphasises 
the importance of pragmatism, sequencing and prioritisation (Peerenboom 2007: 31; Zhang 
2006; Yusuf 2001: 7-8).  A law, institution, policy or practice might be essential at a later 
stage of development but inadvisable at present, or vice versa.  
	
 This desire for sequenced development takes three forms in the case studies under 
consideration.  Firstly, Ethiopian and Kenyan elites draw lessons regarding the importance of 
gradual economic and political liberalisation from the countries they cite as models in East 
Asia.  Secondly, elites are particularly interested in the sequencing of product development, 
whereby countries begin by exporting crude products and later progress to higher-value 
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goods.  In other words, decision-makers are particularly interested in gradually adding value 
to their exports, which at the moment are largely primary commodities.  This, according to 
the theory of 'catch up growth' is how Japan developed—by rapidly emulating 'higher 
echelon' countries and thereby 'scaling up the ladder of industrial upgrading, rung by 
rung' (Ozawa 2005:  144).  
	
 In my case studies, this manifests itself in the prominence accorded to policies of 
value addition and agro-processing in key development strategies (Kenya 2007a: 14; 
MoFED 2010a: 26), but also in the broader beliefs exhibited in elite discourse. Numerous 
respondents took solace in the fact that countries like Taiwan and Japan had initially been 
discounted by the West as purveyors of cheap, low-quality products—only to use this 
experience to become global leaders in the export of sophisticated technological products:
When I was at elementary school, Japanese commodities were of a lesser quality.  They were 
very inferior, because people used to have European commodities in Ethiopia.  Oh this is 
inferior, this is inferior' [they said].  And then the Japanese crossed that line, and now Japan 
is well respected throughout the whole world...So now Taiwan is also crossing that [line]. 
Korea has crossed that [line].  It's now China.   So it's only a matter of time.  Maybe after five 
or ten years, you will see that Chinese products are some of the best quality in the world—
Chinese construction, Chinese products—that is inevitable, because history has shown us 
(EG15).
There was a time when 'Made in Japan' was a bad thing.  It's got to be 'Made in England'. 
Show me what's made in England today.  Do I even care if it says 'made in China?'  No.  The 
quality has come to a level where it's acceptable, it's a brand name. So now most of the stuff 
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that we buy, even this computer.  Samsung – OK, 'Made in China'.  But does it worry you? 
No.  Everything has gone up on a quality level (KN10).
The third facet of elites' desire to draw lessons in prioritisation and sequencing from East 
Asia concerned the role of agriculture in structural transformation.  It is to this lesson that we 
now turn.
7.2 Structural Transformation Underpinned by Agricultural 
Development 
Much of the writing on East Asian lessons for Africa has focused on the centrality of 
sequenced structural transformation in the development of the former region.  More 
specifically, many analyses have focused on the role that agricultural growth and rural 
development played in providing capital, technology and labour to a labour-intensive 
manufacturing industry.  One of the key works on this subject attributes China's rapid growth 
to its 'inspirational success in modernising its agriculture and transforming its rural 
economy' (Juma 2011: 9), while another views Taiwan's sequenced agricultural 
transformation to be one of the most important lessons Africa can take from the region 
(Gabre-Madhin and Johnson 2002).
	
 The evidence that Kenyan decision-makers draw this lesson from the East Asian 
experience is far more ambiguous than in the Ethiopian case.  It is true that in Kenya, lesson-
drawers lament that 'we have not been brutal enough in prioritisation – we want to do so 
many things at once' (KN20).  Vision 2030 (Kenya 2007a: 23) also mentions the importance 
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of prioritisation, and selects six 'lead industries'—tourism, agriculture, wholesale and retail 
trade, manufacturing for the regional market, business process offshoring and financial 
services—on which to focus.  
	
 However, these constitute very broad industries; between them, they encompass 
virtually all of Kenya's economy.  Kenya's economy has not, historically, developed in the 
sequential manner associated with much of East Asia.  The Chinese, Korean, Taiwanese and 
Japanese FDI-driven, export-led economies were all preceded by variations on a process 
whereby the labour and knowledge first freed by rural reforms and agricultural development 
‘spilled over’ into industrial development (Grabowski 2009; Ravallion 2008; Fan et al 
2005).42   
	
 In contrast, Kenya's colonial and post-colonial development has traditionally been 
highly urbanist in practice and in policy.  Although roughly 75% of the labour force is 
concentrated in agriculture, the sector accounts for less than a quarter of GDP (Bureau of 
African Affairs 2012).  Much of this sector is employed either in subsistence farming or in 
the exporting of cash crops whose prices have remained relatively stable (and low) on the 
global market.  In addition, the vast majority of infrastructural development has been 
concentrated in urban areas.  Because the agricultural sector has seen very limited growth, 
there has been little surplus labour to drive a strong industrial sector.  Revenues from 
Kenya's  manufacturing and agricultural bases are dwarfed by income from its urban-based 
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42 The dynamics of this process have a potential importance for a comparative study of Kenyan, Ethiopian and 
East Asian economic development that go beyond the remit of this study.  A further exploration of the ways in 
which agricultural growth did the real 'heavy lifting' (Ravallion 2008: 7) in China and its neighbours can be 
found in the three works cited above.  
services sector, which comprises a very small segment of the workforce but generates almost 
60% of GDP (Bureau of African Affairs 2012).  
	
 Given this uneven distribution between the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors, 
the Kenyan elites I interviewed were divided on questions of structural transformation. 
While virtually all agreed that the country had to decrease its reliance on agricultural exports 
and subsistence farming, not all felt that this should be achieved through a sequential focus 
first on rural development, then on manufacturing, and only eventually on a knowledge-
based, services-led economy.  For everyone who felt that 'you do have to have 
industrialisation, because the economy must move from a simple rudimentary crude agrarian 
[system] to some kind of modern, planned, mechanised, automated economy, and the 
population must also shift from an agrarian to a more industrialised population' (KG16), 
there was another who felt that all three sectors could be focused on simultaneously.  No-one 
felt that the agricultural sector was unimportant, but some emphasised the expansion of high-
intensity exports (horticultural products, for example) whereas others focused on food 
security, rural spending and smallholder agriculture.  
	
 It is likely that this lack of discursive agreement is at least partially underpinned by 
additional structural factors.  Over 75% of Kenya's population resides on the 9.5% of the 
land that is arable (World Bank 2012), severely limiting Kenya's choices in this regard.  In 
addition, several elites pointed out that the regional devolution mandated in the 2010 
constitution would place such decisions within the hands of the 47 newly-created regional 
authorities; if implemented, this would preclude a uniform nation-wide policy.  It is thus no 
surprise that Kenya's major East Asian models are Singapore and Malaysia—both countries 
with very small or non-existent agricultural sectors but very large and varied service sectors. 
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The Minister of Lands, when asked why he had cited Singapore as a model, answered that it 
was due to 'the service sector, the financial sector, the communications sector, being the hub 
of transport and communications...because when you look at Singapore...the focus is on the 
service sector' (KG6).
	
 In short, Kenyan elites draw notions of progress and catching-up from East Asia, but 
their learning does not extend to the direct desire to undertake the kind of structural 
transformation that would initially focus primarily on agricultural development.  Kenyan 
decision-makers believe that emulation of East Asia (countries 'further' than themselves 
along the path of development) could act as a 'stepping stone' to get them there.  However, 
even Vision 2030—that document in which emulating technocrats have the greatest influence
—addresses the development of all three sectors concurrently.  As one businessman puts it, 
'You also have to rank them – what is the prerequisite for the other?  What comes first...I'm 
not sure I've seen the prioritisation [in Vision 2030].  I'm not so sure it says what should 
come first.  It touches everything, but...it's got to be sequenced' (KN15).
	
 As regards the lessons East Asia holds for sequenced structural transformation of the 
economy, elites from Ethiopia exhibited less ambivalence.  In Ethiopia, China and South 
Korea's focus on rural development and agriculture was the second-most frequently-cited 
lesson by interviewees (after the importance of state intervention in the economy).  Elites, 
particularly those in government, view the East Asian experience as a clear exemplar for the 
EPRDF's own flagship policy of ‘agricultural development-led industrialisation (ADLI) 
(MoFED 1993: 8).  ADLI centres around the concept of phased development, beginning with 
efforts to improve agricultural productivity and only later focusing on industrialisation. 
Investment first in new technology, then in rural infrastructure and finally in irrigation will, 
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the thinking goes, increase agricultural yields, which will in turn create labour for, inputs into 
and demand from the non-agricultural sector (Dercon and Zeitlin 2009: 4).  It is only after 
sustained agricultural growth—and a gradual natural decline in the size and importance of 
the agricultural industry—that Ethiopia will have accumulated enough capital to shift to a 
strategy of industrialisation.	
     
The EPRDF has held to this policy of ADLI since at least 1993, and it seems from 
interviews that the agricultural development of certain East Asian countries embodied many 
cadres’ earliest interest in and emulation of the region.  In the words of one senior EPRDF 
member, 'these nations have devised agricultural-led development.  This is another most 
important, essential feature and the common denominator which you can get from these 
nations' (EG12).   	
   
	
 As with the other lessons cited above, this aspect of emulation is also reflected in 
official government discourse.  One example is the extensive and very high-level programme 
of dialogue between the Japan International Cooperation Agency and the top EPDRF 
leadership, created at the request of Meles Zenawi with the express purpose of learning from 
East Asian experiences of industrial development (GDF 2010).  Many of the written outputs 
from the seven forums held by the time of writing have focused on lesson-drawing in the 
areas of agriculture, rural development and structural transformation (GRIPS 2011: 107-142; 
Ohno 2009).  Government economic plans express a particular interest in eventually using 
surplus agricultural labour, technology and products to eventually transition to 
industrialisation (MoFED 2006: 151).
	
 African Development (2006), Revolutionary Democracy (2006) and other documents 
then expressly link these ideas to the experiences of Taiwan and South Korea.  The EPRDF's 
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'Ten Year Road Map' for agriculture defines development as 'a process of transforming an 
economy from largely agricultural to largely service and manufacturing', and calls Taiwan 
the 'poster child' for this process (Demese et al 2010: 147).  Similarly, a Japanese advisor to 
the Ethiopian government, writing about ADLI, holds that 'the paradigmatic shift which 
Ethiopia envisages is largely inconsistent with the traditional political and economic 
conditionalities of the Western donors' and 'shares more commonalities with the traditional 
development strategies in East Asia' (Ohno 2009: 4).  Indeed, so out-of-fashion is the 
structural approach with global financial institutions and donors that the hundreds of country 
indicators tracked by the World Bank do not include the proportion of a country's workforce 
employed by or the GDP contributed by each sector (World Bank 2012).   
	
 Although the EPRDF's desire to focus on smallholder agriculture and food security is 
clearly inspired by prominent East Asian examples, recent changes in agricultural policy 
illustrate the tensions between lesson-drawing and other determinants of policy.  Ethiopia's 
emphasis on rural empowerment, peasant mobilisation and food security has been one of the 
primary justifications for the retention of the current system of land tenure, whereby all land 
remains the property of the government, which leases it primarily to smallholders.  Not 
surprisingly, ADLI has been a central point of contention with donors and domestic civil 
society, who have criticised it for its technological optimism, neglect of the service and 
industrial sectors (Halderman 2004: 18) and especially for its reliance on a land tenure 
system that critics feel discourages farmer investment in land improvement (CRDA 2004: 
19-20).  At the same time, the rise of potential investors in Ethiopian agriculture, particularly 
India and Saudi Arabia, has created a lucrative incentive to depart from the smallholder 
model.  
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 For this reason, Ethiopia's long-term development plans in the 21st century have 
begun to depart from the government's previous strict adherence to ADLI.  PASDEP added 
an 'emphasis on greater commercialization of agriculture and enhancing private sector 
development, industry [and] urban development' (MoFED 2006: 1); the GTP (MoFED 
2010b) has further emphasised large scale farming and industrial expansion.  Ethiopia has 
offered over three million hectares of fertile land to foreign investors, often at very cheap 
prices (Vidal 2011).  This move towards large-scale commercial farms and cash crops signals 
a real (and highly controversial) change of direction, and partially detracts from Ethiopia's 
emulation of East Asia.  The vehemence with which many EPRDF interviewees defended 
East Asian-inspired ADLI illustrates a tension between two models that, in all likelihood, 
extends to the heart of the EPRDF leadership.  
	
 Regardless of which model eventually predominates, Ethiopia's development strategy 
remains centred around agricultural policy, which the government claims 'will still be 
playing the leading role' in growth (MOFED 2010a: 18).  Creating industrial growth from 
agricultural inputs remains a prominent goal, also, while a focus on the services sector is 
seen as highly premature.  Elites continue to cite East Asia as an example of the successful 
allocation of resources to programmes aimed at rural development and agricultural 
productivity, as well of the need for the intensive use of technology in order to achieve this. 
Much sectoral learning is also taking place in this regard:  elites reported emulating specific 
aspects of agricultural extension programmes, land use and agricultural technology.  
Most importantly, however, East Asia remains a major contributing factor to elites' 
perceptions that most countries go through similar stages of development—albeit at their 
own pace and time in history—and that careful prioritisation is needed in order to ensure 
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adherence to these stages.  One respondent, describing China's transition to an industrial 
economy, put it thus: 'We are 20 years behind China, and we're trying to do what they did to 
get where they are.  Maybe 20 years from now, we'll be following where China is [then], and 
so on!' (EG17).  On the matter of prioritisation, a senior representative of the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry acknowledged that the selection of priority industries is 'based on the 
experience of the East Asian countries' (EG11).  
As Alden and Large point out, there exists an interesting contradiction between the 
dual constructions of China as (on the one hand) a successful moderniser and (on the other 
hand) as a fellow developing country that understands African challenges in a way that 
developed countries cannot:  ‘it is hard...for Beijing to convincingly maintain that China is a 
developing country with lingering and pervasive poverty if African delegations are taken 
only to such places as the glimmering vision of modernity that is contemporary 
Shanghai’ (Alden and Large 2001: 32).  Although this divide may one day be stretched to the 
point of untenability, one way in which Ethiopian elites currently reconcile it is by 
emphasising the sequential nature of this modernity.  China’s present achievements may 
seem breathtakingly remote from its past, but are in fact, according to this reading, linked by 
a chain of agricultural and industrial achievements that can be replicated in Africa.  A 
gradualist, step-by-step development trajectory underpinned by agricultural and rural 
development is thus one of the main lessons the EPRDF takes from East Asia, even if other 
policy inputs compete with lesson-drawing in practice.
	
 If there is a clear but imperfect overlap between the East Asian Model and Ethiopia's 
own agricultural policy, this is also the one area of lesson-drawing where modernisation 
theory is only partially relevant.  On the one hand, both modernisation theory and other 
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agricultural-led development models view the replacement of agriculture with industry as 
both the natural endpoint and the goal of development.  Kuznet's (1966) dualist theory of 
'modern economic growth' is the best-known example of this, but Rostow (1990 [1960]: 24), 
Johnston and Mellor (1961) and many others viewed structural transformation away from 
agriculture to industry as an essential precondition of development.  Industrialisation was 
therefore viewed as both desirable and unavoidable, if living standards are to rise.  A 
revolution in agricultural methods was also seen as indispensible:  for Rostow (1956: 42), ‘a 
requirement for take-off is, therefore, a class of farmers willing and able to respond to the 
possibilities opened up for them by new techniques, land- holding arrangements, transport 
facilities, and forms of market and credit organisation’.
On the other hand, modernisation theory more often targeted industry directly, 
usually prioritising industrial development at the expense of agriculture and seeing 
development more as a case of industrial 'demand' than of agricultural 'supply'.  Brohman's 
(1996: 19) paraphrasing of this position is illuminating: 
The traditional sector is non-dynamic; it does not represent a source of development, but is 
merely a reservoir from which the modern sector can extract labour and other resources. 
Basically, the modern sector acts as a 'pole of development' from which various socio-
cultural and economic elements radiate.  
In sum, it is in the area of agricultural policy where some of the greatest divergences between 
the case studies and development models arise, although it is also an arena where much 
learning takes place.  Kenya's service-heavy economy precludes the sequencing of its three 
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constituent sectors, leading its elites to draw limited and often contradictory lessons from 
East Asia on this issue.  Ethiopia, by contrast, draws heavily on China, Taiwan and other 
countries that have prioritised agricultural growth before turning to industry and services. 
Although this move can be said to constitute modernisation in the sense that it is undertaken 
for the purposes of subsequent industrial development, its immediate focus on the rural 
sector distinguishes it from those modernisation theorists, such as Levy (1966: 11), who 
treated modernisation and industrialisation as synonymous.  Ethiopia's emulation of East 
Asian sectoral sequencing also competes with other factors which militate for a more 
commercial approach to agriculture.  
7.3  The Importance of 'Catch-Up' Economic Growth
If development, according to emulating elites, is a process of phased, self-propelled 
structural transformation from agriculture to industry, the question remains as to how this 
transformation is to be achieved.  Four themes, in particular, emerged to answer this 
question.  Each was heavily associated, by elites, with the East Asian region, but each also 
shared much with the modernisation paradigm.
	
 The first of these key 'ingredients' was rapid economic growth.  Earlier chapters have 
discussed the central role that rapid economic growth has played in both modernisation 
theory and the literature on the Chinese Model.  Other development paradigms, particularly 
the early Washington Consensus, have placed a similar level of emphasis on this aspect of 
development.  Williamson's (1990) original 10 principles all had this overarching aim, for 
example.  However, the moral critiques that have been incorporated into the Augmented 
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Washington Consensus over the past decade have largely focused on narrowing the 
perceived gap between countries' economic performance and their social development (Gore 
2000: 796).  International donor discourse has thus shifted towards an emphasis on 
sustainability, participation, decentralisation and inclusiveness, and current donor practice is 
wary of an overly growth-oriented approach to development. Dependency theorists, too, 
were primarily critical of that they saw as an unwarranted belief that a rise in GDP would 
lead to a concurrent improvement in the well-being of the poor.  
	
 One of the most frequent observations of both Ethiopian and Kenyan lesson-drawers 
concerned the importance and the possibility of achieving the level of sustained, double-digit 
economic growth that East Asian countries had exhibited:
They have grown rapidly and they are still growing rapidly, and that should motivate us.  If 
Asia is able to do it, we should be able to do it (EG13)
When NARC [the National Rainbow Coalition] won the election in 2002, I was Minister of 
Planning and National Development.  We more or less did what the Singaporeans and 
Malaysians did.  We sat down and we said 'look at where we are today.  How do we bring 
economic recovery? What are some of the things we must do to have economic recovery? 
And that is what led to the ERS – the key elements of it' (KG4).  
It was not only the presence of rapid growth in these countries which impressed 
interviewees, but its sheer speed: several interviewees remarked that their countries could not 
afford to take several hundred years to develop, as the West had done. 'The pace at which the 
West developed and the East Asian countries developed is different.  Theirs is faster.  So 
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we're adapting a faster model', said one (EG11).  Development was seen as a process of 
'catching up' (KG10) and 'leapfrogging' (EG20).  As 'latecomers' to an unavoidable and 
universal process, Ethiopia and Kenya could achieve this by aiming for double-digit growth. 
This is again reminiscent of Ozawa's 'catch-up growth', which was first applied to Japan and 
later to the Asian Tigers and China (Crafts 2004: 53).  It has since, it appears, become a 
central plank of the thinking of Ethiopian and Kenyan emulators.  As one Kenyan 
policymaker phrased it, 'when you are at the back, you have to put additional effort to get to 
the front of the pack.  So we have to grow rapidly to be able to get there.' (KG9). 
	
 Outside of elite discourses, the need for double-digit growth also manifests itself in 
both countries' ambitious short- and medium-term development plans.  In Ethiopia, PASDEP 
made 'a massive push to accelerate growth' the second of its central pillars, and aimed to 
achieve an annual average of 7 to 10% growth in real GDP from 2006 to 2010 (MoFED 
2006: 165, 63).  The lowest of these numbers is explicitly said to come directly from 'the best 
experiences of eastern and southern Asian countries that have registered accelerated 
growth' (MoFED 2006: 165).  Its even more optimistic successor, the GTP, aimed to double 
the country's GDP from 2010 to 2015 (MoFED 2010b)43.  Kenya's foremost economic goal, 
similarly, has been to 'maintain a sustained economic growth of 10% per annum over the 
next 25 years' (Kenya 2007a: 2).  
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43  Interestingly,  Amharic-language documents and unofficial English translations (such as that cited above) 
quote these figures, which were also widely reported in the media with the launch of the GTP.  However, the 
official English-language document for presentation to donors (MoFED 2010a) omits explicit mention of these 
aims, perhaps due to earlier criticism by IMF officials and others that the original figures were 'a bit 
inflated' (quoted in Kirubel 2010).  
	
 Decision-makers also view attainment of 'middle-income status' as a particular 
milestone in a country's coming of age.  Vision 2030 aims to 'transform Kenya into a rapidly 
industrialising, middle-income country' by 2030 (Kenya 2007a: 1); a Kenyan economic 
planner told me that the standards of living in Malaysia, Thailand and certain Latin American 
countries—rather than formal per capita income figures—had acted as yardsticks during 
formulation of this goal.  Despite Ethiopia's vastly different economic background, its plan to 
reach 'middle-income status' by 2025 (MoFED 2010b) is strikingly similar.  Once again, 
several interviewees made a clear link between this aim and the East Asian development 
experience; one stated that 'Ethiopia has a vision: within 20 to 25 years, her citizens will 
become middle-income.  Like China and the Five Tigers' visions.  So she is going to be 
there' (EG17).  
	
 The tensions between wealth creation, redistribution and poverty alleviation have run 
through over half a century of development debates, and these same tensions can be seen in 
the discourses of Ethiopian and Kenyan elites.  Although both groups emphasised all three 
aspects of economic development, subtle differences illustrated the influence of the East 
Asian example.  In each country, those who cited East Asia as a central model were more 
likely than their peers to accord paramount importance to growth, often arguing that wealth 
creation would lead to other desirable economic outcomes.  Although these elites were 
careful to emphasise the importance of ensuring that this wealth was sustainable and 
equitably distributed, many were also candid about their prioritisation of growth over direct 
poverty reduction.  In contrast, those who disapproved of emulation of these countries were 
more likely, also, to criticise what they saw as a narrow focus on growth alone.  
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 In Kenya, the same top-level planner who drew direct parallels between East Asia's 
growth strategy and his own country's ERS, above, condemns the current 'pro-poor ideology' 
as 'very bankrupt' and describes the motivations of the drafters of ERS as follows:  'We 
needed a paradigm shift from PRSP [poverty reduction strategy papers] to economic 
recovery. The aim of the Kenyan government was not to reduce poverty but to create wealth 
and employment’ (Anyang’Nyongo 2005).  Another policymaker echoes this perspective, 
arguing that 'the leadership of the country decided that it wanted an economic strategy for 
wealth creation and employment generation', and that it wanted to move away 'from the 
traditional approach of doing poverty reduction strategies' (KG8).  A business leader cites 
China directly as a lesson in 'never forget[ting] that we should not let the cost of wages affect 
investment and growth' (KN20).  
	
 It might be expected that opponents of the Kenyan government would view 
policymakers as continually preoccupied with wealth creation; for this reason, it is all the 
more significant that one of the government's fiercest critics views this as a relatively recent 
trend.  When asked whether modernisation informed the thinking of Kenyan leadership, this 
respondent answered 'I guess it has come back in a different sense – really now the focus is 
on growth and the idea that growth will trickle down'.  Although members of this leadership 
were generally loath to use the still-maligned term 'trickle-down', their continual expressions 
of admiration for the rapid economic growth experienced by Singapore, Malaysia and others 
in East Asia, as well as the focus accorded to wealth creation in their spoken and written 
discourse, indicate their clear commitment to this overall approach.
	
 In Ethiopia, also, emulating elites felt rapid GDP growth to be the sine qua non of 
development, with many viewing the two concepts as virtually synonymous.  Rapid 
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economic growth had not merely put more capital at the disposal of East Asian governments, 
but ensured that these governments disposed of the policy space and sovereignty to 
implement the development policies of their choosing (EG13).  Even elites who claimed to 
eschew East Asian authoritarianism emphasised the region's role as an economic model:
The model is incorporated into our policy because...especially, their growth is very fast. 
Since our country is very poor, we have to develop our economy, to improve the living 
standards of the people.  How they improved their economy—we have to take that model 
(EG7).  
Although Ethiopian policymakers were even more sensitive than their Kenyan counterparts 
to the suggestion that they were privileging macro-economic issues over social justice, this 
social justice was viewed as impossible without 'catch-up' growth.  In the words of one 
senior policy-maker, 'without rapid economic growth, what will we distribute?  Of course, 
things like equality are important, but the size of the cake must expand...We give first priority 
to growth' (EG20).  According to another, 
Twenty years ago, I was of the opinion that we were going to build a system whereby priority 
is given to distribution, and we were more inclined to see distribution as justice taking place. 
Over time, we came to the conclusion that the first thing was to ensure rapid economic 
development (EG14). 
If the example of East Asia is inspiring Ethiopian and Kenyan governmental elites to place 
double-digit growth at the forefront of their national development strategy, this would 
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certainly be consistent with much of the literature on the East Asian Model and the Beijing 
Consensus.  The East Asian Model puts economic growth and the fulfilment of the material 
needs of the majority at the heart of government policy (Gore 2000: 796), often becoming 
the main source of governmental legitimacy (Peerenboom 2002: 245; Wade 1990: 246).  In 
Suharto's Indonesia, for example, economic recovery and 'material expansion...became an 
ideology in the strongest sense of the term, describing the purpose of political activity, the 
methods used to achieve that goal, the attitudes which public figures should express, as well 
as serving as an effective ideological weapon against opponents of the regime or proponents 
of alternative visions' (Chalmers 1997: 3).  The emphasis is on productivity and 
competitiveness rather than on welfare, provided that trickle-down alleviates the most severe 
manifestations of social inequality (Wong 2004: 351).  In addition, other nations are 
consciously used as ‘reference economies’ which bureaucrats can emulate and use to 
measure their progress (Johnson 1982: 24).  The strong parallels between Kenya's, Ethiopia's 
and East Asia's drives for economic growth are thus rooted, at least partially, in processes of 
emulation.
7.4  Scientific and Technological Optimism
A further key lesson that Ethiopian and Kenyan elites drew from East Asian models was an 
emphasis on the roles of science and technology in development.  This manifested itself both 
in specific policies that sought to increase what Avila and Evenson (2009: 3779) call national 
'technological capital', and in the broader belief that scientific and technological 
advancement could solve society's most pressing problems.  
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 The importance that Ethiopian and Kenyan elites attach to scientific progress can 
hardly be overestimated:
There is no other worthwhile knowledge (EN8).
The basis of a country's development is the use of technology.  We can talk of the best 
economic theories in the world, but if you are not able to have technological development, I 
don't think you will be able to achieve it.  That's the basis of development, and that is where 
you start (KG13). 
Good governance and education are strong candidates, but for me the single most versatile 
solution to Africa’s development challenges...is science (Alemayehu 2009).
East Asia was not the only region from which Ethiopian and Kenyan elites drew this lesson. 
Ethiopia's Minister of Science cited attraction to the German model as one of his ministry's 
key reasons for increasing the prioritisation of technical education in Ethiopia (EG15). 
However, East Asian countries were most frequently referred to overall. 'To me', responded 
one Kenyan interviewee, 'those still remain the ultimate case studies in terms of 
benchmarking how you can infuse technological aspects into development' (KN15).    An 
Ethiopian respondent felt 'Korea should be emulated' because it had 'invested a lot in science 
education, as opposed to the humanities – engineering, pure science' (EG24).  According to 
Meles Zenawi himself, 'Taiwan and Korea are without doubt the most successful of all 
developing countries' in large part because 'they have had the most rapid and sustained 
accumulation of technological capability' (Meles 2007).  Even the aforementioned science 
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minister frequently paired his expressions of admiration for German science policy with 
expressions of the desire to emulate South Korea's successful adoption of the German 
example:
If Ethiopia does not learn from Germany like Korea did, like Taiwan did, then Ethiopia will 
not survive.  So in about 15 years from now, by 2025, if Ethiopia does not export its own 
technology, then Ethiopia will not survive (EG15).
In science and technology, I think 80% of what we learn comes from Germany and from 
Korea (EG15).  
The economy requires more technical knowledge than those unproductive people who just 
study certain things....the mentality was very bad.  People don't want to get their hands dirty 
and do things and create things...so that mentality has to change.  That is one of the things we 
learned from Germany.  And not only us, Korea also learned from Germany (EG15).
The final quote illustrates an important facet of this aspect of learning.  The emphasis that 
leaders placed on science and technology—and particularly on incorporating it into the 
educational system—did not consist solely of the usual assurances that this was one priority 
among many.  After all, few governments today, or even in the past, would deny the 
importance of scientific innovation.  Elites were actually willing, however, to argue for the 
replacement of other, arguably equally important priorities with a focus on science, and to re-
engineer an entire culture to centre on the single-minded pursuit of innovation.  In 2010, 
Kenya's then-Minister of Higher Education William Ruto announced tentative plans to halt 
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government funding of those university subjects deemed 'irrelevant' to the realisation of 
Vision 2030 (quoted in Muindi 2010).  Although Ruto did not specify the subjects he was 
referring to, these were widely regarded as comprising scientific and technical subjects such 
as agriculture, construction, architecture, engineering, medicine and information technology 
and excluding subjects such as on anthropology, philosophy, history, archaeology and the arts 
(Wanyama 2010; Muindi 2010).  Such changes are already well on the way in Ethiopia. 
Ethiopia's Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) programme is one of the 
continent's most ambitious; it envisions a tertiary education system where 70% of graduates 
originate from scientific fields (EG15), and aims to build a number of dedicated Universities 
of Science and Technology over the course of a decade (Ohno et al 2009: 8).  
	
 Aside from the lesson that technical, technological and scientific training should 
replace other forms of education where at all possible, other concrete expressions of this 
theme have emerged.  One is an emphasis on the use of technology in increasing crop yields 
and driving agricultural growth.  The central argument of the influential A New Harvest 
(Juma 2011), written by a Kenyan academic, is that African countries should learn from East 
Asia—and especially from China—the importance of the application of science and 
technology with a view to increasing agricultural productivity.  
	
 Signs abound that a more technologically-intensive approach to agriculture is taking 
hold in both countries under consideration.  In 2010, Kenya passed the Biosafety Act, 
allowing the commercial cultivation of genetically-modified crops.  The mechanisation of 
agriculture is one of the most strenuously-emphasised priorities in Ethiopian agriculture, and 
the justification used to underpin Ethiopia's controversial plans to lease agricultural land to 
foreign investors (Berhanu 2011).  The Kenyan government has also launched an ambitious 
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irrigation programme aimed at moving from rain-fed agriculture towards intensive irrigation 
in Kenya's arid and semi-arid areas; it aimed to triple agricultural output through irrigation 
from 2010 to 2020 (Kenya 2010a: 54).  
	
 Donors and NGOs have watched these developments with some trepidation; although 
Ethiopia's move towards cash crops corresponds with the recommendations of the World 
Bank and other Western institutions, some have also expressed reservations at what they 
view as an overweening faith in scientific progress.  In the words of the Augmented 
Washington Consensus, 'this kind of emphasis on biotech and science as the way forward in 
Africa lacks understanding of how development is largely a political process and crucially 
depends on the effectiveness of institutions' (Bunting 2010).  Kenyan and Ethiopian 
advocates of biotechnology have, in turn, accused Western critics of 'arrogance' and 
'hypocrisy' (e.g. Mboyi quoted in Derbyshire 2011: 23). 
	
   As with the lessons surrounding TVET, not all moves towards technologically-
intensive agriculture are drawn from East Asia.  Israel and the United Arab Emirates, for 
example, were cited in Kenya as sources for the technology that would enable the country to 
farm or develop arid land (KN10, KN3).  Once again, however, this was one of the lessons 
most often cited by elites wishing to emulate East Asia; as a corollary, East Asian countries 
remained among the most-mentioned in the realm of agricultural technology.  
	
 This chapter has analysed the influence of countries such as Taiwan, South Korea and 
China on Ethiopian and Kenyan approaches to development, arguing that these countries 
often present models of agriculturally-led structural transformation.  This discussion 
dovetails with the role that science and technology plays in agriculture, as much of Ethiopia's 
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official discourse, in particular, makes clear.  According to the 'Ten Year Road Map' of 
Ethiopia's Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development:
Taiwan is the clearest example of a country that reduced [the] cost of production in 
agriculture through research-base technological change and used that success to accelerate 
growth in the non-agricultural sector...For Ethiopia, Taiwan illustrates how successful the 
ADLI strategy can be (Demese et al 2010).
There are also signs that emulation in the realm of science and technology is aided by 
growing practical cross-national linkages between Asian countries and the African cases 
under consideration here.  The development and implementation of Ethiopia's TVET and 
Agricultural Technical and Vocational Education Training (ATVET) programmes has had 
substantial input from Chinese technical experts; the former brought 190 Chinese trainers to 
Ethiopia from 2001-2011, while the latter saw the influx of 290 trainers in a comparable time 
frame (King 2011: 101).  While King (2011: 101) points out that many Western countries 
such as Germany play a larger role in advising Ethiopian ministries and universities, he also 
notes that the level of China's assistance in the specific realm of TVET is virtually 
unparalleled 'at a time when many Western donors have moved away from reliance on 
technical experts'.
	
 For their part, Kenyan elites cite their membership of the Commonwealth Partnership 
for Technology Development as an important forum for lesson-drawing in this sector of 
science and technology.  The forum, which aims 'to become a leading agent of change in 
harnessing technology for growth and wealth creation' (CPTM 2012), is chaired by its 
founder, Mahathir's erstwhile science advisor.  
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 The use of science and technology to fuel rapid economic growth, nation-building 
and structural transformation is, therefore, a central priority for both Kenyan and Ethiopian 
elites;  those outside examples that contribute to this emphasis are most likely to be East 
Asian countries (although they are not exclusively from this region).  
	
 This emphasis also shares much, however, with modernisation theory.  A belief that 
technology transfer and the intensive use of science would lead to progress in all arenas of 
society was so central to the theory that modernisation itself has been viewed as virtually 
impossible without a corresponding increase in man's technological control over nature 
(Black 1966: 10-11; Levy 1966: 11; Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 30).  The discourse of 
Ethiopia and Kenya's emulating elites is thus not far removed from the theory's view that 'the 
progress of the country rests on rational technology, and ultimately on scientific 
knowledge' (Shils quoted in Gilman 2007: 2).
	
   
7.5  The Return of Physical Infrastructure
The fifth key lesson that Kenyan and Ethiopian lesson-drawers take from East Asia centres 
around the immense priority currently accorded to the improvement of physical 
infrastructure in these African countries.  As is the case with science and technology, it is 
virtually impossible to overplay the enthusiasm with which elites approach this policy area. 
At a 2010 infrastructure conference convened by the Ministry of Roads and attended by 
nearly every high-profile decision-maker in the Kenyan executive, Prime Minister Raila 
Odinga proclaimed that 'our priorities are: first, infrastructure; second, infrastructure; and 
third, infrastructure' (Odinga 2010).  The budget of the Kenyan Ministry of Roads had 
already increased five-fold from 2003 to 2010 (KG14).  Similarly, Ethiopia's 
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unprecedentedly large 2011 development budget was devoted primarily to road construction 
and electrification; the roads sector alone was due to receive over a third of total government 
expenditure on development (Maasho 2011).  Key EPRDF and government documents 
exhibit an intense desire to prioritise infrastructure, particularly in rural areas (MoFED 
2010a; MoFED 2006).
	
 Elites' increased emphasis on the improvement of energy, transportation and other 
infrastructure networks does not occur in a vacuum:  in each country, investment in 
infrastructure was viewed as one of the key means by which East Asia had prospered. 
Unlike with the other lessons analysed in this chapter, China was indisputably the primary 
exemplar in the region—although it was not the sole exemplar.  This was the case even in 
Kenya, where smaller, more familiar countries were usually preferred as models.  In the 
realm of infrastructure, however, China was the foremost example for both countries:
China is a huge country, with a huge population...However, they do their roads very well.  We 
can learn a thing or two from them (KG3).  
Without infrastructure you can do nothing.  They just gave priority to infrastructural 
development (EG23).
I also saw fast growth – they concentrated on the development of basic infrastructure, which 
is a prerequisite for development (EG22). 
The central role that China occupied as a model of infrastructural development is due to 
another anomaly in this area of learning:  more than any other, this was a policy sector in 
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which elites preferred not to differentiate between international development cooperation, 
foreign investment and lesson-drawing.  China is the external actor most directly involved in 
road construction in both Ethiopia and Kenya; conversely, road construction is one of the 
areas in which China is most involved in the cases under consideration.  There is evidence 
that the visibility of Chinese construction—exemplified both by the presence of Chinese 
labourers and the rapid appearance of new roads funded or built by China—directly 
contributes towards lesson-drawing.  One newspaper editor saw it in this way:  
There is something to see.  Here the American Embassy is trying to give 50 000 books for the 
Kennedy Library, but these [Chinese] guys are coming and building roads.  You can see it. 
And in Africa, where there is not literacy, which is not an educated society, where there is a 
90% rural population, where nobody analyzes, the issue is 'don't tell me, show me'.  What 
you see [with Chinese aid] is a road, what you see [with American aid] is a book (EN6).   
Decision-makers drew from China, as well as from the rest of the region, the lesson that 
infrastructural development was not only important, but also that it was actually possible. 
This recognition may initially appear self-evident.  However, such an assumption would 
underestimate the deleterious impact of longstanding donor conditionalities, corruption and 
local neglect on Ethiopia and Kenya's infrastructural networks.  To elites (and, presumably, 
ordinary citizens) accustomed to viewing highways, dams and high-speed trains as 
unattainable luxuries found only in a handful of the most developed countries, East Asia's 
domestic infrastructure and current Chinese-led projects on their own soil are both sobering 
illustrations of their own countries' tardiness.  This was particularly true in Kenya:  one 
respondent viewed China as having 'demystified' infrastructure (KG1), and another pointed 
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out that 'in Thailand they have roads like in the US, so why not us?' (KG10).  According to a 
Kenyan bureaucrat, the use of Chinese labour has alerted Kenyans to the fact that 'the actual 
cost of construction is actually quite low.  And you wonder what was happening 
before?' (KN5).  
	
 In both country cases, there is an element of what Baruah (2008: 62), in reference to 
China, calls 'developmental monumentalism'.  Countries engaging in developmental 
monumentalism undertake the construction of infrastructure for symbolic as well as for more 
practical reasons.  To the Kenyan Minister of Roads (KG14), then, Kenya focuses on road 
construction as much for the 'feel good factor' as for transportation:  'It's like walking with a 
torn dress – if you find everybody walking with a torn dress, here in the streets, you go back 
and the image you have of Kenya is that people are very poor, they can't dress, they can't eat', 
he says.  'When you arrive at an airport, that's your first image, then you drive from the 
airport to a hotel—how does the road look?' (KG14).  In 2011, construction began in 
Ethiopia on the tenth-largest hydro-electric power plant in the world.   In a gesture laden with 
symbolism, Ethiopia has vowed to raise the substantial cost domestically through bonds 
rather than through foreign assistance.  Ministers voted to name it 'The Grand Ethiopian 
Renaissance Dam', expressing clearly their hopes that the dam would herald Ethiopia's long-
awaited return to international prominence.  Developmental monumentalism is, as Baruah 
(2008: 62) notes, 'a way for a country to announce to the world:  we have arrived, we are 
modern'.
	
 Dams are, in fact, a particularly potent symbol of modernity even among other 
infrastructural accomplishments.  Highly-visible, large-scale attempts to harness technology 
and mobilise natural resources, they bring about industrialisation and control over the natural 
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environment, but have high social costs, at least initially.  As such, national discourses on the 
building of dams are illustrative of broader prevailing attitudes towards modernisation.  
	
 Ethiopia's second-largest dam, Gibe III, has provoked vociferous criticism from 
Western INGOs that claim that it will disrupt the livelihood of up to one million rural 
Ethiopians and that accuse the EPRDF of 'eco-genocide' (Sharife 2010).  The project was 
planned and executed very rapidly; a no-bid contract was awarded to Italian firm Salini 
Costruttori before funding or impact assessments had been carried out, leading the World 
Bank and other donors to decline involvement in the project (Greste 2009).  For its part, the 
Ethiopian government holds that the dam is necessary in order to more than double 
Ethiopia's power generation capacity;  Meles Zenawi (quoted in Moszynski 2011) accuses 
Western opponents of Ethiopia's Gibe III dam of wanting Ethiopians to remain 'undeveloped 
and backward to serve their tourists as a museum', and points to the West's own history of 
large-scale infrastructural development.  Gibe III and the 'Ethiopian Renaissance Dam' are 
only two of six large dams under construction in Ethiopia as of 2011, and Meles' discourse 
pales in comparison to that contained in an article that appeared on the EPRDF-owned Walta 
Information Center news website in 2010.44  Opponents, it held, 
...want to preserve the tribal life styles of the Omotic and Turkana peoples intact and free 
from the threat of economic development. Secondly, they want to keep the whole...area for 
the local tribes only to be accessed by white tourists and photographers taking pictures of 
half naked African tribes for the consumption of their weird TV programmes under the 
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44 Walta Information Centre is officially a private entity, but is owned by the Mega Corporation, which is itself 
owned by the EPRDF (Stanbridge and Ljunggren 2003: 85) and headed by the wife of Meles Zenawi.
pretext of anthropological studies. In other wards [sic] they want to keep these Ethiopian 
tribes completely shielded from civilization and economic development...They worry that it 
will transformed [sic] the environmental area beyond recognition, instantly changing it from 
an area of backwardness to an area of modernity and development...This amount of 
additional electrical energy will enable Ethiopia to erect heavy industrial plants such as steel 
mills and iron smelting factories, enabling it to become an industrial giant of East Africa 
(Shumay 2010).
Kenya possesses its own controversial dam project, the proposed Magwagwa Multipurpose 
Dam to be built by Chinese corporation Sinohydro.  Although the size and impact of the dam 
will be considerably smaller than Ethiopia's mega-dams, it will still involve the relocation of 
over 1000 families (Cherono 2010).  
	
 Such debates are reminiscent of two dams that have become icons of modernisation: 
one is China's Three Gorges Dam, the construction of which necessitated the relocated of an 
estimated 1.3 million rural residents from its inception in 1994 until its completion in 2012 
(Reuters 2012).  The other is the United States' Hoover Dam, constructed during the interwar 
period by labourers working under notoriously dangerous and difficult conditions (Steinberg 
1993: 404) and still occupying a place in the historical imagination as the preeminent symbol 
of the New Deal era's desire to grant humanity control over nature in the service of progress 
and prosperity (Steinberg 1993: 402).
	
 It is thus apt that Ethiopian and Kenyan elites look primarily to China as a model of 
infrastructure, and that the resulting policies and discourses resemble those of the United 
States during the early 20th century.  Modernisation theory, which essentially sought to 
universalise the United States' own early processes of industrialisation, placed a central 
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emphasis on physical infrastructure.  As Graham and Marvin (2001: 84) describe it, 'the 
assertion of an embryonic national identity in the form of airports, four-lane highways and 
power stations...would sweep away the divisions of colonialism and the barriers of 
traditionalism'.  The government was often held to occupy a central role in the planning and 
execution of the ‘big push’ that such initiatives—and the broader programmes of 
industrialisation and modernisation of which they were a central part—necessarily entailed 
(Rosenstein-Rodan 1957).
	
 Although the neo-Marxist paradigm of the 1970s began by placing considerable 
emphasis on the mobilisation of resources, it also marked the beginning of an era in which 
the provision of 'basic needs' was seen as more important than a focus on grand 
infrastructural projects (Gilman 2003: 70).  Infrastructure became even more marginal with 
the Washington Consensus:  although it was rare for donors to explicitly dismiss its 
importance, other priorities firmly supplanted it.  Whereas the 'hardware' of development 
(capital, technology and infrastructure) had been important in the 1950s and 1960s, now the 
'software' of development (institutions, management processes, human capital) began to be 
emphasised (Pieterse 2009: 189).  The result was a sharp reduction in funding for physical 
infrastructure across Africa, and an increase in spending on the social sector (Ndulu and 
Chakraborti 2007: 159).  In some cases, the new priorities did not merely replace 
infrastructural goals, but actively weakened their influence.  Most notably, widespread 
privatisation saw many public utilities leave the hands of the government, decentralising 
development activities and making ambitious projects difficult to finance.
	
 The discourse of my Ethiopian interviewees echoed this final point, with emulating 
elites tying a perceived need for greater attention to infrastructure with an argument for 
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government control over the process.  One of the central planks of EPRDF policy is the 
argument that investment in rural roads and electrification is essential but initially 
uncompetitive on the open market; only a developmental state possesses, therefore, the 
means with which to achieve this goal (Meles 2006).  According to one Ethiopian 
interviewee, for example, 'the government is investing very heavily in infrastructure, which 
China did and is still doing.  So I think the [Ethiopian] model of development is very close to 
that of China' (EN12).  An EPRDF training manual makes the same point in reference to 
policies enacted by South Korea and Taiwan during their 'developmental' phases (EPRDF 
2006).  	

	
 A focus on physical infrastructure—particularly in the areas of energy and transport
—is therefore back on the agenda in both Kenya and Ethiopia, after several decades of 
relative neglect.  China is a particularly influential model in this area, due in no small part to 
its direct involvement in the construction sectors of these countries.  The example of East 
Asia demonstrates to elites not only the benefits, but also the sheer possibility of a rapid 
improvement in physical infrastructure; elites therefore see infrastructural development as a 
symbolic as well as a practical boon.  In addition, Ethiopian elites cite the East Asian 
example as evidence of the need for strong state involvement in this area. 
7.6  The Need for Cultural Transformation
The East Asian Model is prompting Kenyan and Ethiopian emulators to view development as 
a process that happens endogenously and in stages, in which 'catching up' with developed 
nations is important, as long as pace and policy are set by national leaders.  They view 
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technology, rapid economic growth and large, ambitious infrastructural projects as essential 
elements of this process.  In addition, Ethiopian policy-makers draw lessons from China, 
South Korea and Taiwan on the importance of structural change that begins with rural 
smallholder-based development and only later prioritises the secondary and tertiary sectors 
of the economy.   
	
 The final lesson discussed in this chapter is arguably both the most controversial and 
the most intangible.  Many of the discussions about the East Asian model have centred 
around the extent to which it is underpinned by particular cultural values, and thus replicable 
in vastly different cultural contexts such as Africa.  Those whom Peter Berger (1988: 8) 
labels 'culturalists' offer the Weberian hypothesis that Confucian values have driven 
economic growth in East Asia, and that the model is thus very difficult—if not impossible—
to transfer outside the region.  'Institutionalists', on the other hand, believe that economic 
success has largely stemmed from a set of specific economic policies and practices, and are 
thus more optimistic about the potential for cross-societal emulation (Berger 1988: 9).  The 
debate on the Chinese Model has witnessed a similar divide (summarised in Friedman 2010) 
between those who see China as possessing an ‘inimitable...Chineseness’ and those who 
believe in China’s ability to inspire other developing countries regardless of cultural and 
historical differences. 
	
 Although my group of Ethiopian and Kenyan respondents contained both culturalists 
and institutionalists, a surprising number of elites fell into a third category—those who 
believed that their cultures had to modernise in order for emulation, and development, to take 
place.  Like the modernisation theorists who had preceded them, they sought to use 
education and mechanisation to create 'modern' citizens who used science and rationality to 
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order their affairs, and who could become entrepreneurs and informed political participants. 
This process of cultural transformation was tightly linked to economic growth—whether as 
cause, outcome or—very often—both.   
	
 A very common cultural lesson that both Ethiopian and Kenyan leaders testified to 
drawing from China and East Asia was the importance of discipline and hard work in 
bringing about economic growth.  An influx of Chinese labourers to both countries has 
brought about an unprecedented level of contact between cultures that have hitherto had little 
interaction with each other.  On this issue, the majority of Kenyans and Ethiopians may (or 
may not) have different opinions from their leaders.45  However, a large number of elites in 
both countries expressed admiration for the diligence and determination of those Chinese 
migrants with which they had come into contact, as well as a desire to transfer some of these 
values to the local population:
Every Chinese I know is hard-working, very hard-working.  So somehow or another, they 
have managed to focus the people and have them work towards changing their country.  And 
so, even though there are not as many people in this country as in China, we have a lot of 
people that we could teach, train and focus.  We can change this country, I think (EN14).
I appreciate their working culture—they work hard.  I want to follow this working culture 
because to develop your country, you need to change your working culture, otherwise you 
cannot develop.  Especially for Africans, it is good to change their working culture to get 
some experience from the Chinese (EN10).
306
45 This dissertation avoids this discussion, the outlines of which can be found in Horta (2009) and Sautman and 
Hairong (2009).
I think in terms of the work ethic that the Chinese have, the country is actually learning quite 
a lot.  There are a lot of Chinese people coming in, and they are basically completely 
transforming the way infrastructure development is put in place, the work ethic of the people, 
the way we contract, and so on (KN5).
What we can learn from China is discipline – a work ethic.  They do have a good work ethic, 
more than the West, in my view.  And that is something we can learn.  They work with 
commitment, they work with focus, they're not looking over their shoulder, they just work 
(KG20).
Tom Mboya is said to have driven a white Mercedes in the belief that such conspicuous 
consumption would inspire his fellow Kenyans to work harder in the pursuit of a similar 
lifestyle (Speich 2009: 459).  Over half a century later, this attitude finds its strongest 
embodiment in the minds of elites who wish to use the East Asian—and especially Chinese
—example to motivate and mobilise their populations.  This is illustrated in a particularly 
striking pronouncement by one senior policy-maker:
We want the minds of Kenyans to awaken.  It is good to be pained – it is good for people to 
feel pain when they see the Chinese contractors on all these jobs, and they can ask 
themselves 'why are we not succeeding?'  If we use that...to excel and invest in the 
infrastructure, it can be the medicine or the catalyst we need. (KG14).
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Many elites spoke of need for discipline and hard work in a rather abstract fashion, but a few 
elites proposed concrete changes to policy.  One senior Kenyan bureaucrat, for example, 
citing the examples of Singapore, Japan, South Korea and Scandinavia, wished to impose a 
policy of universal military service in order to instil discipline in young Kenyans (KG9).  
	
 A second common thread united elites who believed that the example of East Asia 
militated not just for economic and political change, but also for cultural transformation. 
This was a desire to educate the population in the application of science and rationality to 
every aspect of their daily lives.  To one Kenyan civil servant, South Korea's success lay in 
its ability to create an 'engineering culture' and a culture of innovation:  'and this is why...it is 
very difficult to talk of modernisation and exclude cultural change' (KG8).  An Ethiopian 
member of the EPRDF focused on 'backwardness', a term she defined as 'a life devoid of 
science and technology' (EG2), while another defined modernisation as a state wherein 'all 
sorts of backward, unscientific views are reduced to the bare minimum, where people live on 
a scientific basis' (EG14).  
	
 In short, interviews were replete with expressions of elites' desire to introduce greater 
efficiency, productivity and rationality in the service of a 'new scientific way of 
reasoning' (KN11).  This viewpoint, while not exclusive to those using East Asia as a model, 
was again more common among this group.  Giving farmers access to fertilisers, better 
seeds, access to modern technology and specialised training will not only lead to an increase 
in output, the thinking runs, but will help them to appreciate the importance of planning, 
mechanisation and productivity.  
	
 Finally, elites in both Ethiopia and Kenya wished to draw a third common lesson 
from what they saw as the cultural underpinnings of East Asia's growth:  a strong sense of 
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national identity among the population.  The role of nation-building—and particularly of 
nation-builders—will be explored in full in the following chapter.  Here, however, it is 
enough to note the importance that elites assigned to nationalism, conceptualised as a new 
and universal identification with the machinery and symbolism of the Westphalian state, as a 
mobilising, unifying and modernising force in East Asia. 
	
 The dynamics of elites' desire for cultural transformation varied somewhat between 
the two case studies.  In Ethiopia, elites were more likely to use overtly civilisatory discourse 
and to place all societies on a continuum ranging from the 'backwards' to the modern.  An 
EPRDF training manual for 'peasants', for example, lists the traits of a 'model 
individual' (EPRDF 2007: 5-8): he should 'struggle to replace backward traditions', 'strive 
and struggle to lessen traditional holidays and increase working hours' and thereby 'start to 
live a modern and better life'.  He should also own a private toilet, refrain from keeping 
animals in his house, keep his money in a bank, use his time efficiently, embrace new 
technology and help his wife with housework.  
Ethiopian discourse on this issue was certainly partially due to the simple reason of 
language; many English phrases and words with very negative connotations in Kenya and 
other former colonies do not have the same impact in Ethiopia.  However, the latter country's 
vision of civilisatory progress is also intricately linked to its history; it is a vision which in 
turn greatly affects its choice to emulate China.  Many elites viewed Ethiopia as a once-
advanced civilisation that had been brought to its knees by an inability to modernise from 
within.  According to Meles Zenawi (2010), Ethiopia under the EPRDF has only recently 
begun 'the long road back to the frontlines of world civilization'.  A senior Ethiopian 
bureaucrat phrases it thus:   
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Modernisation is the order of the day, and everybody should run for it...but it takes a long 
time for the Ethiopian people to understand the use for modernisation, it comes gradually. 
Maybe it might be the last country to understand the benefit or the advantage of 
modernisation...One reason, as I told you, is that Ethiopia will not surrender to outsiders, and 
the other is that most Ethiopians love their traditional support networks (EG18). 
Elites both inside and outside the ruling party frequently also used the purported lack of 
education and knowledge among Ethiopian 'peasants' to argue for a gradual approach to 
democratisation.  Although few argued explicitly for any formal or institutional brakes on 
democracy, several expressed the sentiment that the logic and norms underpinning 
democracy were completely alien to those governing 'feudal' Ethiopian communities (and 
that this was the main reason for Ethiopia's 'imperfect' democracy).  'The understanding of 
democracy is very low.  Because [people] do not know how to agree, how to negotiate, how 
to accept other opinions' (EN10), felt one non-governmental leader.  A EPRDF member 
echoed this sentiment:  'We were not democratic at all 19 years back...it requires a lot of 
things, to change the mindset of all to bring them to that level.  So we're in the process.  We 
have not reached that high level, as such' (EG22).  EPDRF publications, too, speak of 
Ethiopia's 'backward and undemocratic culture' (EPRDF 2005: 2).  Even a critic of the 
government felt the problem lay more with African culture than with a lack of institutions:
We believe ideas which are typical of the Dark Ages and we use modern ideas...An election 
is a manifestation or a result, like a computer of technology, but at the base are ideas of 
liberty. We are not familiar with those ideas but we are trying to implement the external 
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manifestations of those ideas – which are elections. That's why it's not becoming successful 
in African countries, it's why it results in chaos, conflict and death' (EN8).
It was rare to find explicit references to China or East Asia in this aspect of Ethiopian 'lesson-
drawing', but the content of these discourses is markedly similar to much of the Chinese 
discourse on modernisation.  One example is the Chinese government’s preoccupation with 
improving 'population quality' through manners classes, anti-spitting campaigns and other 
efforts at mass public education (Nyiri 2006).  Even staunch critics of Ethiopia's electoral 
system have remarked on the fact that the EPRDF 'allows and even encourages the teaching 
of democratic values' (Pausewang et al 2002: 239) in schools, cadre trainings and kebele 
gatherings—as long as it is completely in control of the process.  
	
 Another area in which this civilisatory discourse is particularly prevalent in China is 
in its policy towards minorities.  Modernisation has long been China’s purported source of 
legitimacy in Tibet, especially, an area the White Paper on Tibet (PRC 2001) describes as 
having been 'backward', 'in decline’, 'feudal', 'savage' and 'primitive' before the establishment 
of the Tibetan Autonomous Region in 1951.  Under Chinese rule, however, Tibet is moving 
'from darkness to brightness, from backwardness to progress, from poverty to prosperity and 
from isolation to openness, and...marching toward modernization'.  Similarly, the White 
Paper entitled Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities in China (PRC 2005b) mentions the 
need for the preservation and protection of minority culture, but at the same time encourages 
ethnic minorities to adopt 'new, scientific, civilized and healthy customs in daily life'. 
Ethiopia's own desire to move rapidly from the traditional to the modern, due to the fact that 
'you can't imagine modernity in a feudal setting' (EG16), mirrors this desire.  It creates both 
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an affinity for and a lesson from the Chinese approach to development, suggesting that 
causality—in the case of this lesson in particular—runs in two directions.
	
 There are echoes of this approach in Kenya, also, as well as indications that elites 
view cultural transformation as an important factor of Chinese and East Asian success. 
Kenyan discourse is less overtly civilisatory: elite discourse is more consistent with a 
broader international dislike of terms such as 'backwardness' and even 'modernisation'.  As 
one governmental advisor put it, 'in Kenya we don't talk about modernisation, because it's 
pejorative.  It connotes that we are natives' (KG22).  There was also less overt evidence of 
such thinking in government documents.   
	
 Nonetheless, elites privately expressed a strong belief that 'there is no way you can 
begin to define a modern society without a change of the traditional culture (KG8).  One 
example is a civil society representative who expressed admiration for Mao, who 'simply had 
to interfere with the whole of China, bring it to a standstill, redefine new values and push 
them out.  We may not have agreed, but he got somewhere at the end of the day’ (KN15). 
For this reason, this respondent argued, all other emulation would be impossible without 
equally far-reaching changes in Kenyan values:  
I've never seen adequate attention paid, in my view, to the social restructuring that makes for 
development...Yes, it should start with the social development, and once your society has 
developed a consciousness that enables people to do the right thing and understand that 
individual behaviour impacts on the whole society, then you accept the foundations of 
development.  And then you can borrow (KN15).  
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A second example is a technocrat who listed Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia as the 
countries Kenya should most seek to emulate.  On the afternoon of our interview, he had just 
come from a meeting with the World Bank on the subject of Kenya's policy towards its 
indigenous pastoralists.  He recounted his government's position, one that the World Bank 
found problematic:
We told them that our thinking is not to preserve the culture of the indigenous people as such, 
but we recognise them as marginalised, behind the rest of society in terms of development, 
which is now modernisation.  So our policy is to bring them to our level, which is now 
modernisation.  To bring them to—I don't want to say 'modern' ways of doing things, but—
basically the Western ways of doing things (KG10).
There is an almost uncanny irony in a situation where Western donors are attempting to 
persuade African elites not to 'Westernise' their citizens, and African leaders are looking to 
East Asian countries to assist them in just this process.  The term 'Westernise', as used above, 
should be interpreted somewhat cautiously.  It would have been impossible to find a Kenyan 
or Ethiopian elite who felt that their citizens should—or would—ever precisely resemble 
those of other 'advanced' countries, whether in East Asia or the West.  There was a lot of 
emphasis, in particular, in retaining visible local practices such as local dress and cuisine:
If we take for example the way we dress, for example, we are very Westernised. If you go to 
West Africa, you'll find that inasmuch as they are modernising, you can still see it is West 
African...What we need to retain more are things to do with our own culture, to do with food, 
with practices, with things like that (KG12).
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Most African countries, we see that they are just copying whatever the Western 
modernisation is doing, and they’re losing everything.  So I feel that modernisation is a 
modern way of thinking, a modern way of innovating, making life easy for the people, but 
still maintaining the best traditions you have...I just see it from my attachment with some 
friends from Japan and my visits to Tokyo. None of the Western youths will bow down for 
his boss. But in Japan a junior will bow down to a senior engineer (EG16).
What, then, is meant when many elites speak of 'modernising' or even 'Westernising' their 
citizens?  As mentioned previously, much of this hinges on the fostering of certain values 
such as national pride, diligence, delayed gratification, civic responsibility, 'need for 
achievement' (to use a phrase from the modernisation theorists) and rationality.  Ethiopian 
and Kenyan elites want to 'update' or 'modernise' their existing cultures, rather than replace 
them outright.  As a senior Kenyan government official put it, 'That's why I say we need 
Version 2.0 of our culture, where people use scientific methods to determine their future...We 
have been stuck in Version 1.0 of our culture' (KG9).  According to an Ethiopian 
parliamentarian, modernisation entails 'understanding our heritage in a new way' (EG2). 
	
 There is scope for a certain amount of cultural variation in such an approach, but less 
room for cultural relativity than might be expected.  The last-mentioned Kenyan interviewee 
went on to express his dislike for South Africa's Jacob Zuma, who has 'never suppressed that 
Africanness – many wives, many children, out of wedlock.  Which are symptoms of 
irresponsibility' (KG9).  The above-mentioned Ethiopian interviewee, meanwhile, views 
traditional Ethiopian culture as highly patriarchal and oppressive of women (EG2).  
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 Interestingly, the notion that Africa can look to East Asia for lessons in modernising 
yet retaining its culture can also found in the writings of academics from both country cases. 
Both Adem (2005) and Mazrui (2001) use Japan as an example of a country that has been 
able to develop a locally relevant modernisation whilst retaining the cultural promiscuity 
necessary to develop in the era of globalisation; both urge that this example be selectively 
emulated by African countries looking to do the same.
	
 The elites I interviewed demonstrated a similar desire.  Certainly, East Asia acts as a 
direct, conscious model in the areas of work ethics, nationalism and attitudes towards 
technology.  The extent to which elites directly draw on East Asia as a model of broader 
cultural change is a slightly more nebulous question:  although direct references are less 
frequent, there are numerous parallels particularly in Chinese and Ethiopian discourses 
towards cultural transformation.  In both countries, those elites most concerned with drawing 
lessons from East Asia in other areas were also most likely to use the discourse of cultural 
transformation.  This is not to imply that Ethiopian or Kenyan elites wish to transplant East 
Asian culture to local settings; instead, elites view East Asia as demonstrating the ability of 
all cultures—not merely those with Western cultural heritages—to 'modernise' themselves 
and thereby fuel economic growth.  As one Ethiopian policymaker who viewed Japan as a 
model of indigenous modernisation phrased it, ‘several factors affect the modernisation and 
development of one country.  Among these, culture is one of most important, because it is the 
internal factor that mainly affects the development process, rather than the external 
factors’ (EG1).  As with modernisation theory, then, difficult but essential processes of 
internal societal transformation were viewed as the keys that would unlock other aspects of a 
nation's progress.  
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7.7  Conclusion
In analysing the nature of Ethiopian and Kenyan emulation of East Asia, this chapter has 
discussed several 'lessons' that arose from the interview and documentary data.  Elites draw 
from East Asia the lesson that countries can develop endogenously and independently, and 
that development is a staged process that entails structural transformation of the economy. 
This process is driven by rapid 'catch-up' economic growth, the harnessing of science and 
technology and massive investment in physical infrastructure.  Because emulators also view 
cultural transformation as an important ingredient of development, they wish to draw certain 
values and social practices from East Asian countries, whilst more generally 'modernising' 
their cultures in order to fuel economic growth.  Ethiopia's civilisatory discourse and 
emphasis on gradual agricultural 'spillover' into industry make it particularly aligned to 
certain elements of the East Asian–and especially the Chinese—experience.
	
   What prevents the above from constituting a mere 'laundry list' of lessons is the 
congruity between these aspects of elite emulation of East Asia and the modernisation 
paradigm.  Most modernisation theorists viewed development in very similar terms, before 
ensuing theories replaced their views with foci on redistribution and institution-building, and 
with a post-modern scepticism of the potential of science to bring about development. 
Ethiopian and Kenyan lesson-drawing is not limited to discrete policies or technologies, but 
penetrates to the very foundation of thinking on development.  Based on the evidence 
analysed in this chapter, Ethiopian and Kenyan emulation of East Asian models thus may not 
merely pull them closer to the experiences of countries such as China or Malaysia, but 
overturn many of the assumptions governing current development orthodoxy.  If the next 
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chapter, which explores the ways in which emulating elites look to East Asian on questions 
of leadership and governance, reaches a similar conclusion, East Asian models may be at 
least partially responsible for bringing modernisation theory back to Africa.
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CHAPTER EIGHT:  WHO MODERNISES?  THE 
FUNCTION AND FORM OF THE STATE 
'We can learn from China how a developmental state should act' 
	
 	
 	
 	
 	
 	
 – Deputy Prime Minister of Ethiopia (EG16)  
***
Previous chapters have examined the ways in which emulating elites in both Ethiopia and 
Kenya look to East Asia as a key source of lessons on development, drawing from the region 
a conceptualisation of the process as endogenous, technology-driven and occurring in 
roughly predictable stages.  Rapid economic growth, cultural transformation and the linkages 
between these two facets of societal change are deemed particularly important in allowing 
countries to 'catch up' with others who had 'overtaken' them in recent decades.
	
 This picture of the development process is incomplete, however, without examining 
and contextualising these elites' perceptions of their own roles and those of the institutions 
they represent.  Some of the most striking and frequently-cited lessons related to questions of 
governmental intervention in the economy, and to the form of government most likely to 
ensure development along the lines cited above.  In this final empirical chapter, I therefore 
examine each of these issues in turn.  I also seek to situate these within the literature on the 
East Asian Model and on modernisation theory, where applicable, in order to understand how 
these lessons fit into broader debates on development.  Finally, in order to further contribute 
to the robustness of my findings through triangulation, I explore the responses of elites to the 
term 'modernisation' itself.   
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8.1  Emulation of East Asia in the Area of State-Market Relations 
The role that the state can most fruitfully play in national economic development lies at the 
heart of one of the most enduring debates in development theory and practice. It is thus not 
surprising that Ethiopian and Kenyan leaders regularly admitted to emulating East Asian 
models in this regard, although the precise content of this learning differed substantially 
between the case studies.  
	
 In the case of Ethiopia, the need for the government to retain substantial control over 
the economy was by far the single most important lesson cited from East Asia.  In particular, 
emulating elites viewed East Asia as an alternative to the 'neo-liberalism' they so decried in 
the West, and particularly to the conditionalities it imposed on aid recipients:
So intervention by the government has to be understood.  Why, when it comes to Africa, is 
intervention by the government condemned?  Why has Korea done this?  Why has Taiwan's 
government done this?  Even in Japan, at the early stages, the government was strongly 
involved in guiding the economy until certain market failures were satisfied (EG15).
And I believe this is the way that Africa and developing nations have to go.  Because the 
experience of South Korea, of Taiwan, of Japan, shows that market fundamentalism did not 
work at that time.  Even now, some Asian countries like Malaysia, Singapore, do not follow 
the Western way of market fundamentalism - they follow others, and that makes development 
faster (EG16).  
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Elites were able to give many concrete examples of borrowing taking place in this regard: 
interviewees cited South Korea as a model for the creation and management of state 
enterprises, and Taiwan as an example of a 'developmental bureaucracy' (EG16).  The 
Ethiopian Development Research Institute, a government-run development think tank (and 
the largest and most influential in the country), is explicitly modelled on the Korean 
Development Institute in both form and function (EG24). Import substitution policies, 
government-directed private sector development programmes and institutions established by 
the Ministry of Industry to promote exports in certain key sectors were all expressly named 
as being influenced by observation of East Asia.  
	
 In certain aspects of emulation—the perceived importance of economic growth, for 
example—Ethiopia's lesson-drawers isolated China as their primary example in the region. 
In the case of governmental intervention in the economy, however, countries such as South 
Korea and Taiwan were viewed as equally important models, and it was thus the region as a 
whole that was admired.  This lesson was also drawn more frequently by governmental than 
by non-governmental respondents.  However, several non-governmental elites, particularly 
in business and the media, were more accepting of the need for the government to 'build' a 
market economy, along East Asian lines, than would perhaps be expected: 
It seems to me I hear the South Korean model very much talked about – a lot – in Ethiopia. 
The very, very strong, active hand of the government to start the private sector, which we're 
seeing now in Ethiopia...And I don't know, somehow I get the feeling that that might actually 
be the right approach for Ethiopia right now, in this time.' (EN13).
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This lesson not only constituted a major way in which elites were learning from East Asia, 
but also one of the most cohesive and passionately-held ideological stances held by EPRDF 
respondents.  To these interviewees, liberalism (and neo-liberalism, taken mainly as a 
synonym) was a dirty word.  The state needed to intervene in Ethiopia, they felt, because 
market failures would make the development of rural areas unprofitable and unfeasible for 
the country's nascent private sector, particularly in the sector of physical infrastructure 
(EG22).  It would also prevent 'rent-seekers' from taking advantage of Ethiopia's 
underdevelopment, whilst encouraging the 'right' investors (EG10).  By this reasoning, all 
countries could be divided into three groups: 'developmental states' (found primarily in East 
Asia); 'failed states' (found in Africa); and developed, 'neoliberal' states (exemplified by the 
United States, and so far removed from Ethiopia's situation that their experience is all but 
irrelevant).  Ethiopia, alongside perhaps South Africa, was seen as the only developmental 
state in Africa.  
	
 Once again, this stance comes directly from Meles Zenawi himself, and carries 
through to all levels of the party.  One of the lessons that Development, Democracy and 
Revolutionary Democracy (EPRDF 2006) draws from South Korea and Taiwan is an alleged 
ability to free rural communities from rent-seeking private landlords and to build 
'developmental structures' through selective governmental intervention.  One of the key 
themes of Dead Ends and New Beginnings (Meles 2006) is the necessity of learning from the 
various means by which the Taiwanese and South Korean state machineries guided economic 
development:  
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Massive and comprehensive government intervention to address market failures combined 
with the appropriate set of incentives and disincentives provided to the private sector to elicit 
the desired response was how the Taiwanese and Korean miracles were achieved...The 
practices of the two most successful development experiences over the past half century are 
in direct and total opposition to the neo-liberal paradigm.
This thinking has carried over into policy as well, primarily by preventing the EPRDF from 
liberalising the economy at the speed that donors would prefer.  The government continues to 
practice import substitution, impose controls on foreign exchange, and protect and promote 
key industries from outside competition.  All land remains public, and key sectors such as 
banking and telecommunications are wholly government-owned.  The Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012a: 1), which assigns countries a score from 
1 to 10 depending on extent of market liberalisation, accords Ethiopia a score of 3.96.46 
	
 A severe distrust of the market has, of course, pervaded the thinking of the party 
since its inception as a student-led socialist movement.  In addition, Ethiopia's 'culture of 
power' and history of top-down governance predates socialism by several centuries.  It is 
thus unlikely that the example of East Asia alone informs governmental elites' desire for a 
strong state.  However, the East Asian Model plays an important role both in legitimating and 
modernising this desire.  The EPRDF's vision of Ethiopia's future economy is, for all its 
reliance on state guidance, not a socialist one.  A number of factors has pushed the country's 
leadership towards a cautious acceptance of capitalism since coming to power in the early 
1990s: donor dependency, the collapse of communism following the Cold War (Tadesse and 
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46 This is up considerably, however, from its score of 1.7 in 2003, when these assessments began (Bertelsmann 
Stiftung 2003: 1). 
Young 2003: 393) and a desire for the TPLF to distance itself from the brutal Derg regime 
(Hughes 1992: 118) were all important factors discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four. 
Most centrally, the rise to power of a reformist faction within the TPLF, headed by Meles 
Zenawi, sidelined 'hardliners' who wished to continue along a socialist path.  The resulting 
tehadiso or 'renewal' may also have been useful in purging the party of perceived enemies on 
both sides of the ideological divide, but certainly allowed the TPFL to begin limited 
privatisation and integration into the global economy.  
	
 In a country where this process is still being cautiously and ambivalently undertaken, 
East Asia plays a valuable role as exemplar.  Between the extremes of donor-advocated 
liberalisation and the communist doctrines that failed Ethiopia, this region is seen as a 
moderate 'third way' which demonstrates to elites that they can grow without completely 
jettisoning the practices of the past.  In a sense, this gives Ethiopia a theoretical framework 
within which to liberalise only in a very gradual and controlled way; as one elite phrased it, 
'we have always followed our principles, but the experiences of others [in East Asia] have 
allowed us to view them in a comprehensive light' (EG20).  This lesson is given a particular 
pungency in the light of the 2008 global financial crisis, which elites repeatedly pointed to as 
incontrovertible evidence that ‘you cannot leave everything to the market to regulate and 
right itself”(EG5).
	
 One of the most striking aspects of this facet of Ethiopian lesson-drawing is the 
extent to which it is couched in language consciously drawn from the literature on the East 
Asian Model and the 'developmental state'.  Ethiopian elites referred time and again to 
Ethiopia as one of the few 'developmental states' in Africa, and made clear reference to this 
literature; the list of references accompanying  Dead Ends and New Beginnings (Meles 
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2006) reads like a bibliography of the East Asian Model literature of the 1980s and 1990s. 
According to this document, policies such as ADLI 'resulted as a synthesis of the Neo-liberal 
Washington Consensus Model and a critical examination of the State-led developmental 
Model pursued by Taiwan and South Korean (sic)' (Meles 2006), indicating once again the 
fine line that Ethiopia wishes to walk between economic reform and state control.  
	
 The emphasis on South Korea exhibited by Ethiopian interviewees is also significant 
here:  although most  countries in East Asia experienced a degree of state intervention during 
their periods of rapid growth, South Korea's government under Park Chung Hee is often seen 
as having been the most interventionist of the Asian Tigers (Larrain and Vergara 1993: 257; 
Chang 1993):  government banks fuelled the country's large corporations, strict import 
controls and export quotas existed, and the Chaebol conglomerates spurred growth by 
adhering to government-designed industrial blueprints.  The fact that Singapore, the most 
economically liberal economy in the region (Larrain and Vergara 1993: 257), was mentioned 
so rarely by Ethiopian interviewees also indicates the selective nature of the country's 
emulation.
	
 Given China's hybrid system and socialist history, the substantial degree of state 
control over this economy is even less disputed in the literature, and forms a central pillar in 
discussions of the Chinese Model.  Indeed, a global move towards 'state capitalism' is one of 
the consequences that opponents of China's example most fear (Callick 2010; Halper 2010). 
In Ethiopia, however, China was mentioned less frequently in interviews and party 
publications as an exemplar of state-led growth than were the Asian Tigers—despite the fact 
that the Ethiopian economy in many ways resembles the former more closely.  Whether due 
to recognition of this fact (Ethiopian elites I spoke to were certainly aware and dismissive of 
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such Western suspicions) or a genuine desire to move beyond a quasi-socialist system, China 
was not the first choice of exemplar in the area of state-market relations.  
	
 In few dimensions of development and emulation did my two country cases differ as 
widely as in the question of state involvement in the economy.  Ethiopian emulators chose as 
models the two East Asian regimes with the greatest degrees of state involvement, and drew 
from them the clear lesson that economic liberalisation, as long as it is sufficiently gradual 
and overseen by the government, need not herald the loss of national autonomy.  
	
 Kenya's emulation, in this regard, is far more moderate.  East Asia was still viewed as 
a source of alternative models of engagement between the state and the private sector, but the 
role that elites envisioned for the government differed vastly from the strict control that 
Ethiopian elites drew from China and South Korea.  This is again largely to be expected 
given Kenya's historical circumstances:  Kenya's economy is already largely export-based, 
and government ownership of parastatals and other public bodies had already been greatly 
rolled back during the structural adjustment programmes of the 1990s (Nellis 2005: 8).  As 
the composition of the drivers of Vision 2030 demonstrates, Kenya's business sector already 
often plays a powerful lobbying role; more so than, for example, its trade unions.  Kenyan 
elites therefore chose countries that had experienced high levels of economic growth in 
situations where the state-market hierarchy was less pronounced than in countries such as 
South Korea. 
	
 On the one hand, then, it is significant that elites cited Singapore—which operates 
one of the most liberal trading regimes in the world—so widely as a model; the city-state is 
ranked by the libertarian Cato Institute as having had the second-highest level of 'economic 
freedom' in the world in 2009 (Gwartney et al 2011: 141).  Accordingly, Kenyan elites 
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emphasised the establishment of export-oriented, FDI-dependent economies as one of the 
key factors behind East Asia's success.  A number of interviewees pointed to East Asian 
countries as sources of lessons on areas such as outsourcing, investment promotion and 
export-led growth.  One bureaucrat bemoaned the fact that Malaysia had used Kenya's  sugar 
processing and cultivation industry as a model during the 1960s, only to subsequently move 
towards higher-value industries such as palm oil; Kenya, he felt, had been unable to do this 
due to powerful lobbies from the domestic sugar industry (KG8).  Others echoed official 
documents pointing to China as a direct model for Kenya's own envisioned SEZs (KG16; 
Kenya 2007: 32), or identified Malaysia and Singapore as the inspiration behind initiatives 
such as the government's ambitious plans to spend $12 million on a 5000 acre 'technopolis' 
dedicated to Business Process Outsourcing (BPO).  According to one business leader, for 
example:  
They're talking about retail and wholesale, and creating an infrastructure that allows that to 
happen...You're talking about having mega-cities where people can come in as tourists and so 
forth...You're talking about IT and BPO.  Again, it's alien to Kenya, but you're bringing things 
in.  You look at Singapore – what natural resources do they have?  Zero.  It's an island where 
they have to import water, almost everything.  And yet they've become a world leader in 
terms of economic development.  So that, I think, if you start looking at where Vision 2030 
was set...primarily I think Singapore has driven it and you can see the elements there (KN5).  
Such examples notwithstanding, specific instances of lesson-drawing in the areas of 
industrial policy and trade were actually less common than the literature on the East Asian 
and the Chinese models would suggest, where these areas are said to constitute the greatest 
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source of potential emulation.  As mentioned previously, Kenyan elites are as eager to invest 
in the services sector as in the industrial sector.  More than one interviewee was highly 
sceptical of the feasibility of SEZs in Kenya, given the already liberal nature of Kenya's 
markets (KG10).  More pertinently, the establishment of Kenya's SEZs had, at the time of 
writing, failed to progress in the face of opposition from local manufacturers.  One business 
representative, for example, felt that these would 'kill the entire economic sector' (KN8).
	
 The attitude of Kenyan decision-makers in the area of state-market relations is also 
reflected in the second main model cited by elites, namely Malaysia.  Malaysia's growth has 
occurred under relatively liberal economic conditions; its economy is highly reliant on 
exports and, increasingly, on FDI (Sundaram 2007: 14-17).  However, this has not happened 
without considerable strategic oversight on the part of Malaysia's leadership.  During the 
1980s and 1990s, Mahathir used economic nationalism to argue that Western-imposed neo-
liberalism was aimed at subjugating a rising Malaysia (and, by extension, Asia) (Beeson 
2000: 339).  His leadership's use of currency controls and large state-supported industrial 
projects earned it the reputation for having trod a middle ground between national autonomy 
and globalisation, and for demonstrating the continuing agency available to national 
governments (Dent 2004: 84; Beeson 2000: 347).  Post-Mahathir, Malaysia has continued to 
resist full economic liberalisation:  in 2009, Malaysia's economy was classified by the Cato 
Institute as far 'less free' than Kenya's (Gwartney et al 2011: 95, 106).
	
 This liberal yet 'defensive' national economic policy has both sustained and been 
sustained by a distinctive fusion of government and business interests.  Whereas 'classic' 
developmental states such as Japan and South Korea were marked by a strong bureaucracy 
fostering and guiding private sector growth, these two sectors cannot be as easily separated 
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in Malaysia.  Government incentives to advantage the country's indigenous 'Bumiputera' 
ethnic group and diffuse inter-ethnic tensions has led today to a sizeable middle class of 
Malay origin.  According to Beeson (2000: 340), the interests of this domestic capitalist class 
are sufficiently intertwined with those of national policymakers to make Malaysia a special 
case in the region.  This arrangement may diverge from pronounced bureaucratic 
developmentalism in several respects, but shares with the latter an intimate connection 
between the two sectors that is at odds with many of the prescriptions of the Washington 
Consensus.  
	
 The argument can be made that even economically liberal Singapore has been headed 
by a government that uses business-friendly policies for the purposes of economic 
nationalism and regime stability.  'Most importantly', argues one observer, Singapore's 
political leadership 'works in close developmental partnership with hosted foreign MNEs in 
ultimate accordance to state-determined interests and policy blueprints' (Dent 2001: 84).  It 
uses tightly-controlled, directed credit to steer the economy to pre-determined governmental 
objectives, and has relied on increases in economic welfare as the main source of regime 
legitimacy.  
	
 The intimate relationship between the state and the private sector in Malaysia and 
Singapore resonates with Kenyan elites' choice of these two countries as primary models.  It 
helps to explain, for example, why they cite these countries as the inspiration for Kenya's 
public-private-partnership (PPP) initiatives (KN10; KG21), despite the widespread existence 
of PPPs around the world.  
	
 This broader lesson also accounts for the fact that Kenyan elites used East Asia to 
argue for greater government intervention in the economy at least as often as they used the 
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region as an example of successful liberalisation.  One key Kenyan economic planner had 
received academic supervision directly from Chalmers Johnson (the originator of the term 
'developmental state'), and combined this knowledge with that gleaned from the literature on 
Southeast Asia to argue for a more prominent role for the state in the Kenyan economy 
(KG21).  Some elites pointed to the social engineering that Malaysia had been able to 
accomplish through affirmative action, housing quotas and other mechanisms, and to the 
ways in which they felt this had enabled national integration and civic sentiment (KG7). 
Other lessons covered the government's role in banking, land management and other areas: 
That is another thing we must learn from East Asia:  to prevent banks from charging such 
high interest rates (KG13).
The other thing which is not very well known is that Singapore has state corporations 
established with the purpose of interacting with other countries. For instance, there is the 
Singapore Corporation Enterprise – which is what Singapore uses when governments 
approach Singapore for technical assistance. That's the one-stop-shop – it structures the 
engagement framework and sources the professionals from Singapore. (KG15).
    
And then you go to Singapore itself...Following the end of the Second World War, the 
Japanese came round and wanted to sort of compensate.  They were very prudent in what aid 
they accepted.  They refused monetary gifts, but accepted a kind of translocation of 
companies from Japan onto their territory.  What they have done with the management of 
land, which is a finite resource, so that nobody owns private land.  And then the public 
infrastructure and the public housing.  And the way you have mortgages that cost next to 
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nothing, so cheap.  And then if you are a senior citizen, you have a reverse mortgage - very 
exciting!  So that the government can buy back your house from you.  And if you die your 
wife takes over, and if she dies they sell it off.  Very innovative ways of doing things (KN21).  
Finally, the very fact that Vision 2030 is centred on the promotion of six key sectors testifies 
to a desire for bureaucrats and other members of the executive to take a somewhat 
interventionist role in the make-up of Kenya's macroeconomic structure.  In 2007, the 
erstwhile American ambassador to Kenya (quoted in Okulo 2011) remarked in a leaked cable 
that 'Vision 2030 often reads like a naïve call for a perfect society, smacking a bit of old-
fashioned socialist central planning'.  While this illustrates the unease with which many 
developed countries regard ambitious long-term visions such as these, it rests on a flawed 
understanding of the extent to which non-socialist countries in East Asia and elsewhere 
engaged in restrained but nonetheless significant intervention in their economies.  Whether 
one labels this a 'market-planned economy' (KG21), 'managed progress' (KG7) or merely the 
building of capacity prior to greater liberalisation (KN6), it marks a reconceptualisation of 
the relationship between the private and public sectors at least partially drawn from a handful 
of key East Asian models.
8.2  The Democratic Question:  Emulation in the Political Realm
Ethiopian and Kenyan lesson-drawers both use examples in East Asia to argue for a greater 
role for the state in national economic development; the baseline for comparison differed to 
such an extent between my cases, however, that each used rather different country examplars 
when making this argument.
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 The more difficult and controversial question concerns the extent to which emulation 
of East Asia affects leaders' thinking on political governance.  One of the central points of 
contention in the debate on the East Asian and particularly the Chinese models is the extent 
to which these are said to encourage anti-democratic practices, political oppression and 
human rights abuses.  Those who argue that China is setting a dangerous precedent by 
demonstrating that economic liberalisation can occur without political liberalisation (Halper 
2010; Callick 2010) are countered by those who argue that China merely illustrates to 
African leaders the importance of gradualism (Zhang 2006) and those who claim that such 
charges are simply an indication of the West's 'hysterical and hypocritical' unease with 
China's growing influence on the continent (Zeleza 2008: 175).  The literature on the East 
Asian model earlier witnessed a similar divide between those who viewed 'developmental 
states' as incompatible with Western-style liberal democracy (Chalmers 1999: 52) and those 
who approached the economic lessons of Singapore, South Korea and others in isolation 
from their political settings (World Bank 1993).  
	
 It is in this area of research where my choice of an interview methodology 
encountered its most significant challenge.  Democracy is today still such a near-universal 
norm (discursively if not in practice) that this was a subject on which elites were often 
guarded.  This was particularly true of Ethiopia, where the EPRDF is highly sensitive to 
accusations of authoritarianism and where retributions from the party leadership can be 
severely punitive for recalcitrant members and non-members alike.  Some non-EPRDF 
members would only express concerns over what they saw as Ethiopia's diminishing 
democratic space while speaking off the record, while EPRDF members only rarely departed 
from the official 'party line' on this subject.  
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 This official position is that Ethiopia wishes to draw economic lessons from countries 
such as China and South Korea, but that it seeks to depart from their political 
authoritarianism (or erstwhile authoritarianism, in the case of the latter).  After detailing the 
myriad ways in which Ethiopia can learn from East Asia's structural transformation, 
Development, Democracy and Rural Development (EPRDF 2006) devotes considerable 
space to the specific historical and structural context that initially prevented democratic 
regimes from taking hold in these countries and that, by extension, does not apply to 
Ethiopia.  As one member of the ruling party put it:
China, Taiwan, South Korea and the like...their commitment to assure rapid economic 
development for their country has guaranteed their economic development and secured their 
sovereignty, and for all their commitment it is very interesting for Ethiopia to take them as a 
model. But their way of engagement in development is quite different from Ethiopia. Their 
way to approach the people was not, in my understanding, so democratic (EG3).
In isolating East Asia's economic lessons from their political context, the EPRDF claims to 
be constructing the world's first 'democratic developmental state' (EPRDF 2006).  A quote 
from the party's chief whip47 illustrates this point:  
We want to see the Asian Tigers as a general model, but not a specific country. We take some 
of the specific issues from different countries in different ways.  If you take the [agricultural] 
extension services, for example, we take from the Taiwanese.  If you go for state enterprises, 
we take the Koreans.  So if you take the developmental bureaucracy, we take the Taiwanese. 
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47 This interviewee is now the country's Prime Minister.  
If you see democracy, you cannot take the Chinese way.  So there are different models you 
can take from different sectors of government.  But we also say that we are a democratic 
developmental state, unlike the Asian tigers in the beginning (EG16).
In contrast to the Ethiopian discourse that primarily presents the country as a full (albeit 
'immature') democracy – and that presents democracy as an unalloyed good – the Kenyan 
discourse is far more likely to admit to drawing political lessons from East Asia.  Several 
Kenyan elites referred approvingly to Singapore and Malaysia's 'benevolent dictatorships', 
for example.  This view was found almost exclusively among government planners and 
senior business leaders; not surprisingly, this was one of the greatest points of contention 
between emulating technocrats and their critics in civil society.  One the one hand, many of 
those involved in Vision 2030 argued that strong, developmental leadership sometimes 
necessitated the postponement or even the quiet but temporary suspension of Western-style 
liberal democracy: 
[We need] that kind of leadership they had earlier in Malaysia...good governance and 
someone who is forceful – not really a full dictator, but somehow.  At least we'd be able to do 
a lot of things, because a lot of things are not done...So you need someone who says 'we need 
to do it this year – no compromises' (KN8).  
To me, I think the Asian tigers have got something to teach anybody, because places like 
Singapore and others took very very visionary leadership. And almost, in a way, I keep on 
saying that for us to make the initial push, we need a benign dictatorship (KN15).
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I think one needs to go back and acknowledge one thing.  Singapore, South Korea and 
Malaysia, if you just pulled out those three and went back to their first development plans – 
their first leaders were dictators.  They were not democrats, but they had the society at heart. 
So their dictatorship...was for the development of those societies.  In [a visit to] South Korea, 
we were amazed (KG8)!  
Is it reasonable, on these grounds, to conclude that Kenyan elites are more amenable to the 
notion of East-Asian inspired authoritarian growth than their Ethiopian counterparts?  A 
close analysis of the data, when viewed in conjunction with other sources, demonstrates that 
this is not the case.  Below, I examine each country case in turn, in order to understand the 
ways in which Ethiopia and Kenya's political emulation of East Asian countries differ from 
each other, as well as the areas in which they converge.
8.2.1  Political Emulation in  Ethiopia
As demonstrated in Chapter Four, Ethiopia cannot, by most international standards, be 
classed as a democracy.48  None of the most commonly-recognised indices of democracy 
classify Ethiopia as such: in 2011, Ethiopia dropped from 'partly free' to 'not free' in Freedom 
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48 For the purposes of conceptual clarity and consistency, this work will not depart from the conceptualisation 
of democracy—often associated with the West—as multi-party, pluralist and politically liberal in nature.  As 
such, it takes its working definition of democracy from Dahl's (1989) classic definition.  A democratic political 
system must thus provide, inter alia, 'frequent, fair and free elections',  an 'effectively enforced right to freedom 
of expression',  freedom of association and 'access to alternative sources of information' (Dahl 1989: 221).  This 
dissertation thus therefore purposefully narrows the scope of what can be labelled a 'democracy', but attempts to 
refrain from making a normative judgement on the desirability of such a system in various national contexts.
House's State of the World report (Freedom House 2011: 13).  Similarly, the Economist's 
Democracy Index reclassified Ethiopia from a 'hybrid' to an 'authoritarian' regime in 2010, 
and notes that the country is a 'de facto one-party state’ (EIU 2011: 18).  The Polity IV index 
places Ethiopia into the intermediate category of anocracy (i.e. neither a democracy nor an 
autocracy) (Marshall and Cole 2010: 25).  The Bertelsmann Transformation Index 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012a: 1) accords Ethiopia's political system a score of 3.63 out of 10 
(where a higher score signifies a greater level of democracy).
	
 In contrast, all major international indices class Kenya as significantly more 
democratic than Ethiopia; its classifications range from a 'hybrid regime' (EIU 2011: 6) and 
'partly free' (Freedom House 2011: 14) to a full 'democracy' (Marshall 2010: 26).  The 
Bertelsmann Transformation Index (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012b: 1) accords it a score of 
6.35 out of 10.  The country’s 2010 constitution limits the power of the President, includes a 
'Citizens' Bill of Rights' and devolves power to 47 newly-created local counties (Kenya 
2010b).  As detailed in Chapter Five, Kenya's ethnically-based politics, weak implementation 
of reforms, extra-judicial violence and high levels of corruption constitute severe limitations 
to democracy.  However, its vigorous civil society, generally free media and lively political 
debates point to a society in which weak governance, rather than outright authoritarianism, is 
to blame.
	
 This discrepancy between Ethiopia and Kenya still poses the question, then, as to 
why an authoritarian regime would claim to eschew the political example of East Asia, while 
many in a partial democracy would look to the very same region as a model of political 
leadership.  The most obvious possibility, of course, is that Ethiopian interviewees were 
simply not being truthful when they claimed not to be emulating Chinese or South Korean 
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authoritarianism.  Despite Western donors' reliance on Ethiopia as a strategic partner in a 
volatile geographic region, Ethiopia's economy remains highly dependent on Western aid: it 
will be recalled that ODA constitutes the vast majority of the Ethiopian government's total 
budget.  Bilateral and multilateral aid partners therefore play a key consultative role in the 
drafting of all major new government policies.  The notion that the EPRDF has brought 
democratic rule to Ethiopia for the first time in the country's history is a central element of 
the ruling party's discursive arsenal within the country as well.  A regime that has spent much 
of the past decade battling domestic accusations of autocracy is, after all, unlikely to admit 
the perceived advantages of authoritarianism to an outsider.  
	
 My interviews contained several indications that democracy is indeed less highly-
regarded within the EPRDF than its public face suggests.  In a rare but revealing admission, 
one very senior EPRDF interviewee conceded that the argument for authoritarian growth was 
one he heard frequently in Ethiopia, including within his party:  
I find it almost everywhere—there are so many people with such views, [who say] 'now we 
have to focus on growth, we don't need this democracy.'  In Ethiopia, I don't want to associate 
it with a certain group.  But development is a critical agenda for us, we have to quickly 
develop.  So when we discuss with friends, colleagues, there are people who publicly argue 
that we can't afford to conduct all these elections and to allow people to get organised—we 
need to focus on investment, on growth, and in some years we will come to political 
pluralism (EG13).  
Many outside the ruling party also drew a direct link between the EPRDF's emulation of East 
Asia and an increase in domestic repression.  To the party's opponents, China's example 
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strengthened the EPRDF's longstanding commitment to the communist doctrine of 
'democratic centralism', whereby communal intra-party decision-making is more highly 
valued than plural representation and the internal dissent it often generates (Vaughan and 
Tronvoll 2003: 119-120).  These opposition members frequently reported such debates as 
happening away from the prying eyes of Western donors:  one former member of the 
transitional government reports being frequently told by senior EPRDF leaders: 'Look, you're 
asking too much.  What we need now is development [rather than democracy]' (EN3).  These 
critics, who most often originated from Medrek, did not argue that emulation of the Chinese 
and East Asian models were solely responsible for anti-democratic practices in Ethiopia; 
most felt this to be one of several central factors preventing political liberalisation. 
According to one opposition politician, this lesson was also not a new one for the EPRDF:
Really, Meles wants the Chinese model because staying in power is his sole, ultimate goal. 
He knew this multi-party democracy, this American music, one day has its own limitations. 
One day these Americans can turn against you, and he wanted to use the Chinese card all 
along...As far back as 1994, 1995, Meles sent a delegation to China, to look very closely at 
the way China is developing, and especially how to deal with diversity the Chinese way and 
how to effectively use democratic centralism...he sent the number two, number three [most 
senior] people to China. So all along, for staying in power the Chinese model is more 
attractive than other models (EN1).
Even those slightly more sympathetic to the thinking of the ruling party felt the EPRDF to be 
taking political lessons from East Asia.  Two nongovernmental elites approved outright of 
what they viewed as Ethiopia's emulation of China's authoritarianism:  'Actually, I agree...If 
democracy comes first, then everything will be too fast.  Everyone will exercise his 
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democracy and do everything...I think the government is using China as a model' (EN9). 
Most of these respondents, however, tended to view East Asia as a slightly softer, less 
extreme version of China's political system for the EPRDF to emulate. Variations on this 
could be either Japan's (formerly) one-party dominant but democratic model (EN7), 
Singapore's minimally representative system (EN8), or South Korea's delayed 
democratisation (EN5). 
	
 What links these seemingly disparate systems is a prioritisation of stability and 
national unity over the fractious, destabilising impact of party politics, enabling the kind of 
state-driven developmentalism seen as instrumental to transformative growth. The former 
President of Ethiopia (EN4) alleges that the EPRDF's 'reform' movement was highly 
motivated by internal comparisons of Ethiopia to Bismarck's Germany, and by Meles' belief 
that only countries such as South Korea and Taiwan had possessed ruling parties sufficiently 
strong to repeat that success a century later. To another subject, the ruling party emulates 
Singapore and South Korea because 'their intention is a one-party dominated democracy. 
Without the one-party dominance for 30 or 40 years, there will be no development' (EN8). 
There exists, thus, the possibility that the EPRDF is consciously emulating Chinese and East 
Asia's history of authoritarian growth, and that it realises any overt recognition of that fact to 
be detrimental to its domestic and international standing.  
	
 Another possibility is that lesson-drawing may not be a significant factor in this area 
at all.  Both Ethiopia and East Asia may have passed through periods of authoritarian growth 
by chance, or perhaps even by historical necessity.  If this is indeed the case, the political 
similarities between Ethiopia and countries such as China may be a cause, rather than an 
effect, of Ethiopia's choice of East Asian countries as models.  In other words, Ethiopian 
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leaders may already have decided to impose heavy restrictions on democratic processes and 
rights in order to retain power or ensure development, and may look to China and South 
Korea as countries with similar political environments from which more specific economic 
lessons can be drawn.  This would be consistent with earlier findings that elites draw from 
models with perceived historical or 'social psychological' similarity (Rose 1993: 107).
	
 This study is unable to reach a definitive conclusion in this regard:  if the EPRDF 
refuses to admit that its policy is one of gradual political liberalisation or authoritarian 
growth, it is virtually impossible to trace the roots of such a policy, however real its effects 
on the ground.  However, although it is difficult to reach the definitive conclusion that 
Ethiopia's leaders wish to emulate China or South Korea's overall political models, it is still 
possible, based on the data gathered, to draw certain conclusions about more limited lessons 
that the EPRDF wishes to draw from East Asia's political development:
A.  An emphasis on economic performance as the primary source of governmental 
legitimacy:
The literature on the Chinese and East Asian models has emphasised the role that economic 
growth has played not only in improving the material wellbeing of these countries' citizens, 
but also in providing the current government with the legitimacy and mandate necessary for 
the long-term retention of power.  The basis of the CCP's rule in China has been ascribed to 
'performance legitimacy' (Yao 2010; Zhao 2010: 435), whereby citizens have been content—
at least temporarily—to sacrifice claims for political freedoms in exchange for material 
increases in their living standards.  
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 This echoes earlier writings on East Asian 'developmental states' such as Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, where economic development has been for long periods of 
time the single overriding feature of government policy.  The originator of the 
'developmental state' concept describes these states as 'quasi-revolutionary' regimes where 
'whatever legitimacy their rulers possessed did not come from external sanctification or some 
formal rules whereby they gained office but from the overarching social projects their 
societies endorsed and they carried out' (Johnson 1999: 53).  Due to the use of propaganda 
and other mechanisms used to drive these social projects, such states are very rarely, if ever, 
classifiable as fully representative, liberal democracies (Johnson 1999: 53-54).  
	
 East Asia is not the only region in which ‘alternative’ sources of legitimacy have been 
proposed. Scholars sometimes view the increasingly regulatory and judicial nature of 
governance within the EU as an alternative to the widening of majoritorian representation at 
a national level (Majone 1998)—or, somewhat more frequently, decry this same 'regulatory 
legitimacy' as a poor substitute for true democratic governance (Scharpf 1999).  Even 
European states, therefore, face questions surrounding the trade-off between technocratic and 
democratic pressures.  
	
 Several factors, however, distinguish the EU’s ‘regulatory legitimacy’ with the 
‘performance legitimacy’ purportedly found in developmental states, making for two very 
separate and distinct sets of literature (Levi-Faur 2012: 3).  The developmental state has the 
clear, overarching goal of increasing the material wellbeing of its populace, and its 
legitimacy (almost by definition) is predicated on the extent to which it achieves this goal.  A 
regulatory polity, however, ‘concerns itself with the forms and procedures—the rules, if you 
will—of economic competition, but it does not concern itself with substantive 
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matters’ (Johnson 1983: 19).  The originator of the term 'regulatory legitimacy' himself 
echoes this delimiting of the EU’s powers, arguing that regulatory legitimacy can only exist 
with a transparently and narrowly defined remit (Majone (1998: 299).  Both forms of 
legitimacy privilege technical expertise and ‘rationality’ over representativeness; one, 
however, is said to exist in a post-Westphalian polity so complex that certain discrete 
functions of the state must be re-allocated to experts, while the other is viewed as 
contributing to the very foundations on which political legitimacy, nationhood and statehood 
can later be built.  Finally, my reading of the literature suggests that performance legitimacy 
is seen as virtually inseparable from the developmental state in a way that does not hold true 
for regulatory legitimacy and the EU.  Both concepts have numerous critics, but those who 
accept the concept of a developmental state usually accept that its style of governance must 
diverge from liberal democracy; this is not the case with the concept of the regulatory state 
or suprastate.  
	
 It is developmental legitimacy, rather than regulatory legitimacy, then, that Ethiopian 
elites refer to in their writings and interviews.  The two most senior EPRDF leaders that I 
interviewed argued, for example, that the Chinese government was, in its own way, as 
legitimate and responsive to the needs of its citizens as were more formally democratic 
countries.  According to Meles' chief spokesman:
It depends on your existing objective situation...Of course [the Chinese] lose some part of 
their rights, but there has not been a big complaint.  Americans were supporting the Koreans 
during their undemocratic period, so it doesn't mean that that kind of governance was so bad, 
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compared with rent-seekers and patronage kind of networks.  So as far as there is good 
governance, and as far as that state is a developmental state, for me that is possible (EG14).  
Even Meles (2006) himself, in his discussion of East Asian developmental lessons for Africa, 
ties the notion of 'performance legitimacy' to the establishment of the Taiwanese and South 
Korean 'developmental states':
Once a political leadership which felt its survival and legitimacy depended on shared growth 
took power in an environment where land reform had created a conservative mass of small 
farmers, the rest could be done by the leadership itself. The leadership was able to change the 
playing field and the rules of the economic game in favor of productive activities and 
developmentalism.  Efforts at consensus-building reinforced by the success in achieving 
shared growth could be made with a high probability of success.  The bureaucracy could be 
remodeled to fit the development agenda. 
Senior EPRDF strategists often deny that they view this model of legitimacy as an example 
for their own country, but other evidence weakens this distinction between Ethiopia and the 
'classic' developmental states.  The very fact that Ethiopian leaders cite East Asia as their 
primary model of economic development implies emulation of the political sacrifices that 
often underpinned this model.  If, for example, Ethiopian elites admire East Asian 
governments' abilities to 'drag all the players to focus on one result' (EG5)—ie. economic 
development—the mechanisms by which this 'dragging' occurred historically are pertinent to 
Ethiopia's own emulation.  If the EPRDF wishes to emulate China, a country where 
'everyone, instead of politics, actually concentrates on development' (EG22), the fractious 
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nature of liberal representative politics is clearly seen as at least a temporary impediment to 
growth.  And if the literature (Kohli 2007: 84-123; Johnson 1999) broadly agrees that the 
'consensus-building' processes cited by Meles above were so frequently accompanied by the 
political tools of what Winkler (1984) calls 'soft authoritarianism', these tools are also being 
used in Ethiopia.  This is openly visible, of course, in Ethiopia's use of Chinese internet 
censorship software (O'Brien 2011), its silencing of journalists and a vast array of other 
methods that control national debates on issues of development.  Combined with an 
understanding of the ruling party's choice of exemplars, it becomes highly probable that such 
tactics are used specifically to deflect attention from elites' political failings to their economic 
successes.
B.  The need for incremental democratisation:
A second clear strand of political learning from East Asia centres around certain Ethiopian 
elites' conceptualisation of democracy as a process whereby a democratically immature 
populace is gradually prepared for greater and greater participation in the political system. 
The previous chapter has already explored elites' view of democratisation as the result of a 
wider project of cultural transformation, and of development as a process that occurs in 
distinct stages.  
	
 The notion of democracy as necessary but alien to Ethiopia's historical and cultural 
context also manifested itself when the EPRDF was challenged on its system of governance. 
The Prime Minister refers to Ethiopia as a 'fledgling' democracy, remarking that this form of 
government is 'a new experience for our old nation. Our institutions of democratic 
governance', therefore, 'need further consolidation. Our culture of democratic discourse 
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needs further refining' (Meles 2010).  In Dead Ends and New Beginnings, he similarly argues 
that only a state willing to depart from neo-liberalism can create a political system capable of 
'evolving over time into a mature, urban-based democracy' (Meles 2006). 
	
 African countries, elites therefore felt, were being judged by an impossibly high 
international standard of democracy—one to which East Asia and other rapidly-growing 
regions had not been subjected due to Cold War-era strategic considerations.49  One senior 
EPRDF member's impassioned views on the subject are worth quoting at length for the 
insight they lend to the party's view on Ethiopia's readiness for democracy:
It's just something you exercise, you rephrase the thinking we have in a democratic way...and 
you grow a new culture.  So Ethiopia has never been democratic before this government, for 
3000 years of history.  So for 3000 years, we have had a culture which is not democratic.  If 
you want to shift from that 3000-year old undemocratic culture, now to a democratic culture, 
for 10 years, it cannot come [easily].  If you take our farmers, they are not educated.  It is 
sometimes very problematic for them to choose which kind of party is proper to their 
thinking.  They had to choose out of 63 parties in this last election.  The farmer, when he gets 
the papers, will not know whether they are upside down.  So if that's the case...how are you 
going to compare it with America, and say that democracy in Ethiopia should be like that? 
Impossible.  So education, awareness, modernisation, growth and democratic change all go 
together, hand in hand.  For example, I assume that in my children's time, we will have the 
best democratic culture in our country, because now we are teaching in the schools what 
democratic governance is all about.  I have never taken such a course, because I was 
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49 It is rather ironic, then, that critics of the support that the EPRDF receives from Western donors make a 
similar point in regard to present-day Ethiopia (e.g. Borchgrevink 2008).  
[educated] in the military junta era, where there has never been this kind of thinking.  I only 
sometimes heard in the media about democratic elections in Europe or America or such 
things.  So that is how democracy grows.  You cannot compare it with affluent countries 
(EG16).50
Those in the ruling party were not the only group of Ethiopian elites to feel this way. 
Several of those business elites, entrepreneurs and members of civil society who were 
broadly supportive of the EPRDF constituted members of the diaspora who had received 
their education in the West and had recently returned to Ethiopia.  Virtually all were willing 
to admit to severe flaws in the country's political system, but explained their cooperation 
with the ruling party by pointing to the ways in which economic development and the growth 
of a middle class had spurred gradual democratisation in East Asia.  Citing South Korea and 
Japan, where 'development and democratisation went more or less hand in hand', one 
entrepreneur, for example, felt that 'that seems to be the model that we're following now, and 
I think that, at least for the present time, it seems to be delivering results' (EN13).  Elites' 
view of development as a sequential process in which countries evolved through a series of 
discrete, historically-contingent stages thus also manifested itself in their views on 
democratisation and political lesson-drawing. 
C.  The need for a single political party to preside over a lengthy nation-building project
The dynamics surrounding Ethiopia's nation-building project are highly complex, with many 
falling outside the purview of this work.  The issue is also highly contentious in Ethiopia due 
to its history.  Tewodros, Menelik and Haile-Selassie each undertook nation-building projects 
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50 This interviewee is now the Acting Prime Minister.
in the 'classic' European mould:  Amhara language and culture were accorded a dominant 
position, with other ethnicities brought into their purview and subdued through military force 
and the establishment of a national administration (Asafa 1998; Makki 2011: 272-280).  The 
EPRDF, dominated by minority Tigrayans, has positioned itself in opposition to this notion, 
and has, since coming to power, followed a programme of ethnic nationalism which posits 
full cultural and political rights for Ethiopia's ethnic groups, or 'nationalities' (Young 1996: 
100).  Whether or not these rights are accorded in practice, this notion of 'multi-nationalism 
as an expression of nationalism', as Aadland (2002: 21) calls it, is not generally seen as an 
important characteristic of most East Asian models, nor of modernisation theory.  This area, 
then, is an example where dynamics other than emulation play an important role in 
development discourse.  
	
 It is in the interplay between a dominant ruling party, economic development, and 
nation-building, however, that Ethiopia's emulation in this regard becomes clearer.  In the 
high-performing East Asian economies, developmentalism and economic growth provided 
the basis for the widespread mobilisation of citizens towards a common goal, in turn leading 
to further development.  Economic nationalism, based on a fear of being 'left behind' and the 
need to 'catch up' with developed countries, was often used to rally public opinion and to act 
as a 'binding agent for growth' (Woo-Cummings 2005: 116).  In a sense, then, state-guided 
modernisation was itself a central plank of nation-building efforts, and nation-building a 
deliberate government policy.  In states such as these, 'the state is viewed as representing the 
long-term interests of the whole nation, rather than short-term or particular interests, and 
goals are expressed in abstract terms such as 'industrialisation' and 
'modernisation'' (Beresford 2008: 226).  
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 To many authors, one-party dominance constituted one of the key means by which 
the stability needed to implement this nation-building and economic growth could be 
assured.  The importance of stability is mentioned with particular frequency in discussions of 
the Chinese Model (Zhang 2006; Ramo 2006: 23). Halper (2010: 151), for example, sees in 
Chinese society a 'delicate social bargain' that sees the ruling party granted political 
monopoly in return for the provision of stability and growth.  This political monopoly 
insulates policymakers from fractious political debates and allows for the implementation of 
long-term social and economic visions which might otherwise be overturned by regular 
elections.  'We do democracy', said one Ethiopian bureaucrat, 'but not anarchism' (EG15).
	
 Ethiopian ruling elites openly express a desire to emulate those countries where a 
single party has been able to conduct a nation-building project over the space of several 
decades.  They do emphasise that this party should remain in place through democratic 
means:  Meles (2006) writes that 'the so-called dominant party democracies can point to one 
way out' of underdevelopment, citing Japan and parts of Scandinavia as examples.  This 
longevity of the ruling party purportedly can transform a democratic state into a 
'developmental democratic state' by providing the necessary 'continuity and stability of 
policy' (Meles 2006).
	
 When this discourse is placed in the context of the EPRDF's broader desire to 
emulate Chinese, Taiwanese and South Korean growth—all of which occurred under the 
remit of one-party dominant systems—Meles' citing of Scandinavia seems more a rhetorical 
device aimed at assuaging fears than a sincere example of lesson-drawing.  Development, 
Democracy and Revolutionary Democracy (EPRDF 2006), designed to translate Meles' 
vision of Ethiopia as a developmental state to EPRDF cadres, makes copious mention of 
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South Korea, China and Taiwan, but none of any Scandinavian countries.  During my 
interview with him, the EPRDF's chief whip51  cited China's 'party discipline'—and 
particularly its use of schools to instruct junior party members in the party's approach to 
development—as the most important lesson Ethiopia could draw from the country (EG2). 
This was echoed by a representative from the Chinese embassy in Addis Ababa, who stated 
that the EPRDF and the CCP exchanged lessons on a 'party-to-party' level that was distinct 
from learning occurring through the formal machinery of the state: 'Both parties are playing 
a great role in their national development and economic building, and there are a lot of 
occasions the two parties are exchanging views on nation-building, on economic 
development, on how to push forward a national strategy' (EA1).   
	
 Most significantly, East Asian governments' ability to mobilise their populations for 
growth and modernisation were very frequently cited as lessons by Ethiopian leaders 
themselves.  One senior EPRDF member drew from China the lesson that 'if the leader of a 
country works strictly and mobilises people, the leader can make a difference' (EG4).  A 
member of the opposition agreed, although he felt the EPRDF had failed to implement this 
lesson: 'People who can really create a nation—we need that type of elite.  Any society needs 
that at one time or another...the Japanese, for example, the Meiji revolution. China, the 
Maoists' (EN1).
	
 These parallels in governance style between Ethiopia and certain East Asian countries 
are not new.  One of the clearest examples of Ethiopia’s emulation of Japan in the Haile-
Selassie era lies in the similarities between Ethiopia’s 1931 constitution and its Meiji 
counterpart of 42 years earlier.  The Ethiopian document retains, word for word, Japanese 
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51 He is now the country's Acting Prime Minister.  
qualifiers such as ‘within the limits provided for by the law’ or ‘except in cases provided for 
in the law’ in order to limit the expression of civil liberties provided for in other sections of 
the constitution (Clarke 2004).  
	
 Many features of Ethiopian authoritarianism are also underpinned by common 
historical and ideological ties to China.  The EPRDF inherited the TPLF's use of Maoist 
methods of mass rural mobilisation and democratic centralism (Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003: 
15).  The EPRDF still identifies as adhering to democratic centralism, a system whereby 
dissent internal to the party structure is transformed into 'consensus' through in camera 
discussion and persuasion.  'Once consensus is achieved, however, the community speaks 
with one voice, and dissent is ruled out – or rather does not “objectively”  emerge since 
decisions are not made until consensus is achieved' (Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003: 117).   The 
EPRDF's emphasis on consensus and national mobilisation, although partially borrowed 
from China, is thus not a new phenomenon.  It is in its use for the purposes of economic 
growth within a global capitalist system, however, that this lesson's particularities are more 
recent, and inspired by a wider range of East Asian exemplars.  
8.2.2  Political Emulation in Kenya  
Decision-makers in Kenya, a more democratic state than Ethiopia by virtually all 
international indexes, nonetheless demonstrated a desire to draw political lessons from 
countries such as Singapore and Malaysia.  It will be recalled, for example, that many 
emulating elites expressed an appreciation for a system of 'benevolent' or 'benign' 
dictatorship—at least until the country had begun to catch up with the world's more 
developed economies.  
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 However, once again this discourse alone does not accurately represent the form that 
lesson-drawing takes in this area of policy.  Just as Ethiopian elites' claims to borrow 
developmentalism without even soft authoritarianism conceal numerous tensions and subtle 
examples of political emulation, Kenyan planners' admiration for the Singaporean mode of 
governance should not be interpreted as heralding the implementation of an identical system 
in Kenya.
	
 There are several reasons for this.  Firstly, although Kenya's emulators expressed a 
desire to draw selectively from strong governments in East Asia, they revealed an almost 
universal distaste for one of the most authoritarian of these, namely China.  One senior 
political leader, for example, viewed Singapore's leadership as 'inspirational' but saw China's 
political model as both impossible and undesirable to emulate: 'I think it can only happen in 
China, because I think you cannot mobilise a people in the way China has unless you have 
the authoritarian command structure that China has had historically' (KG6).  According to 
another, 'in Singapore, it was not a completely autocratic leadership.  It was strong 
leadership' (KG9).  In making this distinction, Kenyan lesson-drawers echo the distinction 
between 'hard authoritarianism' and 'soft authoritarianism' drawn also by many observers of 
East Asian political systems.  According to these observers, East Asian economies such as 
Taiwan, South Korea and even Japan are softly authoritarian in that they are marked by 'an 
extremely strong and comparatively unsupervised state administration, single-party rule for 
more than three decades, and a set of economic priorities that seems unattainable under true 
political pluralism' (Johnson 1987: 131).  It is thus fitting that Malaysia and Singapore should 
both be regarded as archetypal modern 'soft authoritarian regimes' (Means 1998) and also 
constitute Kenya's primary sources of political lessons. 
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 It is also highly likely that certain Kenyan leaders long for more political restrictions 
precisely due to the relative openness of their own political system.  They therefore view 
selective emulation of Singapore and Malaysia as a means of counterbalancing what they 
perceive as increases in political freedoms and governmental guarantees that have 
outstripped increases in institutional and material resources.  This was seen as particularly 
true after the promulgation of Kenya's 2010 constitution.  One admirer of East Asian 
leadership, for example, criticised the new constitution for the financial costs that would 
come with decentralisation, as well as for pledging the fulfilment of certain positive human 
rights—to food, water, education and the like—that he felt the government might not be able 
to deliver:
I believe part of the reason that [the post election-violence] happened is because of a lot of 
freedom, too much democratic space, without adequate strong institutions to enforce it...So 
there were several times I felt I wish we were able to crawl back a little bit on the democratic 
space so that we are able to focus more on development (KN20).
Time and again, these elites referred to democracy as a 'genie' that could not be put back into 
the bottle (e.g. KG3).  Several expressed the wish that Kenya had taken advantage of its 
authoritarianism during the Moi regime in order to affect economic growth and efficient 
central planning, but most felt this opportunity to have passed.  Elites were thus less likely to 
advocate a return to authoritarianism or the repeal of democratic legislation than they were to 
express a desire for the government to push the legal limits of its power and to delay further 
political reforms.
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 A final limitation on political emulation on East Asia is the fact that this strand of 
thinking is only one of many in Kenyan policy debates.  Unlike in Ethiopia, where emulators 
comprise virtually the entire policy elite in a highly centralised context, Kenya's decision-
making process is more diffuse and pluralistic.  As detailed previously, Kenya's 
parliamentarians and civil society representatives were more likely to draw lessons from 
outside East Asia—or to look to no model at all—than were the county's planners.  They 
were also less likely to view an increase in political restrictions as beneficial for Kenya's 
economic development.  Given the vigorous and spirited national debate that existed, for 
example, before the adoption of the 2010 national constitution, it is likely that any lessons 
Kenyan elites draw from soft authoritarian regimes are likely to undergo processes of 
dilution and contestation.  This precludes the close emulation of Singaporean-style 
restrictions (even were planners eager to effect wholesale imitation of these features).  These 
caveats explain the divide between Kenyan planners' comparative enthusiasm for political 
learning from East Asia and the relative political openness that exists in the country.  
	
 As with Ethiopia, however, certain aspects of East Asian political systems were 
sufficiently prominent in elites' discourses as to constitute significant lessons.  Although 
Kenyan lesson-drawers did not propose the legal or even practical imposition of 
authoritarianism, they did draw from their observation of East Asian models a 
conceptualisation of development as primarily a top-down process requiring the mobilisation 
of the country's citizens by a modernising and visionary leadership.  In this process, Kenyans 
are 'soldiers in the army of development' (Bett 2010), and the quality of their leaders the key 
variable standing between developmental success and failure.
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 This emphasis on leadership cuts across sectoral lines:  Kenya's poor record of 
governance is a national obsession.  The average Kenyan interviewee mentioned the term 
'leadership' 4.7 times, despite the term not occurring in the standard interview questions.52 
Whereas virtually every emulator felt that Kenyan and East Asian development had diverged 
primarily due to the former's corrupt, inefficient and self-interested political leaders, East 
Asia's leadership was seen, in contrast, to embody three interrelated features. First, it was 
held to be visionary, and able to enact policies that stretched beyond the current electoral 
cycle.  It is for this reason that so many elites pointed to Singapore and Malaysia as direct 
models for NESC and Vision 2030, the most long-term-oriented development plan in Kenya's 
post-colonial history.  According to one planner, therefore, 'the key thing was to actually call 
it 'Vision Something'—that's very Asian.  To set it far into the future...If you look at the 
programmes in [East Asia], there has always been 'Vision this' and 'Vision that', but in other 
countries it is simply called a strategy (KN5).  
	
 Secondly, this leadership was forceful when necessary, knowing when to put an end 
to excessive public consultations if these threatened other developmental objectives.  To 
domestic critics of this emulation, the East Asian model provides the private sector-allied 
Kibaki administration with a self-serving justification for cracking down on those engaged in 
labour disputes and strikes.  To emulators, themselves, however, the intricate and lengthy 
consultation and conflict-resolution measures demanded by local civil society and western 
donors were seen as a barrier to the sustained yet rapid modernisation that 'catching up' 
demanded.  One interviewee expressed it thusly:
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52 In contrast, Ethiopian interviewees mentioned the term less than once on average.  
The leaders are responsible at the end of the day to deliver the country to where it's supposed 
to go.  I think that responsibility has to be there...People are beginning to realise acutely that 
we are spending a lot of our energy and time in developing countries arguing about policies, 
and it can take forever...It's going to be endless.  You need a cut-off point where you say 'in 
this context, this is right and we are going to take it from this period.'…You can't review it on 
a daily basis, and that is what is hurting our countries (KN7).
The perception of economic development and nation-building as at least somewhat 
incompatible with political liberalisation was most prevalent among Kenyan elites who 
chose East Asian countries as development models.  These elites emphasised the legitimising 
role that sound management of the economy and the creation of a functioning state 
infrastructure would have on governments that temporarily held back further democratisation 
(KN15) and accused civil society organisations of an inordinate focus on citizens' rights over 
their responsibilities (KG15).  They were also more likely to prioritise stability and national 
unity over pluralism; Anyang Nyongo (2005), for example, feels that 'it is very difficult to 
pursue political democracy and economic reforms at the same time' due to the 'compensation 
culture' that accompanies the former.  Attributing Singapore and Malaysia's success to 
leaders who were able to foster such qualities, one business leader bemoaned Kenya's lack of 
a similarly strong government:
Here our leadership says 'do what you want'.  You need someone who is not really a dictator, 
but if he tells you 'do this', you have to do it.  But you see now, if he tells you 'do this' and 
you say 'nah', then you do it only if you feel like it...[If] everybody is mobilised to put their 
efforts towards [Vision 2030], we will achieve it.' (KN8). 
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The final perceived facet of Singapore and Malaysia's leadership deserves special focus for 
its salience both to the East Asian Model and to the position that modernisation theory 
accorded to national elites.  A third lesson drawn by certain Kenyan lesson-drawers was the 
importance of leaders who were technocratic—who were thus both technically 
knowledgeable and able to isolate themselves from political and societal pressures.53  One 
example was the decision-maker who cited the growing importance of knowledge, GDP 
growth and investment in number of successful economies—among them Malaysia, 
Singapore and Taiwan—as evidence that 'if you look into the future, maybe...the state will be 
an organ not for managing people, but for managing things' (KG3).  Troublesome political 
forces were seen as stemming not only from below, but also sometimes from above, at the 
level of elected representatives.  Another interviewee attributed the economic growth of East 
Asia, and later of the Kibaki regime, to the position each had accorded to technocrats:
Political leadership is the one that gives leadership in all other spheres...It can provide a basis 
for the take-off.  In Korea, we had Park Chung-Hee, the benevolent dictator.  He set the path 
for growth in Korea.  We had Mahathir in Malaysia, we had Lee in Singapore.  So political 
leadership sets the target for the population to follow, allows growth.  That is what has 
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53  Collier (1980: 403) has influentially defined technocrats as 'individuals with a high level of specialized 
academic training which serves as a principal criterion on the basis of which they are selected to occupy key 
decision-making or advisory roles in large, complex organisations—both public and private'.  This is the 
definition that will be used here, with one minor modification.  A minority of elected (rather than appointed) 
politicians in ministerial positions are sufficiently trained and involved in technical planning to warrant their 
inclusion in the category.  In Kenya, these 'technopoliticians',  to use a term coined by Silva (2008: 8),  have 
advanced degrees, have spent time in the civil service or academia and apply their technical expertise to the 
formulation of government policy; they can thus be included in this group.
happened in the Kibaki regime.  Technocrats have been given free space to excel and do 
basically plan without much interference, and therefore you find now that gives room for 
growth, rather than being directed and being told what to do (KG14).
The influence of this line of thinking was most clearly visible in the existence and envisioned 
roles of Vision 2030 and NESC.  According to the Secretary of NESC, Vision 2030 was 
specifically conceived as a national project able to transcend the politics of the 'government 
of the day' (Muia 2007).  By establishing an exclusive advisory council of business and 
governmental experts and a written plan with a time-frame spanning a generation, elites hope 
to keep developmental decisions separate from Kenya's fractious political climate and from 
the composition of parliament at any one time.  The fact that all foreign experts on NESC 
originated from East Asia at the time of writing is thus particularly pertinent.  The mid-term 
review of the ERS formally announced the incipient Vision 2030 in the following way:  
To function with the effectiveness of the kind we have observed in East Asia, national visions 
and strategic plans need the full backing from the country’s political leadership, including the 
willingness to intervene whenever the implementation machinery gets bogged down in 
disagreements, detail, or bureaucratic inertia (Kenya 2007: 32).    
To critics of the government's vision, this technocratic distancing that emulators desire is 
precisely the central flaw at the heart of NESC and Vision 2030.  Accusations that ordinary 
Kenyans lacked ownership or knowledge of these 'elitist' initiatives—that Vision 2030 
'dwells on the macro and forgets...the micro' (KN13)—were more frequently voiced than 
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charges that the leaders of these institutions were corrupt or self-interested (the most frequent 
accusation levelled at elected politicians).  
	
 For many technocrats themselves, on the other hand, Kenya's approach still stops 
short of that implemented by many of East Asia's high-performing economies.  China’s 
growth is frequently ascribed, in the literature, to the fact that its economic planners are not 
elected and have, for a time at least, been ‘given a mandate insulated from political 
thinking’ (Moss quoted in Polgreen 2006).  Another solution is less dependent on the 
political system of the country in question:  the role that Japan's Ministry of Trade and 
Industry took in driving economic growth from its establishment in 1949 until the early 
1980s, for example, has assumed almost mythic proportions in the literature on the 
developmental state.  To Johnson (1982: 319), an elite agency that coordinated all aspects of 
industrial policy and macroeconomic planning was the most important ingredient of Japan's 
post-war development.  Japan's neighbours consciously emulated this development, setting 
up their own influential 'super-agencies': South Korea and Singapore both established 
Economic Planning Boards in 1961, Malaysia's Economic Planning Unit was born in the 
very same year, and Taiwan's Economic Planning Council came into existence in 1973.  In 
each case, planning and implementation were concentrated in a single agency whose powers 
extended to areas as seemingly disparate as export promotion, technical training and the 
formulation of financial policy.  
	
 By separating NESC from the Vision 2030 Delivery Secretariat, however, Kenya has 
taken a different, less cohesive approach; the former body is convened afresh each year, 
while the latter organisation is tasked primarily with project management rather than policy 
coordination.  Several elites therefore called for even greater emulation on this front. 
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According to one economic advisor, for instance, 'I would go for an institution which you 
find in Malaysia, and even Singapore, where they have a planning unit that is very strong, 
has a lot of capacity and is chaired by the top political leadership, that is able to say 'this is 
how you prioritise things' (KN20).
	
 The exact form that 'technocratic insulation' took in East Asia differed from country 
to country and from one developmental era to the next.  In the South Korea of the 1950s and 
1960s, for example, Park's government viewed it as essential that technocrats remained 
impervious to—and therefore in control of—business interests (Silva 2000).  In Japan, by 
contrast, the relationship was less hierarchical, and government-business partnerships 
encouraged to a greater extent (Kuznets 1988: S33-S44).  Most notable, given Kenya's 
interest in emulation of Malaysia, is the extent to which bureaucratic and business interests 
have solidified into entrenched, mutually-dependent coalitions in the latter country (Beeson 
2000: 341).  This diversity of approaches means that some observers of East Asia place an 
emphasis on insulation from business interests (Silva 2000: 57), others view insulation from 
rent-seeking politicians as key (Dent 2004: 81), while yet others emphasise independence of 
action vis a vis societal pressure groups (World Bank 1993: 167).  
	
 In Kenya, in keeping with the Malaysian approach, the latter two are most frequently 
taken as lessons.  The emphasis placed on 'public-private partnerships', and the key role 
played by business elites in the formulation of Vision 2030—a feature that interviewees from 
all sectors agreed was present in Kenya—suggests a non-hierarchical relationship between 
the private and public sectors.  The need for the bureaucratic capacity to push through a long-
term agenda without societal, legislative or even judicial interference was, however, keenly 
felt by planners looking to emulate East Asia:
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If you look at the way in which Singapore, for example, approached this issue, from the days 
of Lee Kuan Yew until now, there are lessons to be learned there.  One, if you are going to 
leapfrog from underdevelopment into development, you really must have a very clean, 
efficient, focused state bureaucracy.  Well-trained and focused and organised.  Result-
oriented (KG4).  
I think the Asian tigers have got something to teach anybody, because places like Singapore 
and others took very very visionary leadership...You need a strong man or woman at the helm 
with the right vision, and they just push it through.  There will be a lot of hurt, there will be 
some damage, there will be some sections of society which will be very unhappy but the end, 
in this case, justifies it (KN15).   
To a certain extent, the fact that planners were most likely to draw these lessons is not 
unexpected; most elites involved in Vision 2030 are, after all, technocrats who could 
reasonably be expected to desire an increase in their own influence.  While such actors may 
long have believed in the need for an expansion of their role, it is still nonetheless significant 
that East Asian exemplars now inspire them to verbalise and more openly pursue this goal. 
In addition, non-technocratic elites in business, politics and even civil society were also more 
likely to draw this as a lesson if they were already admirers of East Asia.  According to one 
business leader, for example, 'the countries of the East...could be very good models for 
Kenya'.  India, according to this interviewee, was not suitable because 'there are a lot of 
politics there, and we feel we have enough of our own politics' (KN6).  Finally, many lessons 
that technocrats drew from East Asia—the choice to emphasise collaboration with business 
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rather than with parliament, for example—were more complex than a desire to simply 
increase their scope of action.
	
 The fact that technocrats are the group most likely to draw lessons from countries 
such as Singapore and Malaysia is, in itself, an interesting finding in light of the position that 
technocrats occupied in East Asian developmental states.  This suggests that the degree to 
which the country as a whole is able to emulate East Asia is likely to correspond with the 
degree of influence and insulation that bureaucrats in Kenya are able to carve out for 
themselves.  If this particular lesson were drawn and Kenya were to become, like Japan, a 
country where 'the politicians reign and the bureaucrats rule' (Johnson 1999: 50), the 
likelihood of other aspects of emulation taking shape would also increase.
8.3  Elite Learning and Modernisation
This chapter has shown that lesson-drawing in both Ethiopia and Kenya prompts leaders not 
only to adjust their policy priorities, but that it also reaches as deeply as the 
conceptualisations they have of their own functions and powers.  On the question of the 
state's role in the economy, the influence of the East Asian model is clearly visible in both 
cases.  This is particularly true in Ethiopia, where ruling elites view emulation of East Asia's 
'developmental states' as a means to negotiate and steer recent processes of economic 
liberalisation.  In Kenya, a somewhat gentler form of state intervention, centring around 
long-term bureaucratic planning and close partnerships with private sector interests, is 
envisioned by those who wish to draw lessons from East Asia.  In both countries, however, 
elites desire a significantly greater economic role for the state than that mandated by the 
Washington Consensus, whilst retaining an essentially capitalist and free-market orientation. 
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 It is more difficult to come to a clear conclusion regarding one of the central 
questions found in debates on the Chinese and East Asian development models, namely 
whether these models are (re)popularising authoritarianism.  The EPRDF's insistence that it 
draws no direct lessons from East Asian political systems and Kenyan planners' claims that 
they wish for a Singaporean-style 'benevolent dictatorship' are at odds with the political 
situations in both case studies.  Despite such difficulties, it is possible to discern several more 
limited examples of lesson-drawing in this regard.  These include a reliance on economic 
growth as a major source of economic legitimacy, the perceived need for long-term single-
party dominance and a heightened role for unelected technocrats; they also  encompass a 
desire for strong, forceful leadership that places nation-building above the rights of 
individuals or specific societal interest groups.
	
 These lessons correspond with much of the literature on East Asian development 
models, illustrating both the divergences and common threads in the development 
trajectories of countries as diverse as Singapore, China, Malaysia and South Korea.  As this 
final section argues, however, even this use of an East Asian Model is nested inside a broader 
paradigm of modernisation.  Even as old development paradigms appear to be giving way to 
new paradigms inspired by East Asia, these in fact correspond more closely to the views of 
Tom Mboya and Haile-Selassie than Lee Kuan Yew.  
8.3.1  East Asian Models as Route, Modernisation as Destination
Given the overlap between the lessons that Ethiopian and Kenyan lesson-drawers take 
regarding the developmental role of the state and between the literature on the East Asian 
Model, it would seem that this model constitutes the backbone of any paradigm shifts 
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occurring in these countries.  My research has demonstrated that the example of East Asia is 
indeed greatly responsible for moving Ethiopia and Kenya away from the Washington 
Consensus-era understanding of the functions and form of the state.  This move, however, 
has also taken elites beyond the geographically-specific example they cite, and allowed for a 
return to a broader paradigm with domestic precedents.  This paradigm is modernisation 
theory.  
	
 To begin with, virtually all of the lessons cited in this chapter correspond to the 
assumptions of the early development theorists and the policymakers they inspired. The 
universalisation and 'naturalisation' of the nation-state in the 1950s (Berger 2003: 422) 
presented those concerned with development with a dilemma: as legal-administrative 
boundaries did not, in fact, correspond with socio-cultural boundaries in most newly-
independent former colonies, nation-states would need to be built.  This process required the 
incorporation of the majority of the target population into a wide-ranging process of national 
development, but was best led by a modernising, technocratic bureaucracy which could 
guide the population past any initial stages of dislocation caused by the breakdown of 
traditional structures. 	
      
	
 This view became particularly prevalent in the 1960s, when the 'political 
modernisation' and 'politics of order' approaches began to place a greater emphasis on order 
and stability than had earlier strains of modernisation theory.  To one author, political leaders 
could 'increase their effectiveness by openly and vigorously committing themselves to 
utopian and xenophobic nationalism' (Smelser 1963: 114).  As early as 1963, even Rostow's 
more organic approach had also given way to a belief, in the case of South Vietnam, that 'one 
must create at forced-draft the bone structure of a modern nation' (Rostow quoted in Gilman 
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2007: 155).  Geertz called for an 'integrative revolution' whereby primordial loyalties could 
be subsumed into a national consciousness (quoted in Berger 2003: 98) and MacDougall 
(1976: 1168) praised Suharto’s ‘technocratic model of modernization’ as a ‘highly functional 
strategy of government’ which he felt ‘recommended itself to like-minded and organized 
elites confronting similar crises’.
	
 Even accounts focusing more on the economic than political aspects of modernisation 
advocated a strong state that played a crucial guiding role in capitalist development, 
appearing as they did within the context of the Bretton Woods financial system that 
prevented capital from crossing frontiers without governmental approval and allowed 
governments to set exchange rates, influence commodity prices and to undertake a host of 
other macro-economic initiatives. As Leys (2005: 110) phrases it, in post-war development 
theory 'the agent of development was the state', with theorists predominantly concerned with 
'the best way for colonial, and then ex-colonial states, to accelerate national economic 
growth'.  Democracy was held to be inseparable from development, but this democracy was 
often Schumpeterian and minimalist in nature, and was viewed as developing in tandem with 
economic growth rather than acting as a precondition.  Pointing to the facts that few 
consolidated democracies existed in Western Europe at the height of modernisation theory 
and that Parsons viewed the Soviet Union and the United States as equally modernised by 
the second half of the 20th century, Schmidt (2011: 308-312) therefore argues that 
modernisation theory did not view democracy as an essential prerequisite of political 
modernity.  Even theorists who did view democracy as inseparable from modernisation 
tended to view it as contingent on a range of economic or cultural preconditions such as 
economic growth (Lipset 1960), the evolution of a 'civic culture' (Almond and Verba 1963), 
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the creation of 'modern' personalities (Lerner 1964; Inkeles and Smith 1974; Parsons 1991 
[1951]).
	
 In short, differences between the 'politics of order' and early modernisation theories 
did exist, but these were overshadowed by similarities.  According to Berger (2003: 426), 'far 
more significant was the shift by the 1950s from overtly racially-based ideas about a 
civilising mission in the colonies to much more comprehensive ideas about government-
mediated national development and an emphasis on the importance of the nation-state as the 
main object of nation-building and stability'.  The various strands of modernisation theory 
that emerged from this shift may have differed in certain areas, but all felt the 'need for a 
“modernizing elite”, willing and institutionally able, albeit through “strong government”, to 
shake sleepy, ascriptive, non-rational Third World societies into the period of economic 
“take-off”  and beyond' (Harrison 1988: 32).  Latham (2003: 729) echoes this observation, 
pointing out that modernisation theory allowed the American state to mediate and control a 
world in flux by equating authority with stability—hence the close overlap between the 
American academic and policy worlds of the era, as well as the United States’ support of the 
South Vietnamese regime.  
	
 As we have seen in previous chapters, this paradigm was not limited to American 
theorists and policymakers, but also found adherents in numerous developing countries.  It 
was a view held by local modernisers in both newly-independent Ethiopia and Kenya, where 
both the regimes of Haile-Selassie and Tom Mboya sought to use the power of the state and 
its bureaucracy to undertake ambitious infrastructural projects and long-term economic 
plans.  
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 Not only do many of the assumptions of modernisation theory and the literature on 
the East Asian Model coincide, many of my interviewees, particularly in Ethiopia, were 
themselves highly cognisant of the overlap between the West's historical trajectory and their 
vision of East Asia's more recent development.  Decision-makers who cited East Asia as a 
model also explicitly included 'the early days of the West' (EG20), 19th century Germany 
(EG15) and even 'certain elements' of the 'colonial past' (KN15) as potential exemplars.  The 
EPRDF's private use of the example of Germany under Bismarck has been discussed in an 
earlier chapter, and illustrates the linkages that many emulators make between early and later 
waves of modernisers.  
	
 This linkage is further evident in the frustration that interviewees expressed both 
when accusing donor conditionalities of historical short-sightedness and when dismissing 
Western fears of usurpation by a Chinese or East Asian model.  In each case, elites tended to 
minimise the differences between European and Asian development, and argued that each 
was underpinned by a culturally-specific but essentially similar path to modernisation:
The West always tends to pretend that it was never involved in the economy.  But at the 
lower level of development, the state was also heavily involved in the economy.  So perhaps 
we're not necessarily talking about two different models...There are a few eternal truths that 
hold for humanity in general (EN13).  
An additional important indication that emulation of East Asia drives elites to a broader 
development paradigm rather than towards a specifically East Asian Model lies in the 
selective and heterogeneous nature of lesson-drawers' emulation of the region.  Kenya and 
Ethiopia prefer very different models within East Asia; the former's choice of Malaysia and 
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Singapore correspond to its desire for modernisation in which the bureaucracy and business 
sectors work together intimately, whereas the latter's use of China and South Korea 
correspond with its desire for modernisation that is overwhelmingly by the state.  The 
literature on the East Asian model has, to a certain extent, acknowledged the differences in 
the development trajectories of various East Asian countries; a particularly common 
distinction is made between 'first-tier' economies (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore) versus second and 'second-tier' economies such as Malaysia and Thailand 
(Sundaram and Chen 1997).  The World Bank itself distinguished between Northeast Asian 
and Southeast Asian development models and recommended that other developing countries 
adopt the latter over the former (World Bank 1993).  However, these regional differences 
have been used more often to dismantle the notion of a single East Asian Model than to 
construct a paradigm of development broad enough to encompass the examples of these 
diverse countries.  In an article entitled 'There are at Least Three Models of East Asian 
Development', for example, Perkins (1994) critiques the notion that the experiences of 
economically laissez-faire Singapore and Hong Kong can be grouped with those of 
interventionist countries such as South Korea or those of their resource-rich countries further 
to the South.  
	
 Other factors make the East Asian Model an imperfect fit with the elite emulation 
documented in this study.  While many of the lessons cited by Ethiopian and Kenyan elites—
particularly in this chapter—have parallels in writings on the East Asian Model, the reverse 
is not always true.  Despite the continued debate surrounding the relative importance of 
selective state intervention vis a vis outward-oriented, export-led and manufacturing-heavy 
economic policies in accounting for East Asian growth, much of the literature on the subject 
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views both elements as important to any ‘East Asian Model’ that may be said to exist (e.g. 
Kuznets 1988: S17-S19; Bradford 1994: 9-11).  The subjects of my research generally 
admired East Asia’s use of FDI to build an export-oriented manufacturing base, but also very 
often felt the need to diverge temporarily from one or even several of these.  Kenyan 
modernisers, for example, were as likely to focus on growing the services sector as on the 
manufacturing sector, and at the time of writing Ethiopia exhibits little willingness to 
liberalise its economy to the extent that SEZs would be economically viable.  Because the 
East Asian Model is so often theorised in economic terms, it has been less able to explain 
political and especially socio-cultural learning.  It is for this reason that the lessons outlined 
in the previous chapter—lessons such as technological optimism, developmental 
monumentalism, cultural 'modernisation' and development as staged and endogenous growth
—find less resonance with this theory than with modernisation theory.  
	
 In short, where the intricacies of the various East Asian models are emphasised, it 
becomes clear that Ethiopian and Kenyan elites are following several models rather than a 
single model.  Conversely, where the similarities between these countries are subsumed into 
a single East Asian Model of 'export-led growth guided by firm governmental policies' (Pye 
1988: 82), this model does not express the range of lessons Ethiopian and Kenyan elites wish 
to learn from the region.  
	
 It will be recalled that models constitute mental constructs rooted in specific real-
world examples but abstracted for the purposes of emulation, whereas paradigms refer to the 
entirety of beliefs that constitute an individual’s worldview on a particular issue.  In the case 
of Ethiopia and Kenya, powerful elites have certainly chosen to emulate certain important 
East Asian models—particularly those of China, South Korea, Malaysia and Singapore.  This 
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lesson-drawing has a deeper impact on the way they view development, and the resulting 
development paradigm is not specific to East Asia.  As Wong (2004: 348) points out, 'the 
core idea of the developmental state—that strategic state intervention into the market can 
facilitate industrial transformation and economic growth more generally—was in fact 
nothing especially new or distinctly Asian.'  Modernisation theory also privileges the role of 
governments and their technocrats in the management of national economies, but situates 
this within a philosophy of development that is both older and more fundamental than the 
East Asian model and that has domestic precedents in both Ethiopia and Kenya.  
8.3.2  Direct Views on Modernisation:  A Method of Triangulation
In case any doubt remains as to the desire of Kenyan and Ethiopian emulators to modernise 
their countries, an analysis of their views on the concept of modernisation itself proves 
illuminating.  Interviewees were asked to describe what the term  'modernisation' meant to 
them, whether they viewed it in a positive or negative light, and whether they felt it was 
occurring in their own national contexts.  In both country cases, those who viewed 
modernisation as a broad phenomenon comprising economic, social, political and 
technological changes outnumbered those with a narrower, more technical definition of 
modernisation by almost four to one.  Often, interviewees either equated modernisation with 
development, or felt the two to be tightly linked.  Examples of such broad, holistic 
conceptualisations of modernisation included the following:
Modernisation for me is dealing with the industrial culture, which has been going on for a 
long time but intensified in Western Europe in the last 500 years, and adapting to it (EG25).
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It's a strange thing – Kenya is very, very interested in modernising.  It's how we go about it—
it's piecemeal, it's haphazard, it's not systematic, it's not holistic...You don't modernise 
piecemeal (KN15).
It's not possible for any country to develop without modernisation.  Modernisation, as I have 
given it to you at the beginning, is all this dynamic development within values and economic 
development and science and agriculture, in everything...it's something that no country can 
do without' (KG1).
In contrast, those who viewed modernisation in a more limited sense, either as 'using the 
latest technology to achieve efficiency and effectiveness' (KG15) or as a theoretical term 
belonging to a specific school of thought (KN12), were both relatively rare.  This indicates 
that interviewees in both countries broadly viewed modernisation as a suitable descriptor for 
large, interconnected changes in a society's political, economic, cultural and technological 
circumstances—changes that move a society from a 'traditional' to a new way of life.  Most 
elites viewed technological progress as central to the definition of modernisation, but linked 
this to improved material well-being, cultural transformation, institutional development and 
structural transformation.
	
 This stands in sharp contrast to the ways in which the term is generally used in 
contemporary scholarship and in donor discourse.  In the former, modernisation is either 
heavily historicised and particularised (Gilman 2007; Engerman et al 2006) or used to 
signify the application of cutting-edge technologies and organisational modes to particular 
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institutions such as armed forces or bureaucracies.  It is today hardly used by traditional 
donors.
	
 Interviewees tended to view modernisation as a broad, interconnected process 
regardless of whether they attached a positive or negative normative value to this process and 
regardless of their views on emulation.  There was, however, a clear link between emulation 
of East Asia and the view of modernisation as generally positive.  Followers of East Asian 
models other than China were 3.5 times as likely to view modernisation as positive than they 
were to view it as either having a mixed or negative impact, while this gap was even larger 
for followers of China specifically.  Those unwilling to isolate a particular country or region 
as a model, on the other hand, were 2.7 times as likely to view modernisation as positive than 
they were to have ambivalent or negative views, while those who viewed European or 
African countries as models were actually far less likely to see it as positive than as neutral 
or negative.  In other words, there was a strong correlation between lesson-drawing from 
East Asia and a desire for modernisation within elites' own countries.  
	
 This correlation does not necessarily prove causality—those who view modernisation 
as an important goal might well seek to draw lessons from those countries they see as having 
achieved this goal within a short period of time and under similar constraints.  However, 
these findings do demonstrate the important linkages between emulation of East Asia and the 
return of modernisation to African development discourses, whichever way the causality 
runs.  They therefore illustrate the fact that modernising elites use the examples of South 
Korea, China, Malaysia and Singapore to bring about and justify domestic reforms and 
projects.
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 A significant portion of those who viewed modernisation in positive terms sought to 
redefine and reclaim the concept, simultaneously distancing themselves from the ‘Western 
domination’ they felt the term had implied in the past and affirming their adherence to ‘true’ 
modernisation.  This was particularly true in Kenya, a country whose leaders were more in 
synch with shifting global discourses on development since the 1950s and thus more likely to 
remember the widespread criticism that the term was subject to in subsequent decades. As 
one respondent put it, ‘historically…when I was growing up, a lot of times when the word 
modern was used it actually meant Western, and frankly it meant European’ (KN17).  Elites 
therefore objected to the way they felt the term 'modernisation' had sometimes been used, in 
its heyday, as a pretext for foreign interference and the continuation of colonial relations. 
The tools and outcomes of the process remained important, but now had to be enacted solely 
by domestic actors if modernisation was to regain its utility.  
	
 Earlier chapters identified a group of elites in each country case that were more likely 
to draw broad development lessons from other national contexts.  In Ethiopia, this group 
largely belonged to the ruling EPRDF; in Kenya, on the other hand, these comprised a 
coalition of business leaders and government planners clustered around the government's 
chief planning institutions.  In both cases, these elites wished to draw lessons primarily from 
East Asia, although the former group preferred government-led economies such as South 
Korea and China and the latter the somewhat more economically liberal countries of 
Malaysia and Singapore.  Finally, the dissertation argued, these processes of emulation 
herald the return of many of the assumptions of post-war modernisation theory.
	
 Given these findings, it is not surprising that definitions of modernisation were also 
split clearly along these lines in both countries studied.  In Kenya, those closely involved 
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with Vision 2030 and NESC were over three times more likely to view modernisation as a 
necessary and positive development than were other political and non-governmental actors. 
The gap was slightly narrower in Ethiopia, but EPRDF members were still over twice as 
likely to attach a positive connotation to modernisation than were non-EPRDF members.  
	
 These findings were mirrored in the extent to which elites felt their countries to be 
modernising.  EPRDF and Vision 2030 respondents were more likely to view modernisation 
as a process currently occurring in their own countries.  Similarly, those viewing East Asia 
and China as models were far more likely to view their countries as modernising than those 
who wished to draw lessons from countries in other regions.  This is not surprising, given the 
fact that these elites are responsible for implementing long-term development plans in their 
countries; in effect, these interviewees were claiming that such plans were proving successful 
and bringing about visible transformation on a national scale.  It is significant, however, that 
emulating elites wished to associate themselves with the term 'modernisation', thereby 
claiming it for themselves and their institutions.
	
 To all groups of elites, the extent to which modernisation must necessarily be equated 
with Westernisation was a central point of concern.  The concept, far from being divorced 
from its putative origins, was still narrowly bound up with concerns over imperialism, 
globalisation and the replacement of tradition with Western values.  However, the key 
difference between those with a positive view of modernisation and those who viewed it as 
detrimental to society centred on the ability of elites to 'de-Westernise' the concept, thereby 
rendering it both more universal and more locally-specific.  On the one hand, thus, those who 
rejected the concept often viewed it as irredeemably alien:
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We're a poor country, people have tough lives here, but we make their lives better.  That's 
much more important for me than any kind of definition of modernisation.  And in that sense, 
part of what's usually implied by saying modernisation is adapting Western things.  And I 
don't necessarily think that is the solution (EN13).  
There's a cultural dynamic to it, and a racial dynamic to it, because of the kind of relationship 
we African people have to the West in terms of our colonial encounter....It is not relating to 
people as humans, and the whole notion of empowerment...Museveni has this awful language 
where he refers to Uganda as being backwards, and the African people as backwards.  I really 
can't stand it (KN17).
On the other hand, those who wished to modernise their countries tended to argue that this 
process was both unavoidable and universal.  In Ethiopia, modernisation was linked to 
globalisation, and assimilating the country into a broader global system after years of 
feudalism and 'backwardness':
Modernisation is good – we have to be modern because we live in a globalised world and we 
have to compete.  Modernisation is interconnected with development.  We become 
modernised through development (EG21).
In Kenya, too, modernisation was most often seen as essential to 'catching up' with other 
modern and 'advanced' countries:
To me, modernisation is sustaining a country's level of development at the same level to 
where the whole world is going to.  For example, when we talk about achieving what the 
global direction is...and what the whole world is focusing on (EG21).  
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In both cases, emulating elites spoke of re-interpreting modernisation in such a way as to 
divest it of its Western origins and the unequal power relations that were seen to stem from 
its erstwhile imposition; at the same time, modernisation was seen as encompassing certain 
'core', universal elements that were perhaps first witnessed in the West but were now 
appearing in East Asia and globally:
Modernisation for me is not, you know, the equivalent to what we call Western culture - 
dressing like Western people, speaking English, French and other Western languages.  You 
know, for me, it's not equal to accepting Western culture.  It's about development, it's about 
empowering people, people leading a decent life (EG13).  
Europe before the industrial revolution and the age of enlightenment is very different from 
Europe, post-industrial revolution.  Africa never went through that, so that if you walk in 
Africa, if you go to Pokot, there are fellows who when you talk about things which we take 
for granted, they have no idea.  Their society has meant that cattle-rustling is a traditional 
thing, and they do it as they have done it since before the birth of Christ...I know that that is 
what you want to deal with if you are to move this country forward (KG17).
  
In conducting this research, I did not expect emulating elites to adhere to a unified, strict 
definition of the term 'modernisation', nor for their conceptualisation to be consciously 
informed by the literature on the subject.  Both of these expectations were borne out: other 
than a common emphasis on the term's roots in the West and on the use of technology and 
increased productivity to ameliorate the human condition, elites defined the term in a variety 
of ways.  When asked directly, the majority of elites felt development to be impossible—or 
at least very difficult—without rapid economic growth, industrialisation and massive 
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investment in infrastructure: 'Economic growth is the basis of development', said one, for 
example; 'how can a country develop without rapid economic growth?' (KG13). 
Furthermore, these trends were once again particularly pronounced for those elites who 
wished to emulate East Asia.  
	
 Although this is a further direct indicator of the importance of key components of 
modernisation theory for Ethiopian and Kenyan elites, the intention was not, here, to base 
my conclusions about elites' policy preferences on their direct assessments of different 
developmental theories.  The specific lessons that elites wish to draw from their exemplars 
still provide the primary evidence that emulation of East Asia is turning Ethiopian and 
Kenyan elites towards many of the assumptions of post-war development theory, as 
emulating elites could well reject the label of modernisation but retain its content.  The fact 
that they embrace both the concept and its tenets serves primarily, thus, to 'triangulate' and 
add robustness to the findings presented elsewhere.  It helps to demonstrate the powerful 
impact that the concept of modernisation, despite its widespread vilification in the 1970s and 
seeming obsolescence in the decades that followed, continues to have on the thinking of 
policy elites.  These decision-makers—particularly those who look to East Asia for 
developmental lessons—view the concept as having relevance to virtually all spheres of 
policy and to currently bringing about largely positive societal outcomes.  
8.4  Conclusion
Central to elite lesson-drawing in both Kenya and Ethiopia lies a vision not only of the key 
policy priorities that ensure development—wealth creation, physical infrastructure and the 
like—but also of the role that these emulating elites themselves play in the process.  In 
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focusing on the latter aspect, this chapter has found that both groups of elites view the need 
for strong and modernising leadership by the state and its representatives as one of the key 
lessons to be drawn from East Asia's success.  In Ethiopia, this combines with the country's 
history of centralising governments to manifest itself in a desire for a 'developmental state' 
that intervenes directly in the economy and allows for a level of gradual liberalisation that 
bridges Ethiopia’s current situation and the 'ideal' presented to it by Western donors. 
Whereas this leads Ethiopia to choose interventionist models such as Park-era South Korea 
and present-day China, Kenya’s lesson-drawers look to countries, such as Malaysia and 
Singapore, where leaders have harnessed business-friendly approaches in the service of 
overarching nationalist and ‘developmentalist’ objectives.
	
 This discussion extends beyond the question of state intervention in the economy, 
however.  Despite elites’ not-uncommon assertions that East Asia’s economic and political 
models can be separated, a range of closely-related political strategies and orientations have 
emerged as lessons.  In authoritarian Ethiopia, where elites were reluctant to admit to 
emulating the repressive political systems of their economic exemplars, EPRDF 
representatives nonetheless view democratisation as a process by which a national civic 
identity is gradually inculcated by processes of modernisation and through the efforts of an 
educated elite.  The desire for a strong ruling party that can preside over this process for 
several decades and whose legitimacy rests first and foremost on increases in material well-
being are other areas in which East Asia was used as a key reference point.
	
 Kenyan leaders, in contrast, explicitly drew from East Asia’s ‘benevolent 
dictatorships’, which they viewed as sufficiently forceful, visionary and insulated to push a 
fractious and sometimes reluctant population to modernise.  This perspective was 
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particularly prevalent among Kenya's technocrats, who admired their Malaysian and 
Singaporean counterparts’ abilities at least partially insulate themselves from the demands of 
civil society, party politics and donors, whilst retaining a close partnership with the business 
sector.  On both countries, these aspects of emulation also found expression in policy.
	
 These decisions bear the unmistakable stamp of East Asian emulation, but cannot be 
reduced to this.  Instead, they are part of a wider paradigm of modernisation, today brought 
once more to the fore by models such as China and Malaysia.  East Asia is not the only 
region in which authoritarian but developmentalist leaderships have achieved rapid 
industrialisation, and even there they have done this in numerous ways.  After all, both 
Kenya and Ethiopia have historical experiences of similar leaderships, although one has to 
return to the height of modernisation theory’s influence in these countries to find them. 
Today’s modernising elites may draw on East Asia in their efforts, but are in fact undergoing 
a larger paradigm shift towards views ultimately best expressed by Tom Mboya himself in 
1969:  'politically speaking', he wrote, 'it can be argued that we are in such a state of crisis 
that authoritarian rule is justified. It is said that opposition is a luxury we cannot afford, since 
it will divert us from the progress whose general direction is widely agreed within the 
nation' (Mboya 1970: 9).  
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PART IV:  CONCLUSION
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CHAPTER NINE:  CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
This dissertation has sought to understand the extent to which China serves as a model of 
development to elites in two emblematic but very different African countries.  My research 
took as its point of departure the ‘Chinese Model’ and ‘Beijing Consensus’ debates that in the 
first decade of the 21st century began to make their way from policy and media fora into the 
academic literature, but aimed at providing these with a more robust theoretical framework 
and more empirical data than had hitherto been applied.  Using a constructivist ontology and 
hermeneutic epistemology, I argued that the key questions encapsulated in this debate could 
be best understood by examining the ideational frameworks of those elites who contribute to 
the discourse and practice of development in my country cases.  The cases of Ethiopia and 
Kenya were chosen so to be both intrinsically significant but also representative enough of 
key post-colonial development trends on the continent as to allow for a certain level of 
cautious analytical generalisability.  This concluding chapter summarises the findings 
obtained from this research, before briefly analysing their broader theoretical and empirical 
implications.
9.1  Ethiopian and Kenyan Emulation:  What We Know Now
One of the earliest and most important findings to emerge from this study both detracted 
from and supported assertions that African elites were increasingly following a ‘Chinese 
Model’ of development.  Drawing on the literature and conceptual framework of lesson-
drawing and cross-societal emulation, I found that key groups of Ethiopian and Kenyan elites 
do indeed seek to emulate East Asia’s development experiences—in fact, no other model is 
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as influential.  However, these elites do not view China as an isolated or especially unique 
case.  In Ethiopia, a shared legacy of communism predisposes elites towards emulation of 
China, but this model is nested within a broader set of East Asian models that all accord a 
prominent role to classic ‘developmental states’ such as South Korea and Taiwan.  In an echo 
of earlier modernisers’ attempts to balance the perceived imperatives of globalisation with 
the need to maintain Ethiopia’s historical independence, the EPRDF has come to be 
committed to a certain level of economic liberalism.  It sees emulation of East Asian 
developmentalism, however, as a way to temper, slow and gain ownership over the demands 
of globalisation and the donor community.
In Kenya, elites also wish to emulate the East Asian region as a whole; here, 
however, a long-standing distrust of China and communism means that elites instead look to 
countries such as Singapore and Malaysia for comparable lessons.  Guiding Kenyan elites’ 
desire for emulation is a narrative that contrasts the meagre post-independence progress of 
their own country with the allegedly more substantial gains made by East Asian countries 
that gained independence from the UK at a similar point in their history.  
The dynamics governing elites’ choice of model sometimes overlap from country 
case to country case, and sometimes diverge.  India, a country whose potential as an 
alternative model I was initially interested in exploring, plays some role in determining legal 
and constitutional arrangements in Kenya and is even viewed there as a better source of 
lessons than is China.  However, India does not begin to rival East Asia as an overarching 
model in either country, and its ‘successes’ are viewed with much scepticism.  Another point 
of difference concerns the identities of emulating elites themselves:  in Ethiopia, emulation is 
led by the senior leadership of the ruling EPRDF; those with a more negative view of the 
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East Asian or Chinese models are also those whose influence is being increasingly 
marginalised and suppressed.  In Kenya, emulators also occupy important positions.  In this 
case, however, they comprise that coalition of business elites and technocrats tightly 
clustered around the government’s flagship Vision 2030 development plan (itself a key 
outcome of emulation).   
After determining whether any specific countries or regions serve as exemplars for 
Ethiopian and Kenyan elites, a second key aim of this study was to understand the content of 
these lessons, as well as their impact—if any—on development paradigms in these countries. 
Here, again, the country cases showed both a significant degree of similarity and some key 
differences, with eight lessons emerging as central to elite emulation of East Asia.  These 
were:
1. a conceptualisation of development as an endogenous, staged process whereby 
countries pass through a series of distinct developmental phases by mobilising their 
domestic resources and securing their own domestic policy spaces.
2. a desire to undergo deep-seated structural transformation that would free their 
country from a dependence on primary commodities and subsistence farming, and 
that would facilitate industrialisation by initially focusing on rural development.  In 
both countries, this lesson is challenged by extrinsic factors:  in the case of Kenya, by 
the existence of a services-heavy economy; and in the case of Ethiopia, by a 
contending urge within the party, backed by donors, to open the agricultural sector to 
intensive export-based foreign investment.
381
3. an emphasis on rapid, double-digit economic growth as the first condition of 
development, with wealth creation privileged over wealth distribution.
4. a belief that the vast majority of development challenges can be solved through the 
harnessing of science and technology.  This manifests itself most visibly in a 
privileging of technical and scientific subjects within the educational system and in 
the use of a technologically-intensive approach to agriculture.
5. an emphasis on physical infrastructure as one of the key factors underpinning 
development.  The mobilisation of natural resources in the service of creating large 
projects such as dams, bridges and roads is valued.  This is the only lesson that 
Kenyan elites associate specifically with China.
6. a belief that widespread ‘cultural modernisation’ is needed in order for countries to 
develop; this transformation is associated with the fostering of an increase in 
rationality, a stronger work ethic and a national identity.
7. an emphasis on the need for the state to play a larger role in the national economy 
than currently preferred by traditional donors (but a smaller role than that mandated 
by the dependency approach).  In Kenya, the role envisioned for the state is 
moderate, with a liberal but ‘defensive’ state partnering with a vibrant private sector. 
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Ethiopian leaders, however, envision a full-fledged ‘developmental state’ possessing 
a strict government-business hierarchy.
8. a belief that development, at least in its initial phases, is best led by forceful, 
technocratic leaders who are willing, at times, to judiciously suspend certain political 
freedoms in service of the material wellbeing of the majority.  In Ethiopia, EPRDF 
elites view democratisation as an ethos to be gradually instilled in citizens by 
economic growth and by the modernising efforts of a dominant, long-lived ruling 
party.  In Kenya, elites are more open about the need for modernising elites to act as 
‘benevolent dictators’ at times and thereby to achieve the ‘bureaucratic insulation’ 
necessary to drive development. 
Several of these lessons—and particularly the latter two—coincide with much of the 
literature on the East Asian Model and the ‘developmental state’ that has existed since the 
1980s and 1990s.  This illustrates the importance of contextualising the Chinese Model 
within a broader regional context and thereby avoiding the notion that its lessons are unique. 
However, my findings suggested a need for even the East Asian Model to be situated within 
the broader paradigms that have marked development discourses and practices in Africa.  As 
real-world examples that are abstracted for the purposes of emulation, models are 
inextricably linked to a specific time and place of origin.  The lessons referred to above, 
however, are sufficiently abstract and foundational as to alter those sets of beliefs that 
constitute elites’ developmental worldviews; as such, they alter paradigms.  The less than 
central role that other key aspects of the East Asian and Chinese experiences—the aggressive 
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promotion of a FDI-led export sector, for example—played in the discourses of interviewees 
strengthens this argument.  Elites’ adherence to the notion that East Asia’s development acts 
as a more easily-observable and achievable but essentially similar counterpart to earlier 
development of the West similarly suggests that the East Asian Model is, here, a tool serving 
a larger purpose than itself.   
	
 The most important indicator of this, however, is the resemblance that these lessons 
hold to the earliest of development paradigms that dominated post-colonial Africa.  Before 
they turned to revolutionary communism and the politics of ‘special interests’ respectively, 
Ethiopia and Kenya were both ruled by indigenous modernisers in the figures of Haile-
Selassie and Tom Mboya.  These highly influential individuals adhered to the modernisation 
theory of the day—a paradigm that sought to apply an idealised version of the Western 
developmental experience to ‘traditional’ societies around the world.  
	
 The lessons listed above resemble the doctrines of modernisation theorists such as 
Levy, Parsons and Rostow, and diverge substantially from the theories that supplanted these 
authors in subsequent decades.  The Augmented Washington Consensus that dominates 
global development discourses today and focuses on participatory, rights-based and 
decentralised development is a particularly far cry from the lessons that Ethiopian and 
Kenyan elites draw from East Asia.  The overlap is not perfect, and there do exist certain 
areas of divergence between current elites’ vision of East Asian development and 
modernisation theory.  The former’s emphasis on agricultural and rural development, for 
example, is not mirrored in the latter’s preoccupation with rapid industrialisation.  The vast 
majority of evidence, however, points to the return of a variety of development thinking 
deeply rooted in modernisation theory’s teleological and transformational worldview.
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This dissertation has not, thus far, sought to ascertain the ‘root causes’ of this recent 
trend.  To a large extent, this has been a function of the methodology and ontology used here: 
interviews and other elite discourses may uncover the reasons elites attach to their choices 
and actions, but find it more difficult to understand the unverbalised ‘reasons behind these 
reasons’, as it were.  As discussed in the chapter on methodology, hermeneutic approaches 
also expressly avoid constructing universal covering laws of cause and effect and prefer 
multicausality to the isolation of one or two key variables; conditional links, however, can 
still be established through narrative and imputation.  
In my case, the evidence suggests that elite emulation of East Asia is an important 
factor driving an empirically observable paradigm shift towards modernisation theory in 
Ethiopia and Kenya.  It has also shown that elites choose to emulate those countries they 
view as peers who have successfully overcome challenges similar to their own.  What is less 
immediately clear is why this trend should be particularly pronounced today, to the extent 
that elites in two very different African countries happen to choose similar models, and even 
more similar lessons.  Is it merely coincidence, for example, that decision-makers in Ethiopia 
and Kenya should both, in the past decade or so, have found an emphasis on technical 
education to be a hallmark of their peers’ successes?
In fully answering this question, I would speculate, an understanding of structural 
factors becomes a necessary addition to the agent-centred approach this dissertation has 
taken.  My research has harnessed a hermeneutic epistemology in order to understand the 
subjective frameworks used by elites in their decision-making; it has also demonstrated that 
African elites have more agency than recent development debates have generally accorded 
them.  However, constructivism accords co-constitutive roles to agency and structure, and 
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future research would do well to explore in greater detail the structural reasons for this 
emulation.  For my part, I would argue that Ethiopian and Kenyan elites are looking to their 
industrialising or newly-industrialised peers largely because these peers exist today in greater 
numbers and to greater affect than ever before.  East Asian industrialisation is not new, but 
the vast scale and regional spread of this transformation is unprecedented and this, to these 
emulators, magnifies the differences between that region and their own.  Malaysia and China, 
two of the most influential models in Kenya and Ethiopia respectively due to perceived 
similarities in historical legacy, both experienced vast upturns in their domestic fortunes and 
international standings only relatively recently.  
East Asia’s transformation has broken down the binary distinctions of the post-Cold 
War era that largely divided the world into developed and undeveloped countries.  It has 
allowed for an unprecedented level of direct engagement between Asian and African 
governments.  And, crucially, it has coincided with a financial crisis that has discredited 
those models perceived as ‘Western’ in much the same way that East Asia was discounted as 
a model in 1997.      
Emulation of East Asia was not completely non-existent in the 21st century, of course: 
as we have seen, the EPRDF’s ADLI has drawn on the Taiwanese and South Korean 
experiences since the early 1990s, and Kenyan policymakers began to speak of an ‘East 
Asian Model’ during the term’s resurgence at a similar time.  These precursors to today’s 
emulation serve, in fact, as a warning against viewing the Chinese Model in a historical or 
geographical vacuum.  Nonetheless, several international and domestic structural constraints 
have lessened since this emulation began—each of my country cases has, in its own way, 
seen a diminution of donor conditionalities.  Each has also, until the early 2000s, witnessed 
several decades of economic stagnation and political upheaval at a time when the countries 
they now hold as models were growing rapidly.  One senior Kenyan policymaker reported 
receiving an irate phone call from his political superiors in the early 1990s for publicly 
making an unfavourable comparison between Kenya and Malaysia (KG8)—now public and 
private admissions such as these constitute one of the main planks of technocratic discourse 
in the country.
	
 This brings us to a final and particularly contentious question:  why do both Ethiopian 
and Kenyan emulators draw from their models the lessons of modernisation theory rather 
than, say, the lessons that the World Bank exhorted them to draw in its East Asian Miracle 
report?  It is tempting to conclude that East Asia’s actual post-colonial development 
experience most closely ‘fits’ the arguments and assumptions of modernisation theory, and 
that African elites are to some extent responding to this fact.  I would not completely dispute 
this notion, particularly given the extent to which the contemporary literatures on the East 
Asian and Chinese Models have contrasted their subject matter with more recent 
development paradigms such as the Washington Consensus whilst failing to transform the 
model into a theoretically distinctive new global development paradigm.  It could even be 
that newly-independent countries do indeed respond best to strong, visionary leaderships 
who devote national resources to economic growth and industrialisation, and that priorities 
such as the distribution of wealth and the creation of pluralistic political systems follow only 
once these have been achieved.  
These considerations notwithstanding, we also know that emulation is inherently 
selective, premised as it is on the subjective mental frameworks of individual lesson-
drawers:  witness, for example, how much likelier Ethiopian elites were, in speaking of 
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China’s ‘gradual economic liberalisation’, to emphasise the first word of this phrase rather 
than the third.  Perhaps it is precisely the contrasts between East Asia and the still-reigning 
Augmented Washington Consensus that allow elites to explore the differences, rather than 
the similarities, between those approaches.  If an African government wishes to look beyond 
its borders to learn about democratic institution-building, for example, it can turn to any 
number of Western donors.  In exploring practical strategies of bureaucratic insulation, 
however, it would have to look beyond traditional donors.  In this way, then, Kenyan and 
Ethiopian policymakers may, in the face of similar global structural constraints, choose 
similar variants of modernisation theory as a solution.
9.2  Theoretical Implications 
My findings have implications for several strands of the literature.  Most significantly, for the 
purposes of the overall research question, they contribute to the contemporary debate on the 
nature and existence of the Chinese Model.  My review of this body of writing differentiated 
between advocates, opponents and sceptics of the notion that China’s development 
experiences constitute a model for emulation by others in the developing world.  My findings 
demonstrate that each of these three ‘schools’ understands certain aspects of China’s 
development model but misunderstands other aspects.  Advocates deserve credit for being 
among the first to suggest that China’s new influence on the development efforts of poor 
countries extends beyond the material realm; as my dissertation makes clear, certain African 
countries indeed wish to emulate China’s domestic trajectory.  Advocates also correctly 
identify several lessons that underpin this emulation, such as the sequencing of development 
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initiatives, the harnessing of science and technology and an increased role for the state in the 
economic sphere.  
	
 This group is mistaken, however, in viewing developing countries as a homogenous 
group that uniformly looks to China as a model.  In Kenya—and possibly in other countries 
without a history of close ties to the China—the country is viewed as potentially threatening. 
Instead, China’s smaller but more culturally familiar neighbours are preferred as an 
alternative source of lessons.  There is therefore a need for future research regarding the 
geographical, cultural, historical and political ‘faultlines’ along which emulation of China 
occurs.  
Neither are China’s lessons as unique as advocates suppose:  those in Ethiopia who 
do see the country as an exemplar situate it within a broader regional model, while Kenyan 
elites view this same regional model as offering similar—but safer—lessons to China.  As 
my analysis of modernisation theory has shown, even this East Asian regional model is not, 
itself, unique, particularly given the eclectic and abstract ways in which it is used by 
emulating elites.  In short, then, advocates of a Chinese Model have wrongly treated the 
phenomenon as isolated, unprecedented and near-universal when in fact China provides only 
one model contributing to a larger return of modernisation theory.   
	
   Opponents view the Chinese Model as pernicious primarily because they view it as 
inexorably tied to a decline of ‘Western’ values and other forms of Western influence in the 
developing world.  Some of these suspicions are borne out by my findings:  the overall result 
of China’s example is indeed to overturn many of the assumptions of both the Washington 
Consensus and its augmented, more participatory counterpart.  The effects of this emulation 
are not limited to the economic sphere but, as opponents point out, hold important 
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implications for governance and the recognition of human rights in countries where the 
model holds sway.  Often, this emulation does serve to weaken attraction to contemporary 
European and American paradigms of liberal democracy.  
Opponents are mistaken on three counts, however.  Firstly, they are as wrong as 
advocates of a Chinese Model in assuming that the ‘new’, Asian-inspired paradigm is 
uniquely or even primarily Chinese, and thereby conveniently forget the many similarities 
between the Chinese Model, the East Asian models that came before it and the model that the 
West was itself promoting immediately following decolonisation.  Their neglect of historical 
factors also leads them to underestimate the role that former colonial powers and other 
countries within the same 'social psychological' space continue to play both in determining 
elites’ choice of exemplar and in providing legal-institutional constraints to development. 
For all China’s ‘wooing’ of elites through study visits and the like, Commonwealth countries 
continue to inform Kenya’s legal system.  Countries like Malaysia and Singapore who are 
both in Asia and share a common colonial history with Kenya are most influential of all. 
Opponents and advocates are thus both mistaken in portraying the Chinese Model as a 
phenomenon sweeping indiscriminately across the African continent and the developing 
world.  Thirdly, it is overly simplistic to reduce China’s lessons to the twin threats of ‘state 
capitalism’ and authoritarianism, as Halper (2010) does.  This ignores the numerous other 
lessons—the importance of agricultural development and the need for cultural 
‘modernisation’, to name only two—that developing country elites draw from China.
The third and final group of observers, the sceptics, has argued that China’s 
experience is neither singular, comprehensible nor influential enough to warrant the label of 
‘model’.  Some of these authors have begun to disentangle the normative and empirical 
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threads of emulation and begun to differentiate between those models, discourses and 
paradigms that are influential and those that are actually transferable.  They have thereby 
come closest to exploring what is actually meant when others speak of a ‘development 
model’.  My findings have also validated their scepticism towards the notion that the 
popularity of China’s development model stems from radical departures from the 
development trajectories of other eras and countries.
Despite these important strengths, the criticism of sceptics often embodies one of the 
literature’s key flaws.  By focusing on the merits of the models they dismiss, they still 
undervalue the role of subjective perceptions in shaping lesson-drawing and emulation. 
Thus Kennedy (2010: 477) writes that ‘some countries are deeply interested in learning from 
China’s success’ while still dismissing the ‘Beijing Consensus’ (and with it the Chinese 
Model) as a ‘myth’.  As my conceptual and methodological discussions have shown, 
however, the development experience of China need not be unique, coherent or even fully 
transferable in order to constitute a model.  Interestingly, also, China’s current combination 
of economic liberalisation and political restriction need not remain in place indefinitely for 
the country to remain a model.  Barring a situation of Chinese economic or political 
catastrophe, African elites are more likely to judge China by its overall development 
trajectory than by the policies that happen to be in place at the time of emulation.  Political 
reform need not spell, as Yao (2010) contends, ‘the end of the Beijing Consensus'.  As elites’ 
desire to draw lessons of authoritarian growth from countries such as South Korea and 
Taiwan make clear, Chinese reform may actually strengthen modernisers’ beliefs that 
democratisation is best undertaken only after a lengthy period of economic and political 
maturation.  
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Collectively, these strands of the literature on the Chinese Model have all served to 
highlight an issue of growing importance in international development debates.  By 
recognising the global transferability of ideas on how to ‘do’ international development and 
the agency that local development actors play in implementing these ideas, they have also 
served to bring emulative dynamics to the forefront in a rare and important way.  Their 
shortcomings stem largely from their failure hitherto to contextualise this debate within 
historical theoretical paradigms and discussions and from a lack of empirical data.  This 
leads them, most importantly, to ignore the crucial role that other East Asian models and the 
theory of modernisation play in contextualising the very real—but hardly unprecedented or 
all-encompassing—Chinese Model.     
The findings of this dissertation extend beyond the immediate literature on the 
Chinese Model.  My research has taken neither a theory-testing nor a theory-building 
approach, preferring instead to offer interpretations that remain spatially and temporally 
contingent and therefore generalisable only by subjective observers.  Nevertheless, certain 
anomalies and points of interest emerged in the course of my research; these suggest future 
research agendas or potential adjustments to the existing bodies of theoretical work.  
Two broad theoretical frameworks were of interest in the current study.  The first 
concerned emulation and lesson-drawing, namely the voluntary transfer of development 
policies and programmes from one geographical setting to another.  The second, 
modernisation theory, had long fallen from favour in academic circles, to be replaced by 
successive paradigms such as dependency theory and the Washington Consensus.  The single 
most important contribution that my own study brings to these theories is the recognition that 
each still matters.  Both are large bodies of literature that nonetheless occupy marginal 
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positions in contemporary international relations and development studies.  Yet my findings 
show both to have immense relevance in determining Ethiopian and Kenyan development 
paradigms—emulation in partially determining the mechanisms by which elites formulate 
these paradigms, and modernisation theory in describing their content.
It should not come as a surprise that emulation of China and its neighbours is at least 
partially responsible for bringing modernisation theory back to Africa.  The most prominent 
contemporary historian of modernisation theory sees much in common with China’s current 
approach to development and the earlier American projects he chronicles; 'the contemporary 
Chinese Communist regime is the last of the classic authoritarian high modernist regimes', he 
writes, citing inter alia the monumentalism of the Three Gorges Dam (Gilman 2003: 311). 
To be clear, I am not arguing that the assumptions of modernisation theory have been 
validated, nor that they exactly describe the Chinese or East Asian development experiences. 
I am also not arguing that Kenyan and Ethiopian leaders wish to precisely imitate either the 
policies of their earlier modernisers or of authors such as Parsons and Rostow; as the 
emphasis on agricultural development demonstrates, significant re-imaginings of this theory 
may still occur as elites reconceptualise modernisation and their role within it.  
My argument, rather, is both that those lessons that Ethiopian and Kenyan elites 
draw from China, Malaysia, South Korea, Singapore and others are a far closer fit with 
modernisation theory than with those development paradigms that followed it, and that these 
lessons lack the coherence and breadth to constitute an entirely new paradigm.  It is this 
finding that leads me to argue that modernisation theory—or at least a close variation on it—
is gaining new adherents in Africa.  Moreover, it is this finding that demonstrates the 
importance of a continued engagement with the ideas, assumptions and practical impact of 
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this theory—not, as some have lately begun to do, as primarily a matter for the historical 
record, but as a current, lived development project.  
Thomas’ (2011: 6) argument that ‘the enduring purchase of the modern and 
traditional as explanatory concepts in Africa…makes the study of modernity an analytical 
imperative’ applies equally, I contend, to that specific expression of modernity contained in 
modernisation theory.  She rightly holds both that African elites have long used visions and 
discourses of modernity in order to imagine alternative, ‘better’ modes of societal 
organisation, and that this tendency was particularly pronounced among post-independence 
leaders such as Sengor and Kenyatta (Thomas 2011: 8).  The role of the East Asian example 
in informing and updating such visions in Africa illustrates a need to return to the study of 
modernity and modernisation on the continent.
This dissertation has shown the important role that emulation and lesson-drawing 
play in disseminating models and paradigms of development, where so much contemporary 
scholarship has constructed a dichotomy pitting only unwelcome and intrusive foreign 
influences against indigenous and voluntary practices.  In the cases taken into consideration 
here, emulation is an underlying force behind many policy decisions.  This suggests the need 
for future research into evolving development paradigms and policies to give greater 
attention to emulative dynamics, and encourages a research agenda that grants greater 
deliberative and discursive agency to developing country decision-makers.
Specific aspects of lesson-drawing theory were also illuminated by my research. 
Theorists have posited that lesson-drawing is most likely to occur when policy-makers 
perceive themselves or their predecessors as having failed in some fundamental way.  This 
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proved true where both Ethiopia's 'defensive modernisation'—designed to temper external 
imposition through imitation—and Kenya's 'fall from grace' narrative were concerned.
One of the key debates in this literature concerns the determinants of emulators’ 
choice of model; even assuming, as I and others do, that these choices are cognitively bound 
in some way, this still leaves numerous possibilities.  Are they bound by a model’s prestige, 
its familiarity or its geographical, cultural or historical proximity?  Both Kenyan elites’ 
suspicion towards a Chinese Model and Ethiopian elites’ eagerness to situate this model 
within a broader and less celebrated regional model demonstrated prestige to be a relatively 
unimportant factor.  The East Asian Model is a relatively outmoded concept, and yet these 
elites find more utility in it than they do in the concept of a solely Chinese Model.  This 
suggests that emulators do not merely jump on the most recent ‘bandwagon’ or the latest 
model at hand, and that they are more patient and systematic in their selection than might be 
expected.  Cultural and geographical proximity were also relatively unimportant, with most 
African countries seen as sources of negative lessons and the most popular model on the 
continent—South Africa—heavily subordinated to East Asian countries.  
A model’s availability and ease of use, on the other hand, played a mixed role in 
conditioning elites’ choices.  As my data demonstrated, the study visits and high-level 
exchanges that China now so regularly engage African elites in seems, in this case, to 
facilitate a greater desire to draw lessons from the country.  Similarly, language issues 
hampers Kenya’s lesson-drawing from China while assisting emulation of Anglophone 
Singapore.  Western donors even played some role in facilitating initial lesson-drawing 
between Kenya and East Asia, although the content of these lessons was not always under 
their control.  At the same time, familiarity could also hamper lesson-drawing, as Kenyan 
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elites' frequently-negative attitudes towards Kenyans of Indian origin and often-critical 
testimonies of visiting India illustrated.  
What emerged as the central consideration bounding elites’ choice of country, 
however, was the perceived historical and social-psychological similarity between their own 
country and potential exemplars.  A determination to learn from countries with a similar 
colonial heritage (in Kenya) or economic and political legacy (in Ethiopia) was clearly 
visible, and elites from both countries drew primarily from those they viewed as having 
inhabited a roughly similar ‘stage’ of development in the recent past.  This precluded 
countries who had only recently begun to show promise, as well as those who had developed 
in the distant past.  
Interestingly although historical background played a large role in determining elites’ 
choice of model, it played a less important part in determining the actual lessons elites drew 
from these models.  Thus Kenya could emulate Malaysia and Ethiopia draw lessons from 
China, but these lessons often overlapped and converged.  Elites from both country cases 
appear to admire the region's modernisation as a whole; these emulators then chose specific 
countries in the region from which to draw policy programmes that would contribute to 
making the development vision contained in this new paradigm a reality.
9.3  Empirical Implications 
This dissertation has focused on the influence of East Asian models on the development 
paradigms of Ethiopian and Kenyan leaders, and has only discussed the practical policy 
outcomes of these paradigm shifts where a clear link between the two could be traced.  For 
this reason, it is more difficult to understand definitively the extent to which the lessons that 
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emulators take from East Asia are being implemented ‘on the ground’ – and particularly the 
extent to which they will be implemented in future.  This holds true particularly in regard to 
abstract lessons such as the promotion of cultural modernisation, but applies even to more 
concrete aspects of emulation where other factors may step in to help or hinder the practical 
development of policy. 
	
 This is particularly the case in Kenya, where the transformation of any policy from 
theory to reality remains an enormous problem.  On the one hand, the existence and content 
of Vision 2030 demonstrates that lesson-drawing from East Asia has already migrated from 
the minds of elites to become written policy.  Other concrete lessons—the massive increase 
in funding available for the construction of roads or the investment in agro-processing that is 
to move Kenya up the global commodity chain, for example—are also in evidence.  The 
diversification of external sources of funding and the entry of new ‘development partners’ 
into Kenya have diminished the impact of the conditionalities that so influenced policy in the 
1980s and 1990s and thereby removed a further constraint on emulation of East Asia.
	
 At the same time, indications abound that lesson-drawing from East Asia will suffer 
the same problems of corruption and government inefficiency that bedevil other aspects of 
national development.  In Kenya, those elites with the desire and necessary knowledge to 
draw lessons from East Asia are still a minority, albeit one with inordinate influence over 
macro-economic planning.  Other branches of government evince far greater ambivalence 
towards East Asian models, as does Kenya’s energetic civil society.  
	
 Even those involved in lesson-drawing voiced criticism towards Kenya’s current 
approach to this activity.  Business leaders accused the government of overloading 
delegations to countries such as Malaysia and Singapore with official figureheads (KN20) 
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and of failing to lend continuity and focus to the process by neglecting to send those 
policymakers and nongovernmental actors who would later be involved in the 
implementation of any ‘lessons learned’ (KN8).  One business elite, for example, reported 
being told by Malaysian bureaucrats that ‘we're tired of getting so many delegations from 
Africa.  Everyone wants to look at our model and check it out, but nobody goes back and 
does anything.  They go back to NATO – No Action, Talk Only’ (KN10).  The anecdote that 
perhaps illustrates the potential pitfalls of study trips most starkly was recounted by a senior 
policymaker:
I remember being taken to the Proton car factory, and looking at that, the Malaysians thinking 
we shall start buying cars from them, and we thinking we would like to produce the same 
cars that they are making.  So they want to sell us cars, we want to produce the car…The 
intentions were never the same (KG3).
The need for a bureaucracy that is relatively insulated from and powerful in comparison with 
elected politicians and the judiciary was one of the key lessons that Kenyan emulators drew 
from the East Asian experience; the current lack thereof is, conversely, likely to hamper the 
implementation of other lessons from the region.  A very senior Kenyan bureaucrat who 
wished to emulate South Korea felt unable to implement his vision due to his lack of access 
to political power:  ‘People like us who are practical thinkers never get elected.  I cannot be 
elected President of this country’ (KG9).  Of course, those who view a less pluralistic and 
transparent political process as too high a price to pay for the attainment of East Asia’s 
economic successes will not bemoan the current situation.  In the practical political arena, 
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Kenya’s emulating technocrats currently provide at most a counterbalance both to those non-
ideological politicians competing to divert natural resources to their ethnic groups and to 
those in the judiciary grappling with an ever-widening scope of citizen rights enacted within 
a primarily British-influenced legal system.  The paradigms held by followers of East Asia 
are important both for their influence on written government policy, their more limited 
impact on its implementation and the ways in which they inform broader African and global 
development discourses.  One should, however, be realistic about the limits of their power. 
As one journalist wryly put it, ‘the reason we don't prosper in Kenya is not through a lack of 
brilliant plans’ (KN2).
The tangible evidence of Ethiopian emulation is already far more extensive, as is the 
probability that Ethiopian lesson-drawers will continue to apply policies and practices 
inspired by East Asia to virtually every arena of national development.  Unlike in Kenya, 
admirers of East Asian models have a virtual monopoly on political power and domestic 
development discourse; critical discourses do exist, but are being increasingly marginalised. 
While it is still difficult to empirically trace the roots of many existing Ethiopian policies to 
emulation, it is less difficult to conclude that many of the lessons cited by policymakers do 
indeed make their way into practice.  
The EPRDF’s ability to bring its vision of East Asian-inspired modernisation to bear 
on Ethiopia does not necessarily correspond to its ability or intention to bring lasting and 
equitable development to the country, however.  Just as the EPRDF’s power allows for the 
almost unilateral application of its policies, it also permits the greater abuse of this power. 
Here is not an insulated bureaucracy in the South Korean or Taiwanese style, but rather an 
erasure of the distinction between politics and the machinery of government in the Chinese 
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mould.  But whereas China freely admits that it is not a representative democracy and is 
therefore able to afford legislation explicitly restricting civil and political liberties, Ethiopia 
claims to be fully democratic and now possesses much of the legislation demanded by such a 
status.  Ethiopia must rely largely on patronage and intimidation to achieve Chinese ‘results’; 
China, on the other hand, is able to make use of a limited but real rule of law.  Ethiopia is 
poised to enact the relatively self-restrained and ‘benign dictatorship’ associated with 
Chinese and other East Asian development models, but is equally poised to bring about the 
kind of unbridled authoritarianism more frequently witnessed on the African continent.  As 
Harrison (1988: 25) points out, ‘“strong, centralized government”  is a term that can cover a 
multitude of sins’.
That being said, it would be mistaken to assume that the latter situation will 
undoubtedly occur.  This dissertation has refrained from taking a position on the desirability 
or likelihood of success of Ethiopian and Kenyan emulation of East Asia.  I will cautiously 
break with this principle here to say only this: we know that modernising developmentalist 
states have existed throughout history, and we also know that these states have not always 
been democratic.  To deny the possibility that an authoritarian developmental state can exist 
in contemporary Africa is therefore to do the continent a disservice, regardless of one’s views 
on the value of economic development without democracy.  At the same time, those who 
believe that African countries can attain only the economic successes of East Asia and bypass 
the political constraints and social upheaval—to emulate ‘the results, not so much to copy 
the political shell’ (KG4)—are also mistaken.  There is no reason, in the abstract, to doubt 
the ability of African countries to emulate China, Singapore, or even Bismarck’s Germany; 
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this emulation, however, will inevitably entail the inclusion of many of those elements of 
modernisation that made the theory so unpopular in the 1950s.
The practical implications of these findings have a potential reach beyond the 
domestic situations of individual African countries.  Ethiopia and Kenya were chosen as case 
studies partially due to their prominence and their longstanding status as ‘testing grounds’ of 
development theories.  This alone implies that a move towards East Asian-driven 
modernisation in these countries is likely to influence broader African and global 
development paradigms.  The fact that elites in these two very different countries—each 
hitherto exemplifying one of the major development ideologies of the Cold War era in Africa
—are both now looking to the same region for exemplars also indicates that similar 
dynamics are, in all probability, occurring in other settings on the continent.  The prominent 
role of what the Chinese government calls ‘mutual learning’ in the triennial FOCAC 
conference—currently the major venue for bilateral cooperation between these two blocs—is 
one formal indication of this dynamic.  Virtually every key speech or document to emerge 
from the forum remarks on this aspect of China-Africa collaboration (e.g. Zhai 2012), which 
is also underpinned by an increasingly vast network of formal ‘lesson-sharing’ mechanisms. 
	
 Evidence also abounds that the content of such lesson-drawing is not confined to my 
country cases but instead can be found across the continent.  To name just one example of 
many, a 2007 report by the African Union’s High Level African Panel on Modern 
Biotechnology and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) placed a 
virtually-unprecedented emphasis on the application of science and technology in African 
agriculture and economic transformation (Juma 2011; Juma and Serageldin 2007).
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Just as emulative dynamics compete with other influences on domestic policy in 
Ethiopia and Kenya, so too this input into African and global development discourses and 
paradigms is likely to be tempered by a range of factors:  the demands of Western and non-
Western development partners, natural resource constraints and the future of the global 
financial system will all have an impact that may be at odds with resurgent ideas on rapid 
modernisation and East Asian-inspired growth.  As the EPRDF’s strenuous discursive 
emphasis on democracy and human rights makes clear, the West still maintains a strong 
stamp on discourses and legal-institutional frameworks in Africa, even when actual practice 
at times diverges radically.  As has been pointed out in previous chapters, the growing role of 
alternative development and trading partners ‘on the ground’ in Africa may even, at times, 
act contrary to emulative dynamics if, for example, an influx of Chinese textiles into South 
African markets is as damaging to local manufacturing and thereby detrimental to local 
industrialisation as commonly supposed (Lyman 2005; Le Roux 2006).  
 	
 Nevertheless, indications abound that Western donors are reacting to shifts in the 
development paradigms of African leaders.  For the first time in decades, governmental and 
non-governmental development donors in the West are training their attention on the 
dimensions of development that were neglected in previous decades.  One of the six 
‘structural reform priorities’ that the UK’s DFID aimed to implement before 2015 was to 
‘make British international development policy more focussed on boosting economic growth 
and wealth creation’ (DFID 2010: 2).  Several of the nine ‘key pillars’ articulated in the 2009 
Seoul Development Consensus also reflect these shifts; in what constituted the first ever 
formal inclusion of development challenges in the G20’s biannual policy agenda, nations 
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pledged greater attention to inter alia physical infrastructure, domestic resource mobilisation, 
economic growth and food security (G20 2010).  
There is also a greater global emphasis on South-South learning.  The World Bank-
funded ‘Scaling Up Poverty Reduction’ conference—which is mentioned at the very 
beginning of this dissertation and focuses specifically on facilitating the transfer of lessons 
between developing countries—is only one example; the conference was launched in 
Shanghai and has exhibited a considerable focus on China especially as a source of lessons 
for others in the developing world (World Bank 2006; Wang 2005).  Publications by the G20 
echo this trend:  ‘While North-South knowledge sharing has been the norm, the growth of 
South-South sharing of knowledge has exponentially grown, or come to the surface, 
particularly over the past several years’, holds one report, tracing the source of this trend to 
‘the growing interest among many middle-income and some low-income countries to share 
their accumulated development experiences’ (G20 Development Working Group 2011: 5). 
Knowledge-sharing, incidentally, is also one of the nine Seoul Development Consensus 
pillars (G20 2010: 3).  
Based on my research, the strongest sources of this discourse remain, however, in 
Africa.  It is here where the rapid and fairly recent rise of an entire region of modernising 
states has had the greatest impact on the thinking of local decision-makers.  When the 
Nigerian Chef de Cabinet of the African-Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States calls 
Lee Kuan Yew ‘an African folk hero’ and urges lesson-drawing from countries in East Asia 
who ‘understand our shared experience of humiliation’ (Mailafia 2012), it demonstrates that 
emulation has stretched beyond the importation of discrete lessons and has, instead, begun to 
impact the very ways in which elites conceptualise the possibilities, limitations and goals of 
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development.  And when the South African Minister for Trade and Industry holds that ‘for 
the first time, there are centers of power that understand our development challenges’ (quoted 
in Beri 2007: 306), this reflects a widespread belief that the gulf between developing and 
developed countries has until recently been too wide to make emulation a possibility.  By 
appearing to step into and bridge this gulf, East Asia has brought both emulation and hitherto 
historically-defunct development doctrines firmly into the African and global development 
agendas.  It has, indeed, encouraged Africa’s new modernisers to seek out ‘roadmaps’ that 
differ substantially from those used in recent decades—even if these maps cannot be said to 
be entirely new and if their accuracy remains, once more, an open question.
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APPENDIX A:  SELECTED ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ACP	
 	
 	
 African, Caribbean and Pacific (Group of States)
ADLI	
 	
 	
 agricultural development-led industrialisation 
ATVET	
 	
 Agricultural Technical and Vocational Education Training
BPO	
 	
 	
 Business Process Outsourcing 
CAQDAS 	
 	
 computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software
CCP	
 	
 	
 Chinese Communist Party 
CoE	
 	
 	
 Committee of Experts
CUD	
 	
 	
 Coalition for Unity and Democracy
DFID	
 	
 	
 British Department for International Development 
EFFORT	
 	
 Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigrai
EPRDF	
 	
 Ethiopian People’s Democratic Revolutionary Front
ERS	
 	
 	
 Economic Recovery Strategy 
FDI	
 	
 	
 foreign direct investment
FOCAC 	
 	
 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
GDP	
 	
 	
 gross domestic product
GTP	
 	
 	
 Growth and Transformation Plan
HDI	
 	
 	
 Human Development Index 
IDS	
 	
 	
 Institute for Development Studies 
IMF	
 	
 	
 International Monetary Fund 
IR	
 	
 	
 international relations
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IT	
 	
 	
 information technology
KANU	
	
 	
 Kenya African National Union 
KAU	
 	
 	
 Kenya African Union
NARC 	
 	
 National Rainbow Coalition
NEPAD	
 	
 New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NESC	
 	
 	
 National Economic and Social Council 
ODM	
 	
 	
 Orange Democratic Movement 
OECD	
	
 	
 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PASDEP	
 	
 Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty 
PNU	
 	
 	
 Party of National Unity
PPP	
 	
 	
 public-private partnership 
PRC	
 	
 	
 People’s Republic of China
PRSP 	
 	
 	
 Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
SEZ 	
 	
 	
 special economic zone 
TPLF 	
 	
 	
 Tigrayan People's Liberation Front
TVA	
 	
 	
 Tennessee Valley Authority 
TVET 	
	
 	
 Technical and Vocational Education and Training 
UEDF 	
	
 	
 United Ethiopian Democratic Forces 
UNDP	
	
 	
 United Nations Development Programme
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APPENDIX B:  INTERVIEW SCRIPT54
A.  General questions about development:
 What does the term modernisation mean to you?  What is its relationship to the term 
development?  Does it have a positive or negative connotation for you? 
 Can you have development without rapid economic growth?  Can you have 
development without industrialisation?
 Are there any obstacles towards development in your country?  If so, what are they?
 What group of people or institution do you think is the most important driver of 
development?  Do you agree with the current role the government is taking?
 Is there a relationship between economic growth and development?  If so, what is it?  
Do you feel it is best to work on both at the same time, or to focus only on one for the 
time being?
 Have your views on development changed in the past five years?  If so, how have 
they changed and what has been the reason?
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54 As befits a semi-structured interview, not every question was posed to every interviewee.  Questions that 
were deemed important enough to put to each respondent are underlined.  Often, omitted questions were 
replaced by questions specific to the interviewee's institution and its policies.  The order of questions also 
varied considerably, although I took care to always pose the key question 'do you think your country should 
emulate any other country or region and, if so, which one?' before asking interviewees’  opinions on a specific 
model.  
B.  General questions about emulation
 Do you think it is generally a good idea for countries to use others as models?
 Are there any countries or regions that you feel decision-makers in your own country 
should take as a model?  
 (If a country or region is mentioned):  What is the main reason for you to choose that 
specific country/region?  What do you think is the most important lesson that this 
country/region can teach your own? Have you seen this reflected in policy?  
  (If a region):  Are there any particular countries in this region that you prefer your 
country to learn from, or do you wish to learn from the region as a whole?
 (If a non-governmental respondent):  Do you think your government is taking any 
country or region as a model?  Why do you say this?  Do you agree with their 
decision in this regard?  
C:  Questions about China
 Do you regard China as an example of successful development? Why/why not? 
 (If yes):  How did China achieve this? 
 (If respondent views China as a success):  Are there any policies or development 
strategies implemented by China that you feel your own country should adopt?  Has 
it already adopted or been inspired by any of them?
 Where do you receive most of your information on China? 
 Do you think China’s current relations with your country are mainly beneficial to 
your country?
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D:  Questions about India 
 Do you regard India as an example of successful development? Why/why not? 
 (If yes):  How did India achieve this? 
 (If respondent views India as a success):  Are there any policies or development 
strategies implemented by India that you feel your own country should adopt?  Has it 
already adopted or been inspired by any of them?
 Where do you receive most of your information on India? 
 (In Kenya only):  Do you think the presence of an ethnic minority of Indian origin in 
Kenya affects lesson-drawing in any way?  Why/why not?
E:  A closing question for comparative purposes
To what extent should the following countries be models for your own country:
a)  Botswana  b) Brazil c) Singapore d) the United States e) South Africa f) Sweden g) South 
Korea
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APPENDIX C:  LIST OF INTERVIEWEES
In order to facilitate citation, interviews are cited in the text according to the following code: 
‘E’ signifies an interview undertaken in Ethiopia, and ‘K’ signifies an interview undertaken 
in Kenya; ‘G’ signifies a interviewee from the governmental sector, ‘N’ signifies an 
interviewee formally (if not necessarily in practice) from outside the government, and ‘A’ 
signifies an interviewee from an embassy.  Interviewees are further randomly ordered within 
their sub-sector.  Interviewees EG1 to EG10, for example, are all Ethiopian members of 
parliament, ordered at random.  In cases where subjects' positions have changed since being 
interviewed, the position held at the time of interviews is listed, as well as the current 
position (where relevant and permissible).  Interviewees' exact name and title are not 
necessarily obscured in the text of the dissertation where permission was given to cite them 
as such.
Ethiopia
EG1:	
 Chair of Standing Committee on Trade and Industry, Ethiopian House of 
People's Representatives (EPRDF).  Addis Ababa, 13/07/2010.  
EG2:	
 Deputy Whip with the rank of State Minister, Ethiopian House of People’s 
Representatives (EPRDF).  Addis Ababa, 17/08/2010.
EG3:	
 Chair of Standing Committee on Rural Development Affairs, Ethiopian House 
of People's Representatives (EPRDF).   Addis Ababa, 13/07/2010.
EG4:	
 Chair of Standing Committee on Infrastructure, Ethiopian House of People's 
Representatives (EPRDF).  Addis Ababa, 01/07/2010. 
EG5:	
 Deputy Chair of Standing Committee on Information and Cultural Affairs, 
Ethiopian House of People's Representatives (EPRDF). Addis Ababa,
23/07/2010.
453
EG6:	
 Chair of Standing Committee on Women's Affairs, Ethiopian House of 
People's Representatives (EPRDF).  Addis Ababa, 08/07/2010. 
EG7:	
 Senior parliamentarian (EPRDF), Ethiopian House of People's 
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